Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, and a major intervention is needed as Russia nears an endgame in Ukraine.
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Ukraine war updates.
1) Russia ends October with significant gains.
With more than 150 sq. miles taken last month - highest number for one month since July 2022.
2) G7 to Loan Ukraine $50 Billion, Using Frozen Russian Assets for Repayment.
The G7 has finalized a $50 billion loan package for Ukraine, a landmark deal secured not by burdening Ukrainian taxpayers but by tapping into frozen Russian assets.
After months of intense negotiations, finance ministers from the U.S., UK, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Canada reached the agreement in Washington. These “Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration” (ERA) loans are expected to start flowing later this year, with full deployment planned through 2027.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, roughly $250 billion in Russian assets have been frozen across the G7 and the EU.
These funds generate about $3 billion annually in interest, now earmarked to cover Ukraine’s loan repayments.
The G7’s leaders made their intent crystal clear: Russia must bear the financial burden for its aggression: “We will not tire in our resolve to give Ukraine the support it needs to prevail,” declared a joint statement, warning Moscow that “time is not on President Putin’s side.”
(side note: although they may be wrong on this one.. at least on the current trajectory. More on that later below.)
The U.S. is taking a leading role - pledging $20 billion in loans and aiming to deliver at least half by December.
President Biden drove home the geopolitical message: “Tyrants will be responsible for the damages they cause.” The EU, for its part, has committed €18 billion ($19.5 billion), scheduled for disbursement in 2025.
Additional funds will come from the UK, Canada, and Japan, reinforcing a unified Western strategy to sustain Ukraine’s war effort.
3) Zelensky launches a justified attack on the West for inaction on North Korea.
Zelensky: ‘‘We know where these North Korean troops are gathering in Russia. We could act preemptively if we had the means—long-range capability. Yet, America, the UK, and Germany watch.”
He is right of course - there is absolutely no good compelling reason why Western missile use restrictions must protect North Korean ‘‘storm corps’’ special forces deployed to help Russia defeat Ukraine.
Major Intervention Needed as Russia Nears an Endgame in Ukraine.
As we’ve consistently warned in these cables, Russia is rapidly approaching an endgame in Ukraine.
October brought troubling developments: Russia seized more territory than in any previous month of this war, at the cost of mounting casualties - Russian casualties and manpower loss has been compounded at a very high rate, and September 2024 was for example, the deadliest month of the entire war for Putin’s troops: Russia reportedly suffered more than one 1k killed or injured every single day.
But this offers little solace to Ukraine, which is now fighting for survival, with even the hope of victory fading. The brutal reality is that without a major intervention from Western allies, Russia was always favored to prevail. Simply waiting and hoping for a change of fortune is tantamount to slow acceptance of defeat.
From the outset, these cables have emphasized Russia’s overwhelming advantages in matériel and resources.
Ukraine has only managed to exceed expectations thanks to extraordinary leadership, fierce will to fight, and timely Western support.
Western-supplied precision munitions enabled feats like retaking Kherson and driving back Russian forces in late 2022.
More recently, Ukraine’s incursion into Russian positions near Kursk in August was a strategic reminder to Western allies—now increasingly distracted by other global crises—that with proper backing, Ukraine could still replicate its earlier successes.
It’s tragic, though, that President Zelensky must balance military strategy with political optics to satisfy Western donors.
The ill-fated June 2023 counteroffensive, which faced fortified Russian defenses in Zaporizhzhya, highlights this dilemma.
Ukraine went in without air superiority, without hundreds of armored vehicles, and with minimal training in combined-arms warfare.
It lacked anti-air defenses (especially, the short-range/SHORAD type) to shield frontline troops from Russian attack helicopters, not to mention the necessary anti-mining equipment (and trained personnel) to clear paths through the heavily mined front.
No Western military would attempt such a breach without massive advantages in airpower, artillery, and mechanized forces—NATO doctrine demands a 3-to-1 attacker advantage, if not 5-to-1.
Ukraine had none of this but was forced to act under pressure.
Now, this is not to say that there isn’t time in place for purely politics-driven strategic battles.
(Side note: America’s own Civil War was full of many such examples where Lincoln’s decisions on particular offensives were largely driven by a need to convince the south that resistance was futile - in fact, large casualties sustained by the North were oftentimes the very point: that the North could get away with it unscathed. Similarly, the U.S. decision to attack mainland Japan and even Tokyo itself in a daring and very risky B-52 -led “Doolitle” bombardment raide in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor was primarily driven to make a point that America was coming after Japan.)
But these are by and large supposed to be limited to certain tactical moves - no Western military would engage in a frontal assault akin to that undertaken by Ukraine in the spring of 2023.
Would any American general conduct such an attack on a heavily fortified and mined defensive line in the absence of any significant air power (let alone air superiority)?
The answer is of course no.
In fact, this would be a major malpractice and violation of military doctrine for all NATO states.
But Ukraine was forced into such an unpalatable position and still carried it out - it took all and any risks to win in battle.
Russia always had a natural compounding advantage.
Russia, meanwhile, has been bolstering its ranks with new recruits, enticed by generous bonuses.
Its economy, though strained, remains buoyed by energy sales to partners like India and China, whose imports have softened the impact of sanctions.
Western restrictions have been inconsistent: many Russian banks are still operational and have escaped toughest restrictions on access to international financial markets (avoiding the toughest SWIFT restrictions), and the G7 oil price cap at $60 failed to address the shadow tanker fleet Russia uses to skirt sanctions.
Even glaring gaps remain, like the West’s failure to sanction subsidiaries of Lukoil, which quickly found ways to bypass maritime restrictions and purchased a major fleet of agaeing tankers via its Dubai-based subsidiary.
Was it really that hard to predict that Lukoil - Russia’s biggest oil company - could use its subsidiaries in order to evade sanctions?
(side note: And yet this is exactly what happened - where was the Commerce Department? Why could it not see the most obvious ploy?)
As a result, Russia’s long-term advantages are compounding: its artillery and missile stockpiles vastly outnumber Ukraine’s, and it has a recruitment advantage that allows for relentless offensives.
Ukraine’s failure to expand recruitment early in the war now haunts it.
The delay has left Ukraine scrambling to replenish its ranks, and Kyiv must now make painful choices.
Meanwhile, Western support has stagnated at a dangerous moment.
There are no significant new aid packages on the horizon, and NATO has yet to deliver on key military promises.
If this continues, Russia could achieve maximum leverage by early 2025. At that point, Putin could dictate terms to Ukraine, perhaps annexing more territory or forcing Kyiv to abandon its NATO ambitions.
This would be a crushing blow to Ukraine’s sovereignty and a devastating setback for Western influence.
It would embolden authoritarian powers like China, and bolden revisionists everywhere.
We would essentially return to the 19th-century-style realpolitik - something that the world had collectively committed to avoiding following WWII.
Critical measures are needed to avoid the worst-case scenarios.
To even have a chance at preventing this nightmare scenario, several steps are critical.
1) Ukraine must ramp up recruitment, abandoning any pretense of appeasing public opinion. Zelensky must clearly communicate the gravity of the situation. Zelensky needs to level with the public: total mobilization is no longer optional; it is a matter of survival. The alternative is a risk of Russian breakthroughs that could overwhelm Ukrainian defenses, leading to the loss of major cities and pushing Russian forces deeper into western Ukraine, where towns are less fortified.
2) Western allies must provide Ukraine with all possible long-range weapons without restrictions.
This includes ATACMS and cruise missiles capable of striking deep behind Russian lines (like the German Taurus - which are yet to be delivered at all - the and UK/French Storm Shadows/SCALP-EGs), disrupting supply depots and logistics hubs.
Ukraine must also be authorized to target North Korean troops assisting Russia, signaling that such interventions will carry heavy consequences.
As previously discussed, Moscow is likely not going to stop at 12k troops - it is likely aiming to scale this up to 100k+.
If Ukraine is allowed to hit North Korean troops, then this could potentially be reversed.
3) NATO must revisit its red lines.
In light of North Korean troops’ deployment to Russia, NATO must reconsider its current approach to deterrence, escalation and its own ‘‘red lines’’.
Some Baltic states have already proposed more aggressive stances, and a need to revisit French President Macron’s suggestion earlier this year that the deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine should no longer be a subject of taboo.
This is correct: NATO should make Russia fear the possibility of a direct intervention.
The West must not shy away from making the Kremlin realize that further escalation could provoke a strong NATO response.
4) The West must scale up its commitment and finally approach this war as it is: a major emergency.
Current attitudes are still deficient.
Germany, for example, spent far more of its GDP (3x more) on helping to roll back Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 than it is spending on Ukraine, a European neighbor facing the largest land invasion since WWII.
The United States, despite being NATO’s leader, is still under-spending compared to smaller allies like the Baltic states - almost 4x less in relation to GDP (where Baltic states and Denmark spend more than 1.5% of theirs to help Ukraine).
If the U.S., UK, France, and Germany matched this level of commitment, it would amount to hundreds of billions more in aid, potentially not only halting Russia’s advances, but helping Ukraine regain an upper hand.
Simply put, gimmicks and half-measures won’t cut it: loans and creative financial arrangements may prolong Ukraine’s resistance but won’t secure victory or even stave off a strategic defeat.
The cost of allowing Russia to prevail—militarily or diplomatically—will be far greater than the immediate price of scaling up Western support.
The stakes are too high, and the time to act decisively is now.