Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, Week 2 of the Kursk Invasion.
Ukraine continues to gain and Putin calls Kyiv’s bluff - for now.
Two weeks into the invasion of Kursk, Ukraine is 1) now in control of more than 400 square miles of Russian territory, 2) has taken over a number of towns like Sudzha, and 3) has conducted precision strikes against a strategic bridge to cut off Russia’s ability to resupply its forward troops and delay the arrival of new reinforcements.
To be clear, these are some incredible accomplishments against a nuclear superpower and a country with conventional military capabilities (both in terms of quantity and quality) coming second or third only after the US/China.
In last week’s cables, we discussed a number of tactical and strategic gains sought by Ukraine.
To recap, here they are:
1) Wiping out Khalino air base.
Thus far, not achieved and not close to being achieved.
2) Dividing & redirecting Russian resources
Thus far, Putin has refused to play along and redirect resources from Donbas - more on that later below.
3) Attrition and forcing high value assets into the open.
Yes, this is going well and not only has Ukraine destroyed a number of high value targets, they have also wiped out a number of politically sensitive targets too - the column decimated by precision fires from HIMARS was apparently carrying fresh recruits (and according to some reports even fresh-faced conscripts).
4) Sowing discord and causing low-morale within the Russian military ranks.
This has started to happen: Rumors of Gerasimov being in the doghouse have intensified and a lot of blame game is also taking place.
(side note: Chechen fighters of the “Akhmat” unit have been accused of abandoning their posts in the face of Ukraine’s original assault at the border. This is yet another significant blow to the Chechen dictator Ramzan Kadyrov’s reputation. It is important to remember that there is an anti-Kadyrov Chechen government in exile and that there are Chechen volunteer battalions fighting for Ukraine since 2014 - to this very day. They are gathering valuable battlefield experience and would one day challenge the Kadyrov regime at the most opportune time.)
5) Display flexibility of Putin’s ‘‘red lines’’.
This has been perhaps the most notable strategic gain: the excessive worry of crossing Moscow’s red lines has stunted Ukraine’s capability in this war: it led to years of drip drip drip style too little and too late of military aid to fight back against Russia.
And the most recent assault has now demonstrated that Putin is actually pretty flexible with his ‘‘red lines’’ and that the escalation threats have been overblown all along.
And there are tentative indications that this is now translating into concrete policy wins: the Biden administration is now considering providing Ukraine with long-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) - and these would significantly enhance Kyiv’s military capacity.
Ukraine has been lobbying US officials and lawmakers to send these powerful missiles for some time now.
The JASSMs carry a 1,000 pound warhead and are capable of striking targets over 230 miles away.
The F-16 jets donated by European countries are currently limited by the risk of being shot down near Russian lines - having JASSMs in Ukraine’s arsenal would allow these jets to engage targets from a safer distance.
So if the Biden admin goes through with this, then Ukraine will get another major capability boost on the battlefield.
And there is no reason why Ukraine should not receive such a boost - ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles are both of similar range.
So in reality, this is not even an escalation - but it is perceived as such, and so Ukraine successfully bending Putin’s ‘‘red lines’’ will lead to favorable strategic outcomes.
6) Reverse national morale trends.
This has been an outright success - Ukrainians are elated about the Kursk operation, and on the other side, the Russian social media is starting to feature some major discontent.
7) Create threats to Putin’s regime.
As previously discussed, this could take the form of a disgruntled military leader/general/s organizing a revolt against the Putin regime - similar to the Prigozhin uprising.
This may or may not be assisted by a popular uprising.
For now, this is still a remote possibility, but negative press compounds fast, and over the past week Russia lost a medium-sized town in the region, and more than 300k citizens have been evacuated.
This cannot go on without creating a negative impact to Putin’s popularity, prestige and reputation for being a ‘‘protector’’ autocrat.
Further observations.
Now that the Kursk incursion is finishing its second week, there are additional observations and tentative inferences that we can draw:
1) CSTO was proven to be a complete farce.
The Russian version of NATO - the Collective Security Treaty Organization was once again proven to be a totally farcical institution.
Where are the other members of the CSTO (Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan)?
Why is no one expressing ‘‘concerns’’ about Ukrainian incursion into Russia?
It is of course true that Putin hasn’t notified other CSTO members about Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk.
This is because doing so: 1) Is totally unbecoming for a superpower (imagine Russia asking help from Armenia and Tajikistan), and 2) Would mean that Putin was tacitly agreeing that this was in fact an invasion - something that he is denying to this day (choosing to frame it as a terrorist/sabotage act-more on that later below).
But no other country (even Belarus) volunteered to send resources to help with the evacuation - let alone troops to fight.
The truth is that this is a fake and dying organization - where no country sees any benefit.
Most of the members would want to leave it - like Armenia announced in June.
Many are still too worried about the outcome of the war in Ukraine and don’t want to rock the boat too much.
But the truth is that this is a defunct organization with zero value to its members.
A facade that grants Russia an excuse to request access/bases in the member states.
(side note: the only possible exception that members don’t see any benefit is perhaps Tajikistan - they do receive some minimal military hardware to patrol their border with Afghanistan. But even then, one could argue that Russia would do this in any case since it is in Moscow’s interests to prevent terrorists freely entering Central Asia from Afghanistan.)
2) Ukraine reminded the world that it can organize and execute complex maneuver warfare: and do so with civility.
And not only that, its conduct in Kursk has been exemplary - no indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas - and reliance on precision warfare instead.
In addition, those civilians that have requested help have received it promptly, and many Russians choose to accept Ukrainian offers to evacuate into Sumy in Ukraine.
Contrast this with how Russia has been taking over cities: relentless destruction of all civilian infrastructure like in Bakhmut and Avdiivka - creating a living hell for noncombatants.
3) Those advocating for ‘‘freezing’’ of the war have gone quiet.
Since the very outset of this war, a lot of public figures, politicians, pundits and analysts have advocated for an immediate ceasefire and ‘‘talks’’.
But when it was Russia on the offensive, no one was worried about freezing Moscow’s gains in time and granting 17% of Ukraine to Russia.
Now that Ukraine is in Kursk however, not many people are arguing for a similar tactic: no one is seriously calling for an ‘‘immediate ceasefire and armistice’’.
How could they?
For that would imply that a portion of Kursk was falling into Ukrainian hands.
Crickets.
Instead, those that have always supported Ukraine are now even more confident in advocating their position.
The sheer display of competence and daring by the Ukrainian military have certainly reinvigorated support in Washington: there is now growing support for another supplemental to fund Ukraine.
Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) are preparing to push for a new defense spending bill for Ukraine when Congress returns next month.
After meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Blumenthal and Graham promised to "fight for another supplemental [aid package] before the end of the calendar year."
The senators hope that Ukraine’s surprise offensive in Russia’s Kursk region will help garner more congressional support for additional military aid.
They are probably correct in this estimation.
Risks remain and Putin refuses to divide his resources.
Last week, we also discussed a range of probable risks that flow naturally from Ukraine’s decision to invade the Kursk region of Russia.
To recap, these are that 1) Ukraine’s army in Kursk could be wiped out if Putin decided to redirect major firepower (especially if these were the most experienced fighters in Donbas), 2) Russia could reconsider potential use of tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine (the lowest probability risk), and 3) This was a card that Ukraine could realistically play once, and that if the incursion was to fail, all of that effort and expenditure of resources would be in exchange for a short-lived buzz - with little strategic gains to show.
(side note: not to mention that Ukraine’s morale gains would quickly reverse as well).
For now, the risk of a nuclear escalation remains very low.
Not only is Putin nowhere near pulling that card (doing so would necessitate an admission that Russia is in fact facing an existential threat) but Moscow is actively downplaying the gravity of the situation: the Kremlin’s website aims to display a ‘‘business as usual” vibe - reporting on how Putin is not distracted from other global roles and can even find some time to host negotiators from Palestine..
But precisely because Putin is not declaring an existential threat (or even calling a major national mobilization) he is also creating a convenient excuse not to deploy the regular army to confront Ukraine.
Instead of announcing redeployment of troops from Donbas, Putin has directed FSB and National Guard resources to contain this ‘‘terrorist act’’.
This doesn’t mean however that Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region are safe from annihilation.
On the contrary, Russia is gradually upping the intensity and Ukraine will likely have a major army to deal with very soon.
And contrary to what some over-hyped pundits may claim, Ukraine’s forward momentum is in fact limited by laws of gravity.
That is, even if it didn’t face a major army anytime soon, they simply don’t have 1) enough troops to capture and effectively control the whole region and 2) secure and extend their supply lines to enable a deeper incursion into Kursk.
Indeed, the very fact that they are now blowing up bridges and other core infrastructure leading to Kursk implies that they themselves are not planning to use these assets (to enable their own forward movement) anytime soon.
In other words, Ukrainian troops are likely focusing on consolidation, and time is simply not on their side - the longer this drags on the more Russia will throw at them.
Against this background, Putin also refused to redirect troops from Donbas - he called Ukraine’s bluff and maintained the same intensity in Donbas.
This now means that Russian troops are unfortunately advancing and securing further gains - the city of Pokrovsk (a crucial logistical hub) is now within their reach.
There is at least one major way where Ukraine’s gambit can still pay off however: if the West was to increase funding and delivery of weapons and ammo to Ukraine.
This could potentially help to secure Ukrainian gains in Kursk whilst stopping the onslaught in Donbas.
And with that, Ukraine would secure a new and far more favorable status quo - a far better hand than the one it had in July.