Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war, Macron's deterrence gaffe, and navigating the US-Saudi relations
Ukraine war updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
Russia’s retaliation against Kerch bridge attack with a barrage of expensive (and low on stock) Precision-guided missiles (PGMs) against civilian targets all across Ukraine (including Kyiv), did not do much to reverse the tide of further battlefield losses in the East.
Indeed, Kherson continues to evacuate, 20,000 Russian troops are trapped without much supply and the Russia-appointed puppet governor of the region encouraged residents to flee to Russia.
In the meantime, this was a wake-up call to the West to finally step up its efforts to help Ukraine with much-needed air-defense systems.
US-supplied NASAMS will be operational very soon, and Germany is providing IRIS-T systems: with its radars especially adept at detecting low-flying cruise missiles like “Kalibr”.
The US provided further $725 million security assistance this past week, and beyond direct military aid, NATO states are joining forces to curb Russia’s ability to rearm itself.
The US Treasury, Commerce and intelligence officials are pressing for strategies to deprive Russia of crucial components needed to produce and replenish the lost stock (more than 6,000 pieces of military equipment have been lost since the start of the war in February).
The EU will also discuss new sanctions to prevent Iranian drones making it into Russian hands.
This is an important development, since unfortunately, Iranian Shahed-136 drones are causing major damage in Ukraine, and apparently, Russia had just ordered further 2,400 of these Kamikaze drones.
And Tehran’s assistance has now escalated beyond cheap ($20,000 per unit) drones: there is now credible intel that Iran is preparing to ship Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar missiles to Russia.
These are two well-known Iranian short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range of 300-700 km.
How can the US continue its reluctance in supplying Ukraine with long-range ATACMS when Russia is getting full support from Iran - securing its ability to strike deep into Ukraine.
Washington’s refusal to provide ATACMS was always based on faulty foundations - but a continuous refusal will now become untenable.
How can the senior Biden admin officials tell Ukrainian leadership (that have to deal with Russia’s long-range missile strikes on civilian infrastructure) that they are simply too concerned with them striking targets inside Russia?
Firstly, all legitimate targets within Russia must indeed be targeted.
And secondly, even on this (largely indefensible demands) Ukraine is willing to play ball, and is ready to empower Washington with full targeting oversight - in return for securing ATACMS.
Washington must therefore end this misguided policy that (if continued) will risk making America appear like an indecisive military ally - especially when there is a contrast of Iran’s willingness to provide full backing to Moscow.
Of course, Iran is not the only tool used by Russia - these cables have long called for a stronger pressure/sanctions against Belarus: to prevent it being used as a staging ground for a potential Russian attack.
Belarusian defense ministry announced the presence of 9,000 Russian troops as part of the ‘‘regional grouping’’ of forces to ‘‘protect its borders’’.
Current force deployment is nowhere near enough to attack Ukraine from the north, but this does not mean that Russia couldn’t simply use the current configuration (or further increases) to force Ukraine from re-deploying its troops to protect against the northern axes of attack: this would then force Ukraine to redirect scarce resources from the currently highly successful eastern theatre of operations.
This is a risk that both the US and EU must act upon to neutralize very fast: and these cables have previously discussed a number of advanced policy tools available to the West in relation to Belarus.
There is no good reason why Lukashenko should feel this confident in providing support to Putin without facing major costs.
Putin’s latest state of mind.
Putin’s latest remarks on the Ukraine war reveal his current perceptions of the war, and how he sees his hand.
Putin announced that there was not much need for further “massive strikes” against Ukraine.
Translation: these missiles are expensive, and we are running out of them.
But this is not the only reason Putin had to adjust his rhetoric - the strikes against civilian targets are not too popular with ordinary Russians - who are already angry and annoyed with mobilization.
Putin had their tacit support as long as Russians could watch the war on TV - but mobilizing and actually dying for Putin’s adventurism?
There are now more men who have escaped Russia than those mobilized.
Sensitive to the domestic resistance, Putin was also quick to allay concerns by claiming that mobilization was over.
Translation: I know I am struggling to get much compliance here. I am no Stalin, I don’t have his tools that come with an unrestricted repressive apparatus - I understand that. When our incentives are misaligned, you will not comply. I understand that too - but work with me here, mobilization is over now. I apologize for the temporary inconvenience.
And beyond mere logistical and internal political difficulties, Putin can also see the tough strategic picture.
And therefore, what better time to renew offer of negotiations?
Naturally, one expects the West to dismiss these outright.
There can never be any genuine negotiations to achieve a genuine political settlement without, first and foremost, a complete withdrawal of all Russian troops from all of the post-February 24 invasion territories.
Anything short of this, and Putin will simply freeze the status quo, maintain and crystallize control over the territories (still) under his possession, and will aim to regroup and attack with his army sufficiently replenished (and with Washington’s latest chip warfare/export restrictions against China, Beijing may be persuaded to back him with adequate vigor this time around).
Putin did also say something technically true - but for wrong reasons:
“I want it to be clear: what is happening today is unpleasant, to put it mildly, but we would have got the same thing a little later, only in worse conditions for us, that’s all. So we are acting correctly and in a timely manner.”
It is true that Ukraine was a threat - but not because it was a threat to Russia.
It was never a forward base for NATO, and had no real means of ever becoming a security threat to Moscow.
Rather, Ukraine’s continuous success and Westernization was a threat to the Putin regime.
He could not simply stand the fact that a Slavic country with similar ethnic roots and culture could success and prosper as a democracy - this would directly contradict the Kremlin narrative that Russia had its own way - that Putinist autocracy and governance with rampant kleptocracy & corruption, was the only way for the Russian people to live.
With its success, Ukraine was undermining this narrative - proving in real time that there was an alternative and better political order.
What if Putin waited for a few more years, and Ukraine’s democracy and prosperity accelerated further? How could he then justify the necessity of his regime to his own people?
He miscalculated of course, with all his assumptions based on faulty premises - but his decision to invade Ukraine was (from his perspective) at least somewhat rational indeed.
Biden’s comment on Putin’s potential nuclear use
Quite a few strategists have criticized Biden for his statement that (in his view) Putin will not use nuclear weapons.
Apparently, this is too dismissive and puts a burden on Putin to display his seriousness by re-escalating his rhetoric.
Although this is a legitimate worry, the analysis is wrong-headed.
Biden did not claim that Putin ‘‘cannot’’ use nuclear weapons - only that he will not use it.
Not only is this not dismissive, Biden is in fact (very subtly) granting further power and agency to Putin.
The implication is that, in spite of all Western warning, in spite of America’s threats of ‘‘catastrophic consequences’’, Putin still retains power to choose his next moves - and that, he will simply not choose to escalate.
Biden’s comment clearly does not incentivize further escalatory rhetoric - on the contrary: it grants a subtle, indirect power and agency to Putin.
Indeed, in the very same interview, Biden painted Putin as a rational actor that has simply miscalculated (in his actions thus far) - and in predicting that he will not use nuclear weapons, Biden is affirming Putin’s rationality and giving him a reputation to live up to.
If anything, Biden’s comments were a very subtle ego boost for Putin.
And this very subtlety grants acceptability to this de-escalatory gesture - in spite of the overall dire circumstances caused by Putin.
Macron’s catastrophic damage to West’s posture of deterrence.
President Macron is back in the spotlight - and once again, not for a good reason.
Commenting on Russia’s possible use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine, the French President ruled out the possibility of responding via nuclear weapons.
Macron asserted that the French national security “would not be directly affected if, for example, there was a ballistic nuclear attack on Ukraine, or in the region”.
This is not only a carte blanche on Ukraine, but what Macron is essentially saying is that France will not respond via nuclear means if Russia was to nuke any country - that is, as long as this did not cause a ‘‘direct’’ effect on France.
(side note: presumably, NATO members would be excluded from this - but we cannot be sure of any French response of solidarity with Macron at the helm)
Now, now one was asking for, or indeed expecting France to lead the way in deterring Russia.
But then again, merely keeping mum would have sufficed.
There was absolutely no good reason for the French President to rule out certain responses to Russia’s potential use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
Removing this strategic ambiguity means essentially violating the abc of classical logic of nuclear deterrence.
This is such a major political and strategic error, that it should be career ending.
Having said all this, the damage inflicted with this statement was not only limited to the French national security interests:
1) France is the only nuclear power in the EU, their weak posture weakens the whole bloc by association.
2) Similarly, France is one of the main powers in NATO - the overall deterrence posture of the entire alliance has now been damaged.
3) France is also a major US ally - how do the statements uttered by Macron align with America’s warning of ‘‘catastrophic consequences” for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons?
The very premise of that threat is based on ambiguity as to the potential use of nuclear weapons.
When a major NATO ally rules out this possibility, America’s threats are automatically less credible by association.
France cannot afford such basic mistakes of strategic deterrence.
Not only does this weaken the overall posture of the West, but it also encourages Putin to seize opportunities for further divide & conquer campaigns within the Western alliance: knowledge of the extent to which each one of the NATO allies is willing to go, provides maneuverability and options for the Kremlin.
And in this particular case, leaving aside the military/strategic consequences aside, Putin now knows that Macron’s posture is once again swinging to the open-mindedness towards Russia-benefiting ‘‘ceasefire negotiations” of late February / early March (after a brief demonstration of resolve in June).
France needs to get its act together - how can it complain about being left out of highly strategic alliances like AUKUS, if it fails to demonstrate basic levels of strategic sense, reliability and resolve required and expected of a military ally?
The Saudi Fiasco continues.
Sensing that his earlier dismissive tone would not suffice, President Biden escalated his rhetoric against Saudi Arabia - promising certain (yet to be defined and articulated) ‘‘consequences’’ for defying Washington and playing into Russia’s hands by announcing daily production cuts amounting to 2 million barrels (nominally so - in real terms, and given the current failure of all OPEC+meeting their production goals, the actual number will be closer to 1 million barrels a day).
But Biden did hint that these consequences are going to be substantive in some shape or form - for he promised to look into the issue once the Senate got back into session after the midterm elections.
In the meantime, Saudis dismissed the allegations of aligning with Russia, and have rationalized the announced cuts in purely economic terms.
This line was promptly rejected by the Biden admin: “The Saudi foreign ministry can try to spin or deflect, but the facts are simple”, said John Kirby, a top spokesperson for the US National Security Council.
Accusing a ‘‘regional ally’’ of deflection or spin, can seem like an uncalled for rhetoric.
That is, unless you look into the full picture and consider what else Saudis have claimed: the Kingdom’s foreign ministry suggested that the Biden admin had previously asked to delay the cut by merely a month - simply to reduce the impact of any surges in prices until after the midterm elections.
This is a serious allegation that is yet to be adequately rebutted - since by making this claim, Saudis are essentially saying that: 1) The US did not really care about the impact on Russia’s revenue gains all that much, and that 2) They were driven by domestic political concerns - as opposed to more serious strategic and national security concerns.
(side note: but Saudis did in fact package their rhetoric with a pro-Kyiv gesture. Their decision to provide $400 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine could not possibly have been a coincidence. This is clear evidence of the fact that (even in the absence of concrete retaliatory moves) America’s soft power pressure and name & shame tactics work on even the most self-assured authoritarian “allies”.)
A cynic would jump to the conclusion that this has nothing to do with America’s geopolitical interests - that Biden simply wanted to shave a few pennies off gas prices before the midterms.
And no matter how tempting this conclusion may be, and even if Saudi allegations were true, in this particular context, national security interests and Biden’s short-term political interests are actually aligned.
Who could seriously claim that it is better to face a pressing crisis in Europe, a war in Ukraine, and Russia’s nuclear threats, with a divided government?
Is it more or less likely that Biden losing his Congressional majority will make it easier for this administration to face these threats?
And if this government is to fail in these challenges, all Americans will have to pay the price.
In other words, it is decidedly not in the national security interests that Biden loses his bare majorities in Congress and therefore, a significant source of leverage in foreign policy.
(side note: although the aforementioned argument is true in most circumstances, ironically, losing the Congressional majority could lead to more leverage vis-à-vis Iran. There would be two contradictory forces in play: 1) On the one hand, Biden could point at a GOP dominated Congress and justify ‘‘lack of guarantees’’ and advance the argument that ‘‘this is the best you can get, 2) On the other hand, Iran might calculate that a new GOP admin is now inevitable in 2024 (given that Biden will not be able to do much of domestic impact after losing Congress), and conclude therefore, that there is little point in agreeing to a deal and slowing down their nuclear progress: why not hunker down, speed up the current processes, and gain much more leverage by 2024? (especially when there is little credible Plan B from the Biden admin) And face tougher negotiators in 2024 with a stronger hand?)
But back to policy.
These cables have always advocated for a tougher policy on Saudi Arabia, and now that Biden promised infliction of ‘‘consequences’’, these are no longer optional.
America’s credibility is on the line - there must be consequences.
And these must go beyond the surface level gestures and largely inconsequential chastisements.
There must be concrete actions.
The good news is that with the current breach of trust from Saudis (if their claim about midterms is true, then that is a major violation of confidential communications and trust between the Biden admin and MBS) team Biden will be quite likely to escalate - since there is not too much to lose at this point.
Either Biden continues without major changes in policy for the next 2 years, and achieves very little, or risks going overboard and can always recover the relationship down the line (if Dems win the 2024 elections and retain control of the Congress, then that is a strong position of leverage that Saudis would no longer be able to ignore).
And in terms of concrete steps, these cables have advocated for a number of geopolitical and direct moves: from threatening MBS’s infrastructure and investment projects (like the Neom city - significant undertakings that require western investments and good PR - he must be reminded of what happened in the fall of 2018: post Khashoggi murder - when the Kingdom did turn (unfortunately, temporarily) into a pariah, and foreign investors fled in droves), to propping up the Kingdom’s competitors and cutting off access to America’s advanced munitions necessary for offensive military operations in Yemen.
What should be avoided however, (as a matter of actual policy, not threats) are suggestions made by the Senate Foreign Relations committee chairman, Bob Menendez.
Blocking all military sales is not an effective strategy here - the collateral and second-order consequences will be far too damaging:
1) Cutting off all military supplies could push Saudi Arabia to move closer towards China and Russia - and embark upon a longer-term decoupling for military partnership with the US.
This would only weaken America’s hand: we don’t want another India, dependent on the arms of our adversaries.
Only in this case, the Kingdom can afford to splurge on even more advanced weapons - reducing the longer-term pull to move back to American military hardware.
(side note: this would also lead to interoperability issues with other Middle Eastern allied states - a potentially significant blow to America’s aspirations to create a Middle East air defense alliance/shield)
2) Send wrong messages to Iran.
Tehran must arrive at a wrong conclusion that America’s pressure on Saudi Arabia will amount to a major strategic realignment, and that Washington would not respond if Iran resumed its attacks on Saudi assets and oil fields (like in 2019), or push Houthis to fire up the campaign in Yemen.
3) Cutting the escalation ladder short.
There must be something left on the table for further pressure if/when needed to escalate further.
A blanket weapons sales ban is an escalation too far - Washington would essentially be emptying its chambers and limiting its ability for future pressure and leverage over the Kingdom.
It is heartening to see the Biden admin finally wake up to the reality that a definitive change of policy is needed vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.
The key now is to play it tough and smart - deploying leverage without causing a major backlash and undesirable consequences to America’s own national security interests.
Thanks for these strong statements.
What to make of Musk hinting at ending support for Ukraine infrastructure, then backtracking .