Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, and post-Sinwar moment: Washington must guide Israel to strategic victory in Gaza.
Ukraine war updates.
1) The US announces a new $425M aid package for Ukraine.
The White House unveiled its latest military support package, featuring air defense systems, air-to-ground missiles, artillery, and armored vehicles.
The Pentagon emphasized that this aid will include interceptor missiles (like for NASAMS) and “dozens” of air defense units to counter Russian drone and missile attacks.
The aid draws from previously approved systems as Biden’s authority for new allocations expired in September.
Defense Secretary Austin also attended NATO and G7 meetings to discuss continued support for Ukraine.
In addition, Germany has also introduced additional military aid, and in a monumental move, Australia allocated 49 of its M1 Abrams tanks.
(side note: even a non-superpower allied country tucked away in the Pacific understands the importance of Ukraine’s success in this war. And somehow, we still have a not so insignificant proportion of Americans arguing for an end to US support.)
2) Zelenskyy announces his victory plan.
In a speech to his parliament (Rada) Zelenskyy outlined his plan for victory that consisted of several main proposals and three secret annexes.
Among the publicly known proposals are:
a) An unconditional invitation to join the NATO alliance;
b) Faster deliveries of weapons (with no geographic restrictions on their usage),
c) Ukraine’s neighbors will conduct joint air defense operations to protect Ukraine’s core civilian infrastructure like energy/power plants;
c) The deployment of a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package on Ukrainian soil and;
d) Increased post-war security and economic cooperation with Europe.
This is of course a wish-list not a plan.
But a lot of these elements will enable Ukraine to execute actual plans that make victory more likely.
All of these are reasonable asks - and fully endorsed by these cables.
They are, however, very unlikely to happen - especially the unconditional invitation to NATO.
3) Ukrainian mobilization allegedly drops by 40%.
There are Ukrainian media reports of a sharp decrease (of around 40%) in the number of fresh new Ukrainian soldiers being mobilized—down from 35k in training at the height of the mobilization law in May to roughly 20k now.
If true, combined with Russia’s steady inflow of recruits and additional troops from North Korea (believed to be at a significant size of around 10k), this is an extremely worrying development - if the conscription age doesn’t drop further (possibly all the way down to 18) it is hard to see how the current dynamic would change.
(side note: the fact there is now unrebuttable evidence of NK troops’ deployment to Ukraine creates an opening for NATO - this is a clear escalation from Russia - they are involving formal third country troops in this war. These are not mercenaries - these are formal NK battalions fighting in Ukraine. NATO can use this as an excuse to remove restrictions on long-range munition uses and possibly, even introducing a no-fly zone over Ukraine controlled airspace. Rhetorically, this should be framed as a response to Russia’s own instigations - reducing the burden of ever-escalatory response on Moscow.)
These shortfalls don’t affect in a linear fashion - they will gradually compound: the fewer men Ukraine has, the harder will it become to prioritize objects and cities to defend, the less likely it is that Ukraine can mount a counterattack - both will lead to further morale losses and public disillusionment - which will make future recruitment even harder to pull off.
Yahya Sinwar’s death opens opportunity for a “day after” governance plans in Gaza - necessary preconditions & why Washington must lead.
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by the IDF last Thursday.
(side note: this is yet another nail in the coffin for the ‘‘Hamas is an idea/you cannot defeat Hamas with military means” crowd. It is now estimated that around 17k Hamas soldiers have been killed, all of their senior commanders are dead and all of this happened at a cost of 350 IDF soldiers killed in action. While all casualties are costly for a nation to bear, it is an incredible ratio.)
Curiously, Israeli military leaders thought it prudent to share Sinwar’s final moments caught on a drone camera that followed him into a rubble-ridden building.
Curiously, because in his final moments, even in his final moments, Sinwar demonstrated exceptional defiance and a will to fight to the bitter end.
Israel may have calculated that the captured video would display him as helpless and alone - abandoned by his now decimated army.
The strategic goal here is clear: convince other Hamas fighters that their ends are also near - convince them of the total futility of their fight against Israel and induce them into releasing the remaining hostages and laying down their arms.
But surely, more socially aware leaders may have realized that this video would be widely shared on the social media - earning admiration of millions across the region and the world (no matter how indifferent or negative the initial view of Hamas was to begin with.).
And that remaining Hamas soldiers may now feel hardened in their resolve to continue the fight for the memory of their fallen leader.
In short, Israeli military leaders likely miscalculated the actual impact of the shared video.
Opening for a ceasefire.
It is probably too early to talk about a comprehensive peace - there are a number of preconditions that need to be met (we will discuss some of these below), and unfortunately, it is unlikely to happen any time soon.
But a prolonged ceasefire and end to the intense phase of the fighting is indeed possible.
Leaders all across the world have been calling for just that, and to his credit, Netanyahu offered those remaining Hamas fighters to ‘‘leave and live’’ if they lay down their arms and release the remaining hostages.
President Biden was also quick to call for a ceasefire - and in addition to the obvious strategic needs of the U.S. (and basic humanitarian instincts) he probably also sensing an opportunity to end the active phase of the war three weeks before the elections - hoping that (in tandem with a recent warning of impending military aid cut-off if Israel was to continue human rights violations) this would pacify the Arab-American citizens in key swing states like Michigan.
(side note: latest polls are so tight that one cannot discount even a few thousand - let alone tens of thousands - swing voters in swing states.)
But some of his comments were rather problematic.
Biden said that Yahya Sinwar was an “insurmountable” obstacle to the ceasefire and peace and that this obstacle is now gone.
Of course, Sinwar’s intransigence was at times almost a blocker.
But laying everything on one person is extremely lazy foreign policy and at its core, an abdication of responsibility.
It also removes the agency from Israel - what happened to all the criticism of Netanyahu?
For months, we were being told that Netanyahu is the one spoiling the ceasefire (largely true) because he wanted to prolong the war and his rule (probably lots of truth in this - but Israel’s strategic national interests, and tactical interests of the military campaign clearly also played a major role)
But if Sinwar was the blocker, then why all this criticism of Netanyahu?
What is it that Biden was so unhappy with then?
And secondly, and more importantly going forward, Biden is now creating a potential trap for his admin: with the ‘‘insurmountable’’ obstacle gone, any future failure will be by default pinned squarely on the shoulders of Netanyahu and Biden.
When we know that this may not be necessarily true either: an actual new insurmountable obstacle may rise up - perhaps a new Hamas leader who is even more radical than Sinwar, and one that would be driven by revenge more than the desire for self-preservation (although this is still unlikely in the grand scheme of things).
With all this said, how should a ceasefire take place?
Well, Netanyahu’s offer to leave and live in exchange for surrender and release of hostages is a good start, but it would require something sorely missing in this conflict: trust.
A third-party guarantee would be needed for this.
Perhaps a coalition of western states like the UK and France could step in to facilitate this process (the US is probably not going to have an appetite to provide this guarantee - it would likely also not be trusted: given proximity between Washington and Tel-Aviv).
And Israel itself may do more: it can start gradual withdrawal of troops to signal seriousness of intent: it could perhaps conduct a partial withdrawal of remaining forces, and publicly promise to withdraw the rest - once Hamas fulfills its end of the deal.
There is still no sign of even this limited agreement happening any time soon.
But even if this was to be accomplished, there are other more significant preconditions that would need to be met for a more substantive and stable peace to come into place.
Preconditions for normal governance, reconstruction, and investment.
These cables have called for a UN-led force (similar to one in Kosovo) to be deployed in order to monitor the borders between Gaza and Israel.
Short of that (if the necessary authority is impossible to achieve - for example, failure to secure a UN Security Council resolution), a US-led NATO coalition in combination with the UAE-Jordanian-Saudi and Egyptian troops could deploy a small contingent of several thousand to ensure law and order and prevent further outbursts of violence - most importantly, providing security for the new Gaza administration and preventing Hamas’s reorganization will be essential.
But a lot of analysts are now jumping too far ahead - discussing core reconstruction efforts in Gaza.
But such appeals are often presented free of any policy proposals to deal with the essential security issues first - once again, before all that is sorted, talking about a reconstruction is nothing more than wishful thinking: there can be no appropriate level of investment and commitment to rebuild Gaza without a corresponding guarantee of security.
Let’s play this out: suppose that Israel follows through on the proposed ceasefire deal, hostages are exchanged, and Gaza (somehow) begins a reconstruction, then what?
What happens to thousands of battle-hardened Hamas fighters and their leaders?
How will they not treat this settlement and a peace plan as anything less than a victory?
After more than a year of fighting, Israel would end the war with its soft power (following reckless bombing and resulting civilian death toll) in tatters, more countries will now recognize Palestine as a state, with a full recognition by many EU states (in addition to recent ones like Spain, Ireland and Norway, Slovenia), recognition of Palestine by the UK and even the US would now be on the table, and add to all that: external donors would take care of reconstruction.
How would this be anything short of strategic victory and how could Israel (under any leadership) accept this deal without harming its national interests?
These cables have called for a similar deal before, but crucially, we have highlighted the importance of Hamas either being destroyed in full or incapacitated to such an extent, that they could no longer pose a threat to Israel.
With Sinwar dead and Hamas batallions decimated, this has been largely accomplished.
But allowing Hamas to remain in power with a new successor (even with an army that has little bite) would not work for Israel.
The only way for this deal to work, is for the entire Hamas leadership to either be eliminated or self-exiled (like the 1982 PLO self-exile from Lebanon to Tunisia), or else be captured and sent to Hague (and face ICC charges in court - one way how the ICC warrants can act as a creative measure to end this conflict.)
If Sinwar’s successors were to be convinced that the only way is either death or self-exiling (if that is eventually offered) or even being tried at the ICC, it is not wholly implausible for them to choose either of the latter two options and then live on as heroes that survived the onslaught of the IDF - revered by millions globally: like it or not, Hamas now has plenty of global support after rebranding itself into a resistance movement.
(side note: facing the ICC vs being eliminated by Israel is not only about self-preservation. There is also a powerful political/symbolic aspect of this calculation: Israel would fail to take out every single Hamas leader. But Mossad will surely try to do this regardless for many years to come.)
One trap that Israel faces, is to continue the low-intensity fighting for much longer - Israel is now fast approaching the point of diminishing returns, where any further destruction of Hamas will simply not be worth many more months of war.
This will only ensure that more IDF soldiers are killed in close combat and more Palestinian civilians suffer bombardment, famine, and with winter approaching, cold.
And strategically too, with fighting against Hezbollah still ongoing, Israel needs its military and political capital resources allocated hyper-efficiently.
Naturally, this is only possible if Hamas agrees to lay down its arms and release remaining hostages.
So Washington must lead to put pressure (via intermediaries) on the remaining Hamas leaders to do just that and take the offer of ‘‘leaving’’ (the details would need to be ironed out, but would likely entail some form of self-exile.)
And if/when that is accomplished, Washington must warn Israel that it would fully suspend its military aid if Netanyahu was to renege on this promise/deal - doing so would not only harm Israeli national interests, but would also inflict damage on the U.S. prestige.
This is a pivotal moment where Israel has accomplished its military objectives in Gaza, established strong deterrence, and should now bag the strategic gains as well.
Washington must guide Israel to ensure that this does indeed take place.
Also, would not you consider Australia aligned with the US?
Re: NK involvement in Ukraine. Are there any Byelorussian troops in Ukraine that we know of, or involved in the fighting?