Weekly Overview: A comprehensive strategy to strengthen Ukraine’s hand in the ongoing negotiations.
Weekly Overview: A comprehensive strategy to strengthen Ukraine’s hand in the ongoing negotiations.
A comprehensive strategy to strengthen Ukraine’s hand in the ongoing negotiations.
As Russian advance has stalled across all four axes, Putin complained about delayed negotiations and blamed Ukraine for it: as if Kyiv was stalling the progress with their unrealistic proposals.
Of course, this was nothing else than a ploy to imply his eagerness to come to an agreement - and with that, potentially discourage further sanctions (Putin is betting on enough US/EU policymakers falling into the usual trap and arguing that disincentivizing further negotiations by increasing sanctions on Russia is a bad idea).
The facts on the ground however, point in the opposite direction - Russia is:
a) Building up its resources, and replenishing its troops for another offensive;
b) Reiterating the fake biolab pretexts to justify further ‘‘special operations’’ to continuously ‘‘demilitarize’’ Ukraine, and;
c) Rallying supporters and generating public buzz behind its military campaigns (and yes, a very large proportion of those attending Putin’s rally were ‘‘budgetniki’’ - government employees forced to show up in droves - but this fake ‘‘potemkin village’’ display of excitement, still doesn’t hide the basic fact that majority of Russians are passively supporting the invasion - even surveys arranged by a US polling expert produced a 58% support for the war - clearly, there is still not enough public outcry in opposition to the war.)
So if not a speedy resolution to the war, what is it exactly that Putin wants?
Ideally, Putin would want to secure an overwhelming, and visually indisputable victory.
For example: Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa are fully encircled and Putin extracts major political concessions.
(side note: at the moment, the city most likely to fall is Mariupol - currently under siege, facing Russia’s demands of surrender. But even if it falls, on its own, it is unlikely to cause necessary compellence on the Zelensky government in Kyiv)
He then sells it back home in Russia: ‘‘we forced them to submit to our will’’ , is the ideal narrative sought by Putin (now that the original regime change objective is implausible/unsustainable in the long-term).
And in the meantime, statements like blaming Ukraine for delays in negotiations, secure him more time to implement his ideal scenarios.
(side note: that is, unless Ukraine grants him his wishes even prior to a renewed assault)
But regardless of shorter-term ploys, certain fundamentals remain unchanged.
And as the negotiations with Russia intensify, and a possible settlement becomes likelier with every day, it is time to take a bird’s eye view at the overall context, and determine the necessary strategy to empower Ukraine with more leverage in these talks.
Here is the crux of the matter: time is not on Russia’s side.
Putin’s original political objective of a regime change is no longer feasible - for even if Zelensky is removed/assassinated, his replacement will not survive in power.
That is, unless Russia commits an extraordinary amount of military resources to ensure the survival of the puppet regime - but there is little indication that Putin actually desires to go with such an untenable option.
Given that the very first objective is no longer possible, Russia will most likely double down on grand strategy of compellence - on operational level, this would amount to a war of annihilation and/or attrition - infliction of extreme military and civilian pain to compel a favorable (to the Kremlin) negotiated agreement.
Currently (and unless the battlefield changes dramatically in the upcoming days/weeks) however, the very best that Putin could aim for are the following:
1) Ukraine’s recognition (even if de facto/in technically face-saving way - e.g. we will hold a referendum (that Russia then rigs) ) of all annexed territories (Crimea, DNR, LNR, in their new territorially expanded forms), and;
2) Ukraine’s commitment to remain neutral and forgo a NATO membership.
(side note: what will not happen: Ukraine giving up on EU membership. That this would be a red line, has been reiterated on many occasions by the most senior Ukrainian officials. And President Zelensky himself expects the membership progress materializing very soon.)
Of course, originally Putin’s list was much longer.
Recall the demands from the US on promises to not have any military cooperation with any post-soviet country (territories that Putin considers as spheres of influence).
But back to Ukraine: the recognition of territories must never even be discussed in any serious way.
Sure, some devolution and decentralization to the breakaway regions, may in fact be offered (and these territories did largely enjoy this decentralized power even prior to this war), but all of them must continue to be recognized as Ukrainian territory.
(side note: and even if a hypothetically a feckless Ukrainian government was to ‘‘recognize’’ them, so what? The international community would surely not follow suit. There is international law after all - Ukraine agreeing to their recognition at a gunpoint is irrelevant. Russia simply cannot be allowed to invade a country and rearrange its official borders - forcing the victim to agree to the new reality)
But when it comes to NATO, unfortunately, President Zelensky has indicated enormous flexibility.
And there is a qualitative difference between non-binding ‘‘statements of neutrality’’, and an actual substantive commitment to not pursue a NATO membership.
The former is a meaningless statement designed to allow Putin withdraw whilst saving some face - without granting any real binding concessions.
The latter amounts to a loss of sovereignty - Zelensky (at a gunpoint) agrees to the Russian demands to commit to a specific course of foreign policy.
Of course Zelensky reframed the bitter admission as a simple reality that Ukraine has to face - where most of the complaint was launched at the NATO members’ reluctance to see Ukraine amongst its ranks - in other words, to save Ukraine’s own face, Zelensky tried to frame it as Kyiv simply accepting real facts on the ground, and not conceding to Moscow in any meaningful way - how could you concede something that wasn’t on the table to begin with?
But in reality, the facts would remain that Putin forced Ukraine to agree to something they have resisted for so long - the Kremlin will most certainly frame it as a victory - and undoubtedly many Russians may passively agree.
But not all is lost just yet.
Ukraine could still recover from this (self-inflicted) position of weakness, and refuse to offer any sovereignty-constraining concessions.
With more leverage, Kyiv could still reframe its NATO concessions into a position that involves no firm commitments to a refusal to pursue the membership.
Without introducing any constitutional amendments, or adding the provision in any treaty with Russia, Kyiv may simply insist that the current government is not seeking a membership, and that it could not possibly speak for (and bind) future generations.
Of course, this is not something that Putin would accept as a concession - recall his repeated tropes about ‘‘guarantees’’.
But such guarantees are precisely the ones that Ukraine must avoid making.
With altered facts on the ground, change in context, and enough incentives, Kyiv can attain strong leverage in these negotiations - one that could force Russia into accepting some token face-saving statements instead of continuing on this costly and self-destructive path (which Putin constantly hints in his speeches that he is willing to take - he is careful not to show that sanctions are affecting his calculus).
So what is the strategy to grant Ukraine this crucial leverage?
Creating strong disincentives for Putin continuing the war.
Through a variety of incentives and disincentives, a situation must be shaped where even a bad deal for Putin becomes better than his BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement).
In other words, military, economic, and diplomatic facts on the ground must be stacked overwhelmingly against Russian interests - enough to convince Putin that every day he delays a negotiated settlement further, his hand will be getting weaker - that time works decidedly against him.
Under no circumstances should he believe that soldiering on with attrition warfare and waiting it out just a little longer, will grant him the leverage that he needs to impose the extreme demands on Ukraine.
And there are indeed a number of tactics and strategies to shape Putin’s calculus against a prolonged war:
1) Increasing Ukraine’s combat staying power
Firstly there is the obvious one: continue to arm and supply Ukraine and increase its ability to prosecute a longer war.
If Putin is convinced of Ukraine’s longer staying power, a protracted war will become extremely unappealing.
And to do so, NATO must put specific effort into building a fresh Ukrainian army for prolonged insurgency.
This army must consist of:
a) A large territorial defense force based on the Polish model - and trained specifically in urban combat and anti-siege tactics;
b) Contain smaller and agile special forces units tasked with supply chain (and other high value) sabotage, and trained to interoperate with international volunteers, and;
c) Primarily trained and headquartered in western Ukraine - units spread across deep in the Carpathian mountains will provide an excellent base for this new army.
Secondly, (and this is often overlooked) we need to additionally re-focus on Ukraine’s basic/more conventional military equipment.
Social media is full of Turkish drone strikes against Russian tanks - but Russians are also causing significant damage: destroying Ukrainian MLRS/artillery units/tanks and BMPs, and crushing key military infrastructure with “Kinzhal’’ hypersonic cruise missiles
(side note: these are often conducted by Russian KA-52 ‘‘alligator’’ helicopters. Raising the question around Ukrainian army’s proficiency in their use of Stinger and Starstreak missiles - since it is one thing to fail in shooting down a drone flying much higher/more covertly, but quite another to fail with low-flying helicopters. Perhaps there is an urgent need for extra training)
Therefore, beyond all of the military hardware discussed in the previous cables (Bayraktar TB2 drones, NLAWs, Javelins, Switchblades, S300 Air Defense SAMs etc), Ukraine will be in further need of more conventional weapons: tanks, howitzers, armored vehicles.
Turkey could help with their Roketsan T-107 Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) systems.
France should finally step up and supply VAB VTT armored vehicle carriers, and all T-80 and T-72 tanks under NATO possession must be urgently delivered into Ukrainian hands.
(side note: and President Zelensky is certainly correct in seeking missile defense systems from Israel - and the inevitable training period required to operate a new missile defense system, is a shrewd tacit message from Zelensky that Ukraine is willing to fight on for some time)
Finally, the battles for Mariupol and Mykalaiv will be crucial from both tactical and strategic perspectives - if they are lost, the entirety of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast could then follow - falling easily into Russian hands.
Moreover, Mariupol is valiantly defended by the Azov battalion - their defeat could have a hugely demoralizing effect.
The Ukrainian military leadership must be reminded of the importance of both Mariupol and Mykolaiv - the fate of the whole Donbas region, Odessa, and the rest of the Black sea depend on the survival of these cities.
And with their fall, the Russian army will be free to redeploy and move north towards Kyiv.
NATO must focus its efforts into providing a close-combat tactical and intel advice around the defense of these cities - and outline possible counter-attack strategies - so that even if initially victorious in capturing these towns, the Russian troops (mainly the 8th Combined Arms Army) are then pinned down and forced to maintain a large occupying force - thus unable to redeploy, move out, and push on with their invasion.
2) Geopolitical incentives to end the war.
The US and NATO must make it clear to the Kremlin that unless it concludes the war, fully withdraws its troops, and commits to security guarantees for Ukraine, NATO would be forced to permanently increase its military presence alongside all borders with Russia.
And that this would happen no matter who is in power in Ukraine - in other words, trying to pressure Kyiv into lobbying NATO to reduce its forward presence will not work.
Unless Putin wants a permanent, forward NATO posture with all of the corresponding offensive missiles in place, he needs to fully withdraw from Ukraine.
This threat (if delivered credibly and with confidence) will link Putin’s nightmare scenario to his own conduct, and therefore create clear incentives for desirable outcomes without making him feel cornered - he is in charge of his own fate here.
The stick must however, be paired with a carrot: in return, NATO could promise to never have military bases in Ukraine - something that NATO wasn’t planning on doing in any case (one of Putin’s fabricated false flags), but a bargaining chip for Kyiv nonetheless.
In addition, and in return for full Russian withdrawal and security guarantees (with great implementation mechanisms - for example more transparency into Russia’s BTG/hardware movement close to the Ukrainian border) Kyiv too can commit to never hosting any NATO military bases, and/or offensive missiles.
This allows Putin to cite a concrete accomplishment, and avoid a total loss of face that would follow from merely acquiescing to NATO threats.
Mechanics of this threat matter - the warning must first be delivered via backchannels - reducing the need for face-saving intransigence.
If this doesn’t work, the warning must become public and demonstrate to the Russian siloviki/security apparatus elite, and to the entire Russian population that unless Putin changes his course, Russia’s geopolitical posture will worsen considerably.
3) Economic incentives: make it crystal clear that sanctions will get much worse and that relying on China is futile.
The existing sanctions are biting enough - without going through the whole list, we can safely assume that Putin didn’t expect the most serious sanctions to ever materialize.
He assumed that the Central Bank of Russia would remain untouched, and would not be blacklisted - otherwise, why would he keep 2/3rd of CBR’s $630bn worth of assets denominated in the currencies of the G7 countries?
Along with other sanctions on Russian banks, SWIFT restrictions, and export controls on advanced semiconductors crucial for Russia tech, the current sanctions are in fact biting.
The Russian stock market has still not been opened up, and Venezuela style defaults are now frequently predicted.
But more can be done:
1. Full-blocking sanctions against Sberbank (Russia’s largest bank by assets under control).
2. Blacklisting top 100 state-owned enterprises by market cap - across all industries.
Cut them off from Western debt financing and access to equity markets.
3. Phased approach to Oil sanctions - US and UK embargoes are not enough - EU and the rest of the G20 must be expected to join.
A phased approach is doable and would furthermore prevent extreme price hikes.
The Iran sanctions playbook/ NDAA 2012 is a great example of how to implement this:
a) Phased restrictions and sanctions on Russia’s daily 5m bpd of oil - sudden restrictions would only spike the prices further (perversely, enriching Russians with more oil revenue just when we need to degrade their financial ability to continuous prosecute this war).b) Provide sanction exemptions to countries that reduce the purchases of sanctioned oil over the next six months.
c) Create escrow accounts - where the money from the sale of Russian oil accumulates and remains in the purchasing country’s territory - piling up and incentivizing the reversal of undesirable behavior to access the funds.
Mechanics/messaging is important: this too should at first be delivered as a backchannel warning - allowing Russia to halt its assaults and negotiate a deal before additional sanctions are imposed, and Putin deciding to extend the military campaign (feeling compelled to avoid the impression that additional sanctions succeeded in forcing him to stop and negotiate).
If the backchannels fail, these should be publicly announced - and implemented immediately.
In addition, the Biden admin is correct in warning China about their potential aid to Russia.
From the Biden -Xi Jinping call:
"He [Biden] described the implications and consequences if China provides material support to Russia as it conducts brutal attacks against Ukrainian cities and civilians."
Message to Russia: Don’t rely too much on China - we are ready to impose costs and remember that even before this warning, they were already not even supplying you with crucial aircraft parts - temper your expectations here.
This campaign must continue at the earliest hint of Chinese aid - for Putin must be convinced that there are no lifelines available to him, and that ceasefire and negotiations are his best options.
4) Individual incentives.
a) Putin and his inner circle must see that they will personally have to pay a very high price for their atrocities in Ukraine.
Merely sanctioning Putin and the Foreign Minister Lavrov is not enough - most of their wealth is hidden under the names of their cronies.
Implementation is key - a joint US/EU task-force must be formed: with an explicit and publicly announced goal of hunting down the illicit riches of Putin and his closest inner circle.
Messaging is once again crucial: the Russian public must be made aware of these efforts, and must see that their corrupt leaders - and not the ordinary Russians, are the targets of Western sanctions.
b) Threat of war crime tribunals.
The US and EU must jointly announce the intent to find, identify and prosecute all Russian soldiers and officers guilty of war crimes.
Warning that all Russian soldiers/commanders that target hospitals, theaters, and any and all civilian infrastructure will be found and brought to justice.
The powerful OSINT (open source intelligence) community will add credibility to these claims - from official institutions like Bellingcat, to individual online sleuths collecting OSINT, thousands of people are involved in identification of Russian soldiers and officers liable for civilian deaths.
It is important that this threat be made against all Russian officers regardless of rank - from ordinary soldiers to the Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoygu.
Those in the lower ranks will have an additional reason to abdicate and abandon their army.
Higher up generals and commanders will have even more to lose: even if a successful war crimes tribunal fails to materialize, once successfully identified as war criminals, all of their assets parked safely in the West could be seized - and unlike Putin, their wealth doesn’t add up to hundreds of billions, - the asset seizure threat will therefore be especially effective here.
The message must be clear: you will either be successfully tried for war crimes once removed from office/after the end of the Putin regime, or you will lose all your assets now.
(side note: Biden declaring Putin a war criminal was good - Blinken confirming that he ‘‘personally’’ agreed however, was not. What does this even mean? Is the ‘‘war criminal’’ label open to personal interpretations now? The US must simply declare him a war criminal and be done with it. After all, that’s what we want from allies as well. What we don’t want: instead of simply declaring Putin a war criminal , the UK PM Johnson says that he also ‘‘personally agreed with President Biden’’.)
c) Offer asylum to all soldiers, commanders, and generals that abandon the Russian army.
This will incentivize defections and will damage the morale of Russian troops.
The Russian army’s already battered reputation as a ‘‘military superpower’’ will be further damaged - if enough soldiers and generals defect, the siloviki/security apparatus faction leaders may be forced to act to prevent further damage to the honor and prestige of the military.
4) Mixed messages around no-fly zones.
Both the Biden administration, and NATO Secretary General have repeatedly ruled out the possibility of imposing and implementing a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
We have previously discussed how viewing everything from the frame of a possible nuclear escalation with Russia is simply a bad policy - it is paralyzing and allows for nothing but fear to influence the highest levels of decision-making.
As long as the backchannel communications remain open (which they will be) a possible direct NATO - Russia escalation can and most likely will be avoided.
Given the interest of both sides to avoid a direct conflict, the most likely scenario of a no-fly zone, is that Russia would avoid flying in their aircrafts directly into the Ukrainian air space - firing conventional cruise missiles/quasi-ballistic missiles (like Iskander-M) from outside bases, and firing Kinzhal cruise missiles from MIG-31s flying in the Russian/Belarussian airspace.
The NATO troops would then have an opportunity to use Patriot and/or THAAD SAMs (probably deployed in the western part of Ukraine) to shoot down these incoming cruise/ballistic missiles.
(side note: and if NATO was really trying its best to avoid an escalation, it could in theory focus solely on shooting down the incoming missiles and not the aircrafts/helicopters - most of the significant damage to Ukraine’s core infrastructure is after all caused by cruise/ballistic missiles).
But even if such a policy was not pursued, what is the logic behind constantly and definitively ruling it out?
It is one thing to be risk-averse - quite another to offer a carte blanche to Putin.
This is essentially NATO’s current messaging on the issue of no-fly zones: do whatever you like, we are not going to stop you.
Why remove all and any doubt in Putin’s mind about a possible NATO resistance to his military tactics?
And more generally, how prudent is it to completely rule out a NATO intervention given the uncertainty about Putin’s possible future conduct?
What if the US, UK, NATO warnings about potential Russia chemical attacks actually materialize? What then? Still no intervention?
What if Putin uses his Aleppo playbook and levels major Ukrainian cities - causing tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of civilian deaths?
What if he uses a tactical (low-yield) nuclear weapon in Ukraine? (extremely unlikely but not impossible).
Would NATO really still stay silent and passive to this humanitarian catastrophe and perpetration of extreme war crimes?
In any case, removing all and any doubt in Putin’s mind and granting him a free hand over all potential military moves in Ukraine, is simply a terrible policy.
If anything, this absence of doubt incentivizes further risk-taking and extreme military tactics.
The US must therefore urgently stop this messaging error.
Even if the no-fly zone/NATO intervention remains off the table, this must not be constantly communicated.
Instead, the US must warn that further indiscriminate bombing and deliberate targeting of civilians (as well as the use of the aforementioned extreme tactics), would provide a cause for NATO to reconsider its policy: ‘‘nothing is off-the table’’ should be the message that Putin hears.
And American leaders must cite the widespread public support for such measures (Putin shouldn’t think that Biden’s assertiveness is hindered due to public pressure to stay put and remain on the sidelines): fully 35% of American (without a partisan divide) public favors a US military action in Ukraine - even if this entails a heightened risk of a nuclear conflict with Russia.
This is an incredible statistic - one that is not cited nearly enough by the US leaders.
They must make it clear that the American people are impatient to resolve the crisis, and are willing to take extreme risks in order to prevent further humanitarian catastrophe.
And even if the US/NATO doesn’t alter its policy in substance, the least that it can do is to increase doubts in Putin’s mind - bringing him to the realization that he in fact, does not possess a blank check in Ukraine.
Helping Zelensky via dilution of responsibility
With rising civilian casualties, and Russia (even if very slowly) coming closer to taking over control of key cities like Mariupol and Mykolaiv, the pressure on Zelensky to offer extreme concessions will build.
He should not feel compelled to face these choices alone - he will need loud voices of the entire Ukrainian establishment supporting his policy of resistance.
So then, this is where the Western media can play a major role: Ukrainian political establishment, former and present leaders in politics (on all sides of the aisle), media leaders, public intellectuals and celebrities: all of them must receive as much spotlight as President Zelensky himself.
There should be non-stop interviews where support for Ukraine’s indomitability is expressed loudly by all key public figures in Ukraine - Putin’s maximalist demands must be tempered by the fact that there is powerful political support for Zelensky to continue resisting the extreme concessions.
Next 1-2 weeks (and possibly, even days) will be crucial: Putin’s successful compellence of Ukraine into a capitulatory agreement, would be a disaster not just for the millions of Ukrainians, but also to the entire free world, and to the US-led rules-based global order.
Ukraine must therefore receive a very strong support and help in every possible way that would strengthen Zelensky’s hand - granting him the crucial leverage to negotiate an honorable settlement.