Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War Updates, Zelenskyy in DC, negative signaling and Poland acting petty.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Ukraine accomplishes further breakthrough of defensive lines in Zaporizhia.
In an interview with the CNN, Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, Commander of the Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces, highlighted a significant strategic development: that Ukrainian forces, positioned on the left flank in the vicinity of Verbove, have successfully achieved a notable "breakthrough."
Accumulation of heavy armor around Verbove is corroborating evidence of this claim - since it implies Ukraine’s preparation to doubledown and punch through the opening.
2) Ukraine strikes Russian Navy HQ in Sevastopol.
Ukrainian missiles (allegedly, UK-made storm shadows) have successfully hit the headquarters of the Russian Navy in Sevastopol.
Human intelligence guided the timing of the strike - to achieve a maximum effect during the meeting of senior commanders of the Russian Navy.
3) Abrams and ATACMs on the way to Ukraine.
A senior military US official has confirmed that 31M1A1 Abrams tanks will start to be delivered to Ukrainian in the coming days and all will be delivered in the coming weeks.
Additionally, there are credible reports that in a White House meeting with President Zelenskyy, President Biden finally promised delivery of long-range ATACMS missiles - given that most valuable Russian targets (command & control posts, airfields, logistics depots) are now situated well outside the range (approx 50 miles) of the GMLRS missiles used for HIMARS, the delivery of these missiles (provided that they are in sufficient numbers) has a potential to inflict major damage on Russian lines.
(side note: Storm Shadows can already reach these targets, but their numbers (available to Ukraine) are limited)
Putin’s theory of war keeps getting validated by terrible signaling from the West.
For the war in the Ukraine to end, there either: 1) needs to be a decisive victory of one side, or 2) the perception and beliefs of at least one side needs to change drastically - seeing further continuation of the military campaigns as a futile endeavor that can actually lead to worse outcomes.
The first scenario is not happening for either side anytime soon.
Unless there are some unforeseeable events (like the June coup attempt in Russia), both sides will remain relatively capable of preventing a sudden military collapse - and thus, a decisive victory for the other side.
To be clear, the Ukrainian side is advancing and there is no stalemate.
But this advance is not at the pace that would yield major results in the upcoming weeks/months.
Add to this: mud of late fall, and frozen ground of winter will make it much harder for Ukrainian armored columns to advance at the current pace (although, given Ukraine’s propensity to advance on company and unit level vs battalion level major maneuvers, this may not slow them down as bad as most analysts expect).
And when it comes to signaling and perception management, neither side is convinced that its efforts are futile.
Now, these cables have long argued that defending Ukraine and offering it maximum help to defeat Russia is: 1) Right in itself - on ethical/moral grounds and, 2) Strategically advantageous to the US/NATO interests.
But from a purely pragmatic point too, it surely must be much easier to convince one man that he is on a wrong trajectory and should end the war and cut his losses while he can vs convincing an entire nation that after 18 months of war, countless losses of both blood and treasury, it should now also give up 17% of the territory to end the war.
(side note: and that is literally what is being suggested by many ‘‘end the war/cut the losses’’ crowd. For any negotiation for a ceasefire at this very moment would only freeze Russian gains in place, gifting Putin the land that he has annexed since February 2022)
But unfortunately, the opposite is happening in the West - when it is Putin that should be dissuaded and discouraged from further military campaign, it is Ukraine that is getting the cold shoulder.
This past week in particular, we have witnessed several shameful signals of decaying Western support for Ukraine - signaling that is literally serving the opposite goal of ending the war.
Let us now unpack three incidents that in essence, acted as fuel for Putin’s confirmation bias machine that constantly looks for data points to confirm his theory of war - that he can outlast the Western support for Ukraine.
1) DC Reception for Zelenskyy now vs in December 2022.
It is great that Zelenskyy was invited to DC in the middle of the counteroffensive that has thus far received a disproportionately negative (and undeserved) media attention.
It is great that Biden met him in the White House and, apparently, promised delivery of ATACMS for Ukraine.
It is also great that after leaving DC, Zelenskyy was on the way to Canada - to address the national parliament.
But there is an extra (and crucial) context here too: the relative welcome that Zelenskyy received in September 2023 was far less warm than the one in December 2022.
Back then, Ukraine had a powerful battlefield momentum serving as a tailwind for its political prospects in Washington: the Russian army had suffered major defeats in Kharkiv and Kherson - pulling back its army and suffering major losses.
A lot of territory was retaken by Ukrainian forces.
Add to that, in the fall of 2022, General Surovikin had just started his strategy of targeting Ukraine’s core civilian infrastructure.
In other words, there was much excitement and sympathy for Ukraine.
Unfortunately, the situation has changed drastically here in the US.
It is no longer a taboo for leading GOP candidates to suggest winding down support for Ukraine.
Public support remains strong, but has indeed declined too.
So then, in this context, it was doubly important for the statesmen in Washington to signal a continuous support for Ukraine, and confirm America’s staying power.
(side note: and ‘‘staying power’’ is perhaps too glorified here. How difficult is it really for the US to continue spending 0.18% of its GDP on helping Ukraine. It must do much much more, but even the current spend is a 15x smaller share of GDP than that spent on the Korean War in 1950-53 (2.77%) - and there are no American troops on the ground..)
But that is not what happened - unlike in December 2022, Zelenskyy was denied an opportunity to address the House.
Zelenskyy faced staunch resistance from a sizable bloc of Republicans as he sought $24 billion in additional assistance - peanuts for America (especially given the stakes involved).
Now, Zelenskyy did meet members of the House and the Senate - behind closed doors and with much smaller sessions involved.
But even prior to his talks, Zelenskyy already faced opposition from many members of the GOP, as 29 lawmakers, led by Sen. J.D. Vance and Rep. Chip Roy, signed a letter opposing the White House's aid request, citing concerns over an open-ended commitment.
(side note: these ‘‘politicians’’ don’t understand basic issues of game theory involved in war. Without such an open-ended commitment, without promises of backing Ukraine ‘‘as long as it takes”, Putin would essentially be given a specific timeline or an event/condition that he would need to wait out/survive - being assured of a highway to victory after such close-ended support was to expire. Not only that, he would also be able to rally more support from his ‘‘allies’’ like China - since (given that there is a contingency/expiration date for supporting Ukraine) backing Russia would become a far less risky proposition).
2) Blinken sending subpar signals.
In response to a question during a podcast appearance, the Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken sent some inadvertently harmful signals within a larger, well-intentioned message:
“And we want to stand with them to maximize their ability to take back the remaining territory that Russia seized. Russia still controls about 17 percent of Ukraine. But not only that, to ensure that Ukraine not only survives but also thrives. And that gets into supporting it economically and supporting its democratic emergence. But the objective is to make sure that Ukraine can stand on its own feet. This is not a recipe for some kind of indefinite support by the entire world to keep Ukraine going. It’s getting Ukraine to a point where militarily, economically, democratically it can stand strongly on its own. [emphasis added]”
This is an analytically accurate but strategically ill-advised statement.
Indefinite support is exactly what Biden promised with his ‘‘as long as it takes”.
And not only Biden, this was in fact the joint position of the G7 at the beginning of the summer in July:
“We will stand with Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression, for as long as it takes.’’
That literally means unconditional, and yes indefinite support.
So then, it is easy how Putin can/will read this: at the beginning of the Summer, the West was still bullish on Ukraine retaking its territory with a counteroffensive. Now they are not, and America’s Secretary of State speaks against ‘‘indefinite support”.
Real bad optics from Blinken.
3) Poland’s petty conduct.
A diplomatic spat that started with a grain import issue, resulted in Poland declaring that is stopped transfer of weapons:
“We are no longer transferring weapons to Ukraine, because we are now arming Poland with more modern weapons”Said the Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki.
But this official excuse (a rhetoric borrowed straight out of MAGA GOP: ‘‘we need to prioritize our own army etc”) does not make much sense.
These are not mutually exclusive goals and Poland has been on an accelerated timeline to modernize and beef up its army ever since the February 2022 invasion.
Just a month after Russia’s invasion, in March 2022, Poland chose UK’s Babcock to develop new Frigates for the Polish Navy in the Baltic.
And mere six month later, Poland signed a $3bln deal with South Korea’s Korea Aerospace Industries for 48 FA-50 light attack aircraft -to replace Poland’s Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-22s.
Were any of these plans facing any obstacles due to Poland’s armament of Ukraine?
Not at all - if anything, it is precisely because Poland was modernizing its army, and committed to spending 4% of its GDP on defense, that it could supply Ukraine with lower-tier/older weapons.
This is a nice sounding excuse that somehow coincides with another diplomatic spat: over grain imports.
As a quick background: once Ukrainian surplus grain was unable to exit the country via Black Sea ports (due to Russia’s blockade), Kyiv turned to the west for their exports.
This had created concerns among major agricultural producers of the EU: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania.
These countries were (understandably) concerned about high volumes of cheaper Ukrainian grain undercutting their own farmers.
They appealed for the EU’s temporary grant of an import ban - a request that Brussels granted until September 15th.
Upon the expiry of the EU commission’s grain embargo on September 15th, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary declared their intent to extend the embargo indefinitely.
This then led to a diplomatic clash between Ukraine and Poland (granted, it was unwise for Kyiv to attack Poland in public).
Poland’s decision to stop arming Ukraine was also preceded by a nasty rhetoric (by the Polish President) that compared Ukraine to a drowning person pulling down its rescuer.
(side note: if the Polish President insists on using colorful analogies, then he should pick ones that actually reflect reality. A more realistic comparison would have been to a boat being attacked by a shark, where Poland is unwisely refusing to help the person who had the unfortunate fate of being the first subject to deal with the shark. This is a far more accurate analogy - highlighting the reality that if the first person fails in fending off the attacker, the rest of the boat will now be in an even graver danger)
Now, the correct policy for the EU would have been to come up with a longer term solution - instead of parking the issue and planting seeds for a future crisis.
Brussels is rich enough to apply more comprehensive solutions.
For example, the EU could buy (as a bloc) the surplus Ukrainian grain in bulk and resell them to the rest of the world that has been impacted by Russia’s blockade in the Black Sea.
This (in addition to solving the immediate crisis) would also bestow the EU with goodwill (and thus, soft power) from a number of African states that have suffered immensely from Russia’s blockade in the Black Sea.
To be clear, this would be a costly project - but one that the EU is rich enough to pull off - Brussels could even issue Eurobonds (like it did with COVID response Next Generation EU bonds during the 2020 pandemic) and besides, given that these purchases would later be resold, the EU would not suffer too much of an economic loss.
One hopes that the EU gets its act together and comes up with a longer term sustainable solution (and at least consider suggestions like the option above) to this problem - it simply has to solve it properly - until Black Sea blockade is fully lifted/punctured, Ukrainian grain will need to rely on alternative routes and markets.
In the meantime, Poland’s pettiness and decision to pause armament for Ukraine was to date, (without exaggeration) the worst signaling by any NATO member state.
Could there have been a better confirmation for Putin’s beliefs and theory of war than one where one of the most capable NATO states with the largest land army in Eastern Europe stopped transfer of weapons for some petty economic issue?
Could there have been a better instructional guide/manual for the Kremlin on what it needs to do going forward to cause similar divisions and infighting within the West?
The US and its allies must realize that for Ukraine to win, progress on the battlefield is not enough - it is a necessary but insufficient condition to change Putin’s calculus on the trajectory of this war.
Washington and Brussels must always act and talk in a way that sends the opposite signal: that Ukraine will truly be supported for as long as it takes.
Only the futility of this whole project may come close to changing Putin’s beliefs and thus, his decision on further prosecution of this war.
Biden or Blinken or somebody must mediate this Polish-Ukraine dispute. This is ridiculous and petty and damaging. US pressure, respectfully, must be applied.