Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War updates, Kyiv's renewed bid for NATO membership, and Sweden's smart play.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Ukraine ready for a counteroffensive.
Says President Zelensky in his interview with the WSJ.
The statement comes against the background of repeated attacks in Belgorod and across the contact lines in Donbas.
(side note: and the leader of the Wagner mercenaries Prigozhin skillfully capitalized on the widespread public dissatisfaction over security concerns at the border of Belgorod Oblast (region) - delivering a menacing ultimatum and announcing his intent around potential deployment of Wagner Group troops within Russian territory - ostensibly in order to defend Belgorod. This would violate Russian law, and Prigozhin warning of this move whilst bypassing official approval from the Russia’s military command would be yet another red line crossed - and another dent in Putin’s reputation for keeping things under control)
It is pretty clear that Kyiv is trying to overstretch the Russian military and force them to spread their forces thin in an attempt to defend multiple locations at once.
(side note: and ahead of the upcoming counteroffensive, Ukraine received a further $300 million from the US in Patriot missiles, artillery rounders and small arms ammo)
2) Drone attacks and uncredible false flag claims.
Of course the drone attacks targeting Moscow early last week were orchestrated by Ukraine - Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s HUR, literally said a day before the drone attacks on Kyiv that Ukraine would retaliate.
Ukraine backers must tone it down with claims of false flags - they deflate the value of these claims, and render them useless for the times when they are indeed appropriate.
And besides, there is nothing wrong with retaliating against Moscow (as long as the targets are legitimate military objects/assets).
And even though the eight drones have been destroyed and residential buildings were damaged, this does not mean (contrary to Moscow’s claims) that Ukraine was following Russia’s playbook and targeting civilians - the damage was caused by the debris of the intercepted drones: Russia will struggle to prove that they were not targeting legitimate military assets.
As a retort against Iran’s decision to supply drones to Russia.
This is not all too consequential - but it is an essential step in further delegitimizing Iran on the global stage.
(side note: it also helps Zelensky in his pitch for further military aid from Israel)
4) Starlink from DoD.
The US Department of Defense has agreed to buy Starlink terminals from Elon Musk’s SpaceX.
Great: it is far better to have the US gov in charge of distribution of these terminals than a mercurial billionaire preoccupied with slams on Twitter.
Back in 2022, there have been a number of reports that Starlink terminals would stop working in certain Russia-occupied territories.
Apparently, Elon did not want to trigger Putin too much (it was also the period when Musk was trying to advance his own ridiculously dumb peace plan).
DoD taking over is therefore good news for all involved.
5) Gazprom’s militias.
Russia’s state gas company has “recruited, equipped and paid security guards to join the invasion of Ukraine”.
This is yet further proof that state-owned businesses in Russia are complicit in all crimes of the state.
But this also highlights how so many centers of powers are now vying to create their own private armies.
There are well-known militias like Wagner, Defense Minister Shoygu’s “Patriot” and Chechen leader’s “Akhmat”.
(side note: and speaking of Wagner, our drama queen war criminal, and occasional truth teller Prigozhin, was back at it again with fresh accusations against Russia’s ministry of defense: claiming that the Russian military placed explosive devices along routes that Wagner forces were using to withdraw from Bakhmut - apparently to teach them a lesson. These are astonishing allegations. Even if they are untrue (plenty of reasons to doubt their veracity) their mere utterance is already extremely escalatory for intra-Kremlin tensions).
And now we have Russia’s wealthy gas company (a UEFA Champions League sponsor of many years) funding private armies.
It is becoming quite clear that a lot of powerful people are hedging their bets for a post-Putin era: calculating (not so unreasonably) that when number one is gone, those with deepest pockets and strongest private armies will be better positioned to capture power.
6) Blinken sets clear limits to future peace talks.
“A cease-fire that simply freezes current lines in place — and enables Russian President Vladimir Putin to consolidate control over the territory he has seized, and rest, rearm, and re-attack — is not a just and lasting peace. It would legitimize Russia’s land grab. It would reward the aggressor and punish the victim.”
These are the wonderful words of America’s Secretary of State, Antony Blinken from a speech delivered in Helsinki last week.
This is spot on, and naturally, exactly what these cables have been saying since the very beginning of the war.
It is heartening to see that America’s chief diplomat sees things with crystal clarity, and is not tempted into terrible band aid solutions with major downstream costs.
Blinken’s stance will lessen the pressure on Ukraine, and reduce the intensity of performance anxiety (for the upcoming counteroffensive) of the Kyiv government.
Zelensky’s government can see that their Western allies are clear-eyed, and the pressure to deliver short-term performative military maneuvers has thus been weakened.
But with this extremely welcome statement, Blinken has also burned his own bridges - we cannot go back now.
And if fake ceasefire/freeze in combat is unacceptable, then Russia must be persuaded into a genuine settlement - something that will only be possible when Putin’s calculus shifts and he can see quite clearly that 1) the continuous costs of the war are massively outweighing any meagre gains, and 2) time is not on his side: that the longer the war drags on, the less likely he is to succeed in securing any gains necessary to save face.
And as discussed before, such recalibration would only be possible if Ukraine is supplied with everything that it needs to win the war: from F-16s to long-range missiles.
Consequently, and given that Blinken knows that all other alternatives are unpalatable/unacceptable to both Ukraine and to the US and its allies, he must now do everything possible to push for an increase in speed and volume of military support available to Ukraine - if ceasefire is not an acceptable option, then it necessarily follows that Ukraine must be empowered with everything to push Putin into a genuine political settlement.
Ukraine’s NATO aspirations regain momentum - with serious backing.
All three major powers of NATO - the UK, France and US have expressed an interest in seeing Ukraine become a future member of NATO.
(side note: and British PM Rishi Sunak is a world leader that has thus far expressed the strongest support for Ukraine’s potential membership.)
Even hitherto skeptics like Kissinger are now saying that Ukraine should become a NATO member.
Recall how just a year ago, Kissinger was calling for Ukraine to concede territory in return for peace, and a NATO membership would have been a laughable proposition for the older statesman - context changes and so do the attitudes of the highly pragmatist practitioners of foreign policy.
And context has changed indeed: Ukraine has proven itself a capable major military power.
It now has the biggest standing army in Europe - and an invaluable experience in integrating the most cutting-edge tech in war against Europe’s most immediate and proximate security menace.
In other words, Ukraine is not really a burden for NATO - very much the opposite.
Another reason for the revival of NATO membership talks: realization that no post-war security guarantee for Ukraine could be as airtight and credible as an actual membership of NATO.
Indeed, the Estonian PM confirmed this rather explicitly.
And this certainly echoes what these cables have been saying since the very outset of the war: if security guarantees for Ukraine are genuine (meaning that Western backers would actually use force to defend Ukraine) then why not simply let Ukraine join NATO? Where at least they would get to comply with the corresponding obligations?
In other words, if your promise to defend Ukraine is serious, why not promise it in a format where Ukraine gets to reciprocate that promise in case any other member of NATO is attacked?
Here is a straightforward answer to this mystery: because the offer was never serious.
And because it was not ever going to be as serious as a membership of NATO, the security dynamic in the Eastern flank of Europe would always remain unstable.
Russia could always recharge and resume its invasion.
Moscow could always (even if recklessly, and ultimately, erroneously) calculate that a new security agreement was going to be yet another scrap of paper akin to the Budapest memorandum of 1994 (where Kyiv agreed to give up its nukes in return for a security guarantee from the UK, America and France - now, how did that turn out?)
Of course there were always two retorts to this line of argument: 1) securing agreement of the 30 existing members of NATO to accept Ukraine as a fellow member was always impractical - it just takes Hungary to spoil everything, and 2) Unlike 1994, there is now precedent of NATO arming Ukraine to its teeth.
These are plausible arguments, but not sufficiently convincing: Hungary can always be pressured/incentivized to fall into line, and with Ukraine securing itself a new modern and powerful army, it is decidedly in the interests of NATO member states to impose reciprocal obligations on Kyiv.
It was therefore unsurprising that NATO is finally considering Ukraine’s potential membership with sufficient seriousness that the matter deserves.
Having said all that however, it is also not going to happen anytime soon: there clearly is no appetite for member states to accept Article V obligations (attack on one = attack on all) at the time of Ukraine’s ongoing war with Russia.
And this is where the Ukrainian leader got to demonstrate his own ability to read the room - something that he was clearly lacking at the outset of the war.
In contrast to his early 2022 emotional outbursts and complaints that no one wanted Ukraine in NATO, this time around, Zelensky demonstrated mature statesmanship - admitting that Ukraine’s NATO membership was “impossible” before the end of the war with Russia.
(side note: there is an added benefit of incentivizing the Kremlin against pushing for quick wrap up to the war on bad (for Ukraine) terms - if what is coming after the conclusion of the war is a NATO membership for Ukraine, then the appeal of pushing for a temporary settlement (something that Kyiv wants to avoid) goes down - the only alternatives are 1) genuine settlement and seeking good/realistic terms for Russia - given the costs of Ukraine’s NATO membership, or 2) Continuing to prosecute the war against Ukraine - which is exactly what Kyiv wants: this arms Zelensky with a stronger pitch for a continuous military support - whilst placing the blame for the continuation of this war solely on the Kremlin’s delusional aspirations and maximalist war aims)
It is a good tactic to signal this awareness and sensitivity to the current context - helps to build credibility and trust with future NATO allies.
It is also worth noting Russia’s weak response to all these revived NATO membership talks.
Similar to its reaction to the potential provision of F-16s (where the Kremlin warned of vague “questions” around NATO’s involvement in the war vs offering a concrete threat), the Kremlin’s response was once again muted and meek.
Gone are the days of threats of nuclear armageddon.
The most that the Kremlin’s spokesperson could muster, was a vague warning that Ukraine’s potential membership of NATO could “cause problems” for many more years to come.
Cool - we’ll take that: given that any other alternative will always keep Ukraine vulnerable to revived expansionist appetites from Russia.
Vague “problems” are a far better reality than the most likely alternative outcome: that in the absence of iron-clad post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, Russia recoups, recharges and attempts another move - perhaps at a time when the White House occupant is a weak, isolationist leader who concludes (erroneously) that helping out Ukraine is not in America’s national security interests.
(side note: and this need not necessarily be a populist GOP leader either: imagine that Obama and not Biden was the current President. It is beyond reasonable doubt that things would have been much tougher for Ukraine)
Sweden plays smart realpolitik.
We have previously discussed (back in February and March) how it was unlikely that Turkey would approve Sweden’s NATO bid ahead of the presidential elections in May.
Erdogan had simply put too much at stake to backtrack ahead of the polls: the dual electoral positioning of Erdogan as: 1) a fighter against Kurdish terrorism and 2) protector of Muslims anywhere and everywhere, would not align well with reversing course and letting in Sweden prior to the elections.
Having accused the Swedish government of appeasing/providing refuge to those with connections to the PKK (an actual Kurdish terrorist group - as recognized by both the US and the EU), and of closing an eye to Quran-burning protests (which was later found to have been sponsored by far-right individuals close to the Kremlin’s “Russia Today” propaganda outlet), Erdogan could not have suddenly changed his tune without looking inconsistent.
Moreover, he did not really have incentives to do so even if he could have engaged in such a reversal without even incurring major political costs.
Sweden served as a useful punching bag to define his foreign policy priorities, and his continuous refusal/delay to let them into NATO kept the issue of Kurdish terrorism at the forefront of domestic electoral narratives.
(side note: the Kurdish question was once again proven useful as a wedge issue in the latest elections. Erdogan’s campaign tied the prospect of opposition victory to the empowerment of those (allegedly) close to the PKK)
In addition, (and at least from Erdogan’s perspective) there wasn’t an urgent need to approve Sweden’s membership ahead of the elections.
As discussed back in February, with Finland joining NATO, Sweden was essentially shielded from a land-based Russian invasion (a prospect that was always almost inconceivable even to begin with).
Sweden had also signed a security treaty with the UK, and it was simply implausible that NATO would stand back and not defend Sweden in the almost impossible event of a Russian aggression taking place anytime soon.
So then, if 1)Sweden was not in any real danger, and 2) The balance of incentives pushed Erdogan towards delaying the Swedish accession to NATO, it was always a given that the Turkish President would pursue his shorter-term political interests.
But that was all before the elections.
These cables have long made it clear that Sweden’s final NATO membership approval by Turkey is only a matter of time.
There is no plausible/realistic chance of Erdogan blocking the membership.
With his short-term political interests safely secured, he now has to consider the long-term balance of incentives.
And here, Erdogan is facing an overwhelming case in favor of approving Sweden’s bid.
Although America’s Secretary of State has attempted to delink the two issues (good diplomacy of goodwill), it is nevertheless quite clear that the supply of new F-16s to Turkey is contingent upon Ankara playing ball in relation to Sweden’s membership bid.
The alternative reality of losing access to these F-16s is simply too costly for Erdogan to accept: especially in the context of Greece getting advanced F-35s - something that is already unpalatable to Turkey and creates risks from the perspective of balance of powers in the dispute over Aegean islands.
And besides, what would Turkey really gain from a continuous refusal to let Sweden in?
Aside from an enormous loss of political capital and goodwill with major NATO powers?
Consequently, the balance of incentives has now (quite decisively) reversed in favor of Erdogan approving Sweden’s bid.
It is only a matter of time before that happens, but ideally, it happens as soon as possible (and perhaps in time for NATO’s upcoming July summit in Lithuania).
And here is when good diplomacy can grease the wheels and expedite the inevitable.
Erdogan still needs a public excuse to “change his mind” on the issue.
And the Swedish PM certainly realized this and did his part by publishing an opinion piece in the FT - outlining how the country has introduced new anti-terrorism legislation to allay Turkish concerns:
“On Thursday, new legislation enters into force in Sweden that makes it illegal to participate in a terrorist organisation in any way that promotes, strengthens or supports it. We are thereby delivering on the last part of our agreement. Sweden fully supports Turkey against all threats to its national security and condemns all terrorist organisations, including the PKK, that carry out attacks against it……
Our security services also recently established that we have become a priority target for terrorism, not least due to Koran burnings and disinformation campaigns over Swedish social services taking Muslim children into care. [emphasis added]”Now this is how good realpolitik is played.
The Swedish PM is empowering Erdogan with rhetorical ammo to change his mind, change course, and approve Sweden’s bid.
This is something that Erdogan can take back to his base and argue the following: See, I persisted, I refused to give up on our core interests, and this is the result. We now have a future NATO ally committed to our security needs. We now have a future ally openly supporting us against the PKK. We now have a future ally committed to punishing those that burn the Quran.
Of course this is not mere rhetoric - Erdogan did actually win here.
Another concrete foreign policy victory for the Turkish leader.
Say what you will about his autocratic tendencies, his grip over domestic political discourse, political show trials and control over the media, but he is 1) winning elections without rigging them - he is genuinely popular, and 2) he is in fact exceptionally successful as a major player in foreign policy.
And no, he is also clearly no Putin - he is not blatantly rigging elections, he is not throwing his political opponents off balconies (or poisoning them), and he is certainly not pursuing policies that cause major isolation and lead to long-term strategic (and all-around) weakening of his country.
(side note: and no, this is most definitely not a defense of Erdogan - more so an appeal to limit the use of correct labels to where they belong: there is a qualitative difference between players like Erdogan (who are happy to bend many rules), and outright authoritarians like Putin, Xi or MBS. Clear thinking requires us to approach realities with sufficient nuance that they demand.)
Now, will this be enough?
Probably.
But the Biden admin has a chance to thaw relations even further.
Now would be a good time for the FED to offer dollar swap lines to Turkey (just like they did for the ECB during the peak of the Eurozone crisis).
It would help stabilize Turkish lira, win America a lot of goodwill - both with the government and also, the wider population of Turkey - and it would certainly reduce the need for Erdogan to look for other foreign solutions.
It is clearly not in Washington’s interests that Turkey establishes even closer ties with gulf monarchies/Saudi Arabia in exchange for liquidity support for its central bank (since that could potentially reduce Washington’s competitive lever over Saudis/UAE), or even strike some sort of a trade deal with Russia/China in a desperate attempt to boosts exports/create demand for the Turkish lira.
America’s help in normalizing the Turkish Lira would be an overall good policy - making it even more likely that Sweden gets its much needed approval ahead of/or at the time of the NATO’s July summit in Lithuania.
Many good things in today's cable. Yes there must be nuance when thinking of Erdogan. He won. But I wonder if he would have accepted it, if he had lost. .....Glad the Starlink thing is straightened out. ....... I don't care much for anything Kissinger says anymore, but that was interesting. ......What's the thinking of Georgia or Moldova into NATO? ......Obviously, we await the end of the war for even the remote chance of NATO or EU membership for Ukraine. .....side issue: I think recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara is wrong, and I am sorry Trump used that as a negotiating chip......