Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war, Trump VP pick, and how to dissuade a dangerous return of isolationism.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Indications of future recruitment problems for Russia.
New Russian recruits can now expect 1,700,000 rubles ($18,000+) in the Moscow region as a one-off payment for joining the invader army.
The number more than doubled recently.
This is a strong indicator of the increasing difficulty of recruiting soldiers for this campaign - extra sweeteners are now required to hit recruitment goals.
To be clear, Russia has a deep pool to tap, and will always maintain this total manpower advantage over Ukraine.
With that said however it is becoming pretty clear that those lower hanging fruit recruits have now been tapped.
Those who are the most eager have already been recruited.
And so individuals that are being drafted now are by definition less sacrificial/put higher price on their lives.
As such, two further implications become possible:
1) The new recruits who are less sacrificial are also more likely to suffer a morale loss from harsh "meat assault" tactics.
And this morale loss can definitely spread and infect others too.
2) Soldiers who require higher pay to be induced into service are also more likely to be from relatively more well-off families.
They are less likely to be on the brink of destitution like many others who joined at the very outset at a significantly lower pay.
And these relatively well-off soldiers are in turn more likely to come from larger cities (as opposed to deprived towns from far away regions with heavy presence of ethnic minorities.)
So then, this combo of relative wealth and coming from major cities means that complaints will reverberate much louder within the society.
The families of these soldiers are more likely to complain and voice their concerns on social media.
At the same time, these complaints will now spread around major Russian cities.
In other words, the ugly realities of the war will start to spread into the demographics that have been largely shielded from this war.
And this demographic is a more important segment for Putin to worry about politically.
It is one thing when body bags return to a small town with heavy ethnic minority presence and quite another when they go back to cities like Rostov, Ekaterinburg, and Moscow.
With all that said however, the fact that Putin is still delaying a new wave of mass mobilization (in favor of higher value contracts offered to recruits) may point to his belief that the war will not go on for too long and that such high costs are therefore eminently sustainable.
In addition, it is also a strategic signaling to that very effect: demonstrating confidence to both domestic and foreign audiences that he feels sure of weathering this storm at an acceptable cost.
2) Kremlin admits problems in assimilating returning Ukraine war veterans.
The Kremlin is reportedly concerned about the long-term social and political implications of Russian veterans returning from the war in Ukraine.
Last week, a Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reported that during a July 2024 meeting, Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration, stated that Russian war veterans "adapt poorly" to civilian life and that many convict recruits commit violent crimes after returning home.
Kiriyenko indicated that there will be "quite a lot" of veterans returning from Ukraine, and their increased crime could cause discontent, fear, or aggression among Russian citizens.
Kiriyenko emphasized that the return of veterans from Ukraine will be different than after the Soviet-Afghan war or the Second World War due to fewer personnel losses in Afghanistan and a less mobilized society compared to the Second World War.
What was even more remarkable was that someone like Kiriyenko admitted that most of the Russians experience the war in Ukraine exclusively "on TV" and are therefore unprepared to "understand and accept" the veterans.
During the meeting, the concern that disillusioned veterans might form criminal gangs were also aired - even though Kiriyenko did not propose specific solutions.
Nice to see some reports of the Kremlin worrying about real long-term issues that will be caused by this war: something that often gets lost in the background of Russia’s grinding and slowing and yet still forward momentum on the battlefield.
3) Russia questions Trump’s promise to settle the war.
The spokesperson for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, rebuffed Trump’s claims that he could end the Ukraine war within 24 hrs:
‘‘It's necessary to separate pre-election rhetoric from statements by government officials vested with the appropriate powers. If we talk about whether it's possible to resolve the conflict, let's be realistic."
But it didn’t end there, she later proceeded to impugn Trump admin’s overall credibility for achieving diplomatic breakthroughs of significance:
“They prepared for the 'deal of the century' for quite a long time, but it did not end in anything”
At first sight, it is surprising that Russians would say this - why discourage Trump?
Why rebuff an attempt at an outcome that you ultimately desire (since a quick end to war necessarily implies a freeze in territorial gains for Russia)
But at a closer look, there are at least three reasons (among many) for Zakharova to undermine Trump like this:
1) Firstly because feigning disinterest and low expectations is always a better starting point in any negotiation.
2) Guarding against the media risk of the ongoing diplomatic efforts being presented as a Trump - Putin conspiracy.
If Trump was to return and push for a quick end to the war, the Media (all over the world) will necessarily frame it the following way: Putin’s man in Washington is back and is doing his bidding.
This could become a blocker for Russia: a bipartisan opposition in Congress will be easier to pull off, and America’s allies in Europe will feel more confident in openly pushing back against Trump - if the eventual deal is framed and presented as Trump doing his utmost to please Putin.
In fact, this could very well lead to an outcome where Trump has to negotiate harder in order to dispel such notions.
So to preempt that risk, for the Kremlin it would be far more advantageous to frame Russia’s current stance as indifferent and skeptical: we’ve heard this before.. let’s be realistic.. prove us wrong..
As a corollary to this, those on Ukraine’s side must push very hard to create a narrative that any pressure on Ukraine to give land to Russia would amount to Trump acting weak and as puppet of Putin’s: if there are two things Trump hates, it is being perceived as the opposite of strong and fully independent.
3) Avoiding the implication that the US is omnipotent in shaping the entire region.
They don't want this deal to be presented as Trump's success in shaping global world events by forcing Ukraine into specific appeasement.
They would much rather it look like Ukraine simply has no choice because of Russia's momentum - not because of Trump's threat of withdrawal of help/blackmail.
Since if it was due to Trump's pressure, the implication would be that Ukraine was actually capable of withstanding Russia - that it wasn't Moscow that ultimately pressured Kyiv to submit.
Obviously, the Kremlin would much rather have the opposite implication.
Zakharova's comment is actually an example of a direction that Trump could take in reversing his track and doubling down on Ukraine: that he tried to do it.. that he tried to work out a deal, but that there was an intransigence on the Russian side.
And in order to keep his communications lines with Putin open, he could even blame it on Putin's circles - that the Russian establishment didn't want peace.
Ukraine can and will likely make it easy for the blame on a failed negotiation stick squarely on Russia.
Kyiv is already hinting that it is open to talk as long as the talks are genuine (meaning they don't imply total submission).
And to signal this, Ukraine already invited Russia to the peace conference in November.
Kyiv should keep this up.
It is unfortunate that in the middle of a brutal invasion, Ukraine must devote energy to appearances - but such is the nature of the current status quo.
Bad incentives created from presumed return of Trump.
It is disappointing to see how politicians like Viktor Orban normalize treating Putin as a reputable player in international affairs.
It is also discouraging to see the PM of the world's largest democracy (India) to hug Putin shortly after a missile strike on Kyiv's hospital.
Unfortunately though, even though the trend towards normalization of Putin on the world stage was already taking place, with Trump's presumed return to Presidency, such trends will likely escalate.
In addition, if previously, it was mostly the leaders of the “global south" that were willing to do business as usual with Putin, then this normalization will gradually spread towards other western leaders.
This is because Trump is now legitimizing cordial relations with Putin.
This doesn't mean that Trump likes Putin or doesn't care about Ukraine's prospects at all.
In spite of legitimate worries to that effect, there isn't strong evidence to back these assertions yet.
But it is clear that Ukraine will not be his priority, and that his objective is not to help Ukraine to reclaim its lost territory but to end the war.
And his tactical moves flow downstream from these strategic objectives.
And following Trump's promise to 1) settle the war with a negotiated agreement, and 2) do so on a short/tight timeline, the political cost of engaging Putin has gone down.
This is because Trump's objectives by definition presuppose more standard diplomatic relations with Putin.
And this then opens the door for certain far right leaders in the West to take things a little further.
Orban is just the start, but what about Putin appeasers in France, UK, and Germany.
Closeness to Putin has always been a major achilles heel for Le Pen, but if such relations are no longer a taboo, then one major avenue of attack on the far right in France will gradually become blunter (making Le Pen's eventual Presidency in 2027 ever-more likely).
Same goes to the UK - Nigel Farage of the Reform Party took a major hit for his pro-Russia narratives about Russia invasion.
But we now see the same narratives aired at the RNC (in remarks delivered by a Trump supporter investor David Sachs: a long-time Putin parrot on twitter).
And within the US itself, voices considered fringe in Congress a mere year ago, will benefit from the added legitimacy.
This is because on Ukraine, JD Vance (for international readers: Trump’s new pick for VP) is as extreme in his isolationist instincts as one can get.
Vance was one of the loudest voices advocating against provision of supplies and funding to Ukraine, and in fact at one point he even said the he doesn’t care which side wins: a statement so preposterously opposite to America’s national interests that it is astonishing that he even voiced it - which in itself proves how little political costs such a stance carries these days..
(side note: it is one thing to argue that US resources should be diverted towards different theaters of potential conflict - like the Pacific - and quite another to brazenly state indifference to the outcome of the war in Ukraine: there is only one clear outcome that is not only morally justified but also strongly in US national security interests: that Russia that pursues imperialist policies under its current leadership is squarely defeated and loses capacity and appetite to cause further instability in Europe by invading sovereign nations..)
1) Isolate and weaken isolationist influence where possible.
The silver lining in all this is that European allies are taking things into their own hands.
The EU is already outspending the US ($111bn vs $81bn), is on track to outspend further, and the NATO-wide $43bn funding guarantees (for next year) bolster their position too.
Add to that, leaders of the EU are taking diplomatic steps to isolate those that are all too willing to appease Putin.
Here is an example of this happening in practice: Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban is now on a unique diplomatic pedestal due to Hungary's rotating presidency over the Council of the EU.
But given his propensity to be chummy with both Putin and Xi (exemplified by his recent trips to Moscow and Beijing) the leaders of the EU decided to punish him by boycotting his foreign affairs conference on August 28-29 and agreed to holding an alternative instead.
This is to harm his reputation by further isolating him within the EU - good.
Instead of attending Orban’s foreign affairs conference, ministers of the EU will instead be summoned to a ‘‘formal” foreign affairs council meeting of the EU happening at the same time.
And this is significant: Orban’s planned summit was a prime opportunity for him to influence the bloc’s foreign policy and for his Foreign Affairs Minister Péter Szijjártó to gain attention - and now this opportunity to get this attention and promote pro-appeasement/pro-Putin narratives will diminish.
2) Link support to Ukraine to the grander strategic outcomes.
Vance’s reasoning to withdraw support for Ukraine: “so America can focus on the real issue, which is China. That’s the biggest threat to our country and we’re completely distracted from it”
But for the reasons discussed on a number of occasions before (and we will surely revisit these if Trump wins and proceeds in the direction of taking Vance’s counsel) therein lies the fundamental error of judgment: assuming that supporting Ukraine detracts away from energy and resources on the Pacific.
This is not so: the US currently spends mere 0.25% of its GDP on Ukraine - less than even what it spends on the overall US foreign aid (USAID) and 5x less than the amount of money ($247bn) simply lost by the Federal government in payment errors (the total is in trillions over the past two decades).
No one is suggesting that last year’s monetary loss from Federal payment errors will stand in the way of confronting China (in fact, most readers were probably unaware), so how can something 1/5th of that become a serious issue to that focus?
What about weapons? Well here the only major platforms that have relevance to confronting China are the GMLRS and ATACMS missiles - and they are being sent in minimal numbers - nowhere near impactful for operations in China.
Key suppliers are ramping up production of these missiles already, and beyond these, the only other major contribution comes in the form of 155mm artillery rounds (production of which is also ramping up) - something of little relevance to the potential wars in the East and South China Seas..
On the other hand, precisely because of our decision to supply Ukraine, dozens of domestic production facilities are ramping up to revitalize the US domestic military-industrial complex.
And any advanced missiles that are being expended in Ukraine, come with an often-forgotten benefit: strategic insights gained from their use in a real battlefield against an advanced adversary in possession of some of the most modern air-defense and electronic warfare capabilities.
Every time an ATACMS is being used, we learn how Russians defend against them and how they try to jam them - this is an invaluable benefit to the units that could see combat in East Asia - most of China’s (untested) air defense and EW systems are based on Russian prototypes (like that of the S-300/S-400).
Finally, one must also remember that horrific strategic outcome avoided by continuous support offered to Ukraine: major hit to US credibility and deterrence capabilities.
As Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. CQ Brown remarked last week, a shift to isolationism ‘‘opens a door for Xi Jinping and others that want to do unprovoked aggression.. We have credibility that's at stake. It's not just the United States, but NATO, the West, if we just back away.”
Abandoning Ukraine will not only tempt our major adversary to exploit perceived gap in resolve and staying power, but it would also worry our local allies - forcing some to hedge their bets, or act in an otherwise unforeseen way (like over-militarizing too soon) and making an even bigger conflict more likely.
The way to avoid a war in the Pacific is through deterrence: something that is largely incompatible with abandonment of Ukraine.
3) Frame it as a loss for Trump
If there is one thing that Trump hates the most is being branded as weak and as a loser.
He is frequently fond of reminding everyone about the botched Kabul Airlift in August of 2021.
(side note: though many people forget that the original withdrawal deal was made under Trump's presidency in 2020 and this very agreement with the Taliban sidelined Afghani government, required no security guarantees for the government in Kabul (effectively offering a tacit go ahead for Taliban to ramp up its attacks in preparation for the eventual full assault) and imposed specific timelines on US withdrawal - a totally wrongheaded straightjacket which Biden wanted to push against but wasn't successful in extending for too much longer)
But if he let Ukraine fall under Russian onslaught, if he decided to listen to his VP and not care about who wins, if he was to abandon Ukraine then the carnage in Europe on his watch would be far more devastating than any foreign policy fiasco of the last few decades.
The humiliation and disgrace that Trump would face would be on a whole nother level - botched Kabul evacuation would be nothing in comparison.
The whole world would see America abandon its ally and let an imperialist dictator invade a major European country - Washington's commitments to allies in the Pacific would face enormous doubts, since America's credibility would be destroyed.
Is that the legacy that Trump wants?
Well he should be constantly warned (by the few normal Republicans with access to his ears) that this outcome would be his fate if he decided to follow the counsel of unhinged Putin appeasers like David Sachs or JD Vance.