Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, responding to ‘‘How Ukraine Can Win Through Defense”.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Russia’s maximalist war aims reiterated once again.
In a televised interview, director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergei Naryshkin said that the Ukrainian state had a ‘‘sad fate’’ and that Russia would not “stop halfway”.
Note the emphasis on Ukrainian state vs army - that is not slip up.
Since the very beginning of this invasion, (and even a year before that, in his essay) Putin denied the sovereignty of Ukraine as a state.
After a failed attempt to take Kyiv early in the invasion, Putin was forced to withdraw his army and redirect efforts towards capture of Donbas in the east.
But things are changing once again - at least in his mind/in his estimation.
And with all the ‘‘Ukraine fatigue’’ building up in the west, and with unacceptable delays in funding in both US Congress and the EU, it is not hard to see why he would want to once again recalibrate his war aims, and push for a maximum upside.
Naryshkin’s signaling is of course mainly a threat display/bluff: it has multiple target audiences, amongst which is no doubt the government of Ukraine.
Message is pretty clear: cut your losses and settle while you still can.
2) Turkey approves Sweden’s NATO bid.
This is of course as expected.
There were simply no good fundamental reasons for Turkey to deny Sweden’s accession: after long negotiations Erdogan got everything he could have: both symbolic concessions, and concrete commitments in relation to Kurdish PKK terrorists hiding in Sweden and Finland.
It is time to finally approve the transfer of F-16s to Turkey.
(side note: and it is on track to happen - with an announcement of 40 F-16s to be sold to Turkey)
It is also important to get them back into the F-35 program, and find a creative way of solving the S-400 issue.
(side note: the original formal reason for Turkey being removed from the F-35 program was NATO concerns that Russia’s S-400 air-defense SAMs would be trained on F-35’s unique radar signature. But Turkey proposed a number of solutions to this - including the removal of Russian software. Other solutions exist. And Turkey could also be potentially persuaded to resell these to third countries if the US was to offer adequate replacements like the THAAD)
Hungary is the only remaining obstacle - and not for long.
There is no way Hungary will remain the only blocker.
All of this means that Sweden’s membership is very close.
This will (amongst other geopolitical benefits to both NATO and Sweden) allow Sweden to be more generous in supplying Ukraine with its advanced weapons - Archer shoot and scoot howitzers could be especially consequential here.
3) EU’s plans to crush Hungary’s block on Ukraine funding.
Viktor Orban has caused a lot of headaches with his blackmails and a block on the €50bn package to Ukraine.
New reports based on secret EU documents (seen by FT) reveal how Brussels plans to respond to blackmail: with its own blackmail.
EU plans to exploit weaknesses of Hungary’s economy, remove all funding, make it uninvesteble to foreign investors, weaken its currency, and raise the cost of living.
This is pretty ruthless stuff.
On the one hand, it is good that Brussels will no longer be cowed by petty and pathetic mini-dictators that blackmail the entire continent and put its security at risk.
But then again, this is remarkable pressure aimed at the core of a member state’s economy - definitely some fuel for adversarial propaganda.
In the long-term, the way to avoid such unpalatable confrontations is to reform the internal decision-making rules of the union: far too many decisions require unanimity.
Requiring unanimity on core foreign policy and budgetary decisions is a recipe for paralysis.
This made sense 50 years ago: when the entire union was made up of a few core states.
But with 27 states, this is not workable at all.
It will only take a few bad actors like Orban to paralyze an entire union.
To avoid an ever-escalating cycle of blackmail and counter blackmail, the EU must get rid of the unanimity requirement for all but very few decisions (if even that).
Rebutting ‘‘How Ukraine Can Win Through Defense”.
Like it or not, Ukraine will need to spend most of the year in a defensive posture by default - force quality/composition and necessary numbers will not be there for Ukraine to launch another successful (major) counteroffensive this year.
But this is different from a strategy of a theater-wide defensive posture - the latter (proposed by many ‘‘foreign policy experts’’) would cede the strategic initiative to Russia.
And Russia being permitted to launch major attacks at times of its choosing is not a great strategic outcome.
So instead, a better funded and armed Ukraine will need to take opportunistic risks in gaining tactical edge whenever possible - constantly probing for weak spots to exploit.
At the same time, key Russian logistical nodes and supply depots must be under constant precision strikes - to prevent major division level offensives.
So then, an exclusively defensive strategy is a no go.
But it is one thing to propose this as a concept - without delving into details of nonsensical proposals.
That would simply be bad advice.
But some authors, like the one of this piece published in the reputable Foreign Affairs, (and widely circulated in DC’s foreign policy circles) are actually advancing ridiculous policy proposals - which if adhered to, would result in a total collapse of Ukraine, and inflict a major strategic humiliation on the US and allies in Europe.
The subtitle of the article states the following: “A New Strategy Can Protect Kyiv and Stop Moscow From Winning”
Yet the proposals offered in the article would lead to the very opposite outcome.
And the crux of the article can be summarized in the following paragraphs:
"Money is perhaps the most obvious outward indicator of strategy. By dialing down its funding request, the White House can signal it has adopted achievable strategic goals: a cheaper war is a far more sustainable war….But if executed well, a defensive political and military strategy may well be able to persuade Putin that he has no prospects for further conquest in Ukraine, creating an off-ramp for negotiations.”
So then, authors believe that: 1) Putin will be persuaded into an off-ramp through a defensive strategy, and 2) Signaling that the US is willing to cut Ukraine’s funding and “apply pressure” (literal quote from the article) on Kyiv would indicate selection of ‘‘achievable’’ goals instead of simply signaling (how Putin will perceive it) that the west is ready to give up..
Now then, a couple of reasons why this is utter nonsense:
1) Dialing down ‘‘funding requests’’ will not result in the west’s ability to back a ‘‘cheaper war” that is ‘‘far more sustainable’’ - instead, it will result in a total collapse of Ukraine.
There is absolutely no sustainability in this: as of this year, Russia is spending $100bn on defense and military procurement - this is a 2x advantage over Ukraine together with all of its western allies.
And even if the $60bn in Congress and $55bn in EU funds go through, this would merely restore parity (if even that:given the disparity in purchasing power and the fact that Western defense production is not yet scaled to absorb these funds efficiently).
In other words, at the current trajectory, Ukraine is moving towards a defeat - let alone a sustainable defense with further cuts in defense spending.
2) This was tried before.
This strategy of “cheap” and ‘‘active’’ defense was tried for most of 2022.
This was the de facto strategy of 2022 - before US/NATO allies decided to arm Ukraine with tanks/heavy armor, fighter jets (still yet to be delivered), and long-range precision-guided munitions.
Back then, Ukraine was essentially relying solely on low-firepower defensive weapons like the UK-supplied Starstreak and NLAWs and American Javelin missiles.
These would destroy oncoming tanks/helicopters/low flying Su-25s - but that’s it.
Only in the summer of 2022 did Ukraine start to get weapons of significance (allowing for offensive maneuvers) - like HIMARS.
And what happened in the first 4-5 months of an invasion?
Was Putin looking for an off-ramp?
Did he think ‘‘my initial maximalist war aims have failed, but luckily, Ukraine is funded at a minimal level - so that they cannot harm my army in a significant/embarrassing way. I should use this opportunity to de-escalate and remove my army” ?
Did he? or did he proceed to level major cities like Mariupol and aimed to capture all of Donbas in 2022?
It was the latter.
And that was before Russia suffered so many casualties and so much humiliation on the battlefield.
The idea that Putin would seek an off-ramp if the west was to cut-off funding now - when he has even more reasons to push for maximum victory, is pure fantasy.
3) Russia would merely double down and collect its winnings.
Putin decided to put his entire economy on the war footing, spending nearly 6% of Russia’s GDP on defense even before there were signs of cracks in Ukraine’s ability to secure its continuous funding from the allies in the West.
Why on earth would he stop now?
When he sees that the west is on its back foot and looks for ways to exit the conflict by cutting the funding to Ukraine in the name of ‘‘sustainable defense’’?
Did Russia sustain all these casualties, 315k attrition to the army, thousands of lost armored vehicles, tanks, ships and aircrafts, economic sanctions targeting its most advanced industries, exodus of million+ in highly productive and talented labor, risk of a regime overthrow last June, all this, for what?
So that when victory is so close, when the taps funding Putin’s target of acquisition finally start to close, he could suddenly change his mind and become convinced (with no good reason) that now is really good time to give up and negotiate an off ramp?
(side note: and that would be an off ramp from a major victory that Putin was close to more than ever)
In the author’s mind, Putin will see reduction in funds and would be caught off guard: he would then reverse course and say ‘‘oh well.. I guess they are now engaging in “sustainable/cheap defense” - now we are really in trouble!”
And this is of course a pure delusion: signaling to Putin that his calculations about the west’s lack of resolve and staying power are indeed correct, is a surefire way to encourage a further conquest of Ukraine.
And this is the major error committed by this and other ‘‘strategists’’ in assessing Ukraine’s prospects for a successful negotiation.
It is important to remember that negotiations happen in an overall context: where events shape the deal/no deal balance.
And so, why would Putin even need an off-ramp if he was to see Ukraine abandoned, with its government starving for funds and army for weapons?
And besides, off ramp to where? To the status quo? Merely confirming his current gains would be tantamount to legitimization and crystallization of Russia’s current gains.
An off ramp implies a very unpleasant alternative if such an off-ramp is refused - a looming catastrophe that can only be avoided with an off ramp.
Since there is no proposition to work on inflicting such an alternative (on the contrary, proposal is to remove funding from Ukraine, and cripple its offensive capacity) from what ‘‘unpleasant alternative’’ exactly would Putin need an off ramp?
This is what happens when the pundits’ desire to sound ‘‘wise & responsible’’ by proposing a ‘‘balanced approach’’ ends up being total nonsense and a strategic embarrassment.
But perhaps an even more dangerous development is the underlying narrative implied by such propositions: the tacit acceptance that Ukraine is stuck in an unwinnable war.
This is the most dangerous misconception that helps Putin in this war.
But it is not true: the task of defeating Russia on the battlefield is very hard but it is not as difficult as westerners are quick to conclude.
It is important to remember that when battlefield conditions are shaped in a way that favors Ukrainian counteroffensives, they do a pretty good job at executing the task.
Indeed, since the initial February 2022 invasion, Ukraine had managed to retake 50% of originally captured lands - drove Russians from major regions like Kherson, and caused a rout in Kharkiv.
Some western analysts have questioned the possibility of Russia’s total defeat - surely Putin would rather deploy nukes than admit defeat.
We have previously discussed the issue of nuclear weapons, and why it will be against Russia’s own interests to use them (leaving aside the political and strategic catastrophe that this would cause for the Kremlin, these would not be nuclear bombs detonating at some remote location - close proximity to Russia and unpredictable wind patterns could cause an unacceptably high risk of enormous self-harm).
But what these strategists and pundits often miss is that Putin doesn’t have to accept a defeat.
He is a ruler of an authoritarian nation with a powerful propaganda machine.
And the fact that the goals of the ‘‘special military operation’’ have remained deliberately vague, provide an ample wiggle room for Putin.
For example, if the total rout and collapse of Russian military in eastern Ukraine was an increasing possibility (it will never be imminent, Russians will have several months of notice of trajectory of events - allowing them to retreat on their own terms/with their political covers/excuses), the Kremlin could come up with some spin that this was an orderly withdrawal - since the political objectives of ‘‘denazification’’ and complete destruction of the Azov battalion and related militias was finally complete.
Of course, this is the worst case scenario - a more likely outcome (if Russia was on track to lose the war) would be Putin finally agreeing to negotiate in earnest, and agreeing to cut his losses.
The biggest issue then, would be the fate/status of Crimea and the four annexed regions in Eastern Ukraine.
It is hard to see Crimea ever given up freely - Ukraine will unfortunately have to park the issue until another day.
But creative political solutions could be applied to the fate of annexed regions in the east - Russia could pass a new legislation to establish their ‘‘special autonomy’’ and there could be a mutual agreement to demilitarize the region.
Ukraine could of course then treat the regions as their own.
It is also quite possible that Ukraine may have to unfortunately agree to give up those regions voluntarily - if the prize is an end to the war, and membership of NATO and the EU, Kyiv may have to agree to this.
(side note: membership of NATO would require a clear definition of Ukraine’s territory, and Kyiv would need to solve political questions in the east before having any chance of becoming a full-on member).
Clearly, there will be a lot of difficult questions to deal with, but the time for that is not now - Ukraine needs to secure enough battlefield wins to have any hope of exercising leverage over the Kremlin.
And before that, Ukraine needs to survive the ongoing war of attrition.
And in this regard, Russia is (for now) on a better track.
Now, some of the shortcomings are mostly within the scope of the Ukrainian leaders to fix.
For example: Ukraine is yet to announce a general mobilization of men under the age of 27.
Ukraine’s legislature/Rada, has thus far refused to pass the required bill to impose a mobilization of 450-500k men - figure sought by the military’s trop brass.
At this point, Kyiv is delaying the inevitable - and by engaging in such a delay, it is making it much harder for the country to recruit and train enough fresh new assault brigades in time for a new counteroffensive.
On the other hand, most of the disparity in prowess is an inevitable extension of the (natural) economic mismatch between Ukraine and Russia.
Simply put, Russia has a significantly higher productive capacity than Ukraine.
Currently, Russia can produce and/or procure approximately 100k drones per month - most of these are first-person view (FPV) drones: that ultimately play the role of a remotely operated precision strike grenade explosion.
These make it very hard for the advancing infantry assault units to achieve any tactical breakthrough.
Indeed, Twitter/X is full of videos that show how easy it is for remote drone operators to kill these advancing soldiers.
And in this crucial tech, Ukraine can only produce at the amount that is half of the Russian figures.
Similar advantages are observed in artillery shells: Russia’s 152mm shells cost around $600 to produce in Russia.
A 155mm shell used by Ukraine costs up to 10x of that amount when produced by NATO states.
(side note: this is why purchasing power parity (PPP) is so important. For years, western analysts were quick to dismiss Russia’s economy as ‘‘insignificant’’ and similar in size to the economy of Italy. But this was a flattering delusion. Adjusted for exchange rates and in PPP terms, Russia’s economy is 1.5x bigger than that of either France or the UK - two prominent NATO powers. And together with China, they overtake the entire economic heft of the EU by 1.5x. This is why Western unity, America’s leadership, and serious investment is needed to defeat Russia)
Indeed, the situation is dire: back in summer of 2023 (at the time of the counteroffensive), Ukraine fired 225k artillery shells per month - a 2.5x improvement from the 90k rate from the previous winter.
Nowadays, Ukraine fires around 60k a month in contrast to Russia’s 300k: Not only do they enjoy advantage in air power/fighter jets, number of armored vehicles and tanks, manpower and defense spend, but Russia also has a 5x advantage in artillery fires.
Situation is so dire that M109 Paladin artillery units outside Bakhmut receive only smoke shells for ammo.
Fixing all of these issues, and addressing all of the aforementioned disparities will take time.
But more importantly, it will take money and political will.
At the moment, Putin is clearly overconfident - he sees a clearly favorable trajectory of events.
But ironically, this makes it even more important to prove him wrong.
If the West can rally behind Ukraine, and demonstrate that Russia could not succeed in Ukraine, and failed in achieving its battlefield objectives even after all that rally in defense spending, and mobilization of both manpower and material production, and when all fundamentals were favoring Moscow, then Putin’s overconfidence could once again be replaced with uncertainty.
And Ukraine would be in a position to take back its lands and to negotiate from the position of strength.