Weekly Overview
Ukraine takes initiative & faces an important battle in Donbas: what is going well and what further steps must still be taken.
Ukraine is on the counterattack: battle for Kyiv is going rather well, with outcomes that can be described as Russia’s “rapid retreat” - if not an outright rout.
In addition, Kyiv decided to turn the tables and demonstrate initiative: the ‘‘deep strike’’ of the oil storage facility in Belgorod, was the first time that Ukraine conducted a military operation on Russian soil.
Although Kyiv never formally admitted to being behind the attack, foreign minister’s Kuleba’s refusal to ‘‘deny’’ the attack is all we need to know.
Previously, and in order to rapidly prevent Russian false flag operations, Ukrainian officials were eager to rebut any/all of their alleged involvements in potential acts of sabotage.
Such a ‘‘deep strike’’ with low-flying helicopters (evading radars) conducting a precision strike, was a demonstration of Ukraine’s offensive capabilities.
This decision was surely (at least in part) driven by a need to boost the morale of the Ukrainian troops (who are about to enter a new stage of the counteroffensive warfare, and a moral boost was therefore timely) - whilst demoralizing logistics/supply chain troops currently located within Russia - ‘‘we can get you anywhere, nowhere is safe’’ was the intended message.
Belarusian army undoubtedly took note as well - perhaps Lukashenko might have doubts about acting as an overt logistics depo for Putin.
(side note: and Russia in turn responded rather shrewdly: dismissing the gravity of inflicted injury by merely suggesting that this incident will create an ‘‘awkward’’ backdrop for further negotiations. This was smart from the Kremlin - no need to overemphasize the gravity of the insult when you are already maxed out on all fronts, and cannot possibly respond with ‘‘outrage’’ without engaging in something drastic).
Ukrainian demonstration of military prowess didn’t end there: Kyiv’s regions were retaken entirely - Ukraine now has the total control over the territory surrounding Kyiv.
And in the process of this liberation, gruesome evidence of war crimes emerged: hundreds of civilians in the town of Bucha were found dead - many lying out in the streets (and at least one man with his hands tied behind his back - suggesting an execution-style murder).
This massacre will have major political ramifications, and will lead to significant strategic costs for the Kremlin.
Ukrainian people are now going to be less willing to settle/offer concessions - this will in turn tie Zelensky’s hands in future negotiations.
Western public will now feel more strongly about the conflict: adding pressure on the US/NATO to provide more weapons to Ukraine - there might even be an added resilience/stamina to weather the rise in inflation-driven cost of living without a decrease in pro-Ukraine enthusiasm.
And if Putin was hoping to divide & conquer the West on sanctions relief (as a precondition for Russian withdrawal), well that is likely gone out of the window now: on the contrary, the German defense minister even suggested an EU-wide ban on Russian gas imports.
International response has already been swift - with many allied nationals calling for tougher sanctions to punish these war crimes.
But this shouldn’t be the only retaliation pursued: bounties should be offered for any information that leads to capture of Russian commanders/soldiers that occupied Bucha.
Other Russian commanders must be warned with a threat of war tribunals as well.
Both of these steps would lead to additional loss of morale in the Russian army.
And Kyiv is surely considering organizing special ops missions to hunt down the soldiers and commanders responsible for this particular atrocity: successful execution of this campaign would lead to further morale boost amongst Ukrainians - crucial, given the likelihood of upcoming severe battles in Donbas.
(side note: and Zelensky’s announcement of a cleanup in the military, and dismissal/investigation of the two traitorous generals (one of whom disappeared shortly before the Russian invasion) within the military was especially timely. This demonstrates resolve and actually cleansing the Ukrainian army of Russian agents, is crucial ahead of the battle for Donbas - since the counter-offensive warfare involving combined-arms maneuvers will be more vulnerable to sabotage from Russia.)
NATO PsyOps
This past week did also witness multiple ‘‘bombshell revelations’’, with the most consequential ones being:
1) Allegation that Putin is being actively misinformed by his closest military advisers and leaders.
2) Reports that Putin may have been suffering from Thyroid cancer, and is generally unwell and is constantly accompanied by a medical team.
3) Head of the GCHQ spy agency, Jeremy Fleming revealed extreme morale and/or operational problems within the Russian army: soldiers demonstrating an outright refusal to obey commands, actively sabotaging the operations/abandoning their posts, and an astonishing level of incompetence resulting in friendly fires/destruction of own aircraft - demonstrating a serious ineptitude in execution of combined arms warfare.
It is exceptionally difficult to assign appropriate weight to each of these allegations - hard to prove veracity of these claims.
But one thing is clear: they have an enormous value as psyops - demoralizing the Russian soldiers and commanders involved in this war, discouraging future volunteers from joining the army, and potentially starting to produce a dent in what seems to be an overwhelming Russian public support for this war.
And Ukraine had its own creative PsyOps to complement these offers:
All of this narrative warfare is of course important - but Ukraine is about to face decisive clashes in Donbas, and the assistance that it receives must be adequate, and correspond to the challenge at hand.
Izyum-Kamyanka is now the main theater of heavy fighting where Russians are on the attack.
Fall of Mariupol could also free Russian logistics, supplies and actual manpower (though not all of it - since a significant portion will need to remain as an occupying force until sufficient replacements arrive) available to move north and trap the Ukrainian JFO forces in Donbas with pincer movements.
Naturally, fighting on the home ground, Ukraine will benefit from using the internal rail lines (vs relying on external logistical/transport lines like Russia) and deploy troops to new battlefield theaters much more efficiently.
But Russia will now get to concentrate its forces in a relatively familiar theater - and it is already pouring in additional 10 BTGs (Battalion Tactical Group), Wagner mercenaries, and deploying troops from frozen conflict zones that it oversees in Ossetia and Karabakh, as well as from the far away regions.
There is also a risk of the fresh new batch of 134.5k conscripts being involved in (some way) in the upcoming war.
Although Russia’s Ministry of Defense was adamant that these conscripts will not be sent to fight, and Russian law certainly forbids deployment of conscripts to foreign territories, what if Donetsk and Luhansk get annexed and officially incorporated into Russian territory?
We cannot rule out such (or other loopholes/tricks) that could involve conscripts (receiving a minimal/expedited training) in this war.
Putin may also (even if reluctantly) declare a general mobilization - especially now that the public support for the war is on the rise.
The US and NATO must therefore take all of the necessary steps to aid Ukraine in conducting a highly effective counteroffensive in Donbas.
The cost of continuous war must become too high for Putin to delay a political settlement.
An early momentum/success in Donbas could convince Putin to push further and onwards with the invasion - especially if a) reports of him being misled/misinformed are true, b) the economy continues to adjust to the early shocks and rouble continues to stabilize, and c) the current public support stays the same or even grows in intensity.
Ukraine must therefore secure immediate gains and success on the battlefield, and together with other measures discussed below, everything must be done to affect Putin’s calculus and convince him that his best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is further military defeat, unsustainable battlefield casualties, and economic turmoil.
Urgent next steps:
1) Further military aid at higher speed & scale.
It is good that the US is finally in the process of organizing the supply of tanks to Ukraine - and that Germany has sent over 56 PbV-501s : the very first NATO transfer of armored vehicles in this war.
NATO has more than 500 Russian T-72 and T-80 tanks - all of them should be delivered to Ukraine: NATO can afford to backfill them all with modern American, British, French and Turkish tanks.
But armored vehicles are not enough.
Unless NATO wants Ukraine to copy Russia’s tactical mistakes, and roll into battle without proper combined-arms maneuvers, it must supply Ukraine with adequate air power - MIG-29s must finally be delivered.
In addition, soviet-era MLRS, artillery and howitzers must all be supplied.
Modern longer-range systems (with comparatively shorter required training periods) like Spike/NLOS should also be offered.
Ukraine must succeed in its counter-offensive operations.
2) Sanctions and further economic costs.
Sanctions are still at a 7/10 intensity - and with the Russian economy adjusting, and rouble rebounding, they are quickly going down to 5-6/10.
A lot more can still be done.
Sanctioning Russian Central Bank (CBR) and several major private banks initially had a major effect - but foreign currencies are now simply accumulating in unsanctioned banks.
In addition, only 1/5 of Russia’s largest banks (VTB bank) is banned from SWIFT.
These cables have repeatedly called for sanctions against all major financial institutions in Russia.
Russia’s largest bank for assets under management, Sberbank, still retains access to SWIFT.
Furthermore, the US is yet to lead a global effort to cut Russian oil sales - there is a need for a repeat of the Iran oil sanctions playbook: phased restrictions, secondary sanctions, and escrow accounts (where funds from the oil sales accumulate and incentivize desired behavior to recover access).
Without these urgent changes, the Russian economy will adjust and further decline will become manageable.
3) Deterring Russia from creating new conflicts in the Caucasus.
With significant battlefield failures in Ukraine, Putin is extremely sensitive to his ‘‘threat display’’ prowess.
Moreover, he is getting increasingly annoyed with Russia’s neighbors in the Caucasus: Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Add to this mix, the lack of powerful disincentives to expand/create new regional conflicts (he might calculate that most of the sanctions/costs are already imposed - and that there is little room for more), Putin could create new military conflicts in the Caucasus.
His peacekeepers in Karabakh have deliberately failed to implement the political settlement of November 2020 - where the victorious party Azerbaijan, agreed to allow Russian peacekeepers enter its internationally recognized (and militarily liberated) Karabakh territories - in return for Russians to oversee removal of the remaining ethnic Armenian militias.
Unsurprisingly, this has not happened (on purpose - to secure Russia’s leverage over Azerbaijan), and unfortunately, Armenian leadership damaged the process of normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and proceeded to act as a vassal for Russia - once again taking part in active provocations against Azerbaijan.
In Georgia, the situation is even more pressing - Russia has hinted at the possibility that the breakaway South Ossetia could vote in a referendum to be incorporated into Russia.
This would be nothing short of an outright annexation of the internationally recognized territory of Georgia.
In both instances, Russia could resort to force against its southern neighbors in the Caucasus.
The US/NATO must make it clear that Russian aggression would be unacceptable, that it would create conditions for further economic sanctions, and that both countries would be aided with lethal military hardware necessary for self-defense.
Russia cannot be allowed to keep acting as a completely Rogue state - invading/threatening its neighbors as it pleases.
The west had failed in implementing deterrence by denial in relation to Ukraine - Putin was not convinced that an invasion would be a failure, and/or costlier than the price he was willing to pay.
Similar mistakes must not be repeated in relation to Caucasus - a region of potentially higher volatility, where a new conflict could drag a major NATO power into an active confrontation with Russia (for example: Turkey actively supporting/fighting for its ally Azerbaijan).
Competition over India intensifies - opportunities that Washington must seize with urgency.
In the past two weeks, both China and the US have spent a lot of diplomatic resources on India.
But both have competing and opposite goals.
Beijing wants a ‘‘stable and predictable’’ relationship with Delhi (although this particular phrase was used by the Secretary of State Blinken to describe Washington’s relationship aspirations in relation to Russia - didn’t age well..).
China wants India to continue to remain relatively passive within the QUAD, and largely neutral on a larger diplomatic stage.
It most definitely doesn’t want a potential extra military front (for example, due to renewed conflict in Ladakh) on its southwestern border - it also wants to prevent India receiving military support from the US (so far, preferring that those needs are instead continue to be met by Russia-at least in the short-term).
In many respects, Beijing’s ask is rather limited: it knows that once India catches up economically, and boosts its military posture, a significant challenge to China’s regional dominance will arise.
In the long-term, and with much more favorable demographic trends, India is poised to mount a substantial challenge to Chinese hegemony.
China wants to delay that eventuality for as long as possible - facing both the US and India (not to mention other QUAD members) at the same time, would overstretch China.
China’s diplomatic ploys.
The recent visit by China’s foreign minister Wang, is a great mini illustration of China’s foreign policy objectives.
The visit was short and wasn’t going to involve deeper strategic discussions - instead, Wang wanted to accomplish two tactical objectives:
1) Declaring that both parties agreed about response to the war in Ukraine, implying therefore, a further alignment between Beijing and Delhi on Ukrainian war - thereby imposing a Beijing-friendly frame, and committing India to remain the most passive QUAD member on the issue, and (in spite of Washington’s recent efforts - more on that later below), cooling the relationship between DC and Delhi even further.
2) Achieve public declaration of ‘‘normalized’’ relations with India (after a long frost caused by the border clashes in Ladakh).
Unfortunately for Wang, (and perhaps, pleasantly surprising for DC), India rebuffed China on both accounts.
Firstly, by clarifying that Beijing and Delhi did indeed diverge in their view of the war in India.
And secondly, when India’s foreign minister countered Wang with concrete demands on Ladakh - before any such public normalization could be announced.
Indian foreign minister Jaishankar was rather candid and direct on the matter: ‘‘ Frictions, tensions arising from China’s deployments since April 2020 cannot be reconciled with normal relationship between two neighbors.”
In other words, Wang failed to achieve either one of his tactical objectives.
Unsurprisingly too: India is concerned about ‘‘no limits’’ partnership between China and Russia.
The ‘‘no limits’’ part may not apply in a standoff with a powerful US, but with India? What would Russia do if (now ever more dependent on China) it was faced with Chinese demands to suddenly stop any and all military help in a potential military conflict with China?
It is unclear whether such questions were ever probed (even if carefully, and indirectly) by the Indian foreign minister when welcoming his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
(side note: Lavrov’s visit coincided with that of the British foreign minister, and Lavrov’s ‘‘arch-nemesis’’ Liz Truss - she was seeking closer military ties and India’s reduced dependence on Russia: essentially and unsurprisingly, sharing the objectives of the US delegation - more on that later below).
Lavrov was visiting to both rebuff any suggestions that Russia was turning into an isolated pariah state, and to seek certain practical gains: discussion of closer military ties (with new potential deals), and closing a deal for India’s purchase of a discounted Russian crude oil (aiming for 15 mln barrels for this year alone), and setting up a rupee-rouble payment as an insurance against Western sanctions (whereby, Indian importers send payments to the accounts of Russian banks in India, and they then make the forward payment in roubles to the Russian exporters).
And even if India chose to delay the conversation on highly sensitive grand strategic matters, surely more practical topics would have been discussed: for example, Russian bombing of ‘‘Antonov’’ aircraft plants (as part of its “de-militarization’’ campaign) is a direct harm to Delhi’s interests.
Indian Air Force has a fleet of 100+ Antonovs, many of which were up for upgrades with new spare parts (in addition to new expected deliveries) - India relies on these essential transport aircrafts to maintain the logistics of its army, and supply the troops at the border with Pakistan and China.
In addition, the ships that India bought from Russia rely on propulsion systems made in Ukraine - these manufacturers were also targeted by Russian cruise missiles and air strikes.
As a result, any damage to the Antonov plant - and to any other Ukrainian military hardware manufacturers currently supplying India, is therefore a direct hit to India’s national interests.
Clearly then, there is a fresh new area of friction in the Russia-India relationship.
And this is where the more active US role will pay off significant dividends.
These cables have previously advocated for a more aggressive US policy to replace Russia as a primary military supplier of India.
This policy will not only let India play an active role in isolating Russia - but also increase its assertiveness vis-à-vis China: it would not have to worry about Russian ammunition replacements failing to arrive in the middle of a military clash with China.
It is thus great to see that US foreign policymakers are finally stepping up their game on this matter.
US moves: tough love, but also mainly love.
The opening Salvo was President Biden’s description of India’s struggle with confronting Russia: an accusation that they were being ‘‘shaky’’ (in contrast to other QUAD members).
Such “public shaming” was both necessary and almost unprecedented in recent years - this was certainly the toughest that Biden has ever been on India.
But to ensure effectiveness in shaping a desired behavior, such stern rhetoric must always be paired with pragmatic offers: in this case, India must receive concrete US offers that would aim to reduce Delhi’s dependence on Russian oil and weapons.
And fortunately, this seems to be taking place.
There are reports that both the US deputy national security advisor Daleep Singh, and the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria Nuland, offered precisely that in their recent India trip.
Nuland’s comment was particularly intriguing:
‘‘For a long time, the United States was not willing to supply weapons to India ourselves. So now that has changed. And now we are talking about how we help them make that transition.’’
This aligns with how the Indian media portrayed the US delegation’s recent Delhi visit:
‘‘Pentagon official Donald Lu and senior US diplomat Victoria Nuland, who played the role in ousting a pro-Russian Ukrainian President in 2014, have over the past two days met Jaishankar and Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla with offers to replace practically everything that India sources from Russia [emphasis added]’’.
Of course, replacing Russia as the primary military supplier is precisely what these cables have called for mere two weeks ago.
What the US wants from India amounts to a very high threshold request - the value offered in return, must therefore also be correspondingly stratospheric.
And so, it is great to see DC taking initiative on this - not wasting time in seizing this incredible opportunity.
Of course, this policy will have wider implications - imposing a tricky dilemma on China.
Beijing will have to play its own game, and must now choose between two difficult scenarios: 1) The US replacing Russia as the primary supplier of weapons, or 2) Avoiding this scenario by encouraging Russia to increase its arms shipments to India at a lower cost.
At first look, the answer may be rather obvious: surely China would want its ‘‘no limits’’ ally to be the primary supplier? Since those taps can be closed-off on short notice in case of a conflict with India, and let’s be honest, Russian hardware will not match the ones provided by the US (and/or other NATO members like the UK).
And besides, China is already in possession of many of those Russian weapons - and so, better informed about their capabilities/able to counter them in the scenario of renewed clashes with India - with a possibility that Russians could even be pressed to help China sabotage the software of the most advanced weapons like the S-400s.
But that is only the ideal scenario - with more options, India could demand more favorable terms from Russia - forcing for example, installation of third-party software into Russian fighter jet/SAM hardware.
It could also negotiate a better supply/replacement contract, and or joint-development: preventing (or at least reducing the likelihood) of those taps being turned off at Beijing’s request.
And besides, the US promises may amount to very little - bureaucracy may do its thing, and it could be a very long time before India starts receiving any serious American hardware - it is one thing to supply Javelin missiles in an emergency, quite another to complete the procurement of F-16s or THAADS/Patriots.
On the other hand, going with Russia may cause unforeseen challenges: Moscow may in the meantime may be incentivized to sell maximum amount of hardware in shortest amount of time - both to relieve economic pressures, and to compensate for likely drop in demand for Russian weapons - given the poor performance in Ukraine, where 60% of missiles failed to hit their targets (of course, this could partly be due to poor maintenance - but it is still unlikely to be the main cause - there are surely some deficiencies in Russian hardware).
But unless Washington starts moving fast, these dilemmas will remain in the hypothetical realm only.
The US must not delay implementing this timely policy - this is a great opportunity to weaken India’s ties with Russia, and impose unsavory dilemmas on Beijing.