The West-Russia talks come to a ‘‘dead-end’’, and the war is more likely than ever - what can be done to save Ukraine.
The West-Russia talks come to a ‘‘dead-end’’, and the war is more likely than ever - what can be done to save Ukraine.
The past week we saw the West demonstrating admirable resolve, and not blinking in the face of Russian threats.
The Kremlin’s outrageous demands for recognition of its de facto sphere of influence, and for explicit promises to rule out Ukraine’s membership of NATO were thrown out.
This wasn’t so unpredictable - Russian demands were indeed ridiculous.
(side note: and here is an important reminder to all those Western media ‘‘elites’’ attacking the US and NATO for not showing flexibility vis-à-vis Russia, and gambling with the lives of ordinary Ukrainians - the very same Ukrainians that you seem to care so much about, are the ones showing the most resolve, pride, and refusal to placate Moscow. If (instead of signing up to fight for their independence) Ukrainian citizens wanted to appease Putin, none of these talks would take place - the Ukrainian government would accept Putin’s terms under the pressure of its own people)
The disturbing part however, was how Russia responded with an extreme rhetorical escalation - instead of trying to secure at least some (more realistic) concessions in the following weeks, Moscow declared talks hitting a ‘‘dead end”.
Moscow’s decision to suddenly amp up the pressure after only a week of talks (side note: contrast this with America’s endless patience and appeasement of Iranian regime in Vienna) got everyone anxious about the possibility of an imminent war.
It is one thing for the media to do its thing and engage in the hype, but even some US diplomats started to sound like op-ed columnists.
Here is for example, the US ambassador to the OSCE (Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe) Michael Carpenter, sharing his concerns:
‘‘We're facing a crisis in European security. The drumbeat of war is sounding loud, and the rhetoric has gotten rather shrill’’.
Even if his statements are accurate reflections of reality on the ground (and they are), a US diplomat represents a global superpower, and should therefore never sound like a passive and helpless observer of events that he cannot shape.
In reality, there is a lot that the US could and should do (more on the later below), and the US ambassadors must maintain that certainty and self-confidence whenever they make public remarks.
But returning to the pressing issue of the day, and to get a better grasp of the overall picture, one must explore the following three questions in turn:
1) Is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, at this point only a matter of time? 2) How did we get here 3) What do we do from hereon?
1. Is Russian invasion now an inevitability?
At this point, it is important to differentiate the likelihood of a full-scale invasion from a more limited military response.
The latter is still far more likely than the former.
The element of surprise is gone, and Putin knows that Biden will be arming a Ukrainian insurgency in new occupied lands - a new territorial conquest might not therefore pass the cost/benefit analysis with flying colors.
Moreover, even if Putin succeeds in occupying more territory in the East of Ukraine, the rest of the country will be strongly united against a new invasion.
It is also highly likely that Ukraine will receive advanced offensive weaponry from both the US and NATO, and the dreaded de facto border with NATO will move closer towards Russia - defeating Putin’s political objectives.
On the other hand, Putin may decide that the occupation of lands to the north of Crimea (securing strategic locations and therefore crucial water supplies by taking over the control of a 400-kilometer-long North Crimean Canal (NCC) - which, prior to the occupation of Crimea in 2014, provided 85% of the drinkable water in the peninsula, and was later shut off by the Kyiv government as a reaction to the invasion) and control of the Western shores of the Azov sea (especially the highly strategic port city of Mariupol) might both be worthy strategic goals.
But Putin may also pursue a more limited (in duration and/or scope) campaign: an overwhelming blitz to inflict maximum damage to the Ukrainian military - strategic command & control systems, air defense systems, navy bases, entire air force etc.
The idea here would not be to pursue a full-on invasion - but instead, to cause maximum damage in the shortest amount of time.
Under this scenario, the Kremlin would be pursuing a compellence strategy: establishing a clear and overwhelming military superiority, and forcing the government in Kyiv to appease the Kremlin and accept its geopolitical demands.
(side note: And Putin may also estimate that successfully accomplishing a compellence strategy is more likely to take place now than in the future - when the Ukrainian military is even stronger and more modernized)
Indeed, frequent statements from the Kremlin leadership promising a ‘‘military-technical response’’ (as opposed to a threat of invasion) provides Russia with room to maneuver, and chose to pursue a more limited military option (without losing face).
Statements warning that Russia “will eliminate unacceptable threats to our national security if diplomacy fails’’ enable the Kremlin to engage in a limited “military-technical response” and claim victory after those threats are eliminated.
In other words, Putin has been careful to not set the conditions for a military victory impossibly high.
On the other hand however, certain important indicators suggest that the risk of a military response (no matter how limited or restrained) from Russia has reached its peak.
The following three indicators of impending attack are particularly worrying:
1. This ominous statement from the Russian Minister Lavrov:
‘‘We will not wait forever …Our patience has run out…Everyone understands that the situation is not improving.”
Russian leadership is careful about its reputation for following through with threats - if the patience has indeed “run out” (as opposed to running out), then the Kremlin is now likely to engage in at least some form of military response (unless of course, there is a last-minute acceptable/save facing concession to appease Moscow).
This is not an Obama admin that can easily appease violators of its ‘‘red lines’’ - the Kremlin is highly sensitive to its threat display credibility.
2. Covert acts, sabotage, and subversion
As it engaged in inflammatory rhetoric and issued ominous warnings, Russia simultaneously turned to its tried and tested playbook:
a. Ukraine was hit by a massive cyber attack. Its state institutions (70 in total) were paralyzed by Russian hackers .
The move had three objectives: 1) test the resilience and preparedness of the Ukrainian defense forces - essentially, Putin was interviewing the victim, 2) Signal that Russia means business - attempt to compel Ukraine and the West to take its latest threats seriously, and offer concessions, 3) Damage the morale of Ukrainians - increase the feelings of helplessness, and encourage beliefs in the futility of resistance
b. The US received (and publicized via the White House spokesperson) intel that Russia was planning a ‘‘false-flag” operation: “The operatives are trained in urban warfare and in using explosives to carry out acts of sabotage against Russia’s proxy forces”.
This is by far the most worrying signal - but also, one that was preempted and forewarned by the US.
Will Putin proceed with this brazen plan even after the US revelations? If so, that would mark a new level of savagery in the Kremlin leadership - where even the pretenses are now dispensed with.
Russia could naturally always concoct another scenario.
But the basic point remains: Putin would not trap himself into an escalation if he wasn’t sure about military options.
Why on earth would he put himself into an impossible position of backing off from a warranted counter-attack (even if the original ‘‘transgression’’ was all made up), and lose all his credibility?
Of course, the seriousness and implications of this alleged plot also serve to boost the credibility of his threats and convince the Ukrainian government (and the West) into offering last-minute concessions.
So then, even if this is purely speculative, it is not entirely inconceivable that Russia planned a deliberately sloppy ‘‘false-flag’’ op with an ultimate intent of getting caught in the act, and their threats suddenly becoming all too real and convincing.
3. Additional movement of troops
Russia started moving hardware from its far east territories and towards the Ukrainian border.
This was all done under the guise of testing the Eastern Military District’s (EMD) preparedness to deploy over the long distance.
Crucially, moving in the hardware prior to the full (accompanying) personnel allows Russia to keep the tensions higher for longer - since it is far more expensive to mobilize (and maintain) personnel than the hardware.
This could either signal that:
a) invasion is not imminent.
or (once again);
b) could be part of Russia’s deception & disorientation playbook.
How did we get here?
Before we proceed with what to do next, it is important to look at actions taken to date, and see what went wrong? Why was Putin insufficiently deterred to escalate this far?
There are three broad reasons for the failure to deter Putin so far:
1) The Kremlin’s confidence in weathering the sanctions;
2) Lack of will and enthusiasm shown by the European allies, and;
3) Lack of military support to Ukraine - insufficient military aid to alter Putin’s calculus of costs/benefit of a military operation
1) Sanctions won’t hurt us
Biden repeatedly promised to impose grave economic consequences on Putin - a range of proposed actions were discussed.
But even threats of significant economic sanctions: such as removal from SWIFT, sanctions on Putin’s inner circle, and blocking the trade of Russian government bonds (even in secondary markets) all (on their own) seem insufficient to dissuade Moscow from moving forward.
But Putin may have priced all of those in, and still determined that he could weather the storm.
Indeed, a closer look at Russia’s macroeconomic conditions over the past couple of years paints a picture of preparation for an ultimate showdown:
a) The Russian central bank’s war chest has gone up by 70% since 2015, and as of today, there are $612bn foreign currency reserves.
b) $191bn in the National Wealth Fund - that’s almost 2x since 2019.
c) Low external and overall debt level - at 18% of the GDP.
d) Russia now has an alternative (to soften the blow - even if not replacing adequately) to SWIFT - System For Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS).
e) Russian private sector is also better prepared for sanctions - total foreign corporate debt was down 2x since 2014 - $80bn from the high of $150bn.
Putin may additionally calculate that his strong leverage over the EU (which imports 40% of its gas from Russia - and is not too excited about the possibility of those taps turning off in the winter) will empower him to divide & conquer the West, make side deals with the EU, and therefore reduce the universal application (and thus the biting power) of sanctions.
Which leads us to the second point:
2) Europeans dropped the ball
Macron’s over the top promise to defend Ukraine never turned into France taking serious measures to fund and support the Ukrainian military - or even provide significant non-military aid.
Germany not only (still) refuses to provide military aid to Kyiv, but is also now indicating that it may not enforce Nord Stream 2 sanctions even if Putin invades:
‘‘We should not drag (Nord Stream 2) into this conflict" said the German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht.
So to recap: a major NATO ally, and the biggest economy of the EU, refuses to provide any meaningful support for Ukraine (beyond mere public statements).
From Putin’s perspective, why should he worry too much that the EU will follow through with tough sanctions?
He has little reason to believe that the EU will fully align with the US- sticking to the same level of intensity when imposing sanctions on Russia.
3) Biden admin didn’t supply Ukraine with enough defensive firepower to dissuade an invasion.
Back in December, these cables argued that on their own, economic sanctions will not be sufficient in preventing an attack - that they need to be supplemented with significant military aid to Ukraine.
That Biden had to make Ukraine indigestible.
Did this happen?
No.
Although the Biden admin did provide more help - the level of assistance was minuscule and insignificant.
Few more Javelins (supplied in December) aren’t going to change the facts on the ground.
How many drones (both Turkish Bayraktars and US micro infantry drones), air defense systems, self-propelled howitzers, artillery units, and anti-ship missiles (to defend the Azov sea amphibious attacks) were supplied to Ukraine?
None - or at least not in significant numbers (otherwise, Russian intel would reveal it - to bolster its argument that NATO is encircling it).
Of course, there was a legitimate rationale to not supply weapons that could make a difference - the concern was that this would trigger a preemptive Russian attack (incentivizing the Kremlin to prosecute the military campaign before it would get even harder to do so).
But weighed against the overall context, it was a risk worth taking.
At least going forward, it must be acknowledged that the risk of triggering a preemptive attack should now be finally taken - since the most likely alternative now, is to passively await a Russian attack.
What is to be done now?
Is it even at this point possible that any intervention now could dissuade Putin pulling the trigger?
It is highly unlikely but not impossible.
First of all: what is not likely to work?
More of the same: last minute bilateral engagements from allied nations, or threats of slightly tougher economic sanctions
Going forward, everything will now mainly depend on rapidly changing the realities on the ground - at this point, it is the military balance and not more economic sanctions that can affect Putin’s calculus.
And the balance will of course never be in favor of Ukraine - but then again, it doesn’t have to be.
As a defending nation, Ukraine must be helped to the extent that Putin’s prior beliefs get a necessary update.
Essentially, Putin must be convinced that 1) He may suffer embarrassment on the battlefield, and that 2) The costs of engagement will be exceptionally high - both in terms of treasure and manpower.
Putin must believe that there is a credible risk of the Russian military facing difficulties in effectively prosecuting a military campaign, and that the number of Russian soldiers returning in body bags will be too high for the Russian public to stomach.
To do this, the US leadership must urgently do the following three things:
1) Redress the current aforementioned gaps in military aid, promise monetary aid, and provide covert assistance in asymmetric warfare capabilities.
Additionally, the US leaders must push for the introduction of a legislation in Congress to enable the sale and delivery (with training of Ukrainian servicemen) of the Patriot air-defense missile batteries to Ukraine.
As of right now, Russia’s superiority in air power over Ukraine is staggering, and the balance of power therefore needs to be adjusted - even a little will go a long way.
This is because, no matter what military option is taken (whether it is a full-on invasion or a limited Blitz), the Russian air force is likely to play a prominent role (alongside cruise/ballistic missiles).
The Kremlin must recognize that if it invades, Ukraine will get advanced air defense capabilities that are bound to cause significant damage to Russia.
Even if these are delivered late in the game, they will still possess serious cost-inflicting capabilities.
Ukraine should furthermore be supplied with advanced anti-ship missiles to defend the strategic port cities of Mariupol and Odessa.
Again, even if they fail to prevent a successful invasion, Russians must know that they may lose a few ships in the process..
Moreover, both the US and the EU must publicly promise to continuously replenish Ukraine’s coffers with monetary aid - in addition to any necessary humanitarian aid.
Russia must see that Ukraine will be supported and equipped with capacity to keep on fighting for longer than the Kremlin currently expects - a prolonged war of attrition is most definitely not in Putin’s plan.
Finally, the US must announce that it will provide cyber attack and defense capabilities to Ukraine.
The US and NATO advisers’ assistance of Ukrainians in offensive cyber operations, could lead to a strong deterrence effect: since this raises the risks of Russian command & control systems getting interfered with, and possibly leading to some embarrassing consequences for Russians.
Related to this: the US must also offer real-time battlefield intel - using its advanced satellite capabilities.
Russia must be forewarned that Ukrainians will see Russian moves in advance - adding further to the risk that Putin’s army will not secure a smooth victory.
Overall then, creating a strong risk that Putin will be embarrassed on the global stage can indeed lead to a strong deterrence.
2) Neutralizing Belarus from action.
The last thing Ukraine needs is to worry about potential attacks from the border with Belarus - a possible Russian blitz attack in the north of Ukraine (which would consequently divert Ukraine’s best troops from defending the conflict lines in Donbas).
There is already evidence that Belarus was involved in the latest cyber attack on Ukraine.
Belarusian dictator Lukashenko must be informed that his further complicity in the Kremlin’s adventurism would cost him dearly.
He should be warned that even if the economic sanctions don’t crush Russia - those that could crush Belarus will be implemented if Lukashenko was to aid Russia any further in its attack against Ukraine.
3) Make it clear that Putin’s nightmare scenario will come true.
Since Putin wants to avoid forward NATO forces deployed in Ukraine, he must be warned that if he proceeds with the invasion of Eastern Ukraine, the Western part will be fortified by NATO.
Ukraine’s NATO member neighbors (for example, Estonia) are already considering direct military support.
Putin must be forewarned that many more NATO powers, including the US, will send over military hardware and advisers to turn the Western part of the country into a no-go zone for Russia.
This message should be delivered in private, via the backchannels - since public pronouncements would necessitate an immediate face-saving reaction from the Kremlin (leading them to double down on their path).
Overall then, at this very moment, Russian starting a war with Ukraine is becoming more likely than not.
Not all is lost however, and the US and NATO can still pull last minute levers to create uncertainty and doubt in the mind of Putin - saving Ukraine will depend on changing his calculus, and convincing him that the war will not lead to successful accomplishment of his political objectives.