Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine support, fighter jets, and Putin's psyops.
*note: cables will be off on Thursday and back next Monday.
Putin’s St Petersburg forum comments: nuclear threats, escalation risk, tit-for-tat proxy war and the usual psyops.
During the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin made several significant statements, particularly in relation to France and escalation risks with NATO, Russia’s nuclear weapons and their possible use, and some psyops on Trump and the upcoming US elections were also part of the mix.
1) Escalation vis-à-vis France and NATO.
Putin issued veiled threats towards France by criticizing its support for Ukraine and its involvement in the conflict.
(side note: most recently, Macron announced that France will supply Ukraine with Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets as well as train Ukrainian fighter pilots on the type. As of now, it is unclear whether they will be supplied with the latest beyond visual range air-to-air missiles - but they can also launch cruise missiles. So at the very minimum, Ukraine will get another means of launching Storm Shadow/SCALP-EGs.)
He accused France of inflaming tensions and seeking a direct role in the Ukraine war, which he framed as a dangerous escalation.
And this comes a day after the Kremlin spokesperson Peskov was more explicit: “No instructor involved in training the Ukrainian military has immunity …It doesn’t matter whether they’re French or not”.
Now, is this a credible threat? Would Russia actually target French advisers on the ground?
Actually, yes - they very well might.
This would all depend on Putin’s calculation on: 1) potential French response and 2) potential NATO response, 3) preemptive deterrence effect on other NATO states on course to follow France into Ukraine.
1. When it comes to the former, France could a) respond in kind and launch a direct attack on Russian troops (unlikely), b) escalate its rhetoric and supply more munitions and weapons of more serious effect - like more fighter jets/advocacy for and supply of more long-range missiles, and c) escalate its/EU’s pressure on China to further distance from Russia and introduce more sanctions on Russia itself.
These are not insignificant outcomes, but more will depend on the next two factors:
2. How would NATO respond?
Would it treat it as an attack on an ally that triggers article V (mutual defense provision) or treat it as a below-threshold event?
The latter is far more likely.
There is little indication that NATO states and their publics have an appetite/are prepared for a conventional war with Russia over the deaths of French military advisers.
And the very conspicuous absence of statements of warning from other NATO state leaders and NATO leader himself, is a strong indication that the key statesmen do not want to issue a retaliatory warning threat that they are not willing to act upon.
In other words, there is no ‘‘Russia attacking NATO advisers would trigger article V/ would be treated as an attack on NATO’’.
Nothing of the sort.. and contrast this with Biden’s previous statement on NATO’s territory: ‘‘we will defend every inch of it’’.
In other words, territorial assault on NATO territories is a red line and would be treated as such - triggering a NATO-wide response (starting with the US).
But attack on advisers in Ukraine? crickets..
One could very well argue that NATO should issue a similar threat - to establish and warn of a clear red line in relation to its instructors on the ground.
But this brings forward an issue of plausible deniability on behalf of Russians - what if such attacks do occur, but Russia claims that NATO troops were not targeted deliberately?
What if the Kremlin maintains that the death of NATO advisers was a collateral damage stemming from their legitimate targeting of Ukrainian military targets/training grounds?
One could very well see a following message coming from Moscow once such an attack was to take place: look if they didn’t want to risk the lives of their advisers, they should not have sent them to locations that they knew we would target.
This is of course different from NATO advisers being legitimate targets - under this scenario, Russia would deny deliberate intent.
But the outcome would be the same - death of NATO advisers.
So one could see the dilemma for NATO leaders: where do we draw the line? How do we respond if Russia denies deliberate intent? If we warn of consequences and then not deliver once Russia claims deniability then how does it affect our deterrence? And what if we don’t draw any lines at all? Is that not an invitation for Russians to actively go after our advisers?
3. Effect on the other NATO states.
Which leads us to the next unpalatable outcome - if the French advisers are targeted and killed, and NATO doesn’t respond (for one reason or another) then how does this affect the willingness of other countries to send their own advisers?
One has to remember that if only the French instructors are sent to train Ukrainians then that is not a very scalable solution.
Realistically, the French would probably afford several hundred to several thousand (unlikely, and a max figure) ‘‘advisers’’ to be deployed to Ukraine.
And whether or not these (few) French advisers are targeted will have a direct effect on other NATO member state’s decision to send (or not) their own ‘‘advisers’’.
Putin may very well calculate that if the 1) post-fact plausible deniability is possible, 2) France is unlikely to retaliate directly, and 3) NATO is unlikely to respond as a unit, then targeting French troops may very well be worth it - given the likelihood of further deterrence and dissuasion effects upon other NATO states.
So what can NATO do in the meantime?
Probably a combination of three things: 1) Warn Russia against crossing these red line in public: a unified front approach where NATO leaders issue a joint warning, 2) Same but in private - removing risks of ‘‘public loss of face’’ and weaker deterrence if they then fail to act upon these threats, and 3) Turn the training grounds into virtual fortresses: set these up in Western Ukraine - furthest from Russia’s reach and saturate the area with long-range and short-range air-defense systems: if there are no NATO casualties, then the need for a response lessens.
Whether NATO goes with silence, public or private warning would all depend on their own aforementioned calculus and political appetite of member states (and an estimation of this appetite from the respective publics in question).
In the meantime however, deterrence by denial should be in full effect - NATO training grounds must be as well-protected as possible.
With that said, this is not an all-encompassing solution - at some point, the number of NATO advisers will reach such a level that some casualties will be likely and the NATO leaders will need to decide on political messaging around their increasing presence of these instructors on the ground.
2) Renewed nuclear threats.
Putin on Russia’s potential use of tactical nuclear weapons: “For some reason, they believe in the West that Russia will never use it…Look at what is written there..[speaking of Russia’s nuclear doctrine] ..If somebody’s actions threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we consider it possible to use all means at our disposal[emphasis added].”
Is this true?
Is the West really carrying this belief that Russia would never use nukes?
Not really - and it is important to distinguish between Western public and leaders.
Although leaders realize that it is very unlikely (though definitely not inconceivable) that Russia would deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, the Western public isn’t so sure - and a lot of far-right parties and Putin apologists are in fact spreading this very propaganda of ‘‘nuclear escalation’’ - doing Moscow’s work for them.
And this is important, since even if the actual risk of a nuclear escalation (and even Russia’s use of nuclear weapons exclusively in Ukraine) is very low, the perceived risk (from general public’s point of view) may be high enough to then influence the actual policies of leaders and decision-makers - incentivizing them to act excessively hesitant and risk-averse: amounting to self-deterrence.
So it is not the case that there is a universal confidence in Russia not using nuclear weapons - Putin is wrong about that.
But with that said (and Putin’s representations to the contrary notwithstanding), Russia’s use of nuclear weapons is still unlikely to materialize at least for three reasons:
1) Risk of self-harm: Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons typically have a yield of 75 kilotons TNT equivalent - that is around 6x as powerful as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: this is a nuclear fallout enough to cover Russia’s own troops - if they were to be used near the frontlines.
And if they are used further to the west of the frontlines and target population centers of Ukraine, then that leads to another problem:
2) De-facto attack on the west and significant escalation risks.
What if the wind blows strongly to the west and the fallout reaches many cities of Central and Western Europe: that is a de facto attack on the west, and with that, the possibility of a significant military response rises exponentially.
Which leads us to the next point:
3) Risk of US/NATO response.
It is very likely that NATO states would respond to Russia’s use of nuclear weapons - especially if the fallout would harm those in central and Western Europe.
If that happens, there would be an enormous public/political capital to launch a military response against Russia.
And even without this scenario, even if the harms were to be contained only in Ukraine, even then a military response is still likely.
This is because at this point, the West would treat Putin as an unstable madman.
Back in 2022, former CIA Director General Petreaus warned that Russia’s conventional naval powers and all of its army would be a fair game: that the US could target all of these with cruise/ballistic missiles and wipe them all out.
Is it a likely response?
Unclear, but the magnitude of such a risk is already so high that its probability need not be equally high to affect Putin’s calculus in a significant way and to dissuade him from trying his fate.
4) Russia’s allies would not be happy.
Both China and India have warned Russia not to use nuclear weapons in the past.
We had a long post about this before, and we won’t delve into details of the calculations of both countries, but suffice it to say that neither country would benefit from Russia’s nuclear escalation…
It is very likely that both would respond highly negatively to Russia’s use of nuclear weapons - perhaps even cut off indirect support (for example: by ending the supply of dual-use goods used for Russia’s military production in the case of China.)
This is clearly an important deterrent to Putin - separate from the response from the West.
3) Threatening to arming proxies.
Putin:
“If they consider it possible to deliver such weapons to the combat zone to launch strikes on our territory and create problems for us, why don’t we have the right to supply weapons of the same type to some regions of the world where they can be used to launch strikes on sensitive facilities of the countries that do it to Russia?..
We will think about it.”
Putin’s threat to engage in a tit-for-tat proxy war is both realistic and yet also somehow largely impotent.
Suppose he follows through on that threat - who then would Russia supply?
With the exception of the RSF fighters in Sudan, Assad regime in Syria, Iran and North Korea, it is hard to see who Russia could help attack the west.
Clearly, these are not going to be some terrorist organizations.
The only possible exception may be Hamas, Hizbullah, and other Iranian proxies. What makes it more palatable is that unlike ISIS etc, Hamas for example is not universally recognized as a terrorist org.
No ISIS terrorist would ever be allowed to negotiate with Americans whilst residing in Qatar.. Turkey even sees it as an independence movement, and Moscow itself has previously hosted Hamas’s leader shortly after the outset of the war.
There is also a practical issue of Hamas being totally besieged and nothing can even get there.
So, any deliveries would have to wait until Hamas was to survive (and Israel was to withdraw) - a big if.
Arming Hizbullah and other Iranian militias is more likely, but even this would cross all lines with Israel and would remove almost all disincentives that Israel faced in arming Ukraine.
If Israel was previously hesitant to supply Ukraine with Iron Domes/Arrow-3s/David’s sling, then now it would have less fear of escalation, and less to lose.
(side note: there would still be a practical issue of keeping enough ammo for themselves.. but theoretically, political/strategic limitations would surely mostly lift.)
But these are all (for now) highly improbable: this means that if Russia was to supply an enemy of the West, it is most likely to be a country that Russia is already helping.
Sure, Russia could do more to arm North Korea and Iran - but to what extent could they afford to help any more?
These countries want modern tech in return for supplying low-tech high volume weapons like artillery shells (North Korea) and ballistic missiles/drones (Iran).
What else is Russia going to do beyond already selling Iran Su-35s (and possibly S-400s) and supplying North Korea with advanced satellite tech?
Russia cannot really afford to send over their best offensive gear - missiles like Kalibr, Zircon or Iskander: all of these are essential capabilities that provide an edge over Ukraine.
As such, even though theoretically there is nothing compelling to preclude Putin from responding by funding a proxy war against the West (a longtime Soviet classic), in practice, the effects will be (at least for the foreseeable future) very limited in both the scope and impact.
4) Usual psyops.
Putin commented on the possibility of rapprochement with the US if Trump was to win and return to power: “I say absolutely sincerely, I wouldn’t say that we believe that after the election something will change on the Russian track in American politics…We don’t think so. We think nothing that serious will happen.”
Why so?
If he was sincere, he would in fact be correct: we have previously discussed in much more details how (in spite of his chummy rhetoric) Trump admin was harsher on Russia than Obama: imposing dozens of sanctions on the Russian state, transferring Javelin missiles (which Obama refused) and his Defense Minister slaughtering more than several hundred Wagner soldiers in Syria.
And Trump’s more recent statements on the importance of defending Ukraine (packaged with criticism of Europe, but still) and even reports that at a private fundraiser he allegedly said that he ‘‘would have bombed’’ Moscow at the outset of the 2022 invasion (clear hyperbole even if he actually said that of course) all indicate that is far from given that he would be that much better for Putin.
Fundamentally, no matter what other objectives he may have, Trump would not want to be known for sacrificing Ukraine and letting Russia secure a clear win: that is a clear stain on legacy.
It is one thing for Trump to force Ukraine into concessions (very possible) but quite another to cut all aid and let Russians roll in unopposed.
And even the former scenario is becoming increasingly unlikely for at least two reasons: 1) Putin is on the roll and would not want to give up any significant concessions for such a deal right now, and 2) European allies are finally gearing up for a long-term confrontation and have only recently normalized the talk of sending troops to Ukraine - there is simply no appetite for submission and letting Russia secure a win.
(side note: Biden is also making it hard for future Presidents to drastically reverse course. In his D-day commemoration remarks, Biden called Putin a ‘‘tyrant’’ and reaffirmed support for Ukraine: “will not walk away from Ukraine..you are the bulwark against the aggression that is taking place. We have an obligation to be there. ... We’re still in, completely, thoroughly.” . Shortly afterwards, Biden signed a new $225 million Ukraine package - most of these funds will go to fixing Ukraine’s electric grid which saw massive battering. )
So then, there are plenty of good, sincere reasons for Putin to truly believe that nothing will change in terms of America’s foreign policy stance on Ukraine.
But Putin is not sincere - he cannot be: this is all political communication.
So there are probably other reasons for him to express such sentiments - here are the three most likely strategic/political objectives accomplished by feigning indifference:
1) Positioning for future negotiations: by showing that he is not very eager for Trump’s return, he is signaling that he has low expectations and that he is indifferent: both aim to increase his leverage vis-à-vis Trump.
If Trump comes back to power and Putin is overly excited, then this would create an opening for Trump to maximize returns/concessions from Putin.
If he is however unimpressed with Trump’s return, then Trump now has to earn his way to Putin’s goodwill, and tone down on maximalist demands.
2) Soft punishment: for Trump’s recent pro-Ukraine statements.
How is this a punishment?
Well, Trump’s pitch to his base and to swing voters is that due to his personal relationship with Putin, (that he understands him well and that Putin respects him) he can secure a quick deal on Ukraine - most famously, within ‘‘24 hrs’’.
In other words, Trump is pitching his competence to get things done.
But Putin’s indifference to Trump’s return lowers the probability that such a special relationship does in fact exist and that Trump could in fact secure a favorable deal quickly.
Consequently, Putin’s statement of indifference throws doubts on Trump’s claims of competence in this particular matter - but it is all subtle: hence the soft punishment.
3) Provide an electoral alibi for Trump.
If Putin is indifferent about Trump’s potential return, then the Democrats’ argument that he is the Kremlin’s preferred candidate loses potency.
With all that said however, Putin did also throw in some indirect support for Trump - calling his recent conviction by a jury (and each member took a major personal risk to convict Trump) of 34 counts as ‘‘the use of the court system as part of the internal political struggle’’.
Of course coming from someone that has thrown in countless politicians opposing him into jail (and creating inhumane conditions and ultimately, leading to the death of one the most well-known opposition politicians - Alexei Navalny only four months ago) this is some expert level shameless trolling.
So in this regard there is consistency with Putin: the usual duplicity and psyops continues.