Weekly Overview Cables - Biden lifts targeting restrictions, Putin's evolving calculus, and Ukraine's high-risk nuclear signaling.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Biden finally lifts restrictions on deep strikes within Russia.
After a long period of drip drip drip military aid - doing what is necessary in small increments, and months (and sometimes years) later than first needed, President Biden has finally allowed Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles in Russia proper - previously, their use was limited to targets on the Ukrainian territory only.
On the surface, this change of policy was justified by the fact that Ukraine is now fighting an additional belligerent (North Korea) in this war.
But this excuse for lifting restrictions is largely irrelevant in practice - Ukraine can use them on any military targets in Russia.
For months we heard faux rationalizations for refusal to lift these restrictions - the current administration argued (in so many ways) how there were ‘‘escalation risks’’.
And Putin duly played along and warned of his ‘‘red lines’’ - frequently threatening nuclear escalations.
Naturally, Russia was never going to escalate to a nuclear standoff over Ukraine using US missiles with a 190 mile range (Ukraine has already been devastating Russian targets with their own domestically built long-range drones.. In other words, it was already a status quo).
But what ended up happening was that Washington decided to deter itself from decisive action.
This constant overreaction and extreme sensitivity to Russia’s ‘‘red lines’’ meant that in effect, the Biden admin was far more concerned with Putin saving face and not suffering devastating battlefield costs over a desire to see Ukraine win.
One wonders how many Ukrainian lives could have been saved if this policy was introduced (and restrictions lifted) months ago.
This endless indecisiveness and timidity in the face of our primary adversaries is not only an undignified conduct which is unbecoming of a superpower but it has concrete strategic and tactical costs - countless Ukrainian lives could have been saved if there was political will to do what is necessary at precisely the right time.
You never see Russia’s allies being similarly timid and endlessly worrying of Western ‘‘red lines’’ - probably one of the major reasons why Putin believes he can outlast everyone in the West.
2) New sprint from Russia - all out assaults and North Korean Artillery.
The Ukrainian General Staff has reported intensified Russian military preparations in southern Ukraine, raising alarms about a potential large-scale offensive targeting Zaporizhzhia.
This looming threat, coupled with sustained Russian pressure in the east (at the peak casualty rates of 1.5k killed/wounded per day in October) and Ukraine's counteroffensive operations in the Kursk region, risks overextending Kyiv’s forces.
In the absence of decisive action and strategic support from its allies, Ukraine could face significant battlefield setbacks, risking its ability to hold key positions and maintain momentum in critical areas.
Add to this, Russia has renewed its massive drone wave attacks on Ukraine’s energy grid ahead of this winter - aiming to create further demoralization amongst the population, and forcing Ukraine to divert its precious few air defenses away from the front.
In the meantime, the front is getting saturated with an even more overwhelming Russian advantage in firepower.
It has now been reported that in addition to deploying 12k troops and 500 officers to Russia, North Korea has now additionally provided some 50 domestically produced 170mm M1989 self-propelled howitzers and 20 updated 240mm multiple launch rocket systems that can fire both standard rockets and guided rockets.
We don’t know the precise volume of aid, but if it scales, this could amount to a significant boost in the Russian firepower advantage above and beyond the current 10:1 ratio.
A lot of well-meaning pro-Ukraine analysts and commentators have argued that this proves how desperate Russia is at this very moment.
Unfortunately, this is a largely incorrect interpretation of the situation on the ground.
Although it is true that without ammo/manpower/financial/critical infrastructure help from the axis countries (Iran, China and North Korea) Russia would be in no position to continue the current war at the current tempo and attritional cost, the very same is even more true of Ukraine - without Western aid, this war ends in weeks.
But unfortunately for Ukraine, in spite of having much poorer military allies, Russia has more decisive ones - they actually want Russia to win and do everything to make that a reality.
Ukraine on the other hand, is stuck with timid Western leaders who debate endlessly whether letting Ukraine strike targets deep within Russia are ok.
You never hear of Iranian or North Korean leaders worrying about crossing some western ‘‘red lines’’.
You never hear Kim Jong Un fret about “escalation risks” - when this is Biden’s favorite and most overused phrase.
This is the ugly truth: Russia’s allies want Putin to prevail in this war and to actually win, Ukraine’s allies want Ukraine to merely ‘‘survive’’.
Ukraine’s allies frequently talk about commitments to defend it for ‘‘as long as it takes’’, but a more honest rephrasing would be as follows: we commit to keep Ukraine on a life support machine for as long as it takes for Russia to slowly overwhelm and eventually attrit away any signs of life.
So no - a correct interpretation of North Korea’s ever-increasing involvement is not that Russia is desperate on the battlefield, but that Moscow wants to spring ahead to acquire maximum leverage via battlefield success.
It is clear that Russia is in the middle of an all-out sprint to maximize territorial gains ahead of Trump’s return in January.
Unlike many in the West, Putin understands rather well that negotiating from a position of strength is an essential precondition to achieve favorable political and strategic outcomes.
He knows quite well that it is almost inconceivable that a political settlement was significantly more favorable than the situation on the actual battlefield.
And unless the West fully absorbs this essential truth, Ukraine will be forced to negotiate from ever weaker hand: the more territories it ends up losing between now and the start of possible negotiations, the harder it will be for Kyiv to insist on anything remotely palatable.
In addition, let us also not forget that Russia may also simply win outright: it is not a foregone conclusion that this war must end in a stalemate.
Western strategists must remember that only minority (30%) of of high-intensity interstate wars end in a stalemate under ceasefire agreements - majority end with either (rarely) an outright win of one side or (frequently) a messy middle - no clear agreements and frequent stalemates with re-escalation and change in the balances of power.
And so at the current trajectory, (if nothing changes for Ukraine, and the West fails to step up), going into mid 2025, Putin will have 1) stronger hand in negotiations - allowing him to extract maximum concessions, and 2) a chance to win outright - depending on 1) how much help the U.S. and EU are willing to offer to Ukraine and, 2) How much stress can Russia itself take on.
So Putin may well calculate that he can either win outright or reduce/increase the tempo as needed.
But this doesn’t necessarily mean that all is lost - a turnaround is still possible and a decisive Western support for Ukraine can once again change things around.
Indeed, with all the doom and gloom around Ukraine, it is also important to not underestimate the intense economic and political pressure on the Kremlin.
The Russian economy is running hot, and inflation (running at a real rate of around 22%) is eating away the real disposable incomes of ordinary Russians.
This persistent inflation has been driven by rising prices of essential goods, notably butter, which has seen a year-to-date increase of nearly 30%.
And in the third quarter of 2024, real disposable income in Russia increased by 9.4% compared to the same period in 2023.
You can see this strain on Russian people through indirect indicators as well: with mortgage rates at 19% (following the end of the hitherto generous mortgage subsidy), mortgage applications have now halved and this has led to predictable outcomes in the market as well: property sales are down 40% YoY across most cities, and economic conditions have led to notable social impacts, including incidents of butter thefts (they now lock them in supermarkets - like deodorants in CVS), highlighting the strain on consumers facing rising costs for basic necessities.
And this issue can only worsen as more and more resources are redirected to war efforts and the economy continues to overheat from lack of labor (not like they are open to central Asian immigration to fill-the gap either): You can’t fight inflation and a war at the same time.
3) Trump’s national security and foreign policy appointments: mix of traditional neocons and one totally inept weirdo.
Marco Rubio as a Secretary of State and Mike Waltz as National Security Adviser are good picks -they are both strong Russia and China hawks.
Waltz especially has a range of intel and military experience.
But then we have Tulsi Gabbard…
Tulsi Gabbard’s nomination as Director of National Intelligence marks a consequential and controversial departure from all professional norms.
Her record includes repeating Kremlin-aligned narratives about alleged U.S.-backed biolabs in Ukraine and invoking "Russia’s legitimate security concerns."
Gabbard is also known as a shill for the bloodthirsty Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, - met him twice and questioned the OPCW’s findings on Assad’s use of chemical weapons.
How do you reconcile that with Trump’s decision (back in 2017) to bomb Assad’s air base for the use of Chemical weapons?
Gabbard’s worldview and policy positions would find a better home at some weirdo 4chan-style forum - standing starkly at odds with sophisticated U.S. intelligence assessments.
How would other allied nations trust her enough to share sensitive intel? How would they know that she wouldn’t share these with some third-world dictator?
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Ukraine signals nuclear ambitions and lays the groundwork for leverage in the face of Trump’s policy shift.
In a move laden with strategic implications, Kyiv appears to be sending a pointed message with the release of a Ministry of Defence briefing paper suggesting Ukraine could develop a basic nuclear weapon within months should the U.S. military assistance wane under Donald Trump’s administration.
This unsubtle signaling serves a dual purpose: 1) underscoring Ukraine's vulnerability in the face of reduced Western support and 2) reminding international players of its latent nuclear potential - a capability rooted in its Soviet-era expertise.
Message is clear: with no other options to guarantee our security, we are willing to explore the development of nuclear weapons.
A calculated gambit.
Ukraine’s signaling reflects a deliberate attempt to highlight the gravity of the Western assistance in maintaining its sovereignty against Russian aggression.
The specter of a nuclear-capable Ukraine raises the stakes for the Western policymakers, signaling that a drastic reduction in aid could have far-reaching consequences, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe.
Historical context and credibility
Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum left it reliant on international guarantees of security, notably from the U.S., UK, and Russia.
The current rhetoric demonstrates (justified) frustration with these guarantees’ inadequacy and serves as a reminder of the technical expertise that Ukraine retains from its Soviet inheritance.
While developing such a weapon would pose logistical and geopolitical challenges, the threat itself is credible enough to alarm allies and adversaries alike.
Strategic risks and repercussions.
Going down this route (even at a signaling level) is a very risky bet for Ukraine.
1) Conflict with the western allies: Kyiv’s nuclear hints could strain relationships with NATO members, particularly those committed to non-proliferation - like Germany and France.
It could in fact lead to the very opposite effects sought by Kyiv - instead of doubling-down on support for Ukraine (to dissuade this nuclear pursuit by reducing the need for them), it could lead to Western concerns that the longer this war drags on the riskier it will get (as evidenced by Ukraine’s nuclear pursuits), and that it therefore makes sense to pressure Ukraine into negotiations and ending the war at all/any cost.
2) Russian Escalation: Moscow may seize on this narrative to justify further aggression, portraying Ukraine as a destabilizing actor.
3) Global Proliferation Concerns: A nuclear-armed Ukraine could set a precedent for other non-nuclear states to reconsider their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
And this is once again a nightmare scenario for the West.
Overall context.
Kyiv’s signaling is as much a cry for help as it is a warning.
The message to Washington is clear: U.S. disengagement will not only weaken Ukraine but could also disrupt the fragile balance of nuclear non-proliferation in Europe.
As the Trump administration redefines U.S. foreign policy, the potential for a Ukrainian pivot toward nuclear armament underscores the profound strategic risks of diminishing support.
In this high-stakes game, Kyiv’s rhetoric should not be dismissed lightly.
With that said, Kyiv’s gamble that this threat could serve as a wake-up call and push the West into action, could also backfire.
Ukraine’s Western allies may conclude that this war must end at any cost - resulting in the very opposite outcome that it seeks: an intense pressure to settle the war and give away territory to Russia.
*The West is doing its own signaling - in the next cable, we shall discuss the strategic implications of the Scholz - Putin phone call.