Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, NATO politics, and Biden - MBS meeting.
Ukraine War Updates:
Donbas battlefield & outlook.
The Russian Defense Ministry announced the end to the operational pause, and on July 16, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu ordered the Southern Group Commander General of the Army Sergey Surovikin and the Central Group Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin to increase offensive operations across all axes of attack.
In the meantime, the US-supplied HIMARS long-range rocket system is producing strong battlefield effects: Ukrainian rocket strikes have destroyed more than 30 Russian military logistics centers in the recent weeks and have significantly reduced Russia's offensive potential - this is in addition to the most recent attack resulting in the deaths of senior commanders in the Kherson region.
(side note: and the State Department was right to approve the sale of HIMARS (worth approx $500 mil) to Estonia - NATO’s eastern flank must be bolstered further)
Information and narrative war.
There were some consequential developments in this arena of war;
1) Putin pulled off a shrewd move and extended the offer of a fast-track Russian citizenship to all Ukrainians.
This bolsters the Kremlin’s position in the narrative war in a number of crucial ways:
a) It is a domestic messaging ploy: we are in Ukraine to liberate all our Slavic brothers from the grip of a fascist, western puppet regime.
This framing, and an added moral dimension to the conflict, will become increasingly important as Putin is exhausting his resources and is likely going to demand more sacrifices (if not a full mobilization) from the Russian public.
b) Helps Russia’s partners and/or indifferent states to justify their indirect (through inaction) complicity in the conflict - Chinese propagandists can now use this data point to reframe Russian operations as ultimately humanitarian in nature.
Statesmen of the countries like Brazil can use it as an excuse to justify their shameful omissions to join sanctions, and/or increase their trade cooperation with Russia: “look, the conflict is far more complicated than the Western media portrays it to be: if Russia was really such an evil invader, why would it offer full citizenship and corresponding rights to all Ukrainians?”
c) In addition, a more practical benefit: an opportunity to fake government stats and show an increase in budgetary revenue (through new additional Ukrainian taxpayers), and present a facade of more favorable demographic statistics (since new citizens are likely to be younger).
d) It is an attempt to remove the stigma from treason and encourage further public compliance and local government collaboration: if Russia is really going to treat them as Slavic brethren, then where is the treason?
Only some (hopefully) Ukrainians will use this as an excuse to justify their treason: “we are not betraying Ukraine, we are simply accepting a new political institution as the ultimate arbiter.”
Although it is unlikely that many Ukrainians would ever agree with this reasoning, Russia needs only a fraction in occupied territories to play ball.
This battle of narratives is crucial: the government in Kyiv is therefore correct in conducting/supporting assassination campaigns against local government officials who betray Ukraine and collaborate with the Russian occupiers.
The crushing stigma of treason must remain.
2) The Kremlin continues to crystallize its red lines in negotiations.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the possibility of Russians withdrawing to the pre-Feb 24 invasion positions (in return for political concessions such as a constitutionally ironclad neutrality, and a commitment to never join NATO, demilitarization etc.) and abandoning the occupied territories, is now extremely unlikely.
Two new data points to highlight this unfortunate reality;
a) Donetsk People’s Republic is now opening an embassy in Russia.
It is inconceivable that Russia would now reverse their recognition of DNR and LNR fake republics - it is equally unthinkable that Ukraine would ever recognize them as independent states.
b) Southern occupied region of Zaporizhzhia is planning a referendum vote on joining Russia (Russia currently controls most of the region, but Ukrainian forces still maintain a grip over the city of Zaporizhzhia, as well as the northern regions).
This indicates that: 1)Russia is likely to target the city itself before/or during early autumn (in an attempt to take over the city prior to the planned referendum date), and 2) There is no way that Russia would ‘‘reject’’ the rigged referendum result that states that Zaporizhzia is to officially incorporate into Russia.
Once again, it was already unlikely that (save for massive military defeat: actual or expected) Russia would change tune and agree to withdraw its troops to pre-Feb 24 invasion lines: doing so would be extremely costly in terms of loss of prestige and perception of Russia’s prowess - this would therefore be a last-resort move where Putin would have to sell the retreat to the domestic audience as a successful completion of a “special operation” that resulted in Ukraine’s political concessions and commitments (conveniently forgetting his “Peter the Great analogy” of reclaiming lost territories).
The good news is that Kyiv is standing strong: Foreign Minister Kuleba once again ruled out ceding territory as part of a possible peace deal, reiterating that Ukraine’s objective was to “liberate our territories, restore our territorial integrity, and full sovereignty”.
More good news: North Korea recognized the breakaway ‘‘republics’’ in Eastern Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s policy is such a global joke that only insane and totally uncredible regimes like Syria and North Korea recognize the fake republics -and this is happening at the time when even their ‘‘no limits’’ partner China is not joining the clown show (same with its CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) allies: even totally Kremlin dependent countries like Armenia and Belarus have not recognized these ‘‘states’’).
Latest NATO weapons produce early encouraging results & present new challenges.
America - supplied HIMARS proves to be extremely effective in extending Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities and range.
The Ukrainian military engaged in few shaping operations in the Kherson region: softening up the targets for the eventual counterattack.
A number of Russian ammo depots and command & control centers were effectively targeted and destroyed: leading to further losses amongst the highest ranked generals.
Russian losses are mounting: US intel officials estimate that 5 months into the war, around 20,000 Russian soldiers have been killed.
It is estimated that injuries have taken about 60,000 more off the battlefield.
If true, that would mean that nearly half (around 42% to be more precise) of the original invasion force (approx 190k) has been lost.
To be clear, the 80k attrition estimate must be taken with a grain of salt.
It is unclear how the 60k number for the injured soldiers was produced.
It appears that the standard 1:3 ratio of dead to wounded was applied.
If so, that could be a dangerously imprecise estimate.
This is because the original 1:3 estimate ratio was developed at the time of WWII: since then, armies have better body armor, faster/more mobile care, and better medical technology to tend to the wounded.
In other words, the wounded are likely to experience lesser injuries and recover faster: all this would mean that a significant proportion of the remaining 60k could be ‘‘fixed up’’ and ready for round two.
But even if we assume a more conservative 1:2 ratio for truer attrition figures, that is still 60k of total attrition - or around 32% of the original force.
In addition, we are now aware that (in addition to a slowdown in the production of tanks), Russia is running out of PGMs (precision guided missiles) and high-tech weapons (like drones: which they produce domestically, but now have to rely on Iranian supplies).
One thing they are still not running out of: artillery guns and shells.
Huge soviet-era stockpiles enable Russia to maintain its significant firepower advantage over Ukraine (ranging between 1:8 to 1:11 for the artillery advantage alone).
But a basic military doctrine would warn Russia from wasting most of their artillery shell resources exclusively on Ukraine: leaving nothing for another conventional war with, say, NATO.
And as Ukraine continues to receive additional shipments of artillery guns and shells, two new challenges arise:
1) The issue of logistics and interoperability.
The Ukrainian military receives a range of different artillery guns: from the French CAESARs and American M777, to the German Panzerhaubitze 2000 Howitzers.
All of these have different maintenance and care protocols, require different training and ammo.
In addition, all of these guns have different use-cases: the French CAESARs and German Panzerhaubitze Howitzers are highly mobile and self-propelled, whereas the American M777s are towed - reducing their range, maneuverability and tactical deployment: for example, an American M777 will have to be incorporated into an active battle scene with different concerns for survivability than the former two.
Moreover, there is a lack of clarity on the future supplies: Ukraine cannot train all of its troops on one platform.
(side note: added to these, are additional pragmatic concerns: 1) exactly what proportion of the skilled and essential artillery operators can be removed from the frontline and for how long (before their absence shows itself with reduced effectiveness on the battlefield), 2) Countries may insist on different type and length of training for political purposes: no country wants to see their guns get destroyed at a higher rate/produce lesser results than its direct competition on the global military hardware market. The system that fares best is bound to get many sales orders from across the world. Just look at the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 drones selling like hotcakes).
There are clearly issues with scalability, training, deployment, and logistics.
Unfortunately, there are no good, short-term solutions - Ukraine simply needs to accept whatever it can get its hands on.
One possible fix is to train the troops contemporaneously: this would require one specific location within somewhere in Western Europe: where NATO instructors train Ukrainian artillery operators contemporaneously - on all systems at once.
This would still not solve other aforementioned operational issues however.
In the long-term, NATO would have to update its interoperability regulations to prevent similar issues from arising in future conflicts.
2) Weapons smuggling and corruption:
This was bound to happen in a war taking place at such a large country with an extremely long frontline.
But explanations do not amount to valid excuses: Ukraine must address worried NATO states that deliver it advanced weapons.
All weapons must be accounted for, and weapons smugglers and those involved in other forms of corruption (for example falsifying inventory data to secure more supplies and then reselling those unused supplies on a black market) must be charged with treason and face toughest punishment possible.
Otherwise, the narrative war will turn against Ukraine.
Russian propaganda will milk these incidents of smuggling and target the publics of NATO member states with messages that all of their hardships are for nothing: that they are merely propping up a corrupt state.
Moreover, leaders of the reticent member states will now have a legitimate excuse to slow down the tempo of the military aid - creating a tough new status quo where it becomes harder for Ukraine to not make any concessions to Russia.
To their credit, Ukrainian leadership is (thus-far) responsive to these challenges.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov provided a compelling response to these accusations.
Explaining that it is first and foremost in Ukraine’s interests to prevent such smuggling (given that they “need to survive”. He also got ahead of the possible Russian propaganda by suggesting that certain reluctant European statesmen were covering up their unwillingness to help Ukraine by advancing a Kremlin-pushed angle: when in fact, the actual reason for their reticence was their addiction to “to cheap gas and money”.
Mr Reznikov revealed furthermore, that NATO’s heavy artillery guns had GPS trackers and that Western states could keep track of them via satellites.
This was simultaneously reassuring, but also concerning: if they are indeed GPS tracked, one could assume that Russians will be trying their best to hack into these systems and satellites.
Just one such successful hack could render all of these heavy artillery guns and rocket systems to precision strikes (that is, if Russians stop wasting their cruise missiles on civilian residential buildings).
But NATO shouldn’t simply point to challenges and demand fast and effective solutions from a country fighting for survival.
Under the US leadership, NATO could and should create a special task force to keep track of all western supplied military kit.
In addition, each NATO member supplying the kit must send over large teams of official representatives to monitor distribution of these weapons: Ukraine must not create any roadblocks for this, and should disarm the reticent ‘‘worried’’ states - weakening their political leverage to refuse any military help.
This is a serious issue that must be resolved with the US leadership and Ukrainian eagerness to prove its bona fides.
Biden - MBS meeting: the good, the bad, and the embarrassing.
Given the gravity of the anticipated Biden - MBS meeting in Jeddah (where the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit took place), and the corresponding media attention, it was always the case that the US President would approach this meeting with utmost seriousness - ensuring that there was at least something to be gained from his presence in Saudi Arabia.
So then, Biden’s Saudi Arabia trip wasn’t a complete flop - we will look at certain successes - before turning to strategic errors and pure embarrassments.
(side note: in the upcoming cables, we shall discuss (separately) Biden’s Jerusalem declaration pledge (jointly with Israel) to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons)
The good.
Saudi Arabia played ball on certain matters, and team Biden will undoubtedly add these achievements to their foreign policy resume:
a) Saudi Arabia opened its civilian airspace to Israel - in itself, this is not a radical development, but a historic first step nonetheless.
If the common air-defense network/shield idea is to work, some basics need to be in place first: this is one of these basic tasks that creates a momentum and precedent for further integration and cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, the National Security adviser Jake Sullivan was correct in his assessment that ‘‘This decision paves the way for a more integrated, stable, and secure Middle East region, which is vital for the security and prosperity of the United States and the American people, and for the security and prosperity of Israel”
(side note: expect this angle to be pushed as a major foreign policy achievement in the coming weeks. The White House will try to crystallize this as part of Biden’s legacy in the Middle East: competing for significance with Trump admin’s “Abraham Accords” of 2020)
b) Saudis committed to extending the ceasefire in Yemen (although, and as discussed in the previous cables, this can be easily spoiled by Iran).
c) Israel and Saudi Arabia agreed to remove multinational peacekeepers (including the ones from the US) from the Tiran island: this is a significant gesture of goodwill - a symbolic removal of the label of ‘‘adversaries’’.
d) Saudi Arabia agreed to a deeper integration of Iraq in the Gulf Cooperation Council: an important step to counter Iranian influence in Iraq.
e) Further cooperation on 5G and 6G development, cooperations on cybersecurity, space exploration and on other issues like public health.
The bad.
Jake Sullivan said that the US did not expect Saudi Arabia to immediately boost oil output.
He could have stopped right there (and that would have been good enough. As advocated in the previous cables, the White House must avoid framing Biden’s trip and the success of his diplomatic efforts solely on his ability to secure more oil from the Kingdom. Since a) it is unlikely, and b) even if it does happen, it won’t be at scale necessary to have any meaningful impact on global prices).
But Mr Sullivan did not stop there - he then added that one needs to await the outcome of an OPEC+ meeting on August 3.
Even if there were ironclad informal commitments about the August 3 decision, it was still wrong to emphasize the date: the media attention will now focus on the date, and any meagre increases in output will now appear as even less substantial: the expectations have now been raised - anything short of a radical increase in output will be framed as a failure.
Biden’s direct comment about his expectations of a higher oil output compounded the error: the President should have avoided any public statements on the matter.
The embarrassing.
Even White House’s last minute new COVID guidelines - a transparent attempt to excuse away a possible handshake with MBS, failed to prevent a fiasco.
Biden defeated the whole point of this excuse by going on a hugging spree in Israel.
And then the most embarrassing part happened: Biden greeted MBS with a fist bump.
A handshake would have been much better: it is at least more formal and weighty.
At the very least, a handshake (when not followed with other gestures like shoulder grabs, hugs, etc.) between statesmen implies a certain level of detachment and formality - it has a minimal level of gravitas attached to the occasion.
Fist bumps are associated with convivial friendly relations - this was a disaster.
A fist bump is just too familiar and informal: not a way to greet a journalist murdering psychopath.
Biden did try to protect his bona fides on human rights by declaring (after the meeting with MBS) that he was ‘‘straightforward and direct’’ with the crown prince and did in fact bring up the issue of the murdered Washington Post writer Jamal Khashoggi.
Biden claimed that he told MBS directly that he held him responsible for the murder (why on earth are you fist bumping him then? Since when do journalist butchering statesmen get greeted in such an affable manner?).
He could have stopped there - but alas he did not.
Biden then added that if a similar assassination ever happened again, Riyadh would suffer a similarly tough response (as in, nothing) and ‘‘much more’’.
This was a horrible diplomatic error - in other words: it is ok if it happens just this one time, but if you do it again, we will be as tough and more!
Naturally, real state of affairs, and the balance of leverage (as perceived by MBS, and this very perception was confirmed by Biden’s trip to Saudi Arabia) allowed the Crown Prince to hit back at Biden
MBS brought up completely unrelated issues: “MBS cited the sexual and physical abuse of prisoners at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison by US military personnel and the May killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh in the occupied West Bank as incidents that reflected poorly on the US”: engaging in whataboutism and embarrassing the President of the United States even further.