Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, Kyiv's anti-corruption measures, and the logic of South Korea's nuclear talk.
(*a lot of readers have emailed asking about the Balloongate and if it was right for Blinken to cancel his China trip. We will look at this more closely in the upcoming cables)
Ukraine War Updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
The battle for Bakhmut continues - with no apparent gains for Russia.
The Ukrainian forces are now repelling more assaults across the Luhansk Oblast (district), in the towns of Nevske, Kreminna, and Bilohorivka.
In the meantime, Ukrainian troops are being trained to operate new Western tanks - these will take many more months, before fresh troops are available for the Spring assault.
And on that point, some good news - the EU will now train 30k Ukrainian troops - 2x of the original number (launched in November) of 15k (to be ready by May).
And 10k have already been trained/in the process of training throughout locations in Germany and Poland.
Western aid continues to scale - and a new taboo slowly crossed.
Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Oleksii Reznikov, had a successful visit to Paris this week.
France (together with Italy) will supply Ukraine with state-of-the-art SAMP/T (MAMBA) air-defence systems - allowing for more expensive Patriot missiles to be used against the most devastating cruise/ballistic missiles.
But it was Washington’s new security package which finally broke previous taboos on the provision of long-range weapons.
The US announced a new $2.2bln security assistance package for Ukraine.
The package crucially includes the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDM): this will almost double the range of HIMARS-launched strikes to 94 miles from roughly 50 miles.
(side note: the package also includes Javelins, two HAWK air defense firing units, regular HIMARS ammunition, as well as the 120mm mortar and 155mm artillery rounds.)
This is a new development - an announcement of a policy change: the US is no longer worried about the long range of supplied weapons.
At the very least that is the reasonable inference we can make.
But not only, the relevant US official, a DoD spokesperson General Patrick S. Ryder confirmed this conclusion with a following comment on the Small Diameter Bombs:
“This gives them a longer range capability, long-range firing capability that will enable them to conduct operations in defense of their country, and to take back their sovereign territory in Russian occupied areas [emphasis added]”.
In other words, the longer range capability is not an incidental side-benefit: it is instead, the whole point.
With this, the US is now committing itself to continue supplying additional long-range weapons.
If this is no longer the taboo, if this is no longer escalatory, and if this is no longer crossing ‘‘Putin’s red lines’’, then why stop at GLSDM?
If provision of longer-range fire capabilities is the point, then why not supply ATACMS for HIMARS, Gray Eagle drones, and F-16 fighter jets?
After all, if the main worry was that Ukraine would engage in risky deep strikes within Russia (which they were already doing via sabotage, and/or their own retrofitted long-range drones), and if that worry is no longer a disqualifying factor for GLSDM, then why stop here and not back Ukraine with full force needed to end the war sooner rather than later?
Indeed, Washington no longer has a good rationale to continue resistance to this aid - this would simply be inconsistent.
And Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was smart enough to quickly fix in this precedent by reiterating the original rationale for the provision of GLSDMs:
“The more long-range our weapons are and the more mobile our troops are the sooner Russia's brutal aggression will end” [emphasis added].
As often mentioned in these cables, the US and NATO end up doing the necessary steps and providing the right amount of military support after the passage of a very long time, and once all other options are exhausted.
They must stop this practice for good, and urgently supply Ukraine with all of the long-range weapons to prevent a very lengthy war of attrition.
Ukraine takes decisive anti-corruption measures.
Last week, we discussed how tougher measures against corruption were necessary for Kyiv retain and enhance the current support offered by the West - that one of the most poisonous talking points advanced by the morally corrupt extreme/isolationist right was the baseless assertion that Ukraine was granted a “blank check” by American taxpayers that was being wasted away.
(side note: ask Putin - who lost 50% of captured territories, including a major city like Kherson, amassed 200k casualties and is now forced to mobilize all of Russia’s resources, whether 0.25% of America’s GDP was truly wasted away)
In Europe, which is closer to the menace that is Russia, such accusations are less frequent and/or loud.
European populists like Hungary’s PM Victor Orban, use less precise justifications based on moral nihilism - in essence, amounting to nothing more than: Ukraine is not our immediate problem, so why care?
Nonetheless, even in Europe, Western public opinion was gradually shifting - and besides, it is the EU that Ukraine wants to join - ergo, compliance with strict governance and anti-corruption measures is a must.
To his credit, Zelensky is now expediting this process.
Kyiv is actively involved in serious clean up: this past week, Security Bureau of Ukraine (SBU) and Bureau of Economic Security (BES) have announced indictments against corrupt officials of two state owned enterprises Ukrnafta and Ukrtatnafta.
It is alleged that both of these are de facto controlled by oligarch Igor Kolomoyskyi (who faces criminal investigations against him in the US and the UK based on money-laundering allegations conducted via “Privatbank”).
Naturally, it is important to note that anti-corruption investigations have been going on for a while now - this is not a PR gimmick.
In fact, Ukrainian media has re-shared a video of August 2022 law-enforcement searches at the apartment of Oleksandr Myroniuk, a former Deputy Defence Minister - where almost a million dollars in cash was found hidden in his sofa.
But the fact that the most high-profile investigations were declared only after the recent corruption scandals, is far from a good look for Zelensky.
Why weren’t these done much earlier? After all, Oligarchs like Kolomoyskyi have been under intense international investigations and a media spotlight for years - what was it exactly that Kyiv was waiting for?
These are legitimate questions that require an explanation: and Western allies must demonstrate tough love and insist on further transparency.
In the meantime, and in order to allay these legitimate concerns, President Zelensky must not stop after these sensational high-level arrests: deeper institutional reforms are essential.
It is an unfortunate reality that Zelensky needs to fight a political & reputational war in addition to an actual war of survival - but fight he must, and in fact, the long-term sustainability of the latter, may be significantly impacted by his performance on the former.
South Korea nuclear talk: Seoul gets a decent chunk of what it wanted.
The news that South Korea’s President declared interest in developing their own nuclear weapons (adding that given South Korea’s technological prowess, that this would not take long), and/or ask the US to redeploy them on the Korean Peninsula, had worried a lot of analysts, strategists, and our readers - this was one of the most common questions coming in.
The context for Yoon Suk Yeol’s statement was the growing belligerence on behalf of North Korea.
The prospect of domestic nuclear development, and/or of US redeployment hadn’t been raised in decades.
This was naturally sensational news.
But is it actually escalatory? Did this raise the prospect of a military conflict with the North?
Most probably not.
And to see why, we need to unpack the political and strategic objectives that this statement sought to achieve.
Yook Suk Yeol wanted to accomplish the following goals:
1) Deter North Korea.
Kim Jong Un’s regime has been amping up tensions: engaging in escalatory rhetoric and conducting more brazen missile tests.
Why now?
It is likely that Kim is estimating that by raising tensions and capturing more of the US bandwidth, it is distracting the US from China/Russia - in the process, becoming more useful for both Beijing and Moscow.
This might be a ploy to secure more financial backing and relief for his troubled economy.
If for example, thanks to North Korea, the US cannot fully devote all of its military resources to the protection of Taiwan, then this is a powerful benefit for Beijing - one that they should surely pay for.
Now onto the next point: did the statement accomplish its goals? Was North Korea deterred?
On the first appearance, the answer seems to be a resounding no - since Kim Jong Un continued to escalate his rhetoric, and North Korea warned of a “most overwhelming nuclear force”.
But then again - this much was expected, of course they were going to respond with even harsher rhetoric and displays of ‘‘iron will’’ to escalate.
But the real impact will be seen over months - not days or weeks - once the immediate pressure to par the threat displays and save face is lessened.
2) Warn China.
This is the angle that many strategists seemed to miss - yet perhaps this very message was the most important one.
Yook Suk Yeol was providing a notice to China: if you don’t rein in North Korea, you could end up with a nuclear-armed South Korea on your doorstep.
For Beijing, the prospect that the US nukes would be stored in South Korea, is even worse of an outcome than if Seoul developed their own weapons: since American nuclear weapons would be ultimately and directly controlled from Washington.
Having a US nuclear weapon right at its doorstep is clearly unacceptable to China - hence why this is such a powerful pressure point: Seoul is essentially tying Kim Jong Un’s conduct with a powerful disincentive for Beijing.
Did the statement accomplish this goal? Again, too soon to judge: no matter what Beijing is actually thinking, they are also not interested in Kim Jong Un appearing weak and cowed.
It is one thing to decide against further escalation, it is another to pressure North Korea so hard, that it loses its potency as a credible troublemaker: which would in turn reduce China’s own leverage.
3) Seek further deterrence displays from the US.
Finally, there was also a message to the US: you need to be more involved in displays of deterrence if you don’t want me to escalate on my own.
Now, one could argue that Yook Suk Yeol’s statement was coordinated with the US - given the analysis above: that it was a deliberate ploy to warn China, and that the US was happy to play along with Yeol’s remarks.
But this is rather unlikely for the following two reasons:
a) President Biden is too risk-averse to agree with a ploy where the South Korean leader promises to develop a nuclear weapon of their own.
b) This sets a bad precedent for other allies and partners - what if other nations: from Indo-Pacific allies like Philippines, and Middle Eastern partner states like Saudi Arabia (in the context of Iran) raise similar possibilities?
Having more countries -however friendly to the US - be in possession of nuclear weapons adds uncertainty to the US foreign policy - and uncertainty is never a great outcome.
Nuclear non-proliferation is still the policy of the US.
It is unlikely that strategists in Washington would risk creating an awful precedent by agreeing to play along with Yeol’s remarks.
It is more likely therefore, that the South Korean leader spoke out on his own, and the US scrambled to provide the necessary deterrence needed for an ally.
But having said all that, at least when it comes to the US, South Koreans got what they wanted: The US displayed intent to increase the scale and frequency of joint military drills.
The Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin declared that ‘‘more U.S. jet fighters would be deployed to South Korea this year and the two countries would hold larger-scale and longer joint military exercises than their previous ones”.
Overall, and on balance, Yook Suk Yeol’s apparently “risky” rhetoric was probably a good ROI for mere rhetoric.
(side note: and given that the US has not yet displayed even limited interest in provisioning the South with nukes, and that SK’s own nuclear program would take years to develop - at this point, this is just rhetoric).
For it reminded the North that their belligerent moves (2022 was a record year for North Korean ballistic missile tests - 90 over the whole year with 23 in a single day) will come with major strategic costs, and that China’s tacit support for these activities (in the hopes of overstretching and distracting the US) may actually backfire spectacularly.
And when it comes to Washington, this could be a cover for the US to (sometime in a distant future) park its own nukes right at China’s doorsteps.
(side note: even though the logic of this action, and the potential benefits may not be too obvious: since even preparatory steps for deployment could incentivize China to escalate preemptively, and there is a further debate on whether having a fixed location close to China is preferable to launching from nuclear submarines, and/or stealth bombers like the B-2 or B-21 in future)
But what about China? Will this incentivize Beijing to amp up its own nuclear development?
Most likely not - upcoming conflict over Taiwan already provides the necessary incentive for China to speed up its hypersonic missiles capabilities (as well as planning to increase the number of actual nuclear warheads to 1,500 by 2035 - which would still be significantly less than that in the US possession (3,750)).
So Beijing was already on that path in any case: Yeol’s statement is not some novel reason for them to escalate.
On balance therefore, it is more likely that Beijing will try to rein in Pyongyang - probably firing them up to resume distraction right at the moment of / around the time of a potential conflict over Taiwan.
And until that very moment arrives, it is decidedly not in Beijing’s interest to empty its chambers and use this ploy prematurely.