Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, and bad reasons to complain about long overdue missile strikes targeting the Houthis.
Ukraine war updates.
1) The EU prepares for Trump’s return.
The Internal Commissioner of the EU, Thierry Breton announced a desire to launch a significant €100 billion EU defense fund to boost the military-industrial production in Europe.
This is belated, and in the short-term, this could finally help the EU to deliver on its promises to Ukraine (thus far, only about 30% of the promised 1m 155mm artillery shells had in fact been delivered to Ukraine).
But beyond Ukraine itself, the EU’s desire for a military-industrial self-sufficiency is welcome: it will reduce the pressure on the US (with Washington’s focus increasingly redirected towards the Indo-Pacific to contain China).
In justifying this significant investment, Thierry Breton shared an anecdote from 2020 - when (allegedly) Donald Trump told EU’s Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen that the US would abandon its European allies:
"You need to understand that if Europe is under attack we will never come to help you and to support you...By the way, NATO is dead, and we will leave, we will quit NATO"
Is this true? We don’t know…
But given Trump’s other public statements denigrating the EU and NATO, it is not really a stretch to assume that he would be even more blunt in private.
Regardless of the veracity of these particular claims however, the essential sentiment that Breton wanted to emphasize (and drive Europe’s urgency to action) is largely correct: the EU really needs to prepare for self-sufficiency in case of Trump’s return.
This is not only important for Ukraine and the EU, but also, to the national security interests of America itself: this would be an insurance policy against a horrendous national security policy coming out of Washington.
If the White House is to be truly captured by someone unable/unwilling to see the strategic issues with sufficient clarity, then it would be very reassuring that allies could at least step up to weaken the blow to America’s own security interests..
(side note: additionally, there could have been an attempt by Breton to force a rebuttal from Trump. As in, make him reject the claims as ‘‘fake news’’ and in so doing, implicitly reaffirm his commitment to NATO/EU. But knowing Trump, this is likely to backfire. He may rebut the precise claims, but he would surely double-down. The idea that Trump would actually pause and reassess what he is about to say is a fantasy. There is a clear formula with Trump: allegations of ‘‘fake news” + doubling down on whatever seems to trigger his detractors (and whether that hurts America’s national interests has no relevance in this formula)
2) The UK steps up to fill the void in western resolve.
Last year ended with Congress unwilling to pass through a $60bn military aid to Ukraine.
Thereafter, President Biden changed his tune: what was once ‘‘as long as it takes’’ was replaced with ‘‘as long as we can’’.
Adding to this, EU’s €50bn aid was held hostage by Hungary’s Victor Orban.
Moreover, the German Chancellor even admitted the possibility that the Western resolve could in fact degrade and decay, and Putin could in fact outlast the west.
Luckily then, this year had a better start.
In a surprise trip to Kyiv, the British PM Rishi Sunak announced a new $3.2 billion package to support Ukraine.
A significant portion of this fund, (at least $255 million) will be allocated for the rapid procurement and production of the various drones for Ukraine.
These include surveillance, long-range strike, and sea drones, making it the largest drone delivery to Ukraine from any nation.
Most drones are expected to be manufactured in the UK, marking a substantial contribution to Ukraine's defense capabilities.
Lastly, Sunak was careful to rebut the previous switch in tone: promising to stand by Ukraine “for as long as it takes”.
Sunak later reiterated his support with a clear commitment:
"I am here today with one message: the UK will also not falter. We will stand with Ukraine, in their darkest hours and in the better times to come. [emphasis added]"
(side note: and unlike in America, this is not a party political issue in the UK. The opposition in the UK shares the government’s support for Ukraine, and is not holding Ukraine funding hostage by making the availability of these funds contingent upon unrelated demands. For example, the Labor party in the UK is not demanding X amount of funding to ‘‘stop the migrant boats’’ from crossing the channel. This is what a responsible statecraft looks like: at the very minimum, not turning issues of global importance and of high national security interests into cheap political theater.)
Later on, the new French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné (in his own trip to Kyiv - to plan an enhanced defense cooperation) echoed Sunak’s messaging and reminded all about Putin’s essential calculus:
“Russia hopes Ukraine and its supporters will get tired before them. We will not grow weaker.”
This is spot on - and what these cables have written about for a very long time.
It is good to see Western policymakers willing to speak the blunt language of strategy.
People miss the point of anti-Houthi missile strikes.
The highly justified (yet exceptionally belated) US-led air/missile strikes against Houthis in Yemen have resulted in a surprising backlash from the wannabe pundits, and by even some relatively well-known “foreign policy experts”.
There are three main arguments against strikes:
1) It is a violation of Yemen’s sovereignty and illegal under international law.
2) Houthis will not be deterred.
3) Things will simply escalate even more.
The first point is naturally the weakest: states don’t have unlimited sovereignty - and lose it when they end up violating the sovereignty of others.
Same principles (even if significantly different fact-patterns) that applied in authorizing the use of force by an international US-led coalition against Saddam’s Iraq in 1991 apply here as well.
And besides, what sovereignty is there even to speak of?
Yemen has been captured by an Iran-backed non-state terrorist actor:Yemen as a state, does not enjoy sovereignty over its own territories (and having a monopoly on violence over a specific territory is the very precondition of being a state).
So either 1) Yemen has sovereignty but chooses to willingly or recklessly disregard its obligations to the international community - by allowing its territory to turn into a terrorist base that launches attacks on foreign ships, or 2) (the actual reality) it does not even have such sovereignty, and application of force against a terrorist non-state actor is therefore wholly legal and justified.
(side note: and it is telling that even the UN security council - that fails to agree on anything due to Russia’s obstructionism, was able to pass a resolution condemning Houthi attacks and demanding an end to them)
It is astonishing that such a basic point even needs to be argued..
Now then, let’s respond to the latter two counter-arguments:
1) Such attacks may or may not deter Houthis.
2) And yes, things may escalate even further.
But how do these two points in any way amount to a persuasive argument against inaction.
Yes, conflict with Houthis may escalate - but what exactly is the alternative? Submit to the objectives of a terrorist organization keeping world commerce hostage?
Grant Houthis a veto over global political affairs?
Houthis launched this campaign at the direction of their backers in Iran, and in support of Hamas.
So either you hit them with overwhelming firepower and degrade their capacity to cause havoc in the Gulf of Aden, or you tolerate Houthi attacks on ships.
There is just no third option here - there is no ‘‘diplomatic negotiation’’ to be made.
Which leads us to the final point: these attacks may or may not deter Houthis from further attacks.
But that is not necessarily the main point here: the objective of these airstrikes is much more straightforward: incapacitating and degrading Houthis to such an extent that they are no longer able to carry out significant attacks against ships in the Gulf of Aden.
It is simply inconceivable that the US-led campaign, armed with most modern surveillance and precision-strike technology could not find and destroy all of the key logistical hubs, weapons/ammo depots, and launch sites that Houthis used to launch their campaigns.
And as mentioned before, these airstrikes are certainly long overdue..
The attacks against commercial shipping by Houthis (which started since their declaration of support for Hamas in October) has reached a breaking point - forcing the US to lead a multinational naval mission ‘‘operation prosperity guardian” to protect container ships, gas/oil carrying tankers, and other commercial ships passing through the Gulf of Aden/Arabian sea on the way to the Suez canal.
The impact of the Houthi attacks is already significant: according to the founder of Flexport (logistics startup), as of January 6, 95% “container ships that would’ve transited the Red Sea are now going around the Southern Tip of Africa”.
In addition, according to a report by the Freightos Baltic Index (fbx), the cost of shipping a standard container rose by 93% in the week to January 9th.
If this continues, the rising transport costs will soon be reflected in consumer prices (mostly affecting the Europeans - since more than 70% of commercial shipping going through Suez to the Mediterranean sea is on the way towards the European continent).
(side note: but all is not lost quite yet. Most of the major shipping contracts are annual - and these are typically agreed in March. So the current rates do not reflect the true cost of transporting goods. The key is therefore, to deal with Houthis as soon as possible - before higher long-term prices are baked into new contracts)
What is quite clear at this point, is that Iran is essentially trying to replay the Arab oil embargo that followed the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
Methods are different, but in both cases, the outcome sought is the same: punish the west for their backing of Israel in the form of a new cost of living crisis.
So then, those arguing against these airstrikes must not forget the implications of the alternative (inaction): granting Iran and their Houthi proxies a hall pass, a monopoly on the use of force against nations of the world in pursuit of their geopolitical aims.
Indeed, the contempt to the Western power demonstrated by Iran and Houthis is astonishing.
(side note: and in fact, just days before the US-led airstrikes on Houthis, Iran’s navy boarded and seized a Greek-operated oil tanker off the coast of Oman…)
Now then, onto the actual strikes and their potential implications.
Few important early observations and inferences to draw from the actual airstrikes.
1) The nature of the strike campaign.
The Pentagon announced that at least 28 locations were hit last night, each with multiple targets (launchers, etc) and at least 60 targets were disclosed.
In total 150 munitions used in 2 waves - including 80 Tomahawk cruise missiles.
The actual strikes were conducted by the US and UK - with support from Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Bahrain, conducted air and missile strikes at Houthi rebel targets across Yemen Thursday evening. The joint assault involved U.S. aircraft, ships and submarines.
2) Bahrain joins the campaign - but not the UAE or Saudi Arabia.
The actual air and missile strikes were conducted by the US and UK (Typhoons from an RAF base in Cyprus) - with support from Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Bahrain.
Unlike Bahrain, neither the UAE nor Saudis joined the campaign.
For Saudis, this is understandable - they don’t want their fragile truce in Yemen ending with a flare up of violence again.
Though revealing these concerns publicly - saying that the concern for peace talks is exactly why they decided to sit this one out, is a really bad signal to send to both Houthis and Iran - openly admitting the extent of leverage an adversary enjoys over you is never a good idea.
Less acceptable, is the UAE’s decision to remain neutral - back in 2022, they complained about America’s lack of a decisive response when Houthi drones crashed into their capital Abu Dhabi - damaging skyscrapers and blowing up fuel tanks.
They complained while American Patriot missiles protected their skies from Houthis.
Yet when the US leads a multinational strike force in response to an unacceptable Houthi terrorism that targets American servicemen and international commerce, the UAE is happy to sit this one out.
And unfortunately, this administration is way too soft on the Gulf monarchies - which are more than happy to constantly hedge their bets, help Russia park their wealth and evade sanctions, and act coy when it is time to stand by your ally and use force.
3) Submarines were used.
The joint assault involved US aircraft, ships and crucially, submarines.
Inclusion of submarines in this campaign is likely more to do with signaling rather than operational needs.
And the intended recipient of this implicit warning is Iran: Houthis don’t have warships that require submarines to get involved in taking them down - only Iran does.
This was a reminder to Tehran that the US enjoys a diverse set of options when it comes to major firepower.
4) White House messaging and tone was too conflict-avoidant.
The National Security Council (NSC) Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby commented on the missile strikes:
“We’re not interested in a war with Yemen. We’re not interested in a conflict of any kind here.”
The logic behind these statements is two-fold: 1) Remind the international community/global south that America is not the instigator, that it is acting in self-defense, and that it is not seeking a military engagement beyond an appropriate response in self-defense, 2) Signal to the domestic audience/American public that this is not going to be one more of the ‘‘forever wars’’.
But the cost of these statements likely outweighs any benefits of such a “measured’’ response.
It is not really helpful to remind Houthis and Iran that America really has no appetite for this conflict to get any longer.
Knowing that a long regional engagement/campaign in Yemen is something that the US wants to desperately avoid (for good reasons), Houthis and their handlers in Iran can end up overestimating the flexibility that they can have in retaliating against America, and simultaneously, underestimate the staying power of the current administration.
And this could ironically lead to a longer war.
At the very least, Kirby (naturally, with permission from Biden) could have added the following caveat: ‘‘but if they continue their attacks, we will not hesitate in wiping out all of their operational capabilities. They should remember what we did to ISIS”.
Implications.
So then, what was the impact of these strikes?
Naturally, the Houthi leadership promised revenge - but what can they actually do?
This is something that may warrant a longer discussion, but it is clear that in addition to long-range ballistic missiles, drones and cruise missiles, Houthis have a number of (and different types of ) Iran-supplied anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).
These will surely pose the gravest danger to ships in the regions.
Even so, it is unclear if Houthis would actually cross this line.
Since a successful anti-ship missile hit could lead to a high number of casualties - and if these are sailors of the US Navy, the consequences for Houthis will be dire.
A lot of it also depends on the severity of the missile strikes conducted by the US - how powerful and devastating were they really?
Well, according to the US intel, the missile strikes have destroyed more than 60 missile and drone targets and as a result, around 20%-30% of Houthi’s offensive capabilities have been destroyed.
So then, we can draw few possible inferences/observations:
1) These are not accurate assessments: either a miscalculation or an exaggeration.
2) These are accurate assessments, and so, Saudis’, multi-year bombing campaign that targeted Houthis (and relied upon the US-supplied weapons, tech, and ammo to do this) was executed in a very incompetent way.
3) These are accurate assessments, in which case, this would be pretty impressive for a day’s worth of work - but the question then becomes why then stop at 30%?
If it is indeed this easy to degrade Houthis, why not extend the strikes by a few more days/weeks and finish them off completely.
Once again, there is this pure nonsense of an idea circling in the national security/foreign policy circles (frequently amplified by the media), that terrorism is an idea and cannot be defeated by force.
That may be true of an ideology, but in practice, the actual organization can be destroyed, and terrorist fighters/commanders can be eliminated.
Just look at what happened to ISIS and Al-Qaeda - they remain in name only, and may still have a few surviving cells, but as an organization, neither poses nowhere near the danger that they did at their respective peaks.
And imagine the following: if the US military could have been successful at wiping out 30% of offensive capabilities of ISIS or Al-Qaeda, and do so without any US casualties, then who on earth would tell them to stop?
Putting an end to such a successful military campaign (that so clearly achieves its specific and narrow objectives), would be tantamount to a dereliction of duty.
If Houthis launch a successful counteroffensive and kill US servicemen, the leadership that decided to stop last week’s successful campaign is surely going to bear at least some responsibility for this tragedy.