Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, the ongoing counteroffensive, and Putin deploying nukes to Belarus.
Ukraine War Updates
1) Ukrainian forces continue to maintain their counteroffensive operations on multiple fronts.
The Russian Ministry of Defense and other sources have claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna and Bakhmut, which were reportedly repelled by Russian forces.
Ukrainian forces have also engaged in counteroffensive operations near Velyka Novosilka and Orikhiv.
Additionally, the Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces made territorial gains in southern Ukraine, advancing up to two kilometers in undisclosed directions.
Overall, the many battles that have thus far taken place as part of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, have proven to be extremely arduous.
Russia's initial combat formations comprised rudimentary foxholes and trenches manually excavated by hand - but these first lines conceal the intricate networks of minefields equipped with anti-tank and antipersonnel mines, diligently monitored by Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and reinforced by artillery support.
Available OSINT/satellite imagery shows that mere 9-12 miles from Ukrainian positions lies the primary defensive line - comprised of meticulously constructed trenches fortified with concrete, and complemented by firing posts that have been strategically reinforced.
Tank obstacles, ground-laid communication cables (more resistant to electronic warfare) orchestrating precise artillery barrages, and an extensive array of additional minefields augment the defenses further.
Positioned beyond this formidable bastion are the reserve fighting positions - which would presumably be the third line of defense.
And in spite of the slow and continuous progress, Ukrainian forces are yet to penetrate the well-entrenched second and third layers of Russian defensive lines.
This is going to take a lot of time and will most likely involve significant losses on Ukraine’s behalf.
A lot of these difficulties could have been eased with proper air power - if the decision to train (and to eventually supply) Ukraine with F-16s was made last fall instead of this spring, Russia’s second and third layers of defensive lines would have been far more vulnerable to frontal assaults.
2) African Delegation’s pie in the sky peace plan.
The Egyptian prime minister, Ugandan presidential envoy, and the presidents of South Africa, Zambia, Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, and Senegal had first visited Kyiv on June 16 - following this up with a trip to Moscow the very next day.
Ostensibly, the idea was to propose a “peace plan’’.
Naturally, no such peace could ever take place under the current conditions.
(side note: indeed, President Zelensky was quick (and correct) to rule out peace talks - making them conditional upon Russia’s retreat from the captured and occupied territories of Ukraine.)
But it was nevertheless right for Kyiv to at least entertain the idea in public.
As an added bonus for Ukraine’s credibility with the African states, Putin’s generals thought it prudent to subject Kyiv to a barrage of missile attacks just when the African delegations were visiting Kyiv.
This then led to absurd outcomes: highlighting how at least some of the leaders of apparently ‘‘neutral” African states are anything but.
After South Africa’s spokesperson’s epic and astonishingly uncredible denial that Kyiv was under a Russian missile attack right at the time of their visit, the President of South Africa promptly reversed course and corrected his spokesperson.
But what he said next, revealed the extent to which South Africa was desperate to remain in Moscow’s good graces.
President Cyril Ramaphosa ‘‘criticized’’ the attacks by saying that ‘‘such activity does not bode well for establishing peace’’.
An utterly farcical understatement - one that could only be explained by the South African President’s desire to suck up to the Kremlin.
But it is still possible that the trip was not a total waste of time: one certainly hopes that South Africa’s awkwardness in trying to rationalize Russia’s missile attacks will linger in its effect: making it harder for the audiences of the Global South to continuously buy into the Kremlin’s narrative with ridiculous ease that has been demonstrated thus far.
3) Putin the reluctant administrator.
After weeks of silence, Putin finally decided to back his own Defense Ministry in their attempt to consolidate and centralize the control over militias.
That it took Putin so long to enter the fray and side with his own formal government over Wagner, cannot possibly be a good sign for the Kremlin insiders.
The whole point of having an all-powerful autocrat is to ensure certainty and speed of execution.
Administering intra-regime disputes and ensuring stability (and maintaining the correct balance of powers) is Putin’s primary value to various factions within the Kremlin.
His slowness and indecision (after months of tolerating Prigozhin’s outbursts) is not a good advertisement for his rule.
Perceptions of power, and the image of being in control, are two essential elements that ensure the actual real power of an authoritarian leader.
But after two decades in power, Putin is slowly veering towards complacency - good news for us all.
4) Putin as amuser-in-chief.
The Russian President made news with a number of strange, amusing, and outright hilarious statements.
First off, Putin warned that if Ukraine’s shelling of Russian border towns continued, he would be forced to create a ‘‘buffer zone’’ within Ukraine.
What on earth does that mean?
Translation: during our initial invasion of Ukraine, we forced Ukraine to attack us in return. They are doing a great job in this. So we need to re-invade them again!
But this was not all, Putin also pondered whether he should take Kyiv again (when discussing the possibility of a future mobilization).
And remember, this is from a commander-in-chief of the army that not only abandoned its first attempt against Kyiv, but also lost Kherson and Kharkiv after mere 7-8 months later, and is now slowly losing Bakhmut - after capturing it at an inordinate cost, very long time, and mainly thanks to Wagner’s “human wave attacks”.
In a meeting with pro-war military bloggers, Putin furthermore admitted that Moscow needed to amp up the production of weapons due to severe shortages of essential hardware.
(side note: and his admission is not a demonstration of transparency. The facts are out there for all Russians to see. He is merely attempting to preserve at least some level of public credibility)
Huh? So you admit lacking means to do so, but still ponder taking back Kyiv?
There is of course some logic to his statement.
In his mind, he is signaling an unquenched maximalist war ambitions - which implies his willingness to stay in this war for a very long time.
Translation: you better pressure Ukraine to offer me something good and try to end this war now - because.. look at me, I am even thinking of taking another stab at Kyiv!
5) Lloyd Austin’s timely framing & expectations management.
Another week of the Biden admin officials setting the right tone and framing for the developing narrative of Ukraine’s counteroffensive.
Two weeks ago, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned against premature ‘‘peace talks’’ - emphasizing how this would merely freeze Russia’s gains on the battlefield and reward Putin for his aggression.
Now, it was the Defense Secretary’s turn to exercise expectation management (at the 13th Ukraine Defense Contact Group) - making it clear for all, that this is a long war that will test the West’s resolve and staying power:
“Ukraine’s fight is a marathon, and not a sprint. So we will continue to provide Ukraine with the urgent capabilities that it needs to meet this moment, as well as what it needs to keep itself secure for the long term from Russian aggression [emphasis added]”.
6) The Kakhovka dam collapse was most likely caused by a Russia-orchestrated explosion.
New, very detailed NYT report demonstrates how in all likelihood, the Kakhovka dam collapse was caused by Russian sabotage (if there was really any remaining doubt).
All available evidence (including the clues from the manner of collapse/and evidence from debris) point to the likely direct cause being an explosion originating from within the dam (as opposed to an external strike).
7) Chris Christie reminds the pragmatist and anti-China wing of what is at stake in Ukraine.
By now, it is pretty clear that a growing proportion of the GOP electorate is buying into the false narrative that the war in Ukraine is detracting from resources and attention that the US could have otherwise devoted to confronting China in the Pacific.
This is false, and we unpack these erroneous and harmful beliefs in our series on the Ukraine war’s long-term implications on America’s capacity to deter China in the Pacific.
However, and unfortunately, not enough attention is being devoted to the essential rebuttal of these views.
As such, it was heartening to see GOP’s 2024 Presidential candidate Chris Christie, to address this issue directly - highlighting the pragmatic importance of the US involvement in Ukraine in containing Beijing.
Christie labeled the war in Ukraine as a ‘‘proxy war with China” and emphasized the catastrophic foreign policy implications of America refusing to get involved to back Ukraine in this war: “the alternative is for the Chinese to take over, the Russians, the Iranians and the North Koreans –– a bad foursome.”
Russia deploys tactical nukes to Belarus: political calculus behind the move.
Big news of the past week was Belarus receiving Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons.
Belarusian President Lukashenko confirmed the receipt: “We have missiles and bombs that we have received from Russia."
He then added that the bombs were “three times more powerful than those [dropped on] Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”
Lukashenko then put on a faux concern and a pretense of weight of responsibility to what was in effect a highly devious threat: “God forbid I have to make a decision to use those weapons today, but there would be no hesitation if we face an aggression.”
This was his most often shared comment - but this is, however, largely uncredible - since it is inconceivable that Putin (a man that obsesses over control of far lesser things) would ever give up control of his own nukes.
Extremely implausible to say the least - instead, Lukashenko is simply a useful front, and Belarus is now all but formally confirmed as a Russian vassal state.
It is also worth mentioning that the direct military implications of this move are rather limited.
Given that any hypothetical nuclear confrontation with the west would largely be limited to the use of strategic nuclear weapons, the potential impact of the Belarus deployment is largely limited to Ukraine.
And yes, it is certainly true that the Belarus deployment opens up new angles of attack against Ukraine, but then again, to what extent is that really game-changing?
Ukraine is already forced to remain vigilant of its northern flank, and if Russia was to ever decide to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, then the situation is already so bad, that Russia’s additional ability to deploy such weapons from Belarus makes the overall context only slightly more unfavorable to Ukraine.
Indeed, Russia has a number of available options of delivery for such tactical nuclear weapons.
The very first use of tactical nuclear weapons is likely to target either an empty landmass or a third-rate city: the initial muted attack would be demonstrative - warning Ukraine of even bigger calamity ahead, and leaving room for escalation.
Consequently, and given that a relatively remote location is likely to be chosen as a first target of a hypothetical attack, it matters little where exactly the missiles are launched from: at the end of the day, they are not going to face the heavily guarded and layered air defense systems of Kyiv, and so whether the location of an initial attack is close to Kyiv (ie Belarus) is going to be much less relevant.
But all of this is probabilistic thinking, and Kyiv could never risk that, the main (albeit still limited) effect of this deployment is therefore to force Ukrainian forces into permanent overstretch and vigilance of its northern flank.
But even if the military impact of this move is largely limited, Putin was still pursuing a number of political goals when making this move.
Putin’s political objectives.
1) Tactical nukes still on my mind.
For a long time, Putin’s nuclear threats were clearly over the top - which made them very uncredible.
But Putin is not interested in the threat of nuclear weapons to melt away entirely.
So to revive this threat, and on this occasion, Putin opted for concrete action over flowery rhetoric.
(side note: there is also the bonus point of retaking the PR initiative when it comes to domestic audiences. Demonstrating ‘‘strength” at the time of Ukraine’s counteroffensive is especially useful in changing the narrative)
2) Signal to Belarusian opposition: resistance is futile - would I ever let go of Belarus, now that I have nukes there? Belarus is mine now. Don’t even think of making any moves. Remain hopeless.
3) The very same signal to the EU - now that I have my nukes here, I am 100% not letting any ‘‘color revolution’’ taking place in this country. So don’t sweat it. Don’t try to topple the Lukashenko regime by supporting the opposition: I will intervene to stop you, and you will end up causing an even bigger mess, and a major crisis on your borders.
4) Signal to Belarusian security apparatus: I call the shots on transition. I get a say on who is next in line now.
5) Signal to the wider authoritarian world - I am still here - I can still prop up allied authoritarians if needed.
If Putin’s peak credibility with authoritarian leaders (especially in the post-Soviet space) was in Jan 2022 (during military deployment (as part of the CSTO mission) to Kazakhstan - to rescue its President, then 16 months of war in Ukraine had damaged this image.
Russia’s weakness in the battlefield and dwindling ‘‘hard power’’ resources had prompted regional authoritarian leaders to hedge their bets.
Indeed, on some occasions, the direction of dependence had even reversed: for example, Russia is now dependent on the EU resale of imports from Kazakhstan to secure the much needed chips for its army.
The Belarusian deployment is a signal of revival and a reminder of the fact that Putin’s imperial ambitions have not weakened - and that those on his periphery should be careful not to write him off completely.
Ultimately, and with Lukashenko’s political survival guaranteed (and underwritten by Putin) there will now be a lesser threat of losing military access to Belarus. Securing this flank now - before any potential worsening picture on the battlefield/demonstration of weakness (which could have prompted Belarusian KGB an or Lukashenko himself to hedge their/his bets) was an important objective for Putin - which he most likely probably achieved.
But this also presents an opportunity for the West: for a very long time, both the US and the EU were hesitant to impose the harshest sanctions on Lukashenko - hoping to maybe one day peel him off from Putin.
That fantasy is now definitively over: Lukashenko’s room for maneuver is now all but gone.
Belarus is now clearly a vassal state - and this consequently means that Washington and Brussels should put their full weight behind the Belarusian opposition and attempt to topple the Lukashenko regime.
If Putin’s goal is to secure Belarus as his solid base for rogue operations (and impose crippling conditions on the lives of 10 million people), then the West must do everything to deny him that satisfaction and must contest this strategic space vigorously.