Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, EU blackmails Hungary into submission, Zelensky to fire his Chief Commander.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Ukraine continues successful deep strikes.
With a stalemate on the border, Ukraine continues its effective strategy of targeting core logistical facilities and military targets deep within Russia.
We discussed St Petersburg attacks last week (a first for Ukraine), and on Saturday, Ukraine conducted two further drone attacks against major oil refineries within Russia.
This is a great strategy, and clearly, the end-goal is to cripple Russia’s oil industry and put a dent into the Kremlin’s easy source of revenue for its war machine.
In addition, there is yet another first: targeted assassination attempt of a Tu-95 bomber pilot in the Russian city of Engels.
Apparently, the bomber pilot in question was responsible for attacks on civilian targets.
Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, delivered an ominous warning against all “all war criminals”: ”we know your names, addresses, car numbers, usual routes and habits”.
Going after a limited number of key military personnel could yet prove to be one of Ukraine’s most significant innovations: this may not only have a powerful fear/deterrence effect (dissuading pilots from being ‘‘effective’’ in their sorties), but it is furthermore, a direct attack on Putin’s reputation for being in control: if his most valuable assets in the war get shot and killed in Russian cities, then that is really not a good look for him..
2) Wagner units to incorporate into Rosgvardia.
Remaining units of a renegade mercenary force that was once marching on Moscow to topple Putin are now to be absorbed by Rosgvardia - a national guard beefed up (after the failed June 2023 coup) with heavy armor and led by Putin’s long-time loyal bodyguard Viktor Zolotov.
In many ways, this is good news for Ukraine - better that these hardened and experienced soldiers stay away from the front (assuming that the National Guard is not going to be deployed to the front).
3)The EU passes through the $56 bn Ukraine fund: blackmail works - was there a better way ?
The US Congress is still stuck on passing the $61bn Ukraine aid.
(side note: there are reports that Trump is shamelessly pressuring his puppets in Congress to deliberately block this bill from passing through - in order to maintain the chaos on the border and boost his chances of re-election: since this bill would have 1) allocated more resources to the border and, 2) toughened up the asylum laws)
On the other hand, finally some good news from Europe.
The EU is stepping up big time: 1) there is a plan for a $22 billion joint-procurement fund to provide military aid to Ukraine, and 2) the long-awaited $54bn long-term funding package was also successfully pushed through.
As discussed in last week’s cables, the EU decided to respond to blackmail with some nuclear blackmail, and threatened to turn Hungary into an uninvestable backwater (by European standards).
Well, it worked, and after some face-saving concessions (around inspections/monitoring of fund disbursements - things that should have been there in any case), Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban used an off-ramp to backtrack and avoid an economic disaster.
So then, a ‘‘strongman’’ was defeated by “rootless cosmopolitan technocrats”.
Those ‘‘cosmopolitans in Brussels’’ aren’t so soft after all?
Great to see them rebut Putin’s assumptions (around the relative staying power of each side) once again.
Nowadays, the establishment of the EU is celebrating milestones around serious stuff - like producing 1 million artillery shells for Ukraine (but yet to be delivered).
And what about the ‘‘strongman’’?
He was cowed at the earliest hint of pressure.
The EU called Orban’s bluff, and the tiger turned into a kitty in no time.
They spoke the language of power to him - the one that he claimed to own..
Of course, this is great news, but arguably, there is still significant collateral damage as well: EU’s willingness to resort to such measures and to threaten tanking the economy of its member states is a fodder for the Kremlin propaganda.
This is exactly the type of stuff that populism feeds upon.
And so, even though in the short term, this was probably necessary to push through this bill, in the long-term there surely needs to be a better mechanism for similar scenarios.
What else could have been done?
Well, there are a number of formal tools that could have been used - perhaps most significantly, the EU could have utilized its Article 7 powers: this would lead to suspension of Budepest’s EU voting rights (on the grounds that Hungary was refusing ‘‘sincere cooperation”).
And although this is known as a ‘‘nuclear option” , it is clearly not as nuclear as threatening to tank a member states’ economy.
But the ultimate fix is to get rid of the unanimity requirement on most decisions - this will simply not work with 27 member states: it will always take 1-2 rotten apples to sabotage the interests of an entire union.
Zelensky to fire his chief commander: speculations and accusation of political foul play abound.
President Zelensky reportedly informed the WH leadership in Washington that he was going to fire his chief commander, Velerii Zaluzhnyi.
This comes after a week of media speculation and frenzy (which went into overdrive when it became clear that Zaluzhnyi apparently turned out Zelensky’s offer to leave his office on amicable terms and to accept a position of a military adviser to the President of Ukraine instead - undoubtedly, a significant demotion).
(side note: his most likely replacement is Kyrylo Budanov - Ukraine’s well-known military intelligence chief, admired for his ability to plan daring missions. But precisely because he is so good at this job, it maybe that someone else fills the chief commander’s role)
That President Zelensky would fire his Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi was always in the cards after: 1) The unsuccessful breakthrough following Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, and 2) Zalyzhnyi’s decision to rebut overly optimistic assessments promoted by the political leadership in Kyiv and admit existence of a stalemate in his lengthy article for The Economist magazine.
Now then, let us pause and consider that a) this had really really irritated Zelensky - who’s twin political concerns are 1) Ukraine fatigue in the west, 2) loss of morale in Ukraine itself.
Without a strong domestic morale and consistent Western support, Ukraine will simply not have political leverage to extract favorable concessions at the negotiation table (let alone win outright).
As such, it is very reasonable for Zelensky to be annoyed with Zaluzhnyi’s foray into the political arena without carrying the weight of the consequent political failures.
It is of course debatable whether Zelensky’s ultimate strategy of overly rosy prognostications would pay off - or would lead to a further loss of credibility.
His tactics may have worked in 1970s - but today, when skies over Ukraine are saturated with first-person view (FPV) drones and satellites providing minute-by-minute updates of the battlefield, in short, when everyone can see what is happening at all times, claiming to have the upper hand or even a momentum may end up causing distrust - as this would simply fly into the face of all available evidence.
Of course, this too is debatable - from Zelensky’s perspective, he is engaged in a series of short term battles - each stage of the war is 4-6 months long and he constantly needs to get to the next stage: and doing so with a strong political support and belief in the viability of Ukraine’s victory is easier than by being all doom and gloom.
The latter approach relies on the capacity of the Western statesmen to adopt a vision of long-term strategic objectives.
And this in itself a risky bet demonstrated by the recent funding blocks in the EU and Congress.
There is also a middle ground: you can remain optimistic while remaining utterly realistic.
This has been the approach of these cables: yes, Ukraine’s counteroffensive failed due to a combination of reasons, but primarily:
a) lack of adequately trained officers and soldiers to conduct combined arms maneuvers at the battalion, brigade and division levels (as opposed to platoon and company level);
b) lack of air power to contest the skies and provide cover for the advancing ground troops; lack of consistent firepower advantage in artillery and drones;
c) lack of sufficient long-range strike capability to weaken Russia’s defense in depth operations and to cause havoc to its logistics (ATACMS were finally delivered at the end of the counteroffensive in the fall - as opposed to in June, when they were most needed);
d) lack of breaching and modern mine-clearing technology that forced Ukraine’s infantry to conduct archaic mine-clearing operations that resulted in them coming under frequent fire.
e) certain tactical decisions: e.g. allocating too many troops to Bakhmut or to be stuck in probing stage vs committing to one major assault axis - these are however very debatable, and most likely, factors of secondary importance - definitely ranking lower than the fundamentals outlined above.
It is also true that without urgent western support, Russia is on track to win the war - in the long-term, there is no stalemate, without decisive western aid, the default is Ukraine’s defeat.
But with all that said, this war is also very winnable: when conditions on the ground change, so will Ukraine’s ability to inflict a decisive loss on Russia.
Recall that back in 2022, Russia had successfully captured Kherson and leveled Mariupol - months before Ukraine successfully retook nearly half of its invaded territory.
So this war is highly winnable - it simply needs a change in variables - most of which are within the controls of the statesmen in the West.
But unlike these cables, Zelensky doesn’t have a luxury of being thoroughly analytic and realistic about conditions on the ground: he has a political job to do, and given the short attention spans in the west, he may very well calculate that hyping things up and getting further funding in place for the next decisive battle, is more important than remaining consistently credible.
We would challenge that assessment - but it is nevertheless a legitimate difference in approach.
What cannot be denied however, is that the attacks on Zelensky and attempts to paint his government as corrupt and dictatorial are simply not based in fact.
Yes, there is indeed lots of corruption in Ukraine - but the highest level of leadership doesn’t deny that.
They frequently investigate and arrest corrupt officials.
And reforms are going so well that institutions as uptight and pedantic as the EU frequently commend Ukraine on the progress.
It is also true that even after going so independent and openly challenging his President, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief remained in power for many months.
This would not have happened in Russia: where he would have probably ‘‘fallen off’’ the balcony by now.
Can you imagine Russia’s lead Ukraine commander, Valery Gerasimov denying Putin’s claims of inevitable victory?
But perhaps we should not even go to that extreme: this would not have happened in most of the liberal democracies either - not without the lead general being sacked promptly after such an insubordination: after all, the well-established principle that generals must not involve in political assessments that challenge their Presidents is a widely accepted as an enduring norm.
Last time anything close to something so brazen has happened was when General Douglas McArthur challenged President Truman over Korea - in spite of all his accomplishments and admirable military record, he was promptly shown the door.
Accusations of political motivations.
There is an ongoing widespread speculation that Zelensky’s decision to remove Zalyzhnyi is due to mainly political interests: that Zelensky sees General Zaluzhnyi as a political rival/challenger, and so wants to remove Zaluzhnyi from such a prestigious high post and neutralize him as a rival.
Now, it is only natural for Zelensky to worry about political challenges - and this is not just a cynical interpretation either.
Assuming that a politician is pursuing good end-goals, and believes in his ability to deliver those goals, he must necessarily pursue (and maintain) power to deliver on those objectives.
But the allegations against Zelensky are of course by their very nature, corrosive to the public trust: suggesting that in the middle of the ongoing war, Zelensky cares more about his own political survival over the good of the country.
This line of argumentation necessarily presumes at least five elements:
1) That Zaluzhnyi is very popular and can be a challenger (true - he is a folk hero);
2) That he would want to challenge Zelensky;
3) That Zelensky is so worried about this challenge, he wants to preempt it now;
4) That there is no other good reason to get rid of Zaluzhnyi - at least not as pressing as Zelensky’s apparent need to survive this political challenge;
5) That firing Zaluzhnyi would indeed neutralize him as a political challenger - or at least decrease his odds of success.
Only the first assumption is solid - Zaluzhnyi is in fact very popular.
But the rest of these assumptions are based on shaky grounds.
We would need to believe that there are no other legitimate reasons (and there are plenty- as discussed above) for Zelensky to fire Zaluzhnyi, and that staying in power is more preferable to winning the war.
This is a hard claim to buy: not only because of Zelenskyi’s own record of sacrifice and bravery, but because simply put - there is no survival without winning the war, and tomorrow’s political challenges are not as pressing as today’s survival.
If Zelensky believed that Zaluzhnyi was the best man for the job - that having him there would maximize the chances of victory, then it would surely not make sense to remove him - even from a purely personal interest: since there is no presidency without Ukraine surviving the Russian onslaught.
In addition, the timing of his firing is not really optimal if your goal is to get rid of a challenger.
If Zelensky wanted to fire him for political reasons, it would make sense to do so right after the failed counteroffensive - pinning the blame on Zaluzhny.
That would not only turn Zaluzhnyi into a scapegoat and would have associated him with failure (weakening his political prospects), but it would also be an excuse in the reset for Zelensky’s rhetoric: “ok we failed because of this one bad commander who bungled things. But we are still on track, and with the new leadership in place, we will have a better chance next time around.”
But that didn’t happen - instead, this rift really escalated after Zaluzhny’s display of unacceptable political involvement and engagement with the media.
Could it not simply be that Zaluzhnyi’s intransigence and excessive media independence is unacceptable to Zelensky?
After all, which western leader would have tolerated the independence demonstrated by Zaluzhnyi?
Let us not forget that Zaluzhnyi is not even a Minister of Defense - he is not a civilian.
He is a Chief Commander of Ukraine’s army - his job doesn’t involve writing articles for The Economist magazine - where he goes on to openly challenge his President’s narrative.
And if that narrative is faulty, then that is the job of the political opposition/media/civil society to challenge that.
The job of a Chief Commander is to remain detached and execute the requirements of his post with dispassionate discipline.
And besides, the final assumption is perhaps even hardest to buy: that firing Zaluzhnyi could somehow neutralize him as a political challenger.
On the contrary - while in his current post, Zaluzhnyi cannot be a political challenger - his hands are tied (unless he was to organize a coup. But we are being realistic here).
But as soon as he is fired, Zaluzhnyi will be able to go after Zelensky openly and without breaching his other duties.
And given that no new major counteroffensives are likely this year, Zaluzhnyi would have a whole year of political material to go after Zelensky: he would be able to capitalize on stagnation and any failure to attack Zelensky personally.
So then, no matter how you look at it, it seems like a stretch to believe that Zelensky’s decision to remove Zaluzhny is driven purely by personal political motivations.
The timeline and political incentives (of avoiding a real challenger once he is fired) simply don’t support such claims.
In the meantime, these accusations are a boon to Russian propaganda - to weave narratives of discord and prevalence of cynical politics-driven decisions at the very top of Ukrainian government.
If these accusations stick, they will weaken the public trust in Ukraine’s leadership at the time of an existential war - and that would be yet another ‘‘hybrid weapon’’ for Putin to enjoy (and a narrative for Tucker Carlson to spread in America).
I see Martha Gessen and others are criticizing Zelensky’s cancellation of upcoming elections, and stating that it detracts from Ukraine’s claims to be a democracy.