Weekly Overview

The White House and the Kremlin compete to set early narratives, and impose their initial frames ahead of the US/NATO-Russia talks

• Preliminary dates for meetings with Russia negotiators have been set.

• The US-Russia meeting will take place on Jan 10, NATO-Russia meeting on Jan 12, and a broader meeting including the US, Russia and other OSCE members will take place on Jan 13.

• Both sides are competing to dominate:

• 1) The immediate confrontational frame and;

• 2) The story told to the whole world - aiming to gain the upper hand in defining the West vs Russia standoff (for the global media to replicate their preferred narrative of events).

• Russia

• The Kremlin is playing the usual game of disorientation by continuously sending mixed messages: from expressions of hope for better relationships, (arming the Kremlin appeasers in the West with arguments in favor of unilateral, and thus unjustified concessions) to open threats - with Putin implying a military response, depending on ‘‘what proposals our military experts submit to me”, if Russian demands were to be frustrated.

• Putin’s decision to withdraw approximately 10,000 troops from the Ukrainian border and send them back to their barracks was another move that threw off Western strategists.

• In reality, one couldn’t interpret this a particular message - rather, this was most likely intended to be perceived precisely as a signal absent a clear message, and add further to the confusion.

• The probable goal was to fuel further speculations without allowing for a definitive (and satisfactory) interpretation of Putin’s intent: Is Putin demonstrating good-will ahead of January negotiations? Will the troops come back? Was it all another trick?

• The Kremlin then proceeded to test waters on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany.

• Putin spoke with enthusiasm on how the NS2 was ready to get going - and that this would benefit the EU via calmer gas prices.

• In addition, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, emphasized that the Kremlin didn’t consider the Germany failure to certify the NS2 as a possibility:

• "We don't consider such options and we believe it will be launched in line with the timings, set for certification."

• These statements on Nord Stream 2 achieve the following 3 objectives:

• 1) Test of the new German coalition government’s resolve - will the new Chancellor Olaf Scholz rebuff the Kremlin, reminding the Russians that the issue of certification is open for consideration?

• 2) Create a new status quo - that the certification must happen under the current circumstances, where Ukraine hasn’t faced any further invasion.

• Prior to Russia’s recent build-up of troops on the Ukrainian border, a lot of Western strategists (including these cables) were advocating for de-certification of the NS2.

• Putin now aims to solidify the new status quo - where the NS2 de-certification would only be considered if/when Russia engaged in further military campaigns in Ukraine.

• 3) Feign vulnerability and shape the US/NATO sanctions strategy.

• Emphasis on (and an apparent inability to process an alternative reality of de-certification) importance of the NS2 to the Kremlin, incentivizes the US/NATO strategists to keep pushing in the same direction.

• By encouraging the groupthink that the NS2 de-certification is already a juicy target (on its own sufficient to cause a lot of pain to the Kremlin) Putin is therefore having an indirect say in the US/NATO sanctions strategy.

• Western strategists may feel content that the NS2 sanctions/de-certification would generate enough pain - and would be disincentivized to pursue other/ further trade and investment sanctions.

• In reality, the NS2 loss will not be a big deal for Putin - since it is not even a current active asset - at this very moment, (when it is still not operational) it is a potentially lucrative opportunity only.

• This is why the US should pursue the NS2 de-certification regardless of Putin’s conduct in Ukraine.

• It would be a significant mistake to create an extra bargaining chip for Putin - especially when getting absolutely nothing in return.

• The sanctions/better relationship trade should revolve around additional economic pain - without granting Putin a strategic win of treating the NS2 pipeline as a current asset to be lost.

• US

• The White House National Security Council framed the upcoming talks with Russia quite well:

• "When we sit down to talk, Russia can put its concerns on the table, and we will put our concerns on the table with Russia's activities as well" [emphasis added].

• Given that Russia has already laid out its ‘‘concerns’’ in enormous detail (and accompanied with plenty of theatrics/absurd allegations), the NSC’s statement urging Russia to come to the table with concerns is an indirect, and diplomatic dismissal of all previous Kremlin demands.

• That lengthy document with outrageous demands of controlling the fate of neighboring countries (and leaving the Kremlin an option to pursue bilateral military alliances, whilst denying the similar rights to the US)? Dismissed.

• What about Putin’s claims of being cornered by NATO with no where to retreat? Also Dismissed.

• The message to Russia is quite clear: come to the table with realistic ‘‘concerns’’ - something that is possible to negotiate around.

• Very nuanced and shrewd statement from the NSC.

• This under the radar statement allows Russians to calibrate ahead of the talks, and seek some reasonable concessions that will not be wholly dismissed - potentially preventing a huge loss of face for the Kremlin.

• In addition, the NSC statement further serves as an effective test/filter for Putin’s true intentions.

• The frequently made argument that Putin is merely seeking pretexts for war, will strengthen considerably if even after this gesture, the Kremlin fails to calibrate, and pursues its outrageous demands in January meetings with the US and NATO.

• Biden - Putin phone call

• This was an interesting development - when Putin decided to request another meeting with Biden before the major US/NATO vs Russia meetings.

• It is clear that Putin wasn’t seeking an opportunity for a very substantive conversation.

• Rather, the relatively brief nature of the call (as well as its timing - only 1.5 weeks before the major US/NATO vs Russia meetings) suggests that the Russian president was on an intel gathering mission.

• Putin was most likely looking for indicators of Biden’s evolving strategy ahead of the major meetings - to determine how far he can push the US.

• So how did the call go?

• Although we don’t know the full details of the conversation, Biden is adamant that he was assertive with Putin - warning that he cannot make a ‘‘move on Ukraine’’.

• Naturally, no objections to that.

• What is more troubling however, is Biden explicitly outlining two distinct options for Putin.

• According to a senior White House official, Biden offered “two paths”: diplomacy or American deterrence through sanctions”.

• Clearcut, binary distinction for Putin - this is problematic, for he can now clearly see when one stops and another begins.

• This incentivizes Putin to keep pushing the boundaries until the deterrence part begins.

• Both deterrence and diplomacy must take place simultaneously - to reinforce the effectiveness of each other.

• The offer of two distinct paths is further problematic and contradictory with another most recent statement released by the White House on the first Sunday of the new year - the readout on Biden’s conversation with the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, promises a decisive response by the US and allied nations ‘‘if Russia further invades Ukraine’’.

• The addition of the word “further” is crucial here - reminding the often-forgotten reality that Russia has already invaded Ukraine in 2014, and continues its occupation to this day.

• But the statement also raises a troubling issue: if deterrence is to be applied in the event that Russia invades Ukraine any further, then what about the current status quo?

• Is it suddenly acceptable for Russia to maintain its current occupation and face repercussions only in the event of further aggression?

• This is why the previous distinction of diplomacy vs deterrence is so damaging.

• It implies that Putin will face no further consequences for his current occupation - only to face deterrence in case of further invasion.

• This then strengthens Putin’s status quo position - making it even less likely that Russia would give up on its current occupation any time soon..

• The diplomacy vs deterrence frame further allows Russians to feign outrage, and pretend that the threat posed is what the Kremlin fears most - this could potentially trick the US/NATO into believing that they struck a nerve with this threat.

• That the current threats of deterrence are indeed effective and sufficient (dissuading the US and NATO from exploring further, and more creative costs to inflict on Russia).

• Indeed, Putin’s foreign affairs adviser Yuri Ushakov, jumped at the opportunity to play precisely this card - warning that further US sanctions “would be a colossal mistake that would entail grave consequences”.

• There are three further self-harming implications of creating this clear line between diplomacy and deterrence:

• a) Implicit permission to continue the current stand off with no downside - Can Putin now enjoy the current limbo without deterrence?

• As long as he doesn’t invade any further?

• So, is it fine for him to (by simply positioning his troops, and adding few menacing statements), prolong the tensions and waste NATO’s will and alertness by engaging in a war of attentional attrition?

• All with impunity?

• If deterrence will only kick in if/when he attacks again, what incentives does he have to not maintain the current tensions, keep blackmailing the US and NATO, and secure possible concessions?

• b) Reducing ambiguity and the possibility of unforeseen risks for the Kremlin - Putin now has a good understanding of the full extent of possible acts of ‘‘deterrence’’.