Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War Updates, Putin's new policy on mobilization, and major insights and implications from the Pentagon leaks.
Ukraine war updates:
In spite of extremely bloody battles, and against all odds, Bakhmut still holds.
And Russian forces still continue their offensive operations across other points of the contact line - especially around the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
At the time of raging intense battles, Ukraine was successful in securing promises of additional $5 bln from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank.
Moreover, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal revealed that Ukraine has now received new pledges of additional support from Switzerland, Denmark and a number of other countries during the meetings taken place in DC last week.
And that America’s Boeing agreed to relieve Ukrainian companies of $200 million in previous commitments.
Russian war crimes and atrocities - not ending anytime soon.
In the meantime, the propensity of the Russian military to commit atrocities has not changed.
Change in leadership and in command over 14 months of war did not have any effect on the soldiers fighting on the ground - they still commit unbelievably deprave acts of war crimes: on this occasion, beheading a captured Ukrainian prisoner of war.
Russian soldiers have now stooped to the level of ISIS terrorists.
And one should not have high hopes that such conduct will change any time soon.
After all, there is not only a culture of impunity, but even a direct encouragement from the very top of Russia’s leadership: recall how Putin awarded honors to the members of the brigade responsible for slaughtering Ukrainian civilians in Bucha last year.
If Russian soldiers see that war crimes are rewarded, it is only natural that they (as individuals operating in an already messy and incompetent institution) will easily engage in a conduct driven by the combination of their base instincts and incentives/rewards from the very top.
Good cop bad cop on Crimea.
A week after expressing willingness to negotiate the fate of Crimea (once Ukraine’s army reaches its borders), the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, Oleksiy Danilov warned that Kyiv was ready to ‘‘test and use’’ any non-banned weapon to liberate the Peninsula.
This is an important addition to last week’s offer of negotiations - we covered how these came with major strategic risks (in spite of tactical flexibility secured), and so increasing the value of this offer by warning of the alternative outcomes was wise.
Putin must see that the offer to negotiate Crimea’s fate is not made in a vacuum: it is not an option available to him when all else fails.
He needed to see that there would be parallel operations in place to inflict maximum pain while the offer was in place.
This is exactly the right approach for Kyiv to take: a balance of incentives and disincentives creating sufficient pressure and urgency for the Kremlin to act.
Putin’s electronic mobilization.
At first, the news that the Kremlin was digitizing its military call-up process did not seem like an extraordinary bit of news - and unfortunately, not enough media attention had been devoted to this story.
But this story should not be treated as that of mere modernization and efficiency improvements.
There are in fact major qualitative policy changes that could amount to some of the most significant developments of the Ukraine war of the past few months.
The announced changes mandate the following crucial updates to the manner and method of military mobilization in Russia.
Russia's call-up notice system for military service has now shifted to electronic delivery through the Gosuslugi online portal, replacing physical paper delivery.
Call-up notices are now legally binding mere 7 days after being posted to a citizen's account, regardless of whether they log in or not.
Citizens who receive a notice are prohibited from leaving the country after the 7-day period, and failure to comply within 20 days results in legal obligations breach, leading to further restrictions such as driving, buying or selling property, obtaining a loan, or starting a business.
This is an enormous qualitative policy change from the previous call-ups.
It will take only 7 days from the day of notice, for a Russian male to be prohibited from leaving the country.
If previously, Putin was fine with tolerating mass exodus of unwilling Russians (calculating that it is better to let off some steam and avoid a major protest movement - incentivizing Russians to adopt an individual solution to a national problem), he is now expecting full compliance.
A Russian male will lose his ability to leave the country after 7 days, and his right to basic citizen activities after 20 days of noncompliance.
This is an uncharted territory for Putin.
How will Russians react? Will they now adopt a national solution (protest movement/unrest) to a national problem?
Or will they (after some minor social media bickering) comply and go along?
Putin is clearly in the process of closing-off all pressure valves.
He has calculated that the risk of a public backlash is one worth paying for.
We shall see if he made the right bet as the new measures come into force and Russians get to experience new unprecedented levels of forced compliance.
Pentagon Leaks Part I: a systemic vulnerability.
When the news first broke out about major Pentagon intel leaks, two questions immediately captured most of the media attention:
1) Are these genuine ‘‘leaks’’ - was what happened truly a leak? Or was it a psyop from Russians, any other adversary, or perhaps from our side, and;
2) Is the ‘‘intel’’ in these leaks accurate/true?
A week later, we now know the answer to both questions: this was a genuine leak and insofar as the documents found on the internet are the original copies, they are indeed accurate and true (meaning: they are data/analysis that the US intel has either intercepted and/or assessed. Now, whether this intercepted data, or intel assessment by US officials is accurate/true, is another question. Ultimately, they are as true/accurate as we can expect the US intel to be. And given the most recent track record, they should indeed be presumed as true/accurate - until serious contradictory facts challenge their veracity).
And this is an important caveat: there are now a trove of docs that have been altered/doctored to suit the interests of our adversaries (for example: Russia altering the original image of Pentagon’s casualty estimates for Ukraine/Russia - where the original estimates have been inverted - created a distorted picture where Russians have sustained much fewer casualties than Ukrainians).
So with a double caveat that: 1) Many docs on the internet are/will be altered, and 2) There is an inherent margin of error/risk to an intel assessment/interception (which, even the most advanced SIG-INT (signal intelligence) could end up intercepting a deliberately uttered misdirection) we should overall assume that insofar as the original docs are concerned, they are to be presumed, as being accurate/true.
Beyond this, we now know the identity of the culprit who leaked the documents, and how exactly he did it.
Jack Teixeira, a 21-year-old in the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was arrested last Thursday at his home in Massachusetts.
At the time of the leaks, he was based at Fort Bragg - he leaked these top secret docs on a random gamer server on Discord (a platform where the most well-adjusted individuals congregate…)
And (according to the official FBI arrest warrant affidavit) Mr Teixeira (who’s intelligence was already in doubt) appears to have been dumber than one would expect - for he subscribed to Discord with his real name and address (Discord in turn, duly gave this information up to the FBI).
Teixeira served at the Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod, as a member of the 102nd Intelligence Wing. The wing’s website describes the following as its mission: “provide worldwide precision intelligence and command and control.”
(side note: great for all of our adversaries and amateur hackers to know exactly which wing is working hard to provide ‘‘worldwide precision intelligence”)
According to intelligence analysts, the classified documents that have recently come to light are not exactly relevant to the job of a guardsman in the Massachusetts Air National Guard - and this must be obvious even to a layman, since Texeira was not even a fed!
And besides, why would a Massachusetts Air National Guard guardsman be anywhere near the kind of material containing some ultra sensitive details like the communications of Mossad leaders (opposing Netanyahu’s Judicial reforms and attempting to arrange political resistance to them) and discussions among South Korea's National Security Council? (more on snooping on allies later below)
It is true that America seems to have a major problem with appropriate classification of security levels required around docs.
There are 1.3 million individuals with a ‘‘Top Secret” clearance level.
That is a contradiction in terms - anything available to 1.3 million (approximately 2x population of the entire DC) could not possibly be top secret..
And besides, having that level of clearance is necessary but not sufficient for such an access to be secured.
There must also be a ‘‘need to know’’ - hard to see how this onerous criteria was fulfilled.
Why would a 21 year old guardsman ‘‘need to know’’ details of Ukraine’s counteroffensive?
He would not - and therein lies the problem.
In spite of formal disqualification that should have precluded his access, a 21 year old somehow got that very access.
It is good that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered a review of the department’s procedures to prevent similar incidents from taking place again.
But why did this have to ever come to this?
Why wasn’t there a fix to all loopholes after an NSA contractor Edward Snowden embarrassed the US on a global stage (also revealing unflattering facts - like America spying on the German Chancellor Angela Merkel) and putting countless lives at risk?
Was that global embarrassment not enough to ensure that a similar colossal error would not take place?
Again, this was not some sophisticated hack - a 21 year old posted these highly consequential documents on a chatroom for months!
How many other (not even federally employed) 21 year olds have a similar level of access today?
(side note: and unlike Austin - who acknowledged the damage at least implicitly, President Biden strained all credulity claiming that no “contemporaneous” intel of “great consequence” was revealed - if the latest state of Ukraine’s air defenses, and its counteroffensive plans (which would surely have to be altered) are not contemporaneous and highly consequential then what is? This was not great for Biden’s credibility…)
One hopes that this is the final wake up call that will finally deliver much-needed changes to the way the US intel is guarded.
But the damage is done - and it is significant.
Out of fear of being caught up in the ensuing diplomatic mess (and also due to even more legitimate security interests), America’s allies everywhere will now be reluctant to share the most sensitive intel with Washington.
Consider the alternative scenario: if a similar incident happened in the UK, Australia or Israel would the US keep sharing intel of similar sensitivity?
Maybe - but probably not.
The most likely scenario would have been Washington’s insistence on proven changes to the security protocols - before resumption of intel sharing of comparable sensitivity.
America’s allies could now do the same - but because they are not the world’s superpower, and because they still depend on America’s security guarantees, they may hide the true treason - and opt to go with a more tactful evasive rationale for their pause in the most sensitive intel-sharing.
Pentagon Leaks Part II: How we spy and who we spy on.
The Pentagon leaks have revealed (or rather, confirmed) two realities: 1) We still spy on our allies (and some of them still behave in questionable manner - more later below) and, 2) We have extremely impressive SI-G (signal intel), like the ability to utilize advanced technique to tap phones or conduct electronic intercepts.
(side note: as impressive as the methods are, precisely because they contain such specific data points and communications, they could lead to an acute awareness among the targets regarding the methods employed by America to gather sensitive information.)
We have spied on some of the closest allies like Israel and South Korea, some less close like Egypt, and even on Ukraine.
(side note: although one could argue, quite persuasively, that given a) Ukraine is not a NATO ally, b) that the relationship of extremely close alliance is rather new, and c) The country is still infiltrated with Russian spies - many of whom are within the government and even military institutions - it is wholly reasonable to spy on Ukraine: ensuring that the aid is delivered and used as intended, and to protect Zelensky against pro-Russia traitors within the key posts of the government in Kyiv)
And when it comes to the methods of intel gathering in use, it is rather clear that America’s might in SI-G intel is unparalleled.
For example, it was SI-G intel that caught some unflattering (to Ukraine, and thus to the US) truths about Kyiv’s ability to command & control its own military - when it was revealed that Ukraine’s SBU (security service) uncovered some striking levels insubordination: where the Ukrainian special ops agents in Belarus defied their own orders and attacked a Russian surveillance plane.
Pentagon leaks part III: Key insights and their implications.
*note: those related to China and intel on Beijing signing off on supplying Russia with lethal military aid will be discussed in-depth in Thursday’s cables.
1) Apparent instances of bad behavior from allies
There were a number of unflattering (to our allies) discoveries about allied conduct:
a) Deepening intel ties between the UAE and Russia.
American spies managed to catch Russian intel officers boasting that they had apparently convinced the UAE leadership “to work together against US and UK intelligence agencies”.
This is huge if true, but is it?
That the UAE leadership would want to appease/flatter Russians to win their favor and secure leverage against ever more assertive Iran (which is about to purchase Russian S-400 air defense SAMs and Su-35 fighter jets from) is an understandable motivation.
But what would the UAE possibly gain from Russia to compensate for an incredible damage that would surely ensue if they did in fact go along to team up against US/UK intel?
This simply does not seem to make sense.
It is more likely therefore, that Russian intel officials embellished their own accomplishments and exaggerated their strategic gains (which could have been nothing of consequence at all- amounting to nothing more than groundless self-flattery).
Russian intel officials are not exactly known for their professionalism and avoidance of treachery when it comes to reporting to their own command.
In a system where the future is uncertain, embellishing accomplishments to secure short-term favors and promotions may be extremely rational (even if deceitful, unethical and unprofessional) conduct.
Whatever the UAE did, and whatever their hedging strategy (which is largely out in the open already), Russian intel officers are almost certainly exaggerating these ‘‘wins’’ for their own personal gains.
(side note: now, if that was how the UAE officials were describing the ‘‘new relationship’’ then that would change things directly. But to date, no such intel exists)
b) South Korea’s reluctance to arm Ukraine with ammo.
Now, even though South Korean officials later claimed that this was untrue, and much of the information disclosed was altered, that does not really change the fundamentals that South Korea was indeed hesitant to arm Ukraine (even at America’s repeated requests).
And much of this was open knowledge (for many months) - in spite of repeated calls, much of South Korea’s involvement has been limited to non-lethal aid.
The good news is that: a) given the leaks, and b) South Korea’s denial, there will now be an added signaling pressure on Seoul to behave contrary to the assessment.
And not only to improve their reputation vis-à-vis the US and other Western allies, but also, to signal to Russia that they are not afraid of a confrontation (and this is an important signal given: Moscow can have a major impact over North Korea’s behavior. It is thus crucial for the Kremlin to see that they cannot boss around Seoul with impunity. That their power of “disincentive influence” over the South Koreans is much weaker than the leaks would suggest).
c) Egypt planned to send 40,000 rockets to Russia.
And according to the leaked document, Egyptian President el-Sisi issued instructions on Feb 1 to keep the supply of rockets secret in order “to avoid problems with ‘the West”.
El-Sisi was caught telling a person referenced only as Salah al-Din (probably Mohamed Salah al-Din, the minister of state for military production) that factory workers should be told that the projectiles are intended for the Egyptian army: the gunpowder offered to Russia was to come from Factory 18 (name of a decades-old chemical manufacturing plant).
What adds insult to the injury, is that the instructions came just days after America’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Egypt’s president during a visit to Cairo.
In retrospect, the immediate nature of the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry’s trip to Moscow for talks with Russian leaders so soon after Blinken’s visit, seems to indicate that whatever the intricacies of Blinken’s diplomacy, they failed to deter El-Sisi.
Now, one could very well argue that, at the end of the day, the Egyptians were in fact ultimately deterred from signing off on this - they deny ever transferring the rockets, and the National Security Council’s Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed (last week) the lack of any evidence to suggest the contrary : “We’ve seen no indication that Egypt is providing lethal weapons capabilities to Russia,” he told reporters on Tuesday.
Or maybe not - perhaps there have been hiccups in production, or even that the rockets have not yet been produced and/or prepared at all.
(side note: it is not clear what proportion of said rockets was ready for shipment - so one has to take the lack of evidence of a potential transfer with a grain of salt: it does not necessarily mean that the Egyptians had definitively aborted this mission at the time of the leaks).
After all, February was only two months ago.
Now, unlike the previous intel on the UAE, the revelations around Egypt are extremely plausible.
For a start, Egypt is not agreeing to actively work against the West (main reason why the UAE ‘‘revelations’’ were difficult to believe).
In fact, El-Sisi was allegedly trying to cover up the whole scheme in order to ‘‘avoid problems’’ with the west.
In addition, El-Sisi had dual motives to do this: a) Russia’s increasing influence and leverage over Egypt, and b) Cairo receiving a cold shoulder from the US.
When it comes to the former, Russia is indeed expanding its footprint in Egypt: it is building a massive railway workshop, and Rosatom, Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, is already in the works (since 2022) to construct Egypt’s first ever nuclear power plant.
(side note: the latest G7 measures to cripple Russia’s nuclear industry - reducing another lucrative avenue of funding for Putin’s war - are thus welcome and well-timed)
Moreover, and once the war in Ukraine disrupted access to Ukraine’s wheat (a country where almost every meal is consumed with bread - accounting for the majority of calories), Cairo was increasingly relying on purchases of Russian grain.
This has arguably saved Egypt’s authoritarian regime from a possible social unrest caused due to wheat shortages - the last thing that El-Sisi needed to deal with: given that the ongoing acute economic crisis, including a devalued currency, high inflation and soaring food prices (due in part by Ukraine war) already caused major headaches to the Egyptian President.
And the fact that (back in September 2022) Washington decided to withhold $130 million from Egypt’s annual allotment of $1.3 billion in security aid due to Cairo’s abysmal human rights record, amounted to yet another reason for Egypt to diversify sources of military cooperation (which, providing 40,000 rockets to the ammo-depleted Russian military, would surely help to secure) and join the club of Middle Eastern states hedging their bets.
Clearly then, Cairo had strong incentives to appease Moscow - but this was a risky bet: a major bet against US intel.
El-Sisi was proven wrong in making this bet.
He should have known that if Washington was snooping on even an ally like Merkel, and had the capability to penetrate the inner court of the Kremlin, then it was simply a given that his scheme would be revealed - it was only a matter of time.
But whether or not the lack of evidence for transfers is because El-Sisi was later ultimately deterred, or simply did not have enough time to act upon his plan, the end result is the same: Egypt has damaged its standing with Washington, and it cannot even proceed with the original plan anymore.
The only thing El-Sisi can show for his misjudgment is the desire to help Russia: even though Egypt may not have been able to ultimately act upon it, Putin will surely appreciate the sentiment.
Consequently, further courting from the Kremlin is now inevitable - and Washington will certainly need to preempt this.
2) The toxic infighting within the Kremlin.
This we always knew and have discussed on a number of previous occasions.
What is surprising however, is the extent to which this intra-Kremlin confrontation is so a) direct, and b) open on the surface.
There are surely some malicious maneuvering and underhanded subtle tactics in play, but there are also a number of open accusations flying around: in one doc, American intel officials have uncovered that that Russia’s main domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Security Service (FSB) had “accused” the country’s Defense Ministry “of obfuscating Russian casualties in Ukraine.”
This means that the head of FSB Alexander Bortnikov, is quite comfortable with having personal confrontation with the Minister of Defense Sergei Shoygu - accusing the latter of incompetence.
(side note: another reason why Putin’s grip on power is solid, and why coup is so unlikely - those who would be presumed to have enough power to pull off such a feat are divided, fight each other, and still compete to appeal to Putin’s good favors)
In another incident: “Mr. Putin attempted to resolve the dispute personally by calling Mr. Prigozhin and Mr. Shoigu into a meeting believed to have taken place on Feb. 22, one document reports.”
It is important to remember how Prigozhin had to accuse the Defense Ministry of deliberate sabotage (in refusing to provide Wagner mercenaries necessary amounts of ammo) in public to secure this meeting: this underlines the point that Prigozhin is not as close to Putin as many claim.
It took the pressure of a public spat to move Putin’s hand in organizing this meeting: if Prigozhin was truly that powerful, and was truly that close to Putin, surely, securing such a meeting would have simply been a matter of picking up a phone and requesting Putin’s assistance?
Instead Prigozhin was forced to throw tantrums in public, and cause enough headaches for Putin to then force his hand.
3) Granular battlefield insights and war projections
There were some unfortunate revelations on the state of Ukraine’s military
Newly released documents reveal that the American-made smart bombs used by Ukraine's military are being jammed by Russia's electronic warfare capabilities, causing them to miss their targets.
The documents also provide a detailed accounting of Western plans to arm and train Ukraine's army, including the status of each brigade, its inventory of weaponry, and the number of shells and precision-guided rockets being fired each day.
If accurate, this information could allow Russian military intelligence to identify the specific brigades involved in breaching Russian defenses, which would make those units a target.
Newly released documents could have further significant political ramifications as well.
This is because they reveal something extremely sensitive: that there are 97 special-forces personnel from NATO countries currently stationed in Ukraine, including 50 from Britain, 17 from Latvia, 15 from France, and 14 from America.
Now, in all likelihood these forces are only involved in training their Ukrainian counterparts - how likely is the alternative? That for example, America sent just 14 special-forces personnel to fight or engage in something non-supervisory?
But this is granular: the Kremlin is not going to focus on this caveat, and will instead, exploit this information to justify its narrative that it is fighting not only Ukraine but also the entire NATO alliance.
This is a major gift to Russian propaganda.
And in practical terms, the deployment of special forces is often conducted with a great deal of secrecy, so the release of this information may undermine the effectiveness of these units in Ukraine and put their lives at risk.
These were not the only bad news, perhaps most discouragingly, there were revelations that Ukraine's air defenses are in dire shape, with the country's Buk and S-300 missiles (together these two make up around 90% of Ukraine’s medium-range air defenses) likely to run out by March 31st and May 2nd respectively.
The remaining batteries, including Western air-defense systems, are unable to match the Russian volume of fire.
Now, it is certainly plausible that the US and NATO are already taking steps to address this shortage - since it would be inconceivable to imagine Ukraine launching into a planned counteroffensive if their frontline troops would truly be left exposed to air strikes to such an extent.
The only heartening bit of news: America’s Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates that Russia has suffered 35,000 to 43,000 casualties, twice the number of Ukrainian casualties, and has lost over 2,000 tanks (with only 419 remaining “in theatre”).
Against this background, American spooks are not predicting an end to the war anytime soon.
The leaked reports outline the DIA conclusion that even if Ukraine was to recapture significant amounts of territory and inflict unsustainable losses on Russian forces, the gains would not lead to peace talks.
In addition, a stalemate is assessed to be the most likely scenario by the end of the year (although the DIA caveats that this could change if there are substantive improvements to Ukrainian or Russian military capabilities).
In the event that Ukraine gains a decisive advantage, the report predicts that Kyiv would likely conduct riskier offensive operations, prompting Russia to increase nonconventional attacks on Ukraine.
The DIA assesses the use of nuclear weapons as unlikely, but estimates that the Kremlin would opt for a new national mobilization to sustain further combat operations.
Now, the DIA assessments are not at all unreasonable, but the job of policymakers is to shape incentives and change facts on the ground.
Yes, thus far, Putin is not willing to give up on his maximalist goals, but this will not necessarily remain to be the case if the Kremlin is convinced that Beijing will not help them with sufficient vigor - while the Western support continues.
Washington’s main strategic task must therefore be: a) deterring China from providing this assistance, and b) making it clear to Russians that their hopes are baseless - that help is not coming, and that their best bet therefore, is to prevent further humiliation and negotiate a retreat.
Putin has shown willingness to feign interest to negotiate before - when the situation after Kharkiv and Kherson was so dire and hopeless.
Even though the previous initiatives were not genuine attempts to seek peace, this still demonstrates that he was not as concerned by the potential loss of face (from appearing weak and reneging on his maximalist war aims) as many would have expected.
So if Putin expressed a fake interest before, he can most certainly be pressured to express a genuine one next time around: the key is to inflict even more pain and disabuse him of the notion that there is a possibility of a Chinese rescue.
The tasks for Washington are therefore pretty clear.
And in the meantime, perhaps the one silver lining from all these leaks is this: now that Ukraine will have to alter its counteroffensive plans, there will be less pressure on (and less expectation of) Kyiv to perform to the same high standard as expected of them prior to these leaks - and before Ukraine was forced to scramble to arrange last minute tactical and logistical alterations.
Even if Kyiv fails to deliver the same level of success as in the Kharkiv/Kherson battles of last summer and fall, there will surely be more understanding and patience from the the US and NATO: since this intel leak and the resulting last-minute changes to the original battle plans will definitely affect Ukraine’s performance in the upcoming months.