Weekly Overview - Latest Ukraine crisis signals, US maneuvers, and misguided messages from Kyiv
Weekly Overview - Latest Ukraine crisis signals, US maneuvers, and misguided messages from Kyiv
Ukraine crisis: latest noise and signals
As always, what is most visually dramatic, wins the most attention - and in this past week, that was the US ambassador in Moscow personally delivering the US response to the Russian security demands.
The precise details of the contents of the response are of course unknown (unless Russians leak this correspondence too - like what they did with German and French letters in the fall of 2021), but what is clear however, is that the major thrust of Russian demands were dismissed (NATO’s “open-door” policy remains intact - and Ukraine’s sovereign rights were not traded away) - and negotiations (and even possible giveaways) around strategic stability and arms control measures are unlikely to be concessions significant enough to enable Putin’s withdrawal without a significant loss of face.
Russia’s reaction to the delivery of the note, did however get many pundits, and even some reputable analysts overly bullish that a de-escalation was indeed possible:
“We will read it. Study it. The partners studied our project for almost a month and a half”, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko.
Those confusing this statement (along with Russia’s willingness to re-engage in the Normandy format negotiations with Germany, France and Ukraine) for a signal of a possible de-escalation and a pause on the military operations, miss three key insights:
1) Russia was never going to stop ‘‘negotiating’’ - given that Putin’s objectives are primarily political in nature, ongoing talks and frequent transfer of notes is likely going to continue.This is a staple of coercive diplomacy.
And this will likely remain true even if Russia begins military operations - in fact, the Kremlin’s compellence strategy implies that Russia is likely to intensify political channels if/when it sees significant gains that would warrant it to stop, consolidate wins (and reduce further casualties and monetary costs), and impose its new political demands from a position of higher leverage.
2) The statement allows Russia to choose its own timeline for attack - wins time and flexibility to delay without implying hesitancy on their part.
The Kremlin can easily drag it out beyond the Beijing Olympics if needed. maintaining element of surprise - keeping everyone tense and watching for possible signs of concessions.
3) The statement establishes a frame of reasonableness - it helps to demonstrate that Russians are not acting like bloodthirsty invaders, and that they will consider all available diplomatic options.
If needed, later attacks can then be re-framed as an inevitable and unfortunate result of the breakdown in negotiations, and a failure to arrive at an acceptable compromise.
In addition, if Moscow was genuinely looking for an excuse to de-escalate, the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov would not dismiss the written response document by reiterating that Russia’s core demands and guarantees around NATO expansion were not addressed.
This is because such a response traps the Kremlin even further - it is harder to agree to a compromise (without losing face) when your core demands remain unaddressed.
The western media, however, still insisted on rosy interpretations - focusing on foreign minister Lavrov and Putin’s denials (in his phone call with the French President Macron) that Russia was interested in prosecuting war.
(side note: the French Presidency official’s statement that Putin expressed "no offensive plans" means absolutely nothing. Putin can always start a war that wasn’t initially “in the plans”. Macron’s aide, additionally risks making the French President look foolish if/when the attack begins - for taking Putin at his word)
Yet again, as pieces of evidence, these have little (if any) probative value: what were they supposed to say? That Russia was actively preparing for war?
Russia’s continuous denials of intent can quickly escalate into ‘‘we didn’t want this, but they forced our hand’’.
Indeed, Lukashenko’s statement that the war was only possible if Belarus or Russia was to be attacked, is a further indicator that some sort of a false-flag operation may be carried out (to justify a counter-attack) if/when Russia intends to begin the military campaign.
Leaving aside diplomatic saber-rattling and push-pull statements, perhaps the most worrying indicator of intent came in the form of Russian military accumulating blood supplies and delivering them to the frontline troops (for emergency use for the battle-wounded) - is there a better indicator that a country is readying itself for a bloody conflict, than by actually stocking up on actual blood?
US maneuvers
In the background to all this, the US government didn’t waste time and pursued a range of preparatory measures and diplomatic maneuvers.
Specifically, these fall under three categories:
1) Troops deployment & NATO reassurance
Early in the week, the Biden admin announced plans to deploy approximately 8,500 troops to Ukraine’s neighboring NATO countries.
Late on Friday, President Biden confirmed that there will be a deployment of a limited (yet unspecified) size in the ‘‘near term’’.
Contrary to what many pundits suggest - this is not going to escalate a potential conflict with Russia, and the US is not sending its soldiers to die for a faraway country.
Putin knows that the US is not going to fight for Ukraine - that has been clearly communicated.
And the public explanation for the US deployment has been framed defensively.
There are three major reasons why the US deployment is highly desirable:
a) On a practical level, the US may need to send in troops into Ukraine in order to rescue trapped American citizens- there are currently tens of thousands of Americans in Ukraine.
And a superpower that is either incapable or unwilling to rescue its own citizens from a foreign aggressor, is no longer a superpower.
b) Presence of the US troops bolsters NATO Secretary General’s assertions that the Russian aggression will only result in the opposite of what Putin is trying to achieve: more NATO forces close to Russia.
c) Neighboring NATO countries will feel more reassurance and therefore will be more likely to provide critical aid to Ukraine.
2) Sanctions and diplomatic maneuvers
a) The State Department warning that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would be cut off -if Russia moves forward with an invasion.
“If Russia invades Ukraine, one way or another, Nord Stream 2 will not move forward” said the State Department Press Secretary, Ned Price.
Better late than never.
But what stood out was the change of tone vis-à-vis Germany: ‘‘We will work with Germany to ensure it does not move forward"[emphasis added].
This is a significant departure from the hitherto softer tone of collaboration and cooperation.
Germany is no longer being consulted on how to act, but rather, on how to implement what the US has already determined is the best way forward.
This new (and very welcome) change in policy is a strong indicator that even the Biden administration (that to date, has prided itself on its collaborative approach vis-à-vis European allies) is getting impatient with German uselessness (to put it mildly) in this crisis.
As discussed in the previous week’s cables, if Germany keeps pursuing its ‘‘rational foreign policy” (meaning unreliable and self-centered) so can the US - reminding its allies of its ruthless streak that comes out when needed.
b) Proposed sanctions against Putin personally.
These are mostly valuable due to their framing effect of focusing the narrative on one antagonist specifically - implying that the crisis is caused by the bloodthirsty dictator’s adventurist tendencies, and has nothing to do with the genuine national concerns of Russia.
The focus on Putin personally, has a further benefit of making it clear that the West has no problem with Russia or Russians - only with its tyrant.
Finally, even if practically these sanctions aren’t going to directly affect Putin too much, (if properly applied) they could, however, potentially affect his closest inner circle - this is because most of Putin’s wealth is parked under the name of others.
Putin’s major assets (including his palace) are formally tied to his closest allies and friends.
These friends (if hit hard enough) may start to whisper in Putin’s ear that perhaps all this is not worth the cost.
Again, unlikely to sway Putin - but overall still decent and somewhat impactful proposals.
c) Export controls: denying Russia access to advanced electronics and semiconductor chips.
These proposed sanctions would in fact be quite effective - targeting all crucial sectors of the Russian economy - from airplane/automobile manufacturing, to telecoms and the military industrial complex.
Given the supply of semiconductors is already in short supply, Russia will struggle to replace these adequately and quickly.
The industries most hurt by these measures, are also those that are managed by Russia’s new money elite - the social class that has hitherto given tacit consent to Putin’s rule, and that may become increasingly disillusioned by the Kremlin’s judgment.
China (currently racing ahead to address its own deficits in the field) is unlikely to provide any significant relief.
The new financial sanctions would target VTB bank - Russia’s second largest, in terms of Assets Under Management (AUM).
Oddly, Sberbank - Russia’s largest bank, controlling 30% of net assets in Russia (and 2x AUM in comparison to VTB) has been left out of the list of potential targets.
This is unfortunate, since full-blocking/blacklisting sanctions on Sberbank would be especially impactful: Most Russians have an account with Sberbank, and the Russian government has no option but to step in and rescue the bank.
Yet even the government bailout wouldn’t immediately calm the markets and would most likely fail to prevent a domestic financial crisis - domestic investment would dry up, rubble will fall sharply against the dollar, and the already high inflation would get even worse - producing a huge dent in the real-income of ordinary Russians.
With an ongoing financial crisis, most Russians would be wary of keeping their savings (even in USD) in Russian banks - the Russian credit market would therefore dry up further.
In short, the sanctions must target all major Russian banks and must avoid the cardinal sin of gradual introduction with prior warnings (if VTB gets sanctioned first, the Kremlin will have an early warning to prepare for the Sberbank related crisis).
The West must avoid the mistake of 2014, when most sanctions were imposed in a piecemeal fashion, and after the Russian military conducted its most important campaigns.
The sanctions were (in addition to being extremely weak - in comparison to the new proposed sanctions) implemented too slowly to have any deterrent effect.
These new financial sanctions could have a strong prospect (especially if applied simultaneously against all Russian banks) to significantly worsen the Russian economy, and consequently, weaken the Putin regime.
And even then, there is still room for more: Russian insurance giant Sogaz, and a large energy-shipping company Sovcomflot, must also be targeted.
These would have a longer-term and more persistent impact on the economy: which is crucial to influence Putin’s 2024 Presidential run calculations - after all, careful about maintaining a perception of legitimacy, Putin wouldn’t want to ‘‘win’’ in wholly fraudulent elections - where electoral interferences would have to go beyond mere ‘‘top up’’ of votes, and instead, amount to Brazen (and well-publicized) ballot-box stuffing - think Belarus 2020, but on a larger scale.
Some in DC circles have expressed concern that Putin is working hard to undermine the united front amongst the EU states on Russian sanctions (unanimity amongst the 27 states being a prerequisite for EU-wide sanctions).
Indeed, Putin is actively courting Italy and Hungary, and hoping that the orthodox Greece and Cyprus would aid in breaking this unanimity.
So then, a unanimous assent of the EU states to imposing debilitating sanctions may very well not take place (at least in the short-term).
But this is a wrong-headed approach - the US shouldn’t wait to secure the EU’s approval before imposing harshest sanctions possible.
Crippling sanctions on Iran would probably not take place if the US decided to wait for the Europeans to jump onboard.
Sure, imposing debilitating sanctions on Russia will also hit the EU - but dealing with this shorter-term damage later, is preferable to failing to move forward and resign with the reality of a fractured alliance - that is a problem much worse to handle in the long-term.
e) The China gambit
The US State Department’s Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria Nuland, called on China to use its influence in the Kremlin to dissuade a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine.
A large number of pundits in the US media have ridiculed this - calling it extremely naive.
Indeed, the argument that China is not interested in preserving the current world order (unless there is a direct impact on its interests) has frequently been advanced by these cables - and it is true: unless there is a compelling reason to affect Beijing’s calculus, any further degradation in the US-led ‘‘rule-based’’ order benefits China (that then fills in the vacuum - adding to its own power and influence).
But, the context is key, and besides, no one can (with a straight face) accuse Victoria Nuland - a seasoned operative of realpolitik, of naivety.
After all, if she was that naive, Putin wouldn’t have accused her of concocting regime changes in both Ukraine (during the Euromaidan revolution of 2013/ 2014) and Russia itself (Bolotnaya protests of 2011/2012).
So then, what prompted this message? For that, we need to analyze the quote in its entirety:
‘‘We are calling on Beijing to use its influence with Moscow to urge diplomacy, because if there is a conflict in the Ukraine it is not going to be good for China either. There will be a significant impact on the global economy. There will be a significant impact in the energy sphere. [emphasis added]"
Beyond the obvious point that China may indeed calculate that a prolonged disturbance in the energy market doesn’t fit well with its 2022 growth goals, the statement has three further effects:
a) Deterrence against Russia - even though the message is directed at China, the primary recipient is still the Kremlin.
There is an implicit threat in the message - that the US is ready to amp up the pressure and engage in sanctions that would (either on their own- or as a consequence of predictable counter-retaliations) have a significant impact both on the global economy and the energy markets.
In other words, if Putin still calculates that the US may shy away from a tough confrontation - he should think again.
And the threat is even more credible (and thus effective) precisely because it is indirect and subtle - there would be no point of warning China of tumultuous markets if the US itself wasn’t preparing for them.
(side note: the upcoming cables will analyze further possible contingency planning for EU’s potential energy crisis - if Putin was to pull the plug on Gazprom’s gas supplies)
b) Insurance against accusations of arrogance - no one can now accuse the US of postures of grandiosity in assuming the sole responsibility in resolution of this crisis.
By attempting to recruit even a major adversary to collaborate in preventing a catastrophe in the European theater (that would then have global implications), the US acted pragmatically, and most importantly: with humility.
c) Trapping China in a bind - publicly calling out China to take a stance on the conflict, imposes a dilemma on Beijing: continue its rhetorical support for Moscow and risk being seen as a petty spoiler and oblivious to conflicts of global impact and suffering (and therefore, weakening its claim for global leadership), or equivocating, and reducing the intensity of support for Russia. And thereafter, moving to the position of neutrality and calling all sides to focus on peaceful resolutions via a dialogue (outright support for Ukraine will of course not happen).
There are now indicators that China might be going with the second option - annoying the Kremlin, and not providing 100% support when Russia needs it the most.
Ukrainian government’s wrong-headed, incoherent, & ultimately self-defeating messaging
In spite of the US dismissal of Russian demands, and the ever-rising unity of purpose within the Western alliance, in at least one aspect, the passing week delivered a major win for the Kremlin: the hitherto resolute Ukrainian government started to demonstrate cracks under intense pressure.
There were, rather unfortunately, a number of misguided and even outright self-defeating statements from the Ukrainian leadership.
The Ukraine’s ambassador to Japan, Sergiy Korsunsky displayed initial signs of muddled political judgment when commenting on the possibility of war with Russia.
Mr Korsunsky commented that even though the full-scale war with Russia was ‘‘very difficult to expect’’ a “more localized conflict’’ however, was still a possibility.
It is very difficult to determine the objective of this statement.
What was the point here? Other than reducing the urgency of the matter?
Why lessen the gravity of the situation, precisely when important allied nations are gearing up to confront Russia and stand firmly behind Ukraine?
And how was this warning consistent with Mr Korsunky’s further comments implying that a military conflict with Russia could lead to a regional nuclear catastrophe (where apparently, and in the course of military conflict, Russian operatives would be reckless and/or dumb enough to cause damage to nuclear reactors in Ukraine)?
The threat of a nuclear disaster is in itself uncredible - the idea that Russian officers would be incompetent enough to carpet bomb the region, and thereby create a risk of a nuclear fallout close to their own border, is ludicrous.
But in any case, it doesn’t align with the earlier characterization of the conflict as likely being only of “localized nature” - no matter how unlikely, if anything, the carpet-bombing that could (even if only theoretically) lead to a nuclear disaster, can be a characteristic of a full-scale war, and definitely not that of a localized (and therefore, limited) conflict of the 2014-2015 type.
But the ambassador’s statement paled in comparison to those made by President Zelensky.
In a number of media appearances, public statements, and even during a phone call with President Biden (where he challenged the US warning that the invasion could be “imminent”), the Ukrainian president repeatedly questioned the hype caused by the West.
(side note: part of the problem was that allegedly, the word ‘‘imminent’’ is commonly translated as ‘‘inevitable’’ in Ukrainian. But this sounds like a foolish excuse - I am yet to see a reputable (in fact, any) Ukrainian news source misquoting US officials as claiming inevitability of the invasion)
At the time when the Pentagon chiefs publicly warned of Russia’s clear capability to invade Ukraine, President Zelensky made wild assertions that the situation was in fact ‘‘under control’’ and that there was apparently ‘‘no reason to panic’’.
He is correct in urging calm, but it is wrong to claim that there are no good reasons for panic.
If the situation wasn’t really that urgent, and an imminent Russian invasion wasn’t a real possibility, then why was his own Defense minister touring Washington DC, asking for more defensive weapons even back in November?
Why are his lawmakers writing letters to the US Congress - appealing for more urgent military help? With a clear list of essentials needed for Ukrainian resistance to an invasion?
If a potential invasion is truly not imminent, then why is the Mayor of Kyiv describing contingency plans, and informing the public that the city’s metro stations will serve as shelters in case of Russian bombing?
So what is the motivation behind these attempts to deny the imminence of a potential conflict with Russia?
Well, Zelensky himself claims that it is due to his desire to calm the markets - that the current volatility harms Ukrainian economy.
It is true that a country facing imminent conflict with a more powerful enemy will face economic repercussions - as investors run away.
But Zelensky’s denials will not change the reality - markets have access to the trove of open source intel, suggesting precisely what Zelensky is denying.
And besides, it is far better to prepare the markets gradually, rather than experience a sudden shock if/when Russia does invade.
It is unlikely that Zelensky doesn’t realize these basic points - so then, what other potential motivations could he have to advance these pronouncements?
There are two likely ploys (out of many possibilities) that Zelensky may have been pursuing:
1) Provide a face-saving exit for Putin: if the war is not imminent, then Putin deciding to pull back his troops doesn’t amount to a retreat in the face of a strong deterrence.
Enabling Putin to save face could have been a noble goal pursued by Zelensky.
But there are two major problems with this strategy:
a) Putin hasn’t yet indicated that he is in fact interested in de-escalating.
Although his, and his government’s statements (denying plans to attack Ukraine) may create that impression, all of the recent conduct points to the contrary.
So then, in the absence of the Kremlin’s clear signal that it is ready to de-escalate, Zelensky’s premature pronouncements denying imminence of the attack, could lead to him and his government ending up looking like utter fools if/when Russia does attack - and it would then be much easier for the Kremlin to remove a government viewed as incompetent by its own people.
b) Even if this misguided policy was to be pursued, there should have been private consultations with the allies first - a lot of Western public opinion was galvanized in favor of defending Ukraine, and Zelensky’s comments risk alienating and frustrating allied nations.
Such comments (reeking of ingratitude) strengthen the arguments of the isolationist movements in the allied nations, and make it harder to unite the West behind Ukraine.
2) Provide an excuse for shameful concessions
This would be the second, (and dishonorable) route: Possibility that Zelensky could be considering unilateral concessions on behalf of Ukraine.
And it certainly easier to justify concessions when the war is not imminent, than when it is considered as such (and the concessions therefore, end up being doubly humiliating).
If this is the case, we will find out pretty soon.
Hopefully, this never happens, and Russia doesn’t succeed in its compellence strategy even without firing a shot.
If taken, this route would lead to a disaster for Ukraine.
This is because (and paraphrasing the famous Churchill quote), when choosing dishonor over war, you end up getting both.