Weekly Overview
An impending invasion, conflict of narratives, and the US advantage in the informational warfare
We have been tracking strong indicators of a likely Russian invasion from early December 2021.
But the final key pieces have now been put in place.
After an impasse with NATO - over its obnoxiously (and deliberately) unfulfillable ultimatums - Russia responded to the US offers, highlighted lack of attention to its key demands, and reiterated its willingness to resort to a “military-technical measures” (which conveniently allows for a range of options - a cornerstone of the decision-centric warfare).
Predictably, Moscow excused its longer than expected military drills by pointing at an escalation in Donbas - Russian troops will extend their stay in Belarus (a country that at this point is under a de-facto Russian rule).
Moreover, (and accompanied by the full mobilization in DNR and LNR) hundreds of thousands of civilians in the eastern Ukraine are being evacuated to Russian cities (and receiving monetary support from the Russian government) - and obviously all these incurred costs are not for nothing.
Troops are ready to go, and Wagner mercenaries are ready to concoct a subversion.
At this point (and saving some last-minute and exceptionally generous concession, and /or appeasement from either NATO or Ukraine), an invasion is all but certain, and we shall not focus much more on additional indicators.
We shall however review pre-invasion narratives advanced by both Russia, and the US/NATO - and examine what is the US advantage that needs further exploitation.
In the upcoming cables, we will additionally re-evaluate Putin’s likely objectives in this campaign, and explore the potentially devastating implications of his (thus far) likely success.
We will unpack his potential tactical options during the ongoing campaign, and examine the steps needed to prevent (or at the very least, hinder) his accomplishments in this campaign.
A lot of readers have also emailed in regards to the Donbas question - asking about Putin potentially granting a formal recognition to the DNR and LNR. This question will also receive a response in the upcoming cables.
Into the storm: pre-invasion narratives and the information warfare
Russia
Moscow engaged in deterrence, domestic audience prep, and psychological warfare.
1) Deterrence
The timing of the Grom-2022, the annual strategic nuclear triad exercises, was not a coincidence - Putin demonstrated combat readiness of his most high-leverage nuclear forces - just as the situation in Ukraine was reaching a boiling point.
Deterring NATO members from getting too close and involved with Ukraine was the objective.
But it is unlikely that anyone in the NATO leadership (or leadership of the member states) believes that Russia is actually prepared to threaten them with nuclear weapons.
But ordinary citizens (in NATO’s eastern flank) may well think that - putting pressure on their respective governments to stay away from the conflict, and reduce the intensity of direct military support given to Ukraine.
2) Preparing Russians for the cost of conflict
Putin: "direct sanctions are not enjoyable, but sooner or later this problem will be resolved and we will stimulate new opportunities in our economy."
3) Psychological warfare
Donetsk militia spokesperson alleged that Ukraine was preparing to evacuate its government & legislature to Lviv “in case of failure of Ukrainian aggression against the people’s republics & the following counter-offensive by the People’s Militia for the liberation of Ukraine from Nazis”.
Is this true? We don’t know - but moving the government to Lviv (if Kyiv was to fall) would indeed be a prudent move to make.
But leaving aside the veracity of the claim, the overriding intent of this communication, was to sow fear and confusion: specifically to a) highlight the futility of resistance, and incentivize defection and side-switching in Ukraine’s senior military leadership (many of whom may already have been ‘‘worked’ on” by the Russian SVR), and b) demoralize ordinary soldiers, encourage mass defections, and discourage local populations from mounting an insurgency.
(side note: and the recent US-initiated leaks of 1) assassination lists of key leaders in Ukraine’s government and civil society, and 2) reports that a large demographic of individuals with presumed opposition to a Russian invasion, could face torture, killing, and detentions in ‘‘camps’’, will inadvertently aid Russians in sowing that fear)
The US
Biden’s remarks
President Biden’s further warnings of an imminent invasion were correct on a policy level (discussed in previous cables), yet the precise messaging was not the best, to say the least.
When addressing the White House press pool on Thursday, Biden reiterated his previous estimations: ‘‘Every indication we have is they’re prepared to go into Ukraine.. My sense is this will happen within the next several days”.
This was too neutral and passive - adding an aura of inevitability to Russia’s forward movement.
And an impression of inevitability, only adds to Russia’s threat display prowess.
Furthermore, ‘‘go into’’ was perhaps the worst phrase to describe a bloody invasion.
Friday’s speech was significantly better, but when creating a contrast between diplomacy and the ‘‘war of choice’’, Biden failed to define Putin’s ‘‘choice’’.
What is it precisely that Putin is choosing? The notion that Putin is pursuing some legitimate security needs (and only, unfortunately choosing war -when diplomacy is available) must be dispelled in its entirety.
Putin’s actions must be framed in terms that completely delegitimize Russia’s ‘‘security needs’’ narrative.
The fact of the matter is that Ukraine hosts zero offensive NATO missiles, and whether or not NATO deploys troops/offensive hardware in nearby NATO states, (which can be the topic of discussion and of genuine diplomatic engagement) has nothing to do with Ukraine.
No - Putin wants to control a sovereign nation of 44 million people on Russia’s border.
It wants to turn Ukraine into another vassal puppet state like Belarus.
And these not so noble ambitions (a far cry from legitimate security needs of Russia) must be tied to a petty dictator’s personal aspirations for legacy - via his efforts to create a Russian empire 2.0.
The contrast between Russia’s stated aims and its true motivations was not made clear.
To an uneducated audience (of unfortunately, millions in both Europe and the US), Biden’s speech created an impression that Putin is choosing needless war when he could have resorted to diplomacy.
And consequently, implying that the imminent invasion was somehow related to legitimate foreign policy goals of Russia - that good old-fashioned diplomacy could have addressed.
Invasion of Ukraine has nothing to do with Russian objections to NATO’s posture near its borders.
It isn’t Estonia or Lithuania that is under a threat of an imminent invasion (hopefully).
If they were, then one could establish a link between an impending military campaign, and Russia’s stated foreign policy goals vis-à-vis NATO.
The contrast between the Kremlin’s pronounced objectives, and its true motivations and interests, must be made clear at every junction.
Russia should not get away with a narrative of an “aggrieved party resorting to extreme measures”.
Blinken’s remarks
The Secretary of State has been on point.
His emergency trip to the UN, outlining all possible false-flag operations, from ‘‘fabricated so-called terrorist bombing inside Russia, the invented discovery of a mass grave, a staged drone strike against civilians” to ‘‘even a real attack using chemical weapons” was extremely important in discrediting all possible Russian narratives to justify an intervention & invasion.
NATO states
Germany continued to excuse its unwillingness to provide military aid to Ukraine, by resorting to some deeply disingenuous justifications: that allegedly, given its WWII past, Germany wants to focus on ‘‘other ways” to secure peace.
Yet this fails to explain why Germany has such a vibrant defense industry - selling everything from submarines to their leopard tanks.
Or why they are happy to sell weapons to bloody middle eastern dictators mired in conflict - surely that doesn’t contribute to peace?
It must be a sheer coincidence that Germany decides to focus on “peaceful resolutions” exclusively when it is Russia on the other side of the conflict.
And besides, how exactly is Ukraine’s ability to raise the cost of invasion, and deter potential invasion (or at this point, at least limit the extent of it) harmful to peace ?
Or perhaps, it is Germany’s conception that the ‘‘peaceful resolution’’ involves a smoother slaughter of Ukraine - with as little resistance as possible?
And if the German foreign minister is aware of a ‘‘other ways’’ of dealing with an adversary engaged in an active false-flag operation, she should inform the whole world about this magical diplomatic trick.
Moreover, it seems like the German chancellor doesn’t follow the statements made by his Foreign Minister - for when she was warning of ‘‘false-flag’’ operations in Eastern Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (straining all credulity) suggested that there were indicators that Putin was still open to diplomacy.
Perhaps this is Germany’s ‘‘other ways’’ of securing peace: empty, and inconsistent statements by its leaders - oh and, sending five thousand helmets to Ukraine…
Italy
PM Draghi’s comments on Russian sanctions, revealed the unpleasant reality (long explored by these cables) that securing a EU-wide consensus for hard-hitting sanctions on Russia will be extremely unlikely: “We are discussing sanctions with the EU and in the course of these discussions we have made our position known, that they should be concentrated on narrow sectors without including energy” [emphasis added].
That EU sanctions would exclude the energy sector was a given - but the Italian PM’s comments goes further than that: the use of the term ‘‘narrow sectors’’, implies willingness to sanction industries like the military procurement, but probably leaving the wider financial sector all alone.
This is the current and unfortunate state of affairs: the smaller pro-Russia states are no longer isolated in their reluctance to confront the Kremlin - they now have bigger backers.
Hence why, these cables have always advocated to go forward with the toughest US/UK sanctions without waiting for a transatlantic consensus - doing so will kill all momentum, allowing for the shock factor of Russia’s brazen invasion to die down.
France
Macron once again threw himself into the fray - offering some last-minute shuttle diplomacy.
Jumping from one phone call to another - talking to Putin, Biden and Johnson in one day.
But it is unclear, what if any result could there be?
The Elysee Palace readout states the following:
‘‘[Macron] proposed a summit to be held between President BIDEN and President PUTIN and then with relevant stakeholders to discuss security and strategic stability in Europe.
Presidents BIDEN and PUTIN have both accepted the principle of such a summit.”
If this is a summit to buy time and delay the crisis, Putin will sniff it out and proceed with an escalation - later on, blaming the Ukrainian side for spoiling the final efforts for diplomacy.
If on the other hand, the issues to be discussed are going to be serious, (we don’t know precisely what Macron promised to Putin), and there is a realistic chance of a significant NATO concession, such a summit is indeed likely to take place (delaying possible invasion until after Putin gets to hear out the proposal).
We will have time to scrutinize this summit and the offered terms (if it ever takes place), in the meantime however, Putin is being rewarded for his gunpoint diplomacy.
Not a great precedent to set - one at least hopes that the offer of a summit came with attached conditions of (at least) partial withdrawal of Russian troops.
Otherwise, this would amount to rewarding Putin for hostage-taking an entire country.
Ukraine
In his Munich speech, the Ukrainian President accused the West of appeasing Russia and urged them to avoid delaying the toughest sanctions (instead of triggering them only at the point of an invasion).
(side note: it was a decent speech, but one that could have been delivered virtually - leaving the country at such a perilous moment was unwise. Zelensky was lucky that a potential Russian invasion didn’t take place over the weekend. Russians could have enforced a no-fly zone - preventing his quick return to Kyiv at the most crucial moment in time).
The problem is that Zelensky wasted his credibility and political capital on months of denial, foolish accusations (against the US/NATO) of hyping up the conflict, and on petty (and unsubstantiated) charges of treason against his political rival.
Months were wasted with little preparation for the worst-case scenario - Ukraine could have declared a full-on national mobilization.
With a population of 44 million, the country could have mustered more than a million troops to face Russian battalions.
Sure, these would not have been professional soldiers - but then again, the goal would have been to become indigestible to Russians (dissuading Moscow from embarking on a full-on invasion), and not necessarily securing an outright win.
Even this late in the crisis, his own Defense Minister still insisted on rationalizing away the increased fighting in Donbas by labeling it as ‘‘a traditional tactic of the Russian side’’, allegedly implemented to increase the pressure ahead of the Normandy format meeting - instead of laying down a context for an invasion.
The truth is that Ukraine is unfortunately being run by a ‘‘don’t look up’’ government - its leadership is not respected, and its appeals are thus not taken too seriously.
Information and intel warfare - where the US retains its advantage
Russians are good at selling themselves as all-powerful and all-knowing.
This has a significant ‘‘threat display’’ effect - discouraging smaller states from confronting the Kremlin (or siding with the US/NATO when imposing sanctions).
The US should step up its game in this regard - there is plenty of opportunity for Washington to remind the world of its advantage in this sphere (especially important after the Afghanistan debacle).
For example: ‘‘U.S. intelligence that provided Biden with the confidence to make that assertion came from an order given to Russian subordinates to proceed with a full-scale attack, according to several people familiar with the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity’’.
If you are Putin, your cold and composed exterior will surely help to conceal what is going on in your mind: the worry that your most secretive and consequential commands are available to the US intel - who can you even trust in this scenario? Your options and freedom of action dwindle as a result.
And this capability was certainly not lost on Xi Jinping - if the US intel can penetrate the shields of FSB and GRU, then what about the PLA?
What about his closest inner circle at the CCP?
There is an additional (and crucial) context here: unlike Putin, Xi did not get the same opportunity to 1) design a system of governance from scratch - shaping it to his liking, and 2) enjoy Putin’s long tenure - which comes with an added opportunity to crystallize a grip on power.
Amidst all the doom and gloom, this is a reminder of a crucial US advantage - one that should be sold more confidently.
For it is an extremely cost-effective method of deterring highest profile adversaries.