Weekly Overview Cables - ATACMS repercussions, and Putin's retaliation and threat of further escalation.
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Ukraine war updates.
1) Ukraine uses ATACMS and Storm Shadows to devastating effects.
A major ammo depot in Bryansk was destroyed using ATACMS.
Furthermore, command and control positions in Kharkiv and other training assembly grounds were also targeted by Ukrainian strikes (reportedly leading to the wounding of a North Korean general).
2) Shifting Public Opinion on the War: Russians and Ukrainians Favor Negotiations Over Continued Conflict
Shift in Russia.
Support for negotiations has risen significantly, with 54% now favoring a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, compared to 38% who still back continuing the war.
This marks a notable change in sentiment, undermining the common perception that Russians remain resolutely behind the Kremlin's war effort.
For those claiming "Ukrainians are tired, but Russians are not," these figures tell a different story.
Indeed, perhaps the most critical finding (and most dangerous to Putin’s regime) is the following:
By a five to three ratio, more Russians say that the special military operation has caused more harm (47%) than good (28%) for Russia
(side note: in Russia, they still call it special military operation vs war..)
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, (according to the gallup poll) the weariness of war is becoming increasingly apparent.
Public support for "fighting until victory" has plummeted from 63% in 2023 to just 38% today.
In contrast, 52% now favor negotiating an end to the war as soon as possible - a dramatic rise from 27% a year ago.
What is perhaps most telling is the growing openness among Ukrainians to territorial concessions.
Approximately half of those who favor talks are willing to consider ceding land (meaning just a little over a quarter of the population), even though Russia has already seized 19% of Ukraine’s territory since 2014.
By contrast, fewer than 40% of negotiation supporters firmly oppose any land concessions.
Two things to note: 1) this gallup poll was conducted before ATACMS (and Storm Shadow/SCALPs) were finally allowed to strike targets within Russia, and 2) before Putin hinted at escalation and re-issued his threats to both Ukraine and backers in the West.
One expects that lift on restrictions would boost morale - highlighting that the West is finally coming around to enable Ukraine to win.
Escalation risks on the other hand could be a mix bag of effects: on the one hand, is the obviously demoralizing and fear-inducing effect (and if 25% are willing to cede territory before further escalation, then their numbers would surely only rise following Putin’s November 21 speech).
But then again, there could also be a rally ‘round the flag effect on the nation - and in fact, create a shared fate of Ukrainian/peoples of the West vs Russia - and this could (contrary to Putin’s intent) create further resilience and pushback.
3) Baseless criticisms of the ‘‘lame-duck’’ President Biden’s supply of ATACMS to Ukraine.
A number of GOP/MAGA-aligned influencers, public figures, and analysts have criticized Biden for a deliberate overreach in his current status as a lame-duck President, for escalating the war mere two months before Trump’s return.
According to these public figures (like Joe Rogan - who described President Biden as a ‘‘dying’’ lame-duck President causing a nuclear escalation via his supply of ATACMS) there are two issues with Biden’s decision: 1) it is escalatory to lift restrictions on ATACMS, and that 2) he shouldn’t be causing this escalation so soon before Trump’s return.
This argument gets things completely the wrong way around.
First of all, like him or not, Biden is the leader of the free world at a time when there is a major war in continental Europe.
Suggesting that he shouldn’t be taking steps to tilt that war in the US favor, and that he should instead delay any such measures by two months (at the time when situation on the ground changes by day) is an extremely unsound proposition.
The longest and highest-intensity war (with more than 1 million casualties to date) in European history since WWII, has its own dynamics and it really doesn’t matter that there is a unique period in America’s domestic politics where a current President will be out in two months.
Secondly, President Biden is not escalating at all - if anything he is extremely late in allowing Ukraine to use these ATACMS missiles (in Russia) to begin with.
He should have allowed for their unrestricted use from the very beginning - something that most of the GOP establishment in Congress is largely on board with.
If anyone is escalating then it is surely Russia - they are the ones bringing in North Korean troops and hardware onto European soil.
Why are these isolationist MAGA influencers ever caught attacking Putin for an escalation?
They should stick to what they do best: comedy/making fun of extreme wokism and talking about UFC (let’s not discount the entertainment value of both).
But if they do insist on dabbling into politics, then it would be nice for a change to hear Joe Rogan say FU to Putin (what he did say to Zelensky last week).
Finally, the claim that Biden is deliberately creating headaches and difficulty for the incoming administration is also completely untrue.
In fact, the very opposite is the case here: by enabling Ukraine with unrestricted use of ATACMS, Biden is setting up Trump to negotiate from a position of strength.
He is doing the most ‘‘controversial’’ step himself, so that Trump can keep his ‘‘personal relationship capital’’ with Putin intact for the first few weeks of negotiations.
Now, Trump can come into power with ATACMS already unrestricted - he wouldn’t be the one ‘‘responsible’’ for this introduction.
To be clear, Trump’s insistence that he can get this war over in 24hrs because he has that sort of relationship with Putin (who of course respects Trump’s strength) is largely uncredible.
Fundamentals will matter far more than any personal touch here.
And unless Trump is willing to force Ukraine into a terrible deal (unlikely), he is most likely not going to get a great deal from Putin.
Fundamentally, what matters the most is that Putin has to see the overall cost of continuing this war as much higher than any potential gains - only this can convince him to back down and seek a way out.
And this requires pressure and cost-infliction - so sooner or later Trump would need to impose these costs.
But if from Trump’s perspective, trying first to get to an agreement based on inter-personal relationship is preferable to actual grand strategy, then Biden did him a massive favor.
Consider the opposite scenario: it is now beyond reasonable doubt that Ukraine would need to have access to unrestricted use of ATACMS/Storm Shadows etc.
There is a bi-partisan consensus on this basic military fact.
And so, like it or not, Trump would simply be forced to do the very same that Biden did last week - only then, there is no Biden scapegoat, and the responsibility for provoking Putin would rest solely on Trump.
No matter how you look at it then, Biden’s decision was a boon for Trump.
Indeed, there is a reason why neither Trump himself, nor his picks for the Defense Secretary, National Security Adviser, or for the Secretary of State attacked Biden for this decision.
Russia’s retaliation and use of Oreshnik IRBMs.
Russia’s use of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to target Dnipro, Ukraine, represents a significant shift in Russian missile deployment strategies.
Newly developed experimental systems like the Oreshnik IRBM signal Moscow’s continued innovation in tactical nuclear-capable platforms.
Oreshnik missiles are based on the RS-26 Rubezh - missiles that are previously designated as a strategic ICBM.
Russia is therefore not only blurring the line between strategic and intermediate -range capabilities but also sending a clear message to NATO about its ability to flexibly adapt its nuclear posture.
The advance warning to the U.S. via nuclear risk reduction channels highlights the calculated nature of the test—designed to push boundaries without crossing into outright provocation.
However, such actions further erode the already fragile arms control architecture, signaling Moscow’s intent to challenge any remaining norms governing missile deployments.
More troubling is the potential operational deployment of such experimental systems.
By targeting Dnipro, Russia sought to test real-world performance under battlefield conditions while simultaneously delivering a psychological message to Ukraine and its Western backers.
(side note: Russian propaganda was quick to warn Western European capitals that they would be next - openly displaying flight times of Oreshnik before reaching London, Berlin, Paris, etc.)
These launches are not just about tactical results, but about reshaping perceptions of risk and escalation - a hallmark of Putin’s brinkmanship strategy.
Decision to use the Oreshnik missile reflects a complex calculus aimed at balancing multiple objectives and stakeholders within his strategic framework.
1. Reestablishing Deterrence
After years of repeatedly hyping potential escalation and issuing endless red line warnings, Putin found himself cornered.Russia’s previous threats—whether over Abrams tanks, F-16s, artillery supplies, or ATACMS missiles (when they were first introduced) — failed to result in clear, decisive responses, eroding the credibility of its deterrence narrative.
While Russia has consistently engaged in escalatory acts—sabotaging NATO infrastructure in Europe, targeting DHL planes, and jamming GPS systems—these actions lacked a one-to-one connection with specific Western measures.
The arrival of ATACMS missiles in Ukraine forced Putin to act.
To do nothing significant would have left Russia’s deterrence credibility in shambles.
So then, passivity was no longer tenable.
The use of the Oreshnik missile offered a way out—a calculated response that signaled Russia’s seriousness while demonstrating advanced military capability, particularly if the missile’s claimed Mach 10 speed is accurate.
Such a platform is effectively impossible to intercept, even with cutting-edge systems.
This balancing act—credibility, seriousness, and a credible display of power—is exactly what the Kremlin needed to maintain its posture.
2. Target Selection and Strategic Restraint
Russia deliberately avoided high-profile targets like Kyiv or Kharkiv.This decision wasn’t one of leniency but practicality: the experimental missile’s accuracy remains untested.
Consequently, striking Kyiv risked inadvertently hitting the U.S. embassy, a scenario that would outrage the American public and destroy any future rapprochement with a potential Trump administration.
Similarly, an accidental strike on the Chinese embassy would trigger a major diplomatic crisis with Russia’s most critical backer.
By targeting a military-industrial facility at Dnipro—a clear military objective—Russia minimizes these risks while retaining escalation options for the future.
There is now ample room for escalation without having to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons - Putin can progressively increase the importance of targets (advancing towards Kyiv) from the current lower baseline (Dnipro).
3. Boundaries of Escalation
Putin carefully framed this escalation as limited and orderly, targeting military objectives and suggested that he would provide advance warning of future strikes on NATO territories to reduce casualties.This paradoxically increases the credibility of Russia’s threat.
Unlike earlier in the war, when Putin or his propagandists threatened to “wipe the West off the map,” this measured approach signals strategic intent rather than blind desperation.
Unrestrained threats are easily dismissed by Western leaders and intelligence analysts - who see them as either bluffs or signs of irrationality.
In contrast, restrained and credible threats force adversaries to reevaluate the risks of further escalation.
Had Putin issued unhinged threats, Western leaders might not have taken them seriously (given the implicit understanding that Russia would be committing suicide via mutually assured destruction - a totally irrational decision) - or worse, concluded he was irrational and incapable of managing risk (thus reopening discussions of regime change in Russia).
By maintaining a veneer of control, Putin projects an image of a rational actor, which paradoxically strengthens his position.
Avoiding unhinged threats also reduces the risk of an intra-regime challenger - the argument that Russia is in the hands of an absolute madman and thus, that it needs saving from within, becomes weaker.
4. Russia’s New Missile Capabilities Threaten NATO Airbases, Expose Critical Air Defense Gaps.
Amid the ongoing clamor over nuclear threats, a more immediate and practical concern has been overlooked: Russia may have just demonstrated the ability to strike strategic targets in Europe - such as air bases - with high-impact cluster munitions that evade almost all of NATO's current air defense inventory.
This development is a potential game-changer, suggesting Moscow is focusing on practical, deployable tools for escalation rather than relying solely on rhetorical nuclear brinkmanship.
A missile equipped with these munitions could cripple NATO's operational backbone by targeting critical infrastructure like airbases, logistics hubs, and command centers, all with evasion capability (though not necessarily precision) that leaves NATO scrambling to respond.
NATO’s air defense systems, while advanced, are largely ill-suited to intercept such threats.
(side note: there are many analysts blaming the current situation on the U.S. withdrawal from the INF (intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty in 2019 - allowing Russia to do the same. The treaty required the two countries to eliminate their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that could travel between 500 and 5,500 kilometers - so presumably, Oreshik would be covered by it. But to claim that the death of this treaty led to present day Russian capability is largely misguided. If the INF Treaty had survived, would it have truly restrained Moscow's ambitions? Unlikely…let’s not forget that the U.S withdrew from this treaty due to violation from Russia. Moscow developed and deployed the 9M729 (SSC-8) cruise missile in direct violation of the treaty. Why should the U.S. be bound by the treaty that Russia brazenly violates? As such, Russia's illegal development of Oreshnik would also probably slip through the cracks. Consider this: the Chemical Weapons Convention is still in force, yet Russia produced, stockpiled, and deployed Novichok with chilling impunity. Treaties alone do not deter determination.)
Now, it is true that systems like Aegis Ashore or THAAD could, in theory, provide a viable response.
However, even these platforms face significant challenges.
Hypersonic speeds, advanced maneuverability, and countermeasures could still outpace their ability to respond effectively.
Indeed, there are serious questions around intercept viability of these systems.
For example, the Aegis Ashore ground-based ballistic missile defense system employs the RIM-161 Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor, which is capable of engaging ballistic missiles traveling at speeds up to Mach 13.2.
And the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is designed to intercept ballistic missiles with speeds up to approximately 2.8 km/s, or about Mach 8.2.
So, only Aegis ashore could handle Oreshnik’s speed of 10 Machs.
That is of course if 1) Putin is truthful about Oreshnik’s speed, and 2) Missiles do reach Mach 10 - their trajectory, distance covered and payload carried could all affect the speed and thus, their interceptibility.
Regardless of these details however, there is even a more basic math problem: these systems are limited in number, and the U.S. is unlikely to divert a substantial share of its inventory to European deployments - given its own strategic needs in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.
And the Aegis Ashore systems in Europe (Poland and Romania) will most likely be used mainly against actual ICBMs - wasting them on Oreshniks would leave the U.S. vulnerable to more serious threats.
This shortage presents a two-fold vulnerability:
1) NATO forces along the eastern flank are left exposed to the growing threat of Russian hypersonic strikes, and
2) The reliance on a small, overburdened pool of systems ensures that even limited Russian deployments of these advanced munitions can exert disproportionate pressure.
Airbases and other high-value targets in Eastern Europe - already stressed by Russia’s missile range and volume - now face a threat that could severely disrupt NATO’s ability to sustain rapid-response operations.
And this then underscores a larger reality: Russia’s military modernization efforts are designed to exploit specific vulnerabilities in NATO’s defense architecture.
While much of the West’s attention remains fixed on nuclear saber-rattling, Moscow’s advancements in high-impact conventional weaponry present a more immediate and operationally credible challenge.
Unless NATO prioritizes expanding its counter-hypersonic capabilities and addressing these gaps, the alliance risks ceding critical ground to a strategically adaptable adversary.
The question isn’t whether NATO can deter Russia (it can of course), but whether it can do so fast enough via conventional (non-nuclear) military means only.
5. Reassuring Allies and Domestic Publics
The strike also serves as a reassurance to both Russia’s allies and its domestic audience.For partners like China and North Korea, it signals that Russia is capable of taking bold action (the threat of future strikes against NATO states being the key here) while safeguarding their shared interests.
Domestically, it addresses growing criticism of Kremlin passivity in the face of Western military aid to Ukraine.
For months, Russian propagandists have hinted at retaliatory measures that never materialized, creating a perception of weakness among hawkish factions.
This strike helps to weaken such criticism, demonstrating both capability and resolve.
Whether it will be sufficient in appeasing the domestic public or deterring Ukraine/the West is another question.