Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War Updates, the Kremlin's diplomatic blunders, Johnson's Kyiv visit, and preventing Russian gains from the Iran nuclear deal.
*note: there have now been further Congressional/political delegations visiting Taiwan. In addition, US warships have sailed through the Taiwan Strait for the first time since Pelosi’s visit. On Thursday’s cables, we shall take a closer look at these developments and delve deeper into the overall context.
Ukraine War Updates.
Donbas battlefield & outlook.
Relative stalemate continues as Russia is attempting to transform a volunteer battalion (which comprises most of Russia’s 3rd Army Corps) into an effective fighting force - most likely, targeting the southern Donetsk city axis.
There is some reputable intel (from Jane’s intelligence) that the battalion has been equipped with relatively more modern T-80BVM and T-90M tanks (and AK-12 Assault rifles), but overall, the size of the offensive formations and experience of the soldiers, do not point towards the existence of a highly powerful combat force.
Even though the actual battlefield movements were rather muted, Putin raised alarms by signing a decree to expand the Russian army by 137,000 (an increase of 13.5%).
The implementation year is 2023, and this is certainly a very short timeline to recruit en masse to eliminate such a big gap.
Russia has already been struggling to recruit soldiers for the past six months: resorting to some extreme measures like enlisting current convicts.
It is hard to see how this number will be achieved.
But regardless of the practicality of the measure, the main point is political: it is a message to the West that Putin is in this for the long-run, and that he is preparing Russia for a grinding attrition warfare.
(side note: recall how back in February, we discussed the core messages that Putin will always reiterate throughout this war: 1) Whatever you do to me, we will do much worse in return, 2) No matter how long this takes, we will outlast you all, and 3) No matter how much pain you think you can inflict on us, we can absorb and tolerate more than you.)
It is therefore essential that the West responds with its own consistent messaging to counter these narratives (and before certain politicians in the West start questioning how much longer we should be stuck in support of Ukraine).
And in this, America is still leading the way.
Credit where it is due - the Biden administration’s announcement of a commitment to further $3bln of aid for Ukraine (on its independence day) was a major event in itself.
The funds (coming from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative) are intended to allow Ukraine to acquire air defense systems, artillery systems and munitions, counter-unmanned aerial systems, and radars from the American defense industry.
In other words, this specific aid comes in addition to the direct supply of weapons from the stockpiles of the US military.
Perhaps even more encouraging news comes from the American public: the latest (and highly reputable) Chicago Council poll has revealed that fully 72% of Americans are in support of continuous supply of Ukraine with American weapons.
And here is the best part: by a six-to-four ratio Americans are in favor of supporting Ukraine for ‘‘as long as it takes”.
Russia’s diplomatic blunder - a gift to the Zelensky government.
Russia’s former “President” and the current Deputy Chair of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev once again grabbed global attention with yet another major announcement: that Russia would not stop the war even if Ukraine was to drop its NATO membership aspirations.
Ostensibly, this was done to demonstrate confidence and a will to prosecute a lengthy war post Crimea attacks/Dugina assassination.
Russia is signaling that the price of peace and end to the war keeps rising as Ukraine is doing much better on the battlefield: the more you push (and help Ukraine) the longer this will drag on, and at the end of the day, the concessions you will be forced to offer to end this war, will keep on rising in both magnitude and volume.
On the other hand however, this very statement reduces the pressure on the Zelensky government to offer even political concessions - let alone territorial ones.
Why offer neutrality if Russia is not going to be satisfied with it in any case?
Why not fight for maximal war aims from now on?
Why not fight for the ultimate victory and offer zero concessions?
Calls from certain western European politicians in favor of political accommodations will now be muted.
And given that the political accommodations are no longer needed, what else would these appeasement supporters suggest? That Ukraine actually gifts its territory to Russia?
This blunder was a major strategic victory for the Zelensky government.
It must now be used to push for stronger narrative dominance - demanding Western help to withstand this invasion.
An invasion that seeks to swallow Ukraine and wipe it off existence.
In the meantime, western statesmen that face the ire of certain domestic cable news anchors, must use this latest Russian admission to demonstrate the need for the continuous support of Ukraine.
There are far too many public figures in the West that advance wholly illogical arguments that America is “inflaming” the war by consistently supporting a victim of a brutal and unprovoked invasion.
Those that find these silly suggestions persuasive, must be reminded that Russia is not seeking any legitimate national security interests in this war.
The goal, as so openly revealed by Putin himself, is to replicate the success of Peter the Great, and further expand the Russian empire: and consequently, anyone that advocates for appeasement and reduction of support for Ukraine, is either deliberately or inadvertently taking part in advancing Putin’s imperial ambitions.
The significance of Boris Johnson’s latest Ukraine visit.
At the time when Kyiv was targeted during the Independence day celebrations, and when even ordinary civilians were under increasing threat of facing Russian missiles, Boris Johnson displayed decisiveness and courage and visited Kyiv for one last time as the current Prime Minister of UK.
This is significant for three main reasons:
1) Johnson once again raised the bar for courage - he was the first foreign leader to visit Kyiv when the danger was still close.
He is now establishing a new standard: that foreign leaders must continue to meet with Zelensky in Kyiv even if it is once again deliberately targeted by Russia.
2) He re-established a pro-Kyiv narrative ahead of the winter grind.
As frequently discussed in these cables, there are major signs of slowdown of European support for Kyiv: both in terms of rhetoric and actual conduct (July was the first month where there was no bilateral commitment from any of the major European powers towards Kyiv).
And ahead of the cold winter (when the energy/cost of living crisis will be felt even more acutely), Johnson’s message that “Ukraine can and will win this war”, was the much-needed narrative boost from a major NATO power.
(side note: and the UK once again backed its rhetoric with action: sending over more than 2,000 drones: 850 black hornets, 1,000 loitering munitions and 150 long-range reconnaissance drones.)
3) Setting the high standard for the UK and his successors.
Boris Johnson’s displays of courage and singularity of purpose have long been derided as cynical ploys to boost his own domestic (and global) political popularity.
Naturally, a politician that ignores the reality of governance (which requires favorable political perceptions/support) is a bad politician - and Boris Johnson is anything but.
But Johnson has articulated a powerful case for the support of Ukraine - one that goes above and beyond any short-term political points.
His latest (and dangerous) visit to Kyiv when he was about to end his premiership, was a powerful signal that the support for Ukraine is above politics - that this is a matter of both principle, and of strategic national interest for the UK - and not for any one particular political player to boost his/her rating.
His visit and pronouncements were also designed to commit the next PM of the UK - now that the bar is set so high, major deviations will come with even higher political costs: something that a new PM will have to avoid.
The Iran nuclear deal may strengthen Russia and threaten Ukraine - preventative measures are needed.
It is becoming increasingly likely that the Iran nuclear deal/JCPOA will be reinstated in the upcoming week/s.
In the previous cables, we discussed how if the JCPOA was to be reinstated, the Biden admin will try to frame it as a last minute success due to persistent and capable diplomacy.
Indeed, this is already happening: the US State Department said that it was “encouraged” by Iran’s response to the EU advanced proposal to revive the 2015 nuclear deal.
Apparently, American diplomats are impressed with Iran dropping its demand that the US must remove the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) from the State Department’s FTO/foreign terrorist organizations list.
In fact, the State Department officials are so impressed by this “concession”, that they are scrambling to respond as ‘‘quickly as possible’’ to Iran’s comments.
Two points on this:
1) The IRGC designation removal demand was always an extremely maximalist and unworkable demand - no US admin would ever agree to this - even the Biden admin (that wants the JCPOA back in place at almost any cost) was not going to concede on this point: especially after the recent IRGC attacks, and assassination attempts on both the former National Security Adviser John Bolton, and writer Salman Rushdie.
The IRGC demand was always a smart negotiation ploy from Tehran: either Iran was going to get the concession, or it was going to give up on this impossibly unworkable demand as a ‘‘concession’’ and win some diplomatic points - a win-win proposition.
So then, Iran did not really concede anything - since IRGC delisting was never in play in any case.
Iran simply could not have given up something that it was never going to get in the first place.
But now, they can claim to have offered a concession, and American diplomats can use this offer as evidence of their own diplomatic skill..
And it is certainly much easier to sell the resulting deal to the domestic audience - after successfully establishing the perception that American diplomats were tirelessly working hard to protect the national interest.
2) What was offered in return?
There are certain DC rumors that in return for this ‘‘concession’’ American diplomats have quietly promised to lessen certain sanctions on the IRGC.
This has not been confirmed yet, but if true, this will be (in some way) revealed once the deal goes through.
And if indeed true, this is going to be a huge embarrassment to the US: lessening sanctions on a terrorist organization that just this past week was attacking US troops in Syria.
How could President Biden authorize American air strikes against militias backed by the IRGC, and then promptly weaken sanctions on the very organization funding these attacks?
And on this note: why would Iran attack American troops in Syria with the deal now (finally) so close to being finalized?
One interpretation is that the IRGC establishment/hardliners want to spoil the deal.
(side note: and not only for the geostrategic national interests - in many ways, the IRGC leadership benefits from its current FTO designation/status: since it is much easier to launder and extract (for personal use) significant amounts of money when engaged in corrupt/underground activities such as illicitly selling oil to fund foreign operations. Contrast this with the previous state of affairs - where IRGC had to rely on the official state budget only - which entails stricter transparency measures - where more obstacles had to be overcome for successful corruption to take place)
Under this scenario, these recent attacks in Syria should be seen as the continuation of the previous campaign that involved assassination attempts on American soil: deliberate engagement in the type of conduct that raises the political cost for the Biden admin to enter a deal with the Ayatollah regime.
So then, this is a plausible theory that cannot be discounted.
But there are also three major strategic reasons for why Iran would engage in these attacks:
1) Maintain pressure on the US, and prevent American dominance in the Syrian theatre - especially at the time when Russia is withdrawing troops to supply its operations in Ukraine: preventing Washington from successfully exploiting an increasing hard power vacuum in Syria is a powerful incentive for Tehran.
2) Signaling resolve and lack of desperation in the JCPOA negotiations.
Tehran does not want Washington to make dangerous inferences from its recent ‘‘concessions’’ - it wants to demonstrate willingness to escalate and spoil the deal: dissuading American diplomats from pushing for more.
3) Signaling to Gulf States: we shall remain active in the region, and this deal will not blunt our ambitions.
Essentially, this is the message to Arab Sheikhs: keep on hedging your bets and do not fall under the Israeli spell.
Russia will benefit significantly - Ukraine under threat.
If this terrible, weaker deal (with shorter sunset clauses) is about to happen, the least that the American diplomats must do is to add provisions that would (ideally) prevent, or (at the bare minimum) minimize Russia’s likely gains from the nuclear deal.
Russia is planning to use Iran as a backdoor - to evade international Ukraine-related sanctions.
In the recent months, a number of trade, finance and energy officials from Tehran and Moscow have met and exchanged tactical knowhow on sanctions evasion.
These cables have long raised alarms about Iran’s support for Russia - and how Russian officials are frequently in Tehran to study for their “PhDs” in sanctions evasion.
And this evasion will become all the more easier with the JCPOA back in place: the sanctions, hitherto imposed on the major Iranian banks and companies, would now be lifted - Russians would then be able to use these entities as intermediaries to evade sanctions.
In addition, with Iranian oil back in the markets, Tehran could offer an even more lucrative deal: buying Russian crude (and receiving their deliveries in the Caspian Sea) and then selling/shipping their own crude (on behalf of Moscow) via the Persian Gulf.
Iran gets to make additional commission and Russia keeps selling its crude at a minor discount.
And then there are other, more ‘‘legitimate’’ ways Russia will benefit: the previous JCPOA for example, allowed Russia and Iran to sign a $10 billion contract for the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran (assigning Russia the role of a custodian for Iran’s nuclear material, and a contracted supplier at other nuclear sites).
All of these, (with crude oil sales being the priority) must be tackled by American policymakers: they must make it clear that Iran will face additional sanctions (separate from the JCPOA) if/when they are caught helping Russians with the evasion of Ukraine-related sanctions.
Tehran must be informed that no matter what the nuclear/JCPOA states, and no matter what reliefs they will get, there will be an : a) additional, b) separate, and c) high cost for aiding & abetting Moscow in the evasion of Ukraine-related sanctions.
Washington’s desire to reinstate the JCPOA/nuclear deal must not lead to major unintended costs of harming Ukraine in its war with Russia.