Ukraine War Updates.
1) Zaporizhia and Bakhmut frontlines unchanged.
Meanwhile and in a first for Ukraine, Russia’s power grid was targeted by Ukrainian drones.
We all remember how in the fall and winter of 2022, it was Russia that paralyzed Ukraine’s power grid and other core civilian infrastructure.
This seems to be a preemptive Ukrainian attack to create at least some deterrence against the repeat of last year’s strategy.
Message to Putin is that Ukraine is now willing to play equally dirty.
It is unclear whether this will have the desired effect.
On the one one hand, one could argue that civilian disruption is worse for Putin than for Zelenskyy - Ukrainians are fully mobilized to fight a total war, and are used to such disruptions.
For Putin however, any evidence of weakness and inability to shield his own citizens from a ‘‘special military operation’’ that is supposed to be fought exclusively on Ukrainian territory, should in theory create a bigger headache - it is a bigger political hit.
But then again, the Kremlin will now have a stronger argument for wider mobilization of troops.
Counter to that of course is simple: Putin was going to do that anyway (as he is doing now - having signed a military decree for the autumn, which calls 130,000 citizens into mandatory service), so better to hit him and cause some political damage in the meantime.
2) Wagner to return to Ukraine.
With Prigozhin gone, it appears like Putin is willing to send the Wagner mercenaries back to Ukraine - with Andrei Troshev appointed as the new commander.
At this point, it is however unclear if Wagner retains even a fraction of personnel or morale of the original Wagner under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitriy Utkin.
3) EU nations continue to step up for the long-haul.
The defense ministers of the UK and France held a meeting with their Ukrainian counterpart.
And the French minister discussed the possibility of a joint production of weapons in Ukraine.
In addition, seven EU states have ordered 155mm artillery rounds for Ukraine under contracts negotiated by the European Defence Agency.
Important signaling of staying power and resolve - especially at a time when news from Washington was rather embarrassing.
4) Shutdown debate - another Putin win.
In cables from last week, we discussed how the US and its allies were busy confirming Putin’s theory of war for him: that all he needs to do is outlast the West’s willingness to support Ukraine (which under certain circumstances may mean waiting only until the end of the 2024 Presidential elections).
This week’s debacle of the GOP’s Putin fanboy caucus dragging its feet on funding for Ukraine, and almost causing a Federal shutdown was yet another evidence in favor of the dominant narrative in Putin’s head.
Funding for Ukraine will now need a separate vote, and although it will almost certainly pass, that is not the most important point here.
It is rather this: it is becoming ever more politically acceptable to challenge funding for Ukraine.
At the very minimum, it is no longer politically costly to do even at the risk of shutting down the government - there is a reason for why such a spectacle did not take place last year.
The Biden admin must do a better job in presenting a pragmatic, national-security/national interest-based argument in favor of a continuous support for Ukraine.
It must argue with full confidence that the cost to the security and prosperity of Americans will be much higher if Russia is allowed to succeed in Ukraine.
Not only will this be a win for (now ever more encouraged to try its own luck in Taiwan) China, but we would essentially return to a pre-WWII era where wars and humanitarian/refugee crises will become more common, and where smaller and medium-sized states will be driven to militarize and seek nuclear shields.
The cost (in both blood and treasury) to Americans in dealing with such an unstable world will be much higher than the current level of US support at mere 0.18% of GDP and with no American troops on the ground.
Karabakh war Q&A.
A lot of readers have emailed asking a number of interconnected questions on the now concluded Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
Questions revolve around causes and dynamics of this conflict, lessons learned, and what (if anything) should the West do going forward.
There a number of observations that we can make, but before all that, a brief overview/backgrounder (without delving too much into history):
Karabakh was an Azeri khanate, and populated by ethnic Azeris for most of its modern history.
That was the case until a deliberate resettlement of Armenians into Karabakh by the Russian empire (especially after the second Russo-Iranian war of 1825-1826).
But this was not enough to alter the ultimate characteristic of this territory, and Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan in 1918 - when three Transcaucasian states of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan had first gained their independence at the end of WWI.
Karabakh was reconfirmed as part of Azerbaijan in 1921 - when all three Transcaucasian states were forced into the Soviet Union.
It remained as part of Soviet Azerbaijan until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The entire world recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan as soon as the three Transcaucasian states once again regained their independence following the fall of the Soviet Union.
But separatist Armenian forces were not happy with this outcome and fought a bitter war (the first Karabakh war) to break away from Azerbaijan.
They had achieved this outcome (to a large extent, with military aid from Russia) and had thereafter proceeded to squat on those territories for the next three decades.
It is important to note that the US, EU, the international community at large had all refused to recognize separatist claims to these territories - indeed, there have been four separate UN resolutions in favor of Azerbaijan - calling for the end of illegal occupation and a withdrawal of Armenian militias/separatist forces.
But over the past three decades, Armenia itself protected and armed the unrecognized “Nagorno-Karabakh” republic.
That was until 2020 - when Azerbaijan inflicted a major military defeat on Armenia in a war that lasted mere 44 days.
(side note: here is a good analysis and discussion of this war by the IISS)
Armenia was saved from a total defeat (and a full return of territories to Azerbaijan) by a last minute intervention from Russia in November 2020 - Moscow brokered a tenuous ceasefire and sent its ‘‘peacekeepers’' to prevent the conflict from being fully resolved with Azerbaijan imposing its sovereignty on reclaimed lands.
By this point, most of Karabakh was already reclaimed, but crucially, Khankendi - the capital of the self-proclaimed separatist republic - and the few towns surrounding it, were still controlled by the Armenian militias.
The third, and final Karabakh war.
On September 19, Azerbaijan launched an ‘‘anti-terrorist’’ operation to get rid of the remaining separatist forces and militias squatting on its internationally recognized lands.
This is crucial, since this was not an attack on Armenia or an invasion - a country cannot invade its own internationally recognized lands - it can only liberate them.
(side note: just like we would not call Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Donbas an “invasion”)
Armenia’s PM Pashinyan was wise enough (more on that later below) to see the futility of defending the territory and prolonging the war - so he did not.
(side note: and besides, Nikol Pashinyan was on the record offering to recognize Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan during the “Brussels” negotiations brokered by the US and EU - it would have been untenable to fight yet another war in support of an unsustainable political position - effectively amounting to a complete u-turn.)
As a result, the forces defending the Nagorno-Karabakh realized (after brief initial clashes) that they had zero prospect of putting forward a successful military resistance, and thus agreed to surrender.
And with that, the third Karabakh war was over within 24hrs - now, with a definitive victory for Azerbaijan.
The militias have given up their arms, and the pseudo-state of “Nagorno-Karabakh” has been dissolved and will cease to exist from January 1, 2024.
Early lessons and observations.
1) Military force can resolve international disputes where diplomacy has failed.
That is, as long as the political objectives sought by the party deploying the force are not in violation of international law.
Azerbaijan will not face sanctions (at least not for this specific military operation) from the US, G7 or the EU.
Why not? Simply because what they did was proper under international law.
All countries recognized Karabakh as Azeri territory and if there is one occasion where you can use force, it is surely in establishing sovereignty and monopoly of state violence over your own territory.
2) This is good news for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
The principle that illegal militias and separatist forces cannot establish their own states in violation of the international law, is good news for the US-led rules-based international order: this was a good reminder that we no longer live in a savage brute-power world (that Russia is trying to restore), and that you cannot go around carving ethnic enclaves and forming illegal militias as your heart desires - causing humanitarian crises and displacement and chaos in the meantime.
But beyond that, this is great news for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova - all three are facing their own breakaway regions - and in all three cases (as it was the case in Karabakh - at least until the very last moment) Russia is behind these mini-states that is unrecognized by wider international community (Donetsk/Luhansk mini-republics in the case of Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia, and Transnistria for Moldova).
That Karabakh was rightfully reclaimed by Azerbaijan after three decades of frozen conflict and numerous wars, is a reminder to these mini-states that their position is untenable and sooner or later (hopefully, much sooner in the case of Ukraine) they will be reincorporated into their original states.
This is also a warning against future adventurism - for any other wannabe breakaway region willing to play Putin’s games.
For example, there has been some worrying Kremlin rhetoric around rights of ‘‘ethnic Russians” in Northern Kazakhstan.
The Karabakh case study is an important warning against complicity in such ultimately futile plans.
(side note: it is almost inconceivable at this point that something like that could happen in Kazakhstan - but never say never with Russia: especially now that Kazakhstan is taking a clearer decisive stance against Moscow - with their President promising not to help Russia evade Western sanctions)
3) There has not been any ‘‘ethnic cleansing” - such rhetoric is harmful for regional normalization and ultimate peace.
One has to give credit where it is due - Armenian diaspora is very effective in creating favorable narratives.
The allegations of ‘‘ethnic cleansing” in Karabakh were widely accepted as a given by the Western media and even many politicians.
But ethnic cleansing at such a scale and in a territory full of EU observers should have left some clues - so then, where are they?
In fact, the only thing we can see from reporters on the ground is how tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians have packed their bags and chose to leave their homes and return to Armenia.
Now, if you have grown up in Karabakh - especially if you are a child - this is very sad.
This is terrible, and you obviously don’t care about higher principles of national sovereignty or international law.
You have grown up in territories that you are now leaving behind.
This deserves some sympathy.
But, let’s not forget that this was also the case for: 1) nearly a million (10x of the current number of Armenians leaving the enclave) Azeris who were forced to leave Karabakh and neighboring districts (also occupied by Armenia) in early 90s, 2) Ethnic Armenians don’t have to leave - they are choosing to leave.
Azerbaijani government has offered citizenship and a right to stay for Armenians in Karabakh.
Now, it is entirely understandable if many of them choose to leave and return to Armenia.
But, and this is crucial, it is a choice - maybe not a truly free choice (especially in the context of uncertainty and fear) but a choice nevertheless.
What ethnic cleansing is not however, is thousands of Armenians packing their bags and driving their cars back to Armenia - with no interference or objection or harm caused by Azeri forces.
In a land where 120k ethnic Armenians have lived, not a single incident of civilian atrocities has been reported by any of the major media/news organizations currently on the ground.
Not only that, senior US officials have traveled both to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Karabakh has EU observers on the ground: not one of these officials has described any evidence of harm or violence directed at civilians.
And civilians aside, even fighters of the Karabakh’s illegal militia did not face any repercussions after agreeing to lay down their arms.
Thousands of Armenian fighters have been granted an amnesty - only a few warlords with a tarnished past and history of war crimes have been detained by the Azeri government.
So then in a context where even militia fighters get a pass, it is simply uncredible to argue that ethnic Armenians have been subjected to ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’.
Even Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan disputed such claims early on - he only reversed his course after two weeks of (Russia-backed) protests against him and accusations of treason.
It is somewhat understandable that Pashinyan would want to regain some political capital and align with the dominant narrative advanced by the Armenian diaspora, but this is shortsighted.
Azerbaijani government has announced its full recognition of Armenia’s sovereignty over its own territories - there is no danger of further war or invasion.
There is, on the contrary, a chance to arrive at a durable peace and transform the region.
Armenia has an opportunity to fully normalize its relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, opening its borders to both and trading and dealing with both as a proper neighbor: this would also remove the need to rely solely on Russia.
Which leads us to..
4) Russia is interested in Pashinyan’s removal.
Moscow has openly threatened Armenia against choosing the path of Western integration, and has warned against membership of the International Criminal Court - which would oblige Armenia to execute an arrest warrant against Putin - in the unlikely event that he would ever visit the country.
Naturally, a spectacle of Armenia - still a CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization - Moscow’s meaningless and impotent alternative to NATO) ally of Russia, taking on such obligations is unacceptable to Moscow.
It is important to note that Nikol Pashinyan came into power in 2018 - as a result of peaceful protests that had removed his predecessor President Serzh Sarkisyan, - a Kremlin ally and a first Karabakh war criminal...
Since the early days, Pashinyan did not have a good relationship with Putin - who missed his old war criminal pal.
Pashinyan is truly a tragic figure - a man who appears to have good intentions for his nation, though one with erratic personality and a track record of poor political judgement.
The second Karabakh war in 2020 (that lasted mere 44 days and ended with a humiliating defeat for Armenia) was triggered at least in part by his poor judgement.
Naturally, the fundamentals matter more, but the proximate cause for the war was Armenia’s decision to launch an artillery barrage against Azerbaijan (targeting a border town outside of Karabakh) in July of 2020.
This resulted in the death of a well-liked Azerbaijani General Polad Hashimov.
Tens of thousands of Azeri citizens were enraged and stormed the parliament of Azerbaijan in a protest against a lack of adequate military response - the people of Azerbaijan were in the streets demanding war.
(side note: it appears that this was not enough of a hint for Armenia’s PM to backtrack - since a mere month after this incident, Pashinyan awarded the soldiers who have killed the Azeri general)
It didn’t take long - the war started in September 2020 - only two months after this incident.
Putin was happy to see Armenia defeated in 2020 (and since Armenia itself was never under attack, Russia (as a CSTO ally) did not have to intervene in its defense) before stepping in at the last minute to prevent a total humiliation.
He did not do so this time around.
Once again, and since a) Azerbaijan maintained its policy of not attacking Armenia proper in the third Karabakh war, and b) Ukraine is taking its toll, Putin decided to let Armenian forces in Karabakh face a total defeat - once and for all.
(side note: Pashinyan’s decision to hold joint military drills with the US did not help either - too little, too late, and too irrelevant - since once again, Armenia itself was not under attack and Washington was obviously not going to help Armenia defend a territory that it recognized as part of Azerbaijan.)
In return, he hopes that Armenian people will rise up in protest against Pashinyan’s pathetic wartime leadership and remove him by force.
Naturally, the pro-Kremlin factions are leading this charge.
But unlike in 2020, Pashinyan did not commit another strategic error in trying to fight a third Karabakh war (it was always futile - what took 44 days back in 2020 would have taken half that time - if even that).
And instead of tying Armenia’s future to unsustainable and illegitimate political goals of establishing a breakaway state in Karabakh, Pashinyan decided to give up such futile aspirations - hoping to end this conflict once and for all.
Indeed, it certainly appears like there is no reason for any future wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
(side note: this is why false accusations of ethnic cleansing are so damaging - it will reignite hatred and drag out the normalization of Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey)
But that does not mean that Pashinyan himself will be there to oversee this normalization.
Which leads us to
5) What is there for the West to do?
Once again, let’s start with what the West should not do: adopt the language used by the Armenian diaspora and advance false claims of ethnic cleansing.
(side note: and indeed, thus far, the Biden admin and allies in Europe have rightly refused to use these terms)
Such nonsense will not be based on facts and will harm the West’s credibility when real crimes against civilians take place elsewhere (like in Ukraine).
People living in hitherto occupied lands and then choosing to turn down offers of Azerbaijani citizenship in favor of returning back to Armenia is not an instance of ethnic cleansing.
However, this does not mean that the West should sit and observe passively.
Whether they remain in Azerbaijan (approximately a third of 120k Karabakh Armenians still do) or go back to Armenia (more than 85k thus far), humanitarian aid and assistance in the reconstruction will be needed.
This is an opportunity to heal the wounds of war and wean off both countries away from Russia’s sphere of influence.
The US should provide political support for Pashinyan to remain in power - the alternative is a forceful removal, where the most likely outcome is that a pro-Kremlin warlord with a revenge-driven agenda comes into power in Armenia: that will not look good for the peaceful future of the region.
The US should also support Azerbaijan in its attempt to get rid of Russian ‘‘peacekeepers’’.
Now that the war is over, and the militias have given up their arms, there is no objective reason for Russian forces to remain in Azerbaijan.
If the goal is to protect Armenian civilians from future potential abuse, that can be achieved by increasing the number of observers from the UN/EU - no need for Putin’s army to linger in Caucasus for much longer.
The war is over, and there is now an opportunity to establish a lasting peace and pull 2/3 Caucasus countries from Russia’s orbit.
That will leave Georgia - but that is a whole ‘nother story.
New Slovak leader, pro-Russia, to end aid to Ukraine. Per report.