Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War Updates, Syria one week in: HTS wins, and Russia's Syria presence in limbo.
Ukraine war updates.
1) U.S. Ramps Up Support for Ukraine With $1.49 Billion in New Military Aid,
In a bold display of continued commitment to Ukraine's defense, the United States has announced two major military aid packages this month, totaling $1.49 billion.
These packages aim to bolster Ukraine’s defense capabilities, particularly as Russian attacks escalate during the winter season.
Breakdown of the Aid Packages over the past 2 weeks:
1. $988 Million Security Assistance Package (December 7).
Air Defense Systems:
Includes Hawk air defense systems, counter-drone capabilities, and munitions for existing air defense platforms.
Essential to neutralize incoming missile and drone threats.
Artillery and Ammunition:
Supplies 155mm artillery shells and other critical rounds to sustain ground operations.
Vehicles and Engineering Support:
Armored vehicles and tactical bridging systems to enable mobility across challenging terrain.
Training and Maintenance:
Focuses on sustaining previously supplied equipment and preparing Ukrainian forces for evolving battlefield demands.
This package is funded through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which facilitates procurement from manufacturers to ensure future readiness.
2. $500 Million Immediate Support Package (December 14).
Air Defense Missiles:
Munitions for Patriot systems and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles to counter Russia's aerial assault on infrastructure.
HIMARS Rockets:
Precision-guided munitions critical for striking Russian positions.
Artillery and Maintenance Support:
Additional 155mm and 105mm artillery shells and maintenance equipment to sustain operational readiness.
Timing & strategic importance.
With these announcements, U.S. military assistance to Ukraine since February 2022 now exceeds $63 billion.
These packages aim to counter Russia's intensified winter campaign, which has targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure with missiles and drones.
Indeed, in a recent barrage involving 94 missiles, Russia targeted Ukraine’s power generation infrastructure exclusively.
Consequently, enhanced air defenses will be pivotal in protecting critical infrastructure.
This is important as the public morale will be critical in the next few months.
It is possible that Trump may continue making statements like the one that criticized Ukraine for deep strikes against Russia.
And if you are the leader of a country with its people hearing such statements from the main military backer, the last thing you need is to have further morale loss due to lack of heating during brutally cold winter months.
In addition, and from a strategic perspective, this sprint to arm Ukraine also serves as a last ditch effort to Trump proof Ukraine for the first few months of 2025 - until (hopefully) Trump realizes that there is little to negotiate with Putin and decides to resume armaments for Ukraine.
2) European powers talk troops in Ukraine.
In a significant diplomatic push, French President Emmanuel Macron and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk are considering deploying a 40,000-strong EU post-war peacekeeping force to Ukraine.
The proposed multinational force would act as a security guarantee during Ukraine's NATO accession process.
Poland, set to assume the EU presidency in January, is advocating for swift action, framing it as a critical step in stabilizing the region.
We will revisit this proposal once it gets more real - and when there is even a possibility of a ceasefire.
Suffice it to say for now however: Trump’s statements that emphasize Europe’s role in keeping the peace in Ukraine will paradoxically create an excuse for European powers to revitalize the ‘‘troops on the ground’’ rhetoric that irks Putin so much.
3) North Korean troops partake in offensive operations.
Ukrainian President Zelensky revealed on December 14 that Russian forces have deployed North Korean soldiers in infantry assault operations in Kursk Oblast.
He noted that these soldiers, described as a "significant number," have already sustained "noticeable" losses, and while currently concentrated in Kursk, they may be redeployed to other parts of the frontline.
This marks the first confirmation by a Ukrainian official of North Korean troops conducting offensive operations.
Previously, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov had mentioned "small-scale" clashes with North Korean forces in Kursk Oblast during an interview in November.
As discussed in previous cables, North Korea is likely testing out a smaller contingent before scaling up its presence in Russia.
It makes little sense for them to limit their involvement to 10-12k troops.
They have already crossed the Rubicon when it comes to relations with the West, and so there is little else to lose from escalating involvement in Russia.
Of course, there is the manpower loss, but Kim Jong Un may calculate that the loss of men will be more than compensated for by an ever-closer military relationship with Russia.
And if the goal is to secure the most sensitive military tech in relation to ICBMs, Nuclear-powered submarine designs, and advanced satellite tech, then indebting Putin further with additional deployment of troops (enough to make an actual impact on the outcomes on the battlefield) may make much more sense than keeping the contingent at its current minimal size.
Syria day after: HTS scores foreign policy wins with major powers and Russia’s presence remains uncertain.
It has been only a week that Assad has been removed from power, and so far so good.
It looks like the victorious rebel groups (led-by the Idlib-based HTS) have now established effective initial governance over the country.
After the initial (and brief) looting of Assad’s presidential palace, the broader situation has now calmed and there is little sign of disorder on the streets.
People of Syria have now had a whole week of unprecedented level of contact with the Western media institutions: people are jubilant and happy to see rebels in power.
There is also no sign of HTS backtracking on its promises of moderation.
There have been no religious diktats on female dress codes for example: on the contrary, HTS explicitly prohibited such directives from being imposed by any ad-hoc group anywhere in the country.
In addition, HTS has had a great week of PR vis-à-vis the West:
1) Rebels found and liberated Travis Timmerman - an American who was detained in Assad’s infamous dungeons for political prisoners.
He was promptly handed over to the U.S. troops stationed in southern Syria - and the senior leadership of HTS accompanied to ensure a smooth handover.
In fact, U.S. leadership has signaled that there is an ongoing communication with the rebels, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken himself confirmed this direct contact for the first time last week.
2) HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly, Jolani) refused to take the bait and confront Israel - choosing instead to send a signal of potential strategic alignment in confronting Iran:
“Syria isn’t ready to enter wars & has no intentions to enter wars in the future. On the contrary the source of concern was the presence of Iran & Hezbollah.” [emphasis added].
Once again al-Sharaa is proving his political capabilities.
3) Relations with NATO member Turkey are at their peak.
HTS invited both the foreign and intelligence minister of Turkey, and the latter was personally welcomed and given a tour of Damascus by al-Sharaa himself.
Russia’s future presence in Syria remains unclear.
It is clear that Putin is trying to secure a new understanding with HTS to preserve Russia’s naval base in Tartus.
al-Sharaa will most likely be willing to negotiate a new deal in return for tangible benefits - like the much-needed cash for reconstruction.
With that said however, there hasn’t been a definitive indication if such a deal is forthcoming any time soon.
There have been conflicting reports on the matter.
Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov confirmed contact with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS).
On the other hand, senior rebel officials stated that Russia's military presence and agreements with the Assad regime are "not under discussion" and future talks would involve the Syrian people's decision.
Syrian politician Mohammed Sabra (who represented the opposition in Geneva talks in 2016) has similarly echoed calls for a future referendum on any foreign military presence in Syria.
Reports suggest that not all Syrian opposition groups are aware of Russia's talks with the select factions.
Meanwhile, Russian state media avoids distinguishing between opposition groups, likely to portray the interim government as unified to legitimize agreements.
Ongoing withdrawal and relocation.
Whatever deal may take place in the future, it is clear that there is nothing imminent on the horizon for the Kremlin.
There is clear evidence of continuous Russian withdrawal from Syria.
Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian soldiers are hesitating to move towards the Hmeimim Air Base due to security risks.
Approximately 1,000 Russian personnel reportedly left Damascus for Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base on December 13, with observed convoys heading to the bases.
Russia’s Africa Corps was deployed to ensure the safe movement of forces and negotiate guarantees of "immunity" for soldiers in transit.
Russian Colonel Dmitry Motrenko is reportedly engaging with other states' military contingents in Syria to secure safety guarantees.
In addition to personnel, the Russian military reportedly evacuated some heavy equipment.
At least one cargo plane reportedly departed Hmeimim Air Base for Libya on December 14.
That Russia is withdrawing heavy equipment is a clear indication that no significant deal is on the horizon as of right now.
On the other hand however, we are also not seeing a full withdrawal just yet.
As such, there might be some hope in the Kremlin that an intermediate deal with HTS may be reached in the meantime.
And such a deal, may (in addition to strategic benefits) soften the reputational damage to Putin sustained after the fall of Assad regime.
After all, if Russia is not forced to pull all of its assets from Libya, the Kremlin may come up with a spin that Russia’s strategic interests have not been affected all that much.
Implications for Russia’s power projection in the Mediterranean.
Russian naval assets remain stranded outside the Black Sea, blocked by Turkey's enforcement of the Montreux Convention.
Their options are stark: either embark on a prohibitively long transfer to the Baltic Fleet or scramble for temporary hosting arrangements at ports like Libya, Sudan, or Algeria.
Moscow’s Mediterranean presence, long acknowledged as ad hoc, now faces a reckoning.
The failure to establish robust, redundant basing agreements has left Russian power projection in the region precarious.
With Syria’s reliability as a host increasingly in question, Russia may pivot towards negotiating expanded basing rights in Libya or Sudan.
And that may paradoxically lead to additional Russian military involvement in conflicts across both Libya and Sudan.
After all, Russia will have to return the favor for the new bases in some way.
That may include increased Russian military aid to relevant parties (in addition to crude transfer of money).
Consequently, even if Turkey was successful in squeezing Russia out of Syria, this may paradoxically lead to more involved Russia in both Sudan and Libya - where Turkey has its own interests too.
But a renewed/intensified Turkey-Russia clash of interests in the aforementioned states is unlikely to materialize anytime soon: Ukraine is currently sucking all of Russia’s energy and resources.