Weekly Overview
Ukraine War Updates:
Donbas battlefield & outlook.
Ukraine is successfully pushing a counteroffensive among multiple axes: the battle of Kharkiv is all but won, and the Ukrainian army is now counterattacking along the Izyum axis.
Russian progress has stalled, and will continue to do so - now that Ukraine has incorporated most of the donated NATO artillery guns and that Switchblade 600s drones are about to enter the theatre.
In addition, the US-supplied counter-artillery radars are making a significant difference: helping Ukraine to quickly identify, target, and neutralize new assaults.
Russia’s internal struggles & low morale.
From the very start of the war, there have been multiple rumors of certain FSB generals (like Beseda) being detained/investigated, and or demoted for their failure to provide accurate and reliable assessments prior to the start of Russia’s “special operation”.
In addition, the FSB’s would be collaborators did not end up turning against the Zelensky administration - prompting Putin to make a direct appeal to the Ukrainian army to switch sides, and to topple the government in Kyiv (which as discussed in the previous cables, was a massive personal risk for Putin - since the Ukrainian generals not responding to his appeals would damage Putin’s authority charisma, and reduce the credibility of all his future public calls. And that is indeed exactly what happened).
It is important to note that we cannot say with sufficient certainty that these defections did not occur for good reasons: for example, strong loyalty to Ukraine - it might instead, have been a self-interested split-second calculation - where the US support and intel weighed high (indicating ability of the Kyiv government to preempt and capture traitors), and that Russia’s offers were on the other hand, of comparatively lower value.
And given that such a monumental decision would have amounted to a major departure from the status quo, the potential Ukrainian defectors would need to have been certain of success - and this requisite certainty was far from present.
But regardless, the coup did not occur and FSB took the brunt.
Many of the resulting investigations/rumors of stern punishments were just that: rumors.
And this is the reason why these cables never dwelled too much on these speculations.
But then there is a second category of more subtle and indirect indicators: the behavior, general conduct/tone, and statements made by the Kremlin insiders, and/or Kremlin backed operatives.
A lot can be inferred from these statements: they reveal a certain state of mind/beliefs that may in turn reflect changing dynamics on the ground.
A great example of this, would be the former separatist commander/Kremlin operative Igor Girkin’s (also known as ‘‘Strelkov’’) comment about the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu.
Girkin is a well-known operative - a clear leader of the 2014 rebellion in the Eastern Ukraine.
As such, he always had close and ready access to the Kremlin, and to Russia’s military intel agency - the GRU (as well as the FSB).
In other words, Girkin is within the siloviki/security apparatus faction (even if currently, not amongst the most powerful or influential players).
His comments carry some weight - particularly when these amount to the radical criticisms of Russia’s internal power vertical leaders.
Girkin berated Shoygu for the failures in this war - describing Shoygu’s performance as “criminally negligent” - and only barely stopped short of accusing him of an outright treason.
This is quite simply unprecedented, and highlights the changing dynamics within the Kremlin.
It is too early to make predictions (especially in the absence of concrete evidence), but it simply cannot be true that the Russian Defense Minister’s status, prestige, and influence, remains unaltered.
It is therefore more likely than not, that Shoygu himself is fighting for political survival - and Putin’s need to present a stable front-row picture of the military leadership is working in his favor.
But it would not be at all unreasonable to expect serious regime infighting and internal politics - this cannot be good for the Russian army, and for the morale of its soldiers.
We have already witnessed how the wrongheaded political objectives have led to devastating military embarrassments for Russia.
The Russian army is certainly in deep trouble if this trend continues, and people like Shoygu (incentivized by a need for a quick visual display of ‘‘victory’’ to save their own skin) continue to prioritize short-term goals over longer-term military objectives.
Which is great news for Ukraine and for the Western allies propping up Kyiv.
Allied support continues & biting impact of export controls.
Next week, the US Congress is all but certain to (almost unanimously) approve an additional $40bn aid package for Ukraine (delayed only due to the clownish Senator Rand Paul. Who should without question, receive a medal from the Kremlin).
The EU has also committed to an additional 500mln Euros of aid, and is actively discussing a full-on embargo on the Russian oil - where, gaining a required unanimous support should not be a problem if Hungary is compensated for the temporary economic difficulty and ‘‘losses’’ the would arise from this shut down.
This past week, we have also learned that the semiconductor export restrictions on Russia are taking its toll.
In her Senate Appropriations Committee testimony, the Commerce Secretary Gina Riamondo informed the Senators of reports from the Ukrainian military: that they find Russian military equipment on the ground filled with semiconductors extracted out of dishwashers and refrigerators.
We have previously discussed the first major casualty of these semiconductor restrictors: Russia’s Uralvagonzavod’s inability to produce new T-72 tanks.
But this is a new humiliating low - one that doesn’t bode well for Putin’s long-term war plans.
The West’s inexplicable push for a ceasefire.
Against this background of Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive, Russia’s military woes, and upcoming stronger Ukraine aid/sanctions against Russia, it was strange to see a sudden Western push for a ceasefire.
Here is for example, the German Chancellor discussing his efforts to achieve exactly that:
It is worth noting how: a) the civilian massacre at Bucha; b) Putin’s refusal to investigate the war criminals (and on the contrary, his rewarding and honoring them), and c) the Azovstal rescue, did not make it to the list of top issues discussed in Scholz’s long phone call with Putin.
And even though it is indeed tempting to write this off as another German blunder, one cannot do so given that the US leadership is (rather strangely) on the same page.
Indeed, for the first time ever since the outbreak of the war, the US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had a phone call discussion with his Russian counterpart Shoygu: where the point about the necessity of an ‘‘immediate ceasefire’’ was once again emphasized.
But how is this consistent with the openly declared (by the very same Lloyd Austin) US political objectives to weaken Russia and impair its ability to repeat a similar offense/invasion elsewhere?
Imposing a ceasefire now, would freeze the conflict as it is: meaning that Russia would have gained territory in both the east and in the south of Ukraine.
And given that a well-established wartime negotiation maxim states that a party can never win more at the negotiation table than what it controls on the ground, is it now the US/NATO policy to force Ukraine into another frozen conflict where it now controls less territory than it did prior to the February 24th invasion?
What incentive would Russia have to give up the territories that it currently controls?
None - at least for now: the threat of future economic pain and isolation, would both need to be credible and sufficient to alter Putin’s calculus. And in any case, it seems like Putin is more concerned about the visuals of a military victory and territorial gains than the long-term prosperity of Russia.
Indeed, Russia is clearly working on a plan to annex Kherson in the south of Ukraine (and sending over its Duma/parliamentary deputy to legitimize the narrative of a potential referendum)
(side note: Russia is also planning a similar move in South Ossetia. Putin is thinking ‘‘why not? I am already sanctioned to the max. What do I have to lose”. As discussed in the previous cables, the US/NATO must respond with a similar/proportionate level of support and military aid offered to Georgia, and warn of separate and additional restrictions/sanctions.)
And given that the G7 has declared that it would never recognize new Russian territories, what is the plan here? To freeze the conflict, allow Russia to annex the occupied territories, and get away with more territorial gain, and arguably, some limited level of military success?
And what about Ukrainians? They are not ready to stop fighting for their lands, (and certainly not ready to accept a permanent presence of additional Russian troops and saboteurs on their lands), and it is inconceivable that Zelensky could employ enough political capital (or indeed, even try/have any interest in this policy) to settle and agree to a ceasefire under these terms.
In other words, just when Ukraine is succeeding in a counteroffensive, and is about to receive even more aid (and Russia is about to face tougher sanctions), the West is encouraging another frozen conflict.
How does it make sense to force a fake ceasefire now?
Do the US/NATO policymakers really not realize that this would in effect create a new frozen conflict - whilst ensuring further territorial gains for the Kremlin?
How is this not ultimately rewarding the Kremlin for the invasion?
And why would the Kremlin not have an incentive to recoup and restart the war at an opportune time to move further into Ukraine - potentially invading the entire Black Sea coast?
Given that toughest sanctions are unlikely to be lifted anytime soon, and that the economic hardship is priced into Putin’s calculus, why would he not resume the war once the Russian army has reorganized into a more capable fighting force?
And the next war would likely happen sooner rather than later - since the Kremlin would want to preempt further significant military aid and training offered to Ukraine.
Plainly, this is a terrible policy: Russia would end up paying a much lower price for accepting the new status quo of a ceasefire: its troops are there, and the ceasefire would ‘‘freeze’’ their status and crystallize their gain.
More of Donetsk and Luhansk gone, Kherson gone - and a new war likely to break out sooner rather than later.
No - this poorly thought out strategy must be stopped in its tracks.
The West must abandon the premature, and strategically self-defeating policy of ‘‘immediate ceasefire’’.
Ukraine must continue onwards towards victory - and the West must continue with additional help.
The time to revisit the talk of an ‘‘immediate ceasefire’’ is when the Kremlin is ready to offer concessions and negotiate the withdrawal of its troops to a pre-invasion/pre-Feb 24 position.
Until then, the counteroffensive must continue with full force.
Sweden and Finland inch closer towards NATO and receive further security assurances - Russia responds with a threat, and Turkey plays its strong hand.
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