Ukraine War Updates.
1) Finally, a breakthrough.
Ukrainian forces have finally achieved a breakthrough by breaching Russia's first line of defense near Zaporizhzhia in the southeastern part of the country.
The offensive, (characterized by successive waves of attacks involving over 100 armored vehicles, including tanks), has resulted in Ukraine successfully gaining a foothold in three sections of the Russian-installed first line of defense.
Simultaneously, Russia is pursuing its own offensive along a 60-mile stretch in northeastern Ukraine, employing a combination of heavy artillery, drones, and ground assaults to make incremental gains.
Nonetheless, both the ground level reports and OSINT (open source intel) indicate that despite claiming small breakthroughs in various locations from Kupiansk to Kreminna, Russian advances have been limited, and Ukrainian forces have been successful in counterattacking and reclaiming some lost territory.
It appears that Russia’s modern PTMK-1R top-attack anti-tank mines (triggered by advanced acoustic sensors that detect the weight of the approaching vehicles, and fire a Javelin-style anti-tank missiles at a sharp top-attack angle) remain as the most difficult challenge for Ukraine to overcome.
Consequently, a lot more emphasis is placed upon individual infantrymen slowly combing through the area - which slows down the progress even further.
In other words, and once again, there is a very good reason for Ukraine’s slow advance.
2) More funding for Ukraine.
Washington has signed off on another tranche of $400 million in military aid - these will include ammo for advanced air defense systems, Hornet surveillance drones, howitzer artillery rounds, and Stryker armored vehicles.
3) China’s limited and indirect armament of Russia is a strategic victory of the West.
It has been reported that Russia has imported over $100 million worth of drones from China this year - a staggering 30x increase compared to Ukraine's drone imports.
Additionally, Chinese shipments of ceramics (crucial components in body armor) have risen by 69% to Russia, amounting to more than $225 million in value. In stark contrast, ceramic sales to Ukraine have witnessed a severe decline of 61%, plummeting to a mere $5 million, based on customs data.
Naturally, China is anything but neutral in this conflict - and the data proves this.
But having said that, and if this is all that there is (and as of today, there is no strong evidence that much heavier equipment is being supplied), then this is already a diplomatic victory for the west.
Of course, and with all that said, an argument could also be made that a zero tolerance approach to even this transfer (of largely insignificant) body armor components and drones, would prove effective in precluding a slippery slope towards Beijing’s more significant involvement down the line.
In other words, we can and should avoid setting a precedent that we are ok with China’s involvement here - even at such a small scale.
Naturally, this impulse must also be balanced against the reality that China will have to do something to show Russia that it has not abandoned it completely.
In other words, there is also a minimum level of involvement we must realistically accept as a given base case - it is in the balance between these two realities that diplomatic finesse will come in handy.
4) Trump’s rare help: it is not all bad for EU to worry about its status and reputation as an ally in Washington.
In an interview to FOX (where else?) Trump dodged the question on whether he would continue funding for Ukraine, choosing to point fingers at the EU instead;
“I’d get the war settled, but money is number one. I’d tell Europe, you're about $100 billion plus short. You got to pay because Europe is smiling all the way to the bank…Europe is doing very little compared to the United States …They should be the same number, if not more, and they get away with murder. [emphasis added]”
For a change, what Trump is saying is actually correct - the EU is getting away with a lot.
Here is a quick “but for” test to prove this: subtract all American funding and support, and the situation in Ukraine would look radically different.
Of course one could argue that perhaps without American support, EU would actually step up properly - giving an existential challenge of expanding Russian empire.
Yes, maybe, but then that is precisely the point - the EU should in fact act as if the US did not exist regardless of how much Washington is willing or able to provide.
Because truly, come Jan 2025, a lot could look different here in America.
So let this statement by Trump act as a bad cop to Biden’s good cop - it is good to keep Brussels on its toes.
Our European allies should not relax into complacency - this is truly a major crisis affecting them first and foremost, and they should start acting like it.
Of course, and on a grander scale, Trump’s continuous ambivalence on Ukraine encourages Putin to wait it out until Trump’s return to power.
This then prolongs the war, and reduces the Kremlin’s incentives to negotiate in earnest.
But if Trump is not going to shut up anytime soon (which he isn’t) then at least on some occasions he could prove useful for the Biden admin to use as a threat and a warning for the EU to step up its efforts.
(side note: the $100bln figure itself, is however most likely exaggerated. We have no idea where it came from. But then, it is almost certain that Trump doesn’t either - he probably pulled that number out of thin air)
5) Africa summit is a major flop - a serious embarrassment for Putin.
In a conspicuous display of underwhelming participation, only 17 African heads of state graced the Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg this week, registering a stark contrast to the previous session in 2019, which saw a larger turnout (almost 2x difference at 43).
The dearth of attendance represents an embarrassing outcome for Putin, who no doubt had high hopes of utilizing the summit to showcase his diplomatic & soft power prowess and recalibrate relations with the continent.
This eventuality is of course exactly what these cables had previously advocated for: that the Western diplomats should pressure African heads of state to skip the summit in protest.
Looks like they did a pretty good job (and certainly, the target recipients were also highly receptive given what Russia is engaged in).
Another suggestion (from Thursday’s cables) was that those that do attend, must raise issue with Putin’s policy in public.
This too happened: adding to Putin’s embarrassment Comoros’ President Azali Assoumani (who holds the current chairmanship of the African Union) openly urged Putin to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
Putin declined however, saying instead that Russia would move towards ‘‘a more just system of resource distribution”.
Naturally, Putin failed to explain how bombing Ukraine’s grain storage helps alleviate hunger in Africa - is this the more just system of distribution that he is talking about?
(side note: Prigozhin was also spotted greeting African guests at fancy St Petersburg hotels. Surprising at first, but probably another one of Putin’s “optionality plays”. He can now either fully defang Prigozhin - displaying this domestication to other wannabe Prigozhins, or he can (at some point in future) administer the poisoned tea/balcony accident treatment, maintaining some plausible deniability thereafter: “look, we were on good terms, and besides, he had a lot of enemies!”)
Putin’s latest domestic policy moves - the goal is to sidestep & postpone internal political and economic challenges and send strategic signals to Ukraine and the West.
A lot of the Kremlin’s current state of mind can be inferred from actions and policies undertaken in relation to domestic issues.
And in fact, free from (to a much larger extent - if not in absolute terms) the facade/hyperbolic theatrics that accompany its foreign policy statements and actual conduct, policy decisions taken to address internal issues, are almost always a better, more reliable guide to uncovering the true challenges that keeps Putin (and his closest inner circle) up at night.
So let us therefore unpack the two new measures in question:
1) Russia's Duma enacts a bill to boost military recruitment.
On Tuesday, Russia's Duma successfully passed a significant bill impacting millions of military conscripts.
Previously, Russian men were obligated to undergo compulsory military service between the ages of 18 and 27.
However, the new legislation extends the maximum conscription age from 27 to 30.
Concurrently, the bill takes measures to curb draft dodging by prohibiting men with draft notices from leaving the country.
Upon Putin’s signature, the bill will take effect in January 2024.
Notably, the revised bill not only widens the conscription age range, but also reverses previous proposals to raise the age limits.
Initially, there was support - including from Andrei Kartapolov, Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee and Putin - for gradually increasing the minimum conscription age from 18 to 19 in 2024, 20 in 2025, and 21 in 2026.
However, Kartapolov has since retracted his backing for this idea, emphasizing the popularity of military service among 18-year-old men.
(side note; of course! But also, and even if this was true - which it isn’t - why make something mandatory if there is always a genuine motivation by the 18 year olds to join the army - given that they are free to do so in any case, why force others if it is only to cater for a large demand in motivation.. These are of course only rhetorical questions aiming to further highlight the absurdity of such claims)
Although the official rationale for this adjustment is to address troop losses in Ukraine, it aligns with the Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's ambition, declared in December, to augment Russian combat personnel by 30%, raising the numbers from 1.15 million to 1.5 million.
(side note: in addition to the conscription age changes, President Putin has recently signed another bill into law, which incrementally raises the upper age limit for military reserves. By 2028, the eligibility age for senior officers will be set at 65, junior officers at 60, and soldiers at 55.)
Now, this bill is clearly aimed at augmenting the number of troops available for Russia's involvement in the Ukrainian conflict without announcing a new wave of mobilization.
This in turn, is in itself indicative of Putin’s careful approach to expanding the war - he wants to keep it under the radar, not taking the continuous compliance/apathy from the public for granted.
(side note: as demonstrated by warm public welcome for Prigozhin in Rostov - for a mercenary taking over a city of 1 -1.15 million - Russian people can behave unpredictably, and so perhaps Putin is indeed wise not to put too much weight upon the Kremlin’s own internal polling as a gauge of true public opinion)
And even so, and even given the political importance of this bill (with a corresponding weight to be attached to the show of unanimous agreement) there was still criticism of the new bill arising even from Russia’s Putin-picked Federation Council senators Valery Bondarev and Andrei Klishas, who were proponents of the previous gradual age increase proposal.
(side note: one could ofcourse argue that this is simply yet another example of Putin’s faux “managed democracy” theatrics. That, unanimity is deliberately avoided to create a sense of genuine political process (and thus, an added legitimacy and weight to the decision). But such measures are usually used in relation to legislation that doesn’t matter. It is unlikely therefore, that in such crucial moments of strategic decisions made so soon after a failed coup (where an utmost premium is placed upon unanimity) Putin was really playing games. More likely: genuine cracks in control over his own puppets)
Now, first and foremost, there will of course be an impact of this felt on the actual battlefield (too soon to tell to what extent), but beyond the too obvious, Putin is also sending a strategic signal: I am in no rush to negotiate. I believe in the strength of the cards that I hold. In fact, I am going to prepare for the long haul.
Naturally, and as a signal, this is all upside and little (if any) downside.
That is, either:1) Putin’s signaling works to discourage Ukraine (and Ukraine’s Western backers) into concessions favorable to Russia (and in reality, merely freezing the conflict would allow Putin to spin victory in Ukraine: “we protected people of Donbas and gained further territory as a buffer), or 2) it doesn’t work, and Russia can now be actually better prepared for the lengthy attritional war.
(side note: the only downside would be this: Washington and Brussels rushing to provide more support and do so faster - before Russia can further benefit from the padded defensive lines. But this assumes too much decisiveness on behalf of the West. Case in point: the US is still dragging its feet on ATACMS - even after both France and the UK have donated long-range missiles of comparable reach)
Of course, as far as signals go, openly announcing a new major mobilization would have been a far more convincing display of resolve - something that Putin could not afford to do (or at least that’s what he estimated) precisely because domestic conditions may not be in reality that amenable for a lengthy war of attrition.
2) Duma authorizes regional military units in Russia
The Duma has recently approved a measure allowing Russian regions to establish their own regional military units, resembling state-owned enterprises' private military companies, albeit under a different nomenclature.
However, this authorization is subject to presidential approval and can only be enacted during wartime, mobilization, and martial law, ostensibly with defensive purposes in mind.
An intriguing exception exists for Moscow, which gains the unique ability to directly negotiate agreements with the National Guard regarding shared responsibility for the city's defense.
These newly formed units will receive funding from both federal and regional budgets and will collaborate closely with the Federal Security Service and the national army.
(side note: it remains uncertain however, how distinct they will be from existing "territorial defense" forces already operational in various regions.)
Now, many analysts and Russia watchers view this new law as yet another covert form of military mobilization, with some of the financial burden shifted onto regional budgets.
(side note: and this move does indeed echoes Putin's October 2022 decrees, which empowered governors to establish operational headquarters to cater to military needs.)
Others are quick to point out the obvious: wasn’t the Prigozhin affair enough of a warning for Putin?
How one earth would creating dozens more military companies help Putin consolidate and centralize power - necessary (though not always sufficient) preconditions to coup-proof his regime?
These are all legitimate points, and the short answer is that he is almost certainly not creating a regional/decentralized fighting force.
Instead, he is effect expanding the army by delegating the costs on regional government/governors.
In other words: I need x amount of more men, you’ve got to pay and contribute more. In return, you get the prestige of maintaining a local militia.
And in fact, there is an added benefit for Putin: filtering for loyalty/earnest effort.
For a regional political entrepreneur, this is a good opportunity to suck up to the chief autocrat and earn favors in return.
And Putin’s timely generosity towards National Guard chief and his former bodyguard, Viktor Zolotov (who will now get his own tanks - in spite of being nothing more than a glorified riot police) is a reminder of what is possible if one carries the burden of the war with sufficient enthusiasm.
Conversely, those who drag their feet, will now get on FSB’s (which will play an outsized role in monitoring these new units) list of “potential deviants”.
So no, it is unlikely that even a gambler like Putin is that careless to create a genuine decentralized/regionalized army so soon after Wagner’s failed coup attempt.
Per the Fareed Zakaria show yesterday, the ex-Foreign Minister of China has now disappeared.