Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war, Countering Russia's hostage-taking plays, and the EU takes a stance on China.
(note*: a lot of readers have emailed asking for the analysis of Putin’s comment that Russia and China were not military allies. We will unpack this on Thursday’s cables.)
Ukraine war updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
As the battle for Bakhmut continues, President Zelensky revealed political imperatives driving his decision to confront Russia in Bakhmut (as opposed to picking a different, and potentially more advantageous location for the defense of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna-Lyman line).
According to Zelensky, a possible victory in Bakhmut would enable Putin to ‘‘sell this victory” to the West, China and Iran in an attempt to secure a peace plan that is unfavorable to Ukraine (freezing Russia’s territorial conquests in place).
This is smart politics from Zelensky - the very fact that the worst-case political outcomes are now uttered in public, allows Ukraine to piggy-back to this very warning if Russia was to in fact succeed in Bakhmut - that is, it would be harder for the West to push for Russia-favoring “peace negotiations’’ now that this very scenario has been outlined 1)preemptively, and 2) in detail.
In other words, revealing all of the potentially disastrous outcomes from a possible loss of Bakhmut now, reduces the actual impact of this very outcome - if it was to ever happen.
This was not the only smart political play from Zelensky last week - during the very same interview, Zelensky (rightly) extended an invitation to Xi Jinping to visit Kyiv - and the longer Xi persists in declining this invitation, China's façade as an unbiased mediator grows increasingly tenuous, thereby eroding its capacity to enforce unfavorable peace conditions upon Ukraine.
(side note: not that Russia would even want a freeze right now. They need more progress to show for all the exorbitant costs. Hence the Kremlin spokesperson Peskov’s comment that a ceasefire would not enable Russia to achieve the goals of its “special military operation” - yet another reminder to the delusional Western media pundits and ‘‘politicians’’ who talk about a premature peace - not only would this freeze Russia’s current gains, the Kremlin is not even interested in that..They want more!)
In the meantime, Russia’s advance continues to stall, and according to UK’s Defense Intel, the overall theater commander General Gerasimov has failed to extend Russia’s control over Donbas since taking over on January 11 - allegedly failing to meet the Kremlin’s deadline to capture Donbas in its entirety by March 31.
Against the background of Russia's persistent setbacks on the frontlines, Ukraine and its Western allies remain poised for a protracted war of attrition - with a further slate of vital strategic industrial production measures in development.
Following EU’s decision to invest $2.2bn into artillery shell production, the US is now also planning to double its monthly production of 155mm artillery shells to 24k per month by the end of the year - with $1.45bn to be invested to this end.
In addition, the production of Javelin missiles and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) will also double to 330 and 41 a month respectively - a measure essential for a capable defense of Taiwan, beyond the impact on the current war in Ukraine.
Russia’s weak diplomacy and loss of credibility continues on its downward spiral.
Perhaps however, the Kremlin’s leadership thought it prudent to compensate for the lack of battlefield progress with over the top threats launched by its diplomats.
In a public statement, the Russian ambassador to Sweden warned that by joining NATO, the Nordic countries would in effect become "a legitimate target for Russian retaliatory measures, including those of a military nature".
An empty, meaningless statement that Russia will not (and is in no position to) back up with concrete action.
This was not the worst instance of the recent (and consistently continuous) downward slide in the credibility of Russian officials.
Just last week, the former President and the current Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation - Dmitry Medvedev, threatened any and all countries ready to implement the ICC’s arrest warrant against Putin with Russia’s nuclear submarines and missile barrages.
Naturally, no-one is going to arrest Putin anytime soon.
But the mere fact that such totally uncredible threats are uttered with such ease and a complete disregard for their perceived weight, is in itself a worrying development.
True - Russia’s threats will become less biting and effectual against any of the Western allies.
But over the long-term, such a deflation of credibility will make it harder to discern between genuine and credible ‘‘threats’’ and the usual talk - this could potentially lead to a miscalculation based on ‘‘business as usual’’ expectations from the recipients of these threats.
And this miscalculation can in turn lead to unforeseen escalations - which is not in the interests of any party to this conflict.
For the benefit of all parties involved, Russian leaders must desist from making hollow threats.
Finlands joins NATO.
But for a few more bureaucratic/formal procedures left, Finland is now going to be the 31st member of NATO.
This is a monumental change in Europe’s security architecture - a country that for decades carefully navigated its ‘‘neutral’’ status between NATO and Russia, is now going to become one of the most technologically advanced powers of the alliance in its eastern flank.
And let us all pause for a moment and appreciate the incredible strategic foresight and statesmanship of Putin.
Let us not forget how the pretext for Ukraine's invasion was fabricated - and one of these fake pretexts alleging NATO's persistent eastward expansion: that Putin could not possibly afford to stand by passively and witness the alliance establish a significant border with Russia via Ukraine.
Well.. now that border is even larger - at 833 miles or 1,340 kilometers - the Finnish - Russian border will now become the longest contact line between NATO and Russia.
Only a truly great strategist could start a war to (unconvincingly, but still, allegedly) push back against a NATO expansion (amongst other apparent grievances), only to secure their larger presence right at Moscow’s doorstep - Russia’s capital city is located mere 372 miles away from the Finnish border.
And as it has been long maintained by these cables, it was only a matter of time before both Turkey and Hungary would agree to Finland’s membership.
(side note: there are some tentative encouraging signs that in addition to Finland’s NATO membership, another long-standing issue that has soured the Washington-Ankara relationship - Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 air defense systems - may also be solved: the head of Turkey’s leading defense manufacturer “Aselsan”, Haluk Gorgun (an individual close to President Erdogan himself), recently indicated a potential solution to the issue : “We are making air defense systems. We don’t need S-300s, S-400s.” Well that would certainly solve it!)
And what about Sweden?
As discussed in the previous cables, their accession is unlikely to materialize prior to Turkey’s elections in May - from Erdogan’s perspective, there are simply too many unpalatable incidents (of Quran-burning “anti-Islam” protests - some brazenly organized by Russian saboteurs interested in creating tensions and stalling Sweden’s application) for Turkey to concede on - all potential irritants for the Turkish President’s more religious/conservative electoral base.
And these political realities were not lost on the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg - who expects Sweden’s accession to NATO to materialize only after Turkey’s presidential elections this summer.
(side note: and so Hungary will now have time to try to secure their own concessions from Sweden - however, given that most of their grievances are pretty illegitimate (resistance to criticisms of corruption and human rights/rule of law abuses), it is hard to see what - if anything - Orban’s government could extract from Sweden. All Sweden would need to do, is to wait for Turkey’s final approval - once that is done, it is hard to see how Hungary would be able to maintain any form of political resistance against its EU partner - and do so all alone.)
It is also important to note that this delay - however undesirable - is nowhere near catastrophic.
Context matters: Sweden is now going to be surrounded by NATO allies, and it is simply inconceivable that Russia would/could do anything against Sweden - Moreover, it is highly unlikely that NATO would remain passive and witness the events transpire without taking any action.
Russia’s “Revolving door” hostage-taking policy
An American journalist and a WSJ reporter Evan Gershkovich was detained on suspicion of spying for the US government.
This is pretty big - it is the first time since the Cold War that an American journalist is facing spying accusations.
That both America and Russia have active spies in each other’s turf is beyond any reasonable doubt.
That they would use legitimate and believable covers is also quite reasonable to expect.
Beyond this however, we shall not delve into the merits of Russia’s case (and to be clear, and thus far, there is none - not a shred of evidence was advanced to even suggest - let alone prove - that Gershkovich was a spy. And if there was even a single legitimate piece of evidence, Russia’s propaganda machine would be all over it), and will instead focus on the larger meta politics at play here: Russia is engaged in the revolving door hostage-taking policy.
Using detentions of high-profile and well-known Americans like Brittney Griner, Russians managed to secure a release of their own valuable assets (and individuals of higher actual impact than just a mere celebrity) like the “merchant of death” Victor Bout.
Getting in fresh new detainees gives the Kremlin new additional levers to pull - using their detentions to trade for something new/additional: perhaps releasing some of their own remaining detainees, lifting sanctions on particular individuals, or demanding a particular policy concession.
And in this particular case, choosing to target Gershkovich specifically, comes with two additional benefits for the Kremlin: 1) Getting rid of another thorough and capable Western investigative reporter - who was quite inconveniently in the middle of working on a story about Russia’s mercenary forces - Wagner Group, and 2) Given that Gershkovich is a WSJ reporter, his detention will be accompanied by a near-constant pressure on the Biden admin to secure his release.
Much media coverage and attention will be devoted to keeping this story at the forefront, as journalists seek to secure the release of one of their own (and to be clear, this sense of solidarity among the media is entirely understandable).
This does mean however, that there will a) now be new additional criteria to judge Biden’s ‘‘performance on Ukraine’’ against, and b) there will consequently be less bandwidth to cover Russia’s other - potentially far more consequential, and far more dangerous - conducts in this war.
And unfortunately, the longer this pressure on Biden is maintained, the more likely is the current admin to agree to at least some sort of a concession vis-à-vis Russia.
There are not too many good options here - Russia being the lawless state, the Kremlin will always have an advantage in using such dirty tricks (like hostage - taking) to exercise leverage.
But there are at least two things that the US can and should do.
Firstly, and as directed by the current admin - all US citizens should leave Russia: we simply cannot allow them any opportunity to strike.
Secondly, the US should vigorously pursue criminal charges - accompanied with extradition demands - against all individuals that help Russia’s war machine: whether that is direct funneling of weapons, or acting as middlemen/businessmen that provide a legal cover for import/export operations that supply Russia with tech found on America’s export control list.
Here is a good example: An Armenian with a Slovakian citizenship, Ashot Mkrtychev attempting to broker a deal between Russia and North Korea.
According to the statement of the Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Mkrtychev worked with North Koreans “to obtain more than two dozen different kinds of weapons and munitions for Russia in exchange for materials ranging from commercial aircraft to raw materials and commodities”.
In response, Mkrtychev has been placed on a sanctions list.
But given the stakes and nature of the transaction, surely the American prosecutors could find some charges of transnational crime?
Surely they could find some creative ways of charging Mkrtychev with a crime - and thereafter demanding his extradition to the US.
(side note: Slovakia being both a EU and NATO member, would most definitely cooperate closely and not refuse such a request…)
There are creative ways to secure such charges and extraditions.
The infamous arms dealer Victor Bout, was for example charged with terrorism offenses (for selling arms to Colombia’s FARC).
The US could use a number of similar tools here as well: from The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) - which would enable the US to secure the extradition of international arms dealers who violate US sanctions - to plain old money laundering laws (like the The Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA)) - after all, at some point, all arms dealers would have to launder their proceeds - especially those based in the EU.
Precise mechanisms and charges are of secondary importance - what matters most, is that the US could achieve two objectives in one stroke: 1) Cripple illicit networks funneling arms to Russia, and 2) Impose costs, and thus dissuade the Kremlin from continuing to play these hostage-taking games - highlighting the fact that the US can also take off its gloves (without even needing to playing dirty: all of these aforementioned individuals should in fact be in prison in any case).
The EU takes a stand on China.
China has always been The EU’s achilles heel: comprising 16.2% of its total trade intensity, China is the biggest trading partner for the EU.
In addition, China maintains an enormous monopoly over both production and refinement of the 30 critical minerals identified by the EU.
And now, there is a risk that Beijing might throw its full weight and industrial capacity behind Russia.
We have previously discussed this scenario: a full on support is unlikely since China has a lot to lose (unity of the EU and the US, and potential loss of the EU as a major trading partner. In pure economic terms, the EU’s significance to China is multiple that of Russia’s).
But neither is it likely that Beijing would let Russia be humiliated on the battlefield and lose the war outright - again, too much for China to lose (and Russia’s value as a credible security partner in the Pacific would crumble to zero).
The most realistic outcome will be somewhere in the middle: Beijing will try to provide a minimum viable support to ensure Russia’s minimal success or to prevent its outright humiliation.
But this careful balancing might be blown of course by tempting appetites - especially if 1) Russia demonstrates a tide-turning capability to dominate with a little tailwinds behind it, and 2) the EU appears to take it without pushing back with concrete measures and imposing zero/near -zero costs on China.
It is vital therefore for the EU to dispel precisely this very notion: this idea that the EU would stand by idly whilst China provides military support to an invader on its doorsteps.
It was commendable and heartening therefore to see EU’s Commissioner Von Der Leyen warn China in her speech (ahead of her trip to Beijing on Tuesday).
In very clear terms, she warned Xi Jinping that “How China continues to interact with Putin’s war will be a determining factor for E.U.-China relations going forward”.
A lot is at stake for China - the EU could for example very well threaten to terminate a landmark trade deal with China (initially agreed to in 2020, and thereafter stalled by the European Parliament).
Van Der Leyen is proving herself as a great statesman with a strong vision and a clear grasp of geopolitical context.
(side note: and the possibility of her becoming the next Secretary General of NATO is most certainly great news for the entire Atlantic alliance)
The West was lucky to have had the right leaders in charge at such a crucial moment in history.
The GOP politicians who are fighting back against populist extremes.
There are a few leading GOP politicians who: 1) Are relatively well-known, 2) Are running for President, 3) Are unlikely to secure their party’s nomination - let alone win the Presidency, yet are also, 4) Extremely helpful in providing a rhetorical alibi for Biden.
Last week, we covered Nicky Haley’s (who could still become a VP pick - if nothing else) op-ed attacking DeSantis, and admonishing the isolationist / populist extremes for their failure to understand how at this moment in time, containing Russia is the most effective way of weakening China.
This week it was the former VP Mike Pence’s turn to reiterate the importance of backing Ukraine with unwavering intent and demonstrative vigor:
Complaining about the “slow’’ delivery of lethal aid to Ukraine, Pence reinforced how it is “absolutely essential to give Ukraine what they need”.
This was naturally followed with a mandatory attack on the Democrat President “President Biden says we're there as long as it takes, but, Greta, with American leadership, it shouldn't take that long.”
Pence is correct to criticize the slow delivery of arms - these cables have long lamented the present admin for precisely this crucial shortcoming.
But overall, and when looked at holistically, Pence’s comments are actually beneficial to the current admin on two fronts:
1) This very attack on the administration is actually very helpful to President Biden: as it furnishes him with a rhetorical barrier against accusations of excessive intervention in Ukraine.
And amidst a gradual erosion of fierce bipartisan public support for arming Ukraine, marked by a growing number of individuals - particularly Republicans - asserting that the US is overstepping its bounds in aiding Ukraine, the significance of this rhetorical barrier (conferred by Pence) is doubly valuable in current times
Within this context, it is not at all the end of the world for President Biden to appear as a laggard in providing sufficient military aid to Ukraine.
In future (and certainly during Presidential debates), Biden will be able to point out to the fact that the support for Ukraine is: 1) bipartisan, and 2) even more fierce within the non-populist “normal’’ segment of the GOP (the side closer towards the median swing voter).
2) Haley and Pence are both doing a lot to narrow the Overton Window of acceptable rhetoric within the GOP.
They are actively pushing back against Trump’s efforts to normalize taking pride in a policy of not helping Ukraine (and DeSantis pandering to similar sentiments).
This is important, but for the establishment candidates pushing back, the Trump/DeSantis rhetoric would gradually crystallize into the status quo approach towards Ukraine within the entire GOP discourse.
In addition, back to back statements made by Haley and Pence also serve as an important signal to DeSantis - it is a warning that he is increasingly at odds with the ‘‘normie’’, non-populist wing of the party (which thankfully, still dominates within both chambers of the Congress).
DeSantis can never outdo Trump in pandering to Trump’s base.
And neither is he trying to do that: DeSantis is instead trying to position himself as both populist and normal enough to attract both Trump’s base and an average normie suburban swing voter.
His pitch to the GOP establishment is simple: only I can secure support of all wings of the party - I am the only candidate palatable to all sides.
But this universal appeal argument will be increasingly at risk the more DeSantis tries to pander to Trump’s base.
And Pence/Haley comments are a clear warning that he is pushing way too hard in the populist direction: a warning that he ought to pull back.
As such, DeSantis will increasingly feel the pressure to temper down the intensity of his populism, and move back to more orthodox views on foreign policy.
And arguably, this is already beginning to happen: shortly after the ‘‘territorial dispute” fiasco (where DeSantis reduced the major war of invasion in Europe to some “dispute” over some unimportant territory - totally disregarding the implications of this war on the national security interests of US) and in an interview with Piers Morgan, DeSantis pushed back against suggestions that he did not support Ukraine, called Putin a “war criminal”, and attacked Russia as a “petrol station with nukes” (which is a direct quote of the late Sen. John McCain).
This is good and must continue.
One does wonder whether both Haley and Pence would have advanced similar arguments if they had much more to lose (ie, if they had a realistic chance of securing their party’s nomination).
But then again, for the purposes at hand, this factor is not particularly significant
What matters is that both Pence and Haley have done a lot to push back against the toxic ‘‘blank check’’ rhetoric on Ukraine - rhetoric that harms America’s national security interests and is music to the ears of both Putin and Xi Jinping.