Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war, Kakhovka dam, and the counteroffensive begins.

Ukraine war updates.

• 1) Progress in retaking Bakhmut.

• As the bulk of the counteroffensive is raging in the southeast, Ukraine still manages to make gains in Bakhmut.

• 2) More weapons for Ukraine.

• On Friday, Pentagon announced a new package of additional $2.1 bln in long-term weapons aid for Ukraine - including more funding for the Patriot air defense missile batteries, Hawk air defense systems, and small Puma drones (that can be launched by hand).

• 3) Wagner vs Russian military continues.

• Wagner PMC’s leader, Prigozhin questioned the Kremlin claims of damage inflicted to Ukraine since the start of the much anticipated counteroffensive.

• Prigozhin labeled these claims as "absurd science fiction", and furthermore announced that he would turn down a contract with the Russian military (which would come under the Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu’s consolidation plans).

• In the meantime, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is using the rumors of Prigozhin’s open challenge vs Putin, to his advantage: the Chechen warlord reaffirmed his loyalty to Putin as the “Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces”, further adding that Putin had the best understanding of the battlefield realities.

• To be clear, Kadyrov still maintains his status as anti-system, pro-Russia warrior (like Prigozhin, he also frequently attacks the Russian Ministry of Defense), but is still hedging his bets by confirming his loyalty to Putin.

• 4) Ukraine’s sabotage cells deep within Russia.

• From a CNN report:

  “U.S. officials believe that Ukraine has developed sabotage cells inside Russia made up of a mix of pro-Ukrainian sympathizers and operatives well-trained in this kind of warfare. Ukraine is believed to have provided them with Ukrainian-made drones, and two U.S. officials told CNN there is no evidence that any of the drone strikes have been conducted using U.S.-provided drones,”

• Here is a bad western response: escalation, Putin’s red lines, nuclear war…

• Correct response: great stuff, keep it up!

• 5) Facing severe shortages, Russia is forced to buy back its own weapons..

• Russia is apparently buying back the military hardware that it had once sold to Myanmar and India.

• It is unclear what price Russia paid for these buybacks, but one hopes that both countries made a profit from a significant markup.

• 6) GOP clowns creating free content for Putin’s propaganda machine.

• In spite of all the legal challenges that he is facing, Trump is still the most likely candidate to win the GOP nomination - he will reframe the latest Federal indictments (that were caused by his repeated refusal to return classified US intel agency docs and Pentagon’s possible attack plans against Iran - highly classified Federal agency docs that he apparently kept in his toilet…) as a witch hunt on steroids (and he could still run from prison - even if the trial was held and concluded prior to the election).

• Then there are still possible candidates like DeSantis - clueless on foreign policy (having spent most of his free time thinking about a company behind Mickey Mouse) but still a viable option with at least some chances of success.

• Other categories include hopeless idealists like Asa Hutchinson (no chance), wise, potential future statesmen (like Mike Pompeo - who withdrew unscathed - to retry his luck at another, more opportune time), and candidates that could become VPs for the frontrunner (like Senator Tim Scott and Nikki Haley).

• And then there is a total clown show: no chance + wild, idiotic policy positions.

• Enter Vivek Ramaswamy: a GOP candidate who unveiled his peace plan last week: give Putin Crimea and most of Donbas in return for Russia’s promise to a) Remove nukes from Kaliningrad (which is a red herring - largely operationally irrelevant), b) not side with China (how on earth would that be even remotely enforceable?) and c) Promise to not invade Ukraine?

• In other words, give Putin everything that he wants, reward his aggression and decision to conquer Ukraine, and request something either totally unenforceable and/or meaningless to Putin.

• Idiots like these are one of the reasons Putin is still biding for time and trying to outlast Ukraine.

• Obviously, Ramaswamy has a zero chance of coming to power - but he, like other lunatics (and significantly more intelligent deviants like Tucker Carlson) could poison the well of ideas just enough for a bad deal (for everyone in the West + Ukraine) with Russia to become a plausible alternative to supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes.

The Damned Dam.

• There are two main questions around the tragic collapse of the Kakhovka dam in Ukraine: 1) Who is responsible, and 2) How will this collapse affect the upcoming counteroffensive.

• The first question is far more straightforward to answer: it most probably was not Ukraine.

• Although there is plenty of developing intel (and even past evidence: far back last fall, Zelensky warned that Russians wanted to blow up the dam) available to both the UK and US intel agencies (spy satellites detecting a controlled explosion just before the collapse) that point towards Russia being squarely behind this sabotage (allowing the NATO Secretary-General to assert rather confidently, that this “outrageous act” demonstrated “the brutality of Russia’s war against Ukraine”), there are also some possibilities of genuine mechanical issues leading to a collapse (hence why one of the recent UK intel briefings was cautious in its language in assigning blame).

• But whether it was a Russian sabotage group (most likely), or a genuine mechanical failure (less likely), it almost certainly was not Ukraine.

• And here is why: leaving aside the basic logic and balance of interests served in committing this act (why would Ukraine want to devote/redirect an incredible amount of resources to rescue operations right at the time of a counteroffensive?), the mere fact that getting caught in the act would have caused such terrible damage to the Zelensky government, already rules them out as potential actors in this incident.

• Consider what we have to believe here: that Zelensky government risked getting caught causing such catastrophic harm to its own civilians, for some meagre (especially on the balance of who gets hurt the most) gains on the battlefield.

• Imagine the backlash from his own citizens - let alone the international community - that Zelensky would receive if he was caught.

• If Ukrainians found out that he destroyed a major dam and submerged entire towns and cities under water, he would probably not have survived politically.

• You can contrast this with the Nord Stream 1 pipeline sabotage - increasingly more available evidence points towards Ukrainian complicity (allegedly, the US intel agencies were forewarned that Kyiv was planning a hit on the pipeline).

• But even a couple of months ago, these cables have asked “so what?!” - that is, even if it was true that Ukraine was behind this attack, from the perspective of Kyiv, this would have been a 1) highly strategic object, 2) and civilian loss of life was extremely unlikely (and it did not happen).

• To be clear, Kyiv is still denying their involvement in the Nord Stream 1 explosion, but even if it was true, it would have been 1000x less ruthless than Churchill deciding to sink a French warship full of crew on board (to deny German access).

• In war, going after legitimate military targets with decisiveness is an imperative and not an option.

• But the Kakhovka dam would not fall under this category - and Ukrainian leaders would know this 100%.

• A few days after the incident, President Zelensky visited the most directly affected large city - Kherson.

• (side note: and Russia naturally shelled the city during his visit. Also targeting a school where survivors were congregating)

• If Kyiv was truly behind this attack however, it is very likely that neither Zelensky nor his government would survive for this long - the whole world would turn against them (let alone the rightly outraged Ukrainian people).

• It is annoying that this needs to be explained.

• But unfortunately, Russian propaganda, and their local mouthpieces like Tucker Carlson - who called Ukraine’s Jewish President ‘‘rat-like’’ - in his new twitter show that so far seems to draw crowds larger than his toxic Fox show (although twitter “views” aren’t really full video views) - have accused Zelensky (whether explicitly or implicitly) of concocting this attack, and unfortunately, they are getting a lot of undeserved airtime.

• So this rebuttal is still important.

• 2) How will this collapse affect the upcoming offensive.

• In addition to significant redirection of resources, (to rescue/reconstruction efforts), the wall of water has also washed away and a lot of mines - they will now be lodged at new and unmapped locations.

• This certainly poses logistical challenges to Ukraine.

• On the other hand, the water has washed away a lot of Russian military equipment and has indeed erased some of the Russian positions on the banks of the Dnipro River.

• But overall, the location of the dam is at least 100 miles from where much of the military activity is taking place (as confirmed by the satellite imagery).

• Indeed, most of the action is in Donetsk to the east and Zaporizhia to the north of the dam.

• It is therefore becoming pretty clear that most of Ukraine’s thrust was not planned over the Dnipro River - the counteroffensive would have been impacted much more if it was.

• Overall, however, it is too soon to say how much of an impact this incident will have.

• Indeed, it is too soon to evaluate Ukraine’s counteroffensive in general.

Ukraine’s counteroffensive: early insights.

• Ukraine's counteroffensive has taken shape across multiple fronts: The eastern front focuses on the area around the fiercely contested town of Bakhmut and Luhansk province, while the southern front extends from Vuhledar in Donetsk province towards the southeast.

• However, the most significant and expansive front is unfolding in Zaporizhia province, occupying a central position along the conflict's extensive frontlines.

• This recent offensive is notable for its scale and intensity, setting it apart from previous engagements.

• What distinguishes the Zaporizhia attack is not only the magnitude of the Ukrainian assault but also the equipment employed.

• Drone imagery released by Russian media (leading to a lot of Western media pundits to conclude, rather prematurely, that Ukraine’s assaults were failing) reveals the presence (and destruction) of advanced German Leopard tanks, including the 2A6 variants, as well as American Bradley armored fighting vehicles and M113 armored personnel carriers in the village of Mala Tokmachka, located east of Orikhiv.

• This is a strong indicator of Ukraine deploying multiple Western-armed and - trained brigades, potentially including its best-equipped units.

• Strategically positioned military officials have long recognized Zaporizhia as a logical focal point for Ukraine's offensive operations.

• Its central location along the frontlines presents an opportunity to encircle a significant number of Russian troops in Kherson province to the west.

• Moreover, a successful strike on the Kerch strait bridge could potentially trap Russian forces in Crimea.

• The city of Melitopol holds crucial importance as it enables Ukraine to disrupt Russian supply lines via road and rail to Crimea, effectively severing the so-called land bridge connecting Russian territory to the occupied peninsula.

• Even approaching the artillery range of these vital links would pose considerable challenges for Russia.

• Anticipating these threats, Russia has (admittedly, quite competently) established multiple defensive lines north of Tokmak in Zaporizhia, covering a distance of 30 kilometers, as evidenced by drone and satellite imagery.

• These defensive measures encompass trenches, shelters, anti-tank ditches, obstacles, and minefields.

• Notably, Tokmak itself is completely encircled by circular ditches strategically designed to accommodate anti-tank teams and numerous strongholds.

• Recent geolocated footage posted on June 10 indicates Ukrainian gains in the western Zaporizhia Oblast during counterattacks southwest and southeast of Orikhiv.

• However, Russian military bloggers and media assert that Russian forces in the area have effectively repelled Ukrainian advances.

• It is also quite clear that the units defending Zaporizhia Oblast are much more competent than those defending the Kharkiv axis last September.

• Indeed, at best, this counteroffensive will most likely resemble a slow grind of Kherson vs quick counterpunch (leading to a collapse of defensive lines) of Kharkiv.

• One of the more notable and credible Russian military bloggers has outlined the Russian defensive tactics - describing three key components: early detection and neutralization of Ukrainian assault formations, extensive utilization of anti-tank weaponry, and the strategic mining of territories near Russian defensive positions.

• The deployment of minefields serves a dual purpose of 1) inflicting initial damage on Ukrainian armored vehicles attempting to breach the barriers, and 2) causing extensive damage during their retreat from the area.

• Things are going according to plan.

• Late on Sunday, Ukraine announced the liberation of three new towns in the southeast of the country: the very first concrete result of the ongoing counteroffensive.

• But even without this minor territorial gain, things are going as expected.

• Ukraine is attempting a complex combined-arms maneuver operation against well-defended and entrenched Russian defensive lines.

• These defensive fortifications run roughly 1,243 miles: from Russia’s border with Belarus in the north, to the Dnipro Delta in the south.

• A 20-25% attrition during frontal assaults of fortified defensive lines is expected per NATO standards.

• And after 16 months of war, Ukraine is probably the best trained Western army (with the exception of the US) that can conduct such complex maneuvers - none of the European armies have had similar live experience after WWII.

• Let us also not forget that Ukraine is conducting this operation:

• 1) Against a superpower, defending a far denser and better protected defensive line than was the case with Kharkiv and Kherson (and doing so with much larger army post-mobilization);

• 2) In the absence of air superiority - with no access to modern western jets to counter Russia’s Su-34s that can deploy long-range “glide bombs’’ to attack advancing columns;

• 3) With very limited access to long-range precision missiles to strike: a) Russia’s ammo and logistics depots that supply the frontline fortifications, and b) the airfields that let fighter jets to take off.

• With all that said and done, let us also not forget that this is Ukraine’s third counter-offensive since last August.

• Previously, the Ukrainian army recaptured almost all occupied land in the Kharkiv district in September, and Kherson city and surrounding areas in November.

• Contrast this with Russia’s very limited and localized counterattacks that produced little results - until Wagner stepped in and threw endless bodies to capture Bakhmut and Soledar.

• Consequently, Ukraine’s counteroffensive is thus far going according to plan - and given the task at hand, it would be strange not to see videos of destroyed tanks and armored vehicles attempting to breach the Russian lines.