Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war, nuclear use leaks: Russia preparing for Chinese invasion.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Russia is resorting to increasingly desperate recruitment ploys.
India uncovered a human trafficking scheme sending men to Russia - where they were forced to fight in Ukraine.
Around 35 men were deceived, with at least two confirmed deaths.
The traffickers used local agents and social media to lure victims with promises of job opportunities and education.
This is a very high-risk and low-reward tactic for Russia.
The costs are way too high to justify the meagre returns of (at the very best scenario) several hundred, duped, and unmotivated Indian soldiers trapped and trafficked to fight in Ukraine.
The very fact that Russia is willing to take this risk suggests Putin’s ruthless focus on further rapid advancement at any cost.
And unfortunately, further advancement might come easier - the recently lost Avdiivka was a well-defended city, with a lot of prep work going back 10 years (to the start date of the original conflict in 2014).
2) The EU Support for Ukraine.
Individual member states continue to step up: The Czech Republic is the latest example here.
Czech leadership had initiated efforts to support Ukraine by raising funds to purchase ammunition.
This initiative has already secured enough money for the first batch of 300,000 artillery shells (earlier reports of 800,000 shells turned out to be erroneous).
In addition, and for the first time ever, The EU has presented a defense industrial strategy and a subsidy program, finally signaling a definitive shift towards prioritizing defense.
(side note: this will need further unpacking as early guidance and results come in).
3) Turkey's pro-Ukraine involvement intensifies.
From the very outset of the Ukraine war, Turkey has been one of the most steadfast allies of Ukraine.
Back when most NATO countries were hesitating to provide hardware of any significance (and when Germany promised to send helmets..) Turkey provided TB2 drones that (alongside American Javelins and Stingers and British/Swedish NLAWs) proved pivotal in the early stages of the invasion.
Later on, Turkish mine-resistant armored vehicles played a crucial role in propping up Ukrainian infantry assault units.
In addition, Turkey’s diligent application of the Montreux convention (on Bosphorus straits that connect Black and Mediterranean seas) trapped Russia’s navy in the Black Sea and precluded Syria-based Russian ships from being able to replenish Russia’s naval strength in the Black Sea basin.
By curtailing Russian naval vessels' use of Istanbul's Bosphorus waterway, Turkey has effectively utilized its geographical and legal leverage to impact Russia's military flexibility, demonstrating a significant form of indirect military support to Ukraine.
And now, in his visit to Turkey to meet Erdogan, President Zelenskyy announced that Turkey was building corvettes for Ukraine.
He then personally visited the specific shipyards to highlight the progress.
All of this is great news not only for Ukraine, but also for NATO at large.
Turkey had approved both Sweden and Finland, is buying $23bn worth of upgraded F-16s and increasing its role in propping up Ukraine.
All of these will make it harder for Putin to accomplish his long-term goal of pulling Turkey away from the Western orbit: Ankara is set on the course back to where its long-term strategic interests lie: NATO and the EU.
Russia’s response to Nuclear files reaffirms tensions with China.
As discussed in the previous post, the Financial Times had recently shared documents that outline Russia’s nuclear use doctrine in the 2008-2014 period.
These documents were shown to the FT by ‘‘western sources’’.
Given the level of granular detail involved in the docs, it is likely that the source of the documents is a Russian official working for the Western intel agencies.
The documents shared with the FT include 29 secret Russian military files created between 2008-2014.
The documents present war-gaming scenarios for senior Naval officers and discuss the doctrinal and operational principles for the use of nuclear weapons.
And what are these triggers?
There are many, and they do in fact range in severity and strategic impact: “enemy landing on Russian territory, the defeat of units responsible for securing border areas, or an imminent enemy attack using conventional weapons…destruction of 20 percent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines, 30 percent of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, three or more cruisers, three airfields, or a simultaneous hit on main and reserve coastal command centres.”
The triggers are summarized as such: where a combination of events could “irrevocably lead to their (Russian military’s) failure to stop major enemy aggression” then the use of tactical nuclear weapons becomes a doctrinal possibility.
Two things to note here:
1) These are guidelines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
So it is not that Russia would consider launching a strategic ICBM after losing a few cruisers.
With that said however, clearly, the tactical nuclear weapons of today yield far more significant firepower than those deployed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
2) The documents are dated: they belong to the 2008-2014 era, and current thresholds may be higher or lower.
But if one had to bet, the current thresholds are most likely higher.
Given how much damage Ukraine has inflicted upon Russia’s navy and air force, it is unlikely that triggers like “destruction of three or more cruisers” or “three airfields” are still up there as possible triggers..
Impact on Russia - China relations.
We have discussed previously, how given the timing of these leaks (so soon after Macron’s statement on not ruling out the French ‘‘ground troops’’ in Ukraine) there was a realistic possibility that the “western sources” chose the timing of these leaks to warn against escalation with Russia: that the Kremlin has a very low threshold for nuclear escalation, and so, even discussing the ‘‘ground troops” should be avoided..
But there is of course another side to this: a possible impact of this leak is to strain Moscow’s relations with Beijing.
This does not mean that creating a wedge between Russia and Moscow was the main goal here (once again, it was probably done to rebuff Macron) but considering that the content of the documents highlights Russia’s worry about/and preparation for a possible Chinese invasion, souring Moscow-Beijing relations are at least a probable incidental side-effect.
Specifically, the leaked documents show how Russia’s Eastern Military district was rehearsing multiple scenarios depicting a Chinese invasion.
For example: one exercise (found in the leaked documents) focused on a hypothetical attack on the “Northern Federation” (Russia) ‘‘from the South’’ (China) - and there is a guide on how a tactical nuclear strike could stop the South from being able to advance with a second wave of invading forces: “The order has been given by the commander-in-chief . . . to use nuclear weapons . . . in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon units and the South threatens to attack further in the direction of the main strike.”
Naturally, a lot has changed since these documents were produced.
Russia and China are genuinely much closer than in the 2008-2014 era.
Never mind the empty rhetoric of ‘‘no limits’’ partnership, the actual conduct points to changing dynamics.
Specifically, Russia is increasingly willing to cooperate with China in areas of national security that are very sensitive indeed.
For example, Russia and China agreed to cooperate in the development of a ballistic missile early warning system.
If Moscow viewed China as a pressing threat, then sharing such a sensitive capability would have been out of question - this is because ballistic missiles will always remain the primary delivery mechanism for Russian nukes, and blunting their deterrence capability by sharing tech on how to warn against them would be in direct contradiction to Russia’s security interests.
With that said however, it is also true that China is nowhere near a military ally that Russia could ever rely upon fully.
The pair don’t enjoy the level of trust and openness typical of NATO allies.
What is a feature for NATO, would be an anomaly for Russia and China.
A good example of this is China’s continuous (and very recent) attempts to convert Russian scientists into Chinese spies.
Several of these scientists have already been arrested and imprisoned for their alleged cooperation with China.
Such incidents are simply inconceivable within NATO - a true military alliance.
If British spies were to do something similar in Poland, the repercussions would be monumental - the entire integrity of the alliance would come under threat.
But a similar incident didn’t cause a major rupture between Russia and China.
Why?
Because there is a tacit understanding between Putin and Xi that this is a partnership of convenience.
Putin especially realizes quite well how China is happy to exercise its leverage over Russia - and be ruthless about it (his comments on Chinese being ‘‘tough’’ negotiators in energy deals was a good signal of his state of mind).
(side note: Back in June and November of 2023, Russia also held exercises for the nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in the two regions bordering China. Is that a signal also? Potentially.. but if it is a signal, it is more likely to be a signal that Russia is not fully bought into the ‘‘alliance’’ narrative with China and demands stronger show of goodwill (which would indeed be a prudent signal) - as opposed to a genuine worry about Chinese threat anytime soon. There were probably some practical elements to the choice of that location as well: Ukraine is increasingly successful in penetrating deep into Western Ukraine, and avoiding sabotage/interference during such exercises is clearly important).
Diplomatic statements around leaks reveal Russia’s continuous dissatisfaction.
The asymmetry in reaction to these leaks was rather telling.
China’s Foreign Ministry denied that there would be any grounds for Moscow to be suspicious: “The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia has legally established the concept of eternal friendship and non-enmity between the two countries… The ‘threat theory’ had no market in China and Russia” said the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson.
But this rush to dismiss any evidence of a rift was not reciprocated by the Russian side.
Normally, we would have expected the Kremlin to reiterate how strong the China-Russia relations really were.
And yet, they did not..
Instead, the Kremlin Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitriy Peskov decided to focus on the veracity of the documents in lieu of addressing the most intriguing part of the leaks: “The main thing is that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is absolutely transparent and is spelled out in the doctrine. As for the documents mentioned, we strongly doubt their authenticity.”
Leaving aside the inherent contradiction of this statement (if they do spell out the doctrine accurately, then why even bother challenging their authenticity?), it is notable what the statement does not do - it does not challenge the underlying narrative that an attack from China is something that Russia is actively concerned about.
Naturally, it is normal and expected for Russia to plan for such an attack - as the common Bismarck maxim states, capacity is more important than intent: so not preparing for such an attack would be tantamount to gross negligence.
But that preparation should not in theory stop Peskov from reiterating that Russia and China are friends.
In other words, Russia did not reciprocate Chinese diplomacy here: there was no public affirmation that the ‘threat theory’ truly had no room in Russia - China relations.
And why is that?
Well it goes back to Putin’s awareness of the changing power dynamic: he realizes that Russia is now significantly more dependent on China.
In 2023, trade between Russia and China reached a new record high, totaling $240 billion, marking a 26.3% increase from the previous year.
When it comes to oil and gas exports - Russia’s main source of revenue to fund the war - around half of Russia's oil and petroleum exports in 2023, were shipped to China, highlighting the deepening Russian dependence on one key buyer.
China in turn, does not act as an ally, and forces Russia to sell its crude at a significant discount rate.
In the meantime, Beijing also continues to refuse to play a more direct, active role in propping up Russia.
Unlike North Korea or Iran, China is thus far avoiding a blatant direct armament campaign, and limits its aid to dual-use technology only - and these by their very definition are not going to have a similarly consequential impact as millions of shells or missiles would have.
In contrast (according to South Korean intel services), since July of 2023, North Korea shipped 6,700 containers to Russia - filled with millions of munitions.
And those tracked containers alone are capable of carrying more than 3 million 152mm artillery shells.
(side note: luckily, (and due to lack of raw materials and supplies) the North Korean factories operate at only 30% capacity.)
With all that said then, Russia’s reluctance to rush into dismissing any signs of strain in relations with China, could be interpreted as its desire to send a message: we are friends, but not that friendly..you’ve got to step it up.
What does that mean in policy terms for the West - we have looked at this before, and will continue to analyze specific policies in the future, but suffice it to say that the current situation and level of aloof partnership between China and Russia, is probably the most realistically achievable state of affairs in the near term.
The status quo is largely good enough.
Fundamentals matter: the two countries will not be true allies any time soon, but the opposite is also true - the idea of creating an effective wedge between Beijing and Moscow is also largely a fantasy: at least in the near-to-medium term.