Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war, Pentagon Leaks Part V, and regrettable fruits of Macron's labor.
(side note: the ongoing crisis in Sudan, interested third parties, and regional strategic implications will be discussed on Thursday’s cable)
Ukraine War Updates.
As the preparation for Ukraine’s counteroffensive continues, there have been reports of troop movements, and what so far seems like a number of shaping operations conducted by the country’s military leadership.
For example: according to geolocated footage and textual reports from Russian military bloggers active on Telegram, Ukrainian forces have apparently set up positions in the east bank of Kherson Oblast as of April 22.
However, the extent of their deployment and their ultimate objectives remain uncertain: whether it is a diversion or a genuine force accumulation remains to be seen.
But given that the potential disruption of Russia's land corridor to Crimea is likely one of major goals of the counteroffensive, the Kherson axis may not be the ultimate battlefield in the upcoming weeks/months.
So if Ukraine decides that cutting off Russia from Crimea is the ultimate short-term goal, then one expects the Mariupol line to be the focus of combat operations.
In the meantime, a Russian bomber accidentally bombed (via erroneous discharge of ammo) its own city of Belgorod.
Makes sense: if Putin gets to destroy his own cities first, Ukraine would be denied the chance to do the same! Strategic genius.
Western military aid.
On a more serious note, the past week was eventful and extremely fruitful for NATO and Ukraine both.
Kyiv will get $325m more in aid from the Biden administration.
The package will include more US-provided HIMARS ammo and artillery rounds, as well as anti-armor systems, small arms, logistics support vehicles, and maintenance support.
Denmark and the Netherlands will furthermore donate 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.
And on Wednesday, Ukraine received its first batch of two Patriot missile defense systems.
These are not going to be used against the low-flying loitering munitions (like the Shahed drones), but they may provide useful against Russia’s advanced precision-guided munitions.
And NATO will get to see whether Patriots can be effective against Russia’s Kalibr and Kinzhal missiles.
Two further developments that benefit both Ukraine and NATO:
1) America’s Lockheed and Germany’s Rheinmetall will work together to develop the German version of HIMARS rocket launchers.
Building Europe’s self-sufficiency will help the US to redirect its resources to build enough for itself and for Taiwan (further weakening the argument that Ukraine is detracting from the efforts to contain China).
2) Germany, Poland and Ukraine signed an agreement on Friday to develop a repair and maintenance hub for Leopard tanks in Poland.
These two developments will be crucial in developing Europe’s ability to become a solid ally to the US - pulling its weight - and doing far more for the achievement of the EU’s genuine strategic autonomy than any number of delusional and misguided speeches that Macron may deliver.
Pentagon leaks part V: Ukraine’s abandoned new axis of attack.
(*other noteworthy reports: China’s plan to conduct cyber attacks against US Satellites in the event of an eventual war (not too surprising), Egypt’s reversal on decision to supply Russia with rockets: thanks to being caught by US intel, and Taiwan’s state of air defense: much poorer than once thought)
Leaked documents show that the Ukrainian leadership had an original plan to open up a new axis of attack against Russia.
This would not be some new deep strike or creative sabotage in the main theater of war.
It would not be even anywhere close by where Ukraine had pressing security needs.
(side note: a good example of this is Belarus - the country remains sovereign in name only, and is essentially a launch pad for Russian attacks. Ukraine should feel no qualms about going after Russia’s military targets that Belarusian President Lukashenko decided to welcome in his country)
No, none of these: instead, Kyiv contemplated arming and training Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to attack Russians in Syria.
And apparently, Turkey was aware.
Now, this would have been a natural partnership: Ukraine gets to weaken Russia in Syria, shake the Assad regime, and boost SDFs regional power in relation to the Iran-backed militia (punishing Tehran for all the drones that they have supplied to Russia).
In return, the SDF would have secured further modern NATO (mostly US) hardware, and training from Ukraine, and increased its power (and therefore, leverage) vis-à-vis all stakeholders involved in Syria.
Now, this was (quite understandably) a very tempting proposition for Ukraine to consider.
In addition to the aforementioned strategic gains, the plan would also come with a number of signaling and strategic benefits:
a) Demonstrating Ukraine’s aptitude, ruthlessness, and willingness to expand the war and play bigger strategic games.
b) It would signal to Russia that even the direct costs of this war will go beyond the theater in Ukraine: this in turn helps to alter the balance of incentives for the Kremlin.
If the benefits of continuously prosecuting the war remain static (and one could argue, are on a diminishing trajectory) while the costs go up, the Kremlin’s overall balance of incentives shifts further into a negative territory: they would now be more likely to at least consider an end to the conflict.
c) It would impose new strategic dilemmas on the Kremlin.
Russia is already running out of precision guided missiles (PGMs) like Kinzhal and Kalibr missiles.
Would they now have to redeploy some to Syria?
What happens if they don’t, and if their positions in Syria weaken? (after the SDF pummeling).
Not only would Russia’s ability to prop up the Assad regime reduce dramatically (acting as a signal to other Putin-dependent autocrats that the end is nigh, and it is prudent to keep hedging their bets), but its ability to counter both Israel and Turkey would also weaken dramatically.
Israel would secure even more space for its missile strikes, and Turkey would have a freer hand to enter and operate as it would please Ankara.
Given that the pressure on the Iran-backed militias would also increase, Tehran would have to redirect at least some resources destined to Russia - to secure its own position in Syria.
And these are just a few of the first order effects - there are undoubtedly a number of second-order effects that would create additional risks to the Kremlin.
d) Signal Ukraine’s staying power.
By expanding the war into Syria, Ukraine would signal that it is willing to keep on prosecuting the war for a very long time.
As in: not only are we anywhere close to conceding our territories, here: we are actually now going to expand this theater into faraway territories that you control.
In the near term, this would perhaps be one of the most powerful signals: if there is one fundamental premise underpinning Putin’s entire war strategy, it is the belief that he can outlast Ukraine and the West.
The ‘‘as long as it takes’’ statements coming from the West don’t necessarily sound too convincing either: Putin can see the actual political realities shifting in both the US and in the Western Europe.
But, if Kyiv signals its own willingness to expand and protract the war, then this (together with the NATO signaling) might in fact put a dent into Putin’s hitherto conviction in his own staying power.
On the other hand however, there were at least three major problems with this plan:
1)Pragmatic issues.
Ukraine is not running a surplus of ammo and essential weapons.
It constantly needs to plead for (lagging and still inadequately minimal) western military support.
Every weapon going to Syria (and every soldier devoted to training the SDF) takes away from the primary battlefield.
Is this really a prudent trade-off?
Shouldn’t Ukraine optimize for success on its own land first? Before even considering any additional campaigns?
Of course, one could argue that by expanding the theater of war, Ukraine would do just that: spread Russia thin and weaken its ability to concentrate its forces in Ukraine.
But this is more of a long-term gain.
When you have a city like Bakhmut on the brink of collapse, sending away troops and weapons to Syria may not be the wisest strategy.
2) High political costs.
And this takes us to the second major cost - perhaps the most important cost when it comes to Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war in the long-term.
And that is: extreme political cost in front of the general public.
And this would be in relation to both domestic and foreign audiences.
A lot of Ukrainians would wonder why isn’t the government utilizing all of its forces and resources to save towns in the east of Ukraine? To save their fighting sons and brothers, to save their relatives in Bakhmut?
And the Western public would also take note: is this really a country in an existential crisis? Is this really a country in desperate need of our support?
After all, if they can afford to expand the war into Syria, surely their survival is no longer a realistic cause for concern as it once was?
Indeed, the voices of Tucker Carlson and co would grow even louder - and on this occasion, many in the middle would also agree.
And there is an added Syria factor here: many in the west (and Europe especially) would be increasingly worried about another mess in the Middle East: a renewal and escalation of a conflict that could lead to yet another refugee crisis.
3) Unapproved escalation against Russia.
The Biden admin is already quite uneasy about provision of the necessary to win armaments like ATACMs and fighter jets - fearing major escalation with Russia, pushing Putin into more drastic measures, and incentivizing China to get involved rather heavily in order to save its failing ally.
Ukraine’s foray into Syria would only confirm these fears - strengthening the hand of those that have long advocated for a more careful and measured support to Kyiv.
At the time when NATO’s Secretary-General says that “Ukraine’s place is in NATO”, engaging in escalatory and theater-expanding campaigns (that many NATO members would find exceptionally reckless), would probably not work out well for Kyiv.
(side note: Stoltenberg’s statement aimed to achieve two primary objectives: 1) Signaling to the Kremlin that their attempts to make Ukraine unviable for a NATO membership have not worked, and that a) NATO is indefatigable in its support for Ukraine, and b) the long-discussed Ukraine war fatigue has not had an impact on NATO’s resolve, and 2) Offering Ukraine a bright future in NATO (along with an accelerated membership to the EU) would prove valuable when it comes to persuading Kyiv into negotiations and settlement with Russia: there would be something concrete to show for such a sacrifice (of deferring the recovery of all lost territories, and the resolution of all outstanding political issues - with the future of Crimea first and foremost). Unfortunately, closer alignment is needed within NATO when such statements are uttered by the Secretary-General. Not too long after Stoltenberg’s comments, the German defense minister dismissed the notion that it was an appropriate time to discuss Ukraine’s NATO membership (he is technically correct - but whether it was worth saying in public is highly suspect. In any case, this could all have been prevented ahead of time, before the Secretary-General was to suffer a very public credibility loss).
And this would be real bad news for Ukraine: with a reduced western support, not only would their Syria campaign end up being short-lived and counterproductive (accruing tactical and strategic costs, whilst ending way before they could ever produce any real benefits), but there would be additional direct implications on Kyiv’s ability to prosecute war on their own turf.
All in all then, there is a clear asymmetry of costs and benefits: the downsides are highly probable, specific, and of a major magnitude.
The benefits on the other hand were contingent (on a number of things going right/according to plan), uncertain, and came with risks of major unforeseen events.
Accordingly, Zelensky was right to abort this plan.
This is not to say that there is no major strategic value to weakening both Russia and Iran in Syria.
On the contrary, and as previously discussed in these cables, stability and peace in the Middle East will not be possible with Iran and Russia’s cancerous outgrowth in the region.
But that is a project for a superpower and not for Ukraine: Kyiv was right to abandon this plan, and should not waste any more time and resources on planning anything similar (or rather not do so in actuality - a deliberate feigned interest (not made in public - avoiding political costs) in such campaigns distracts Russia and keeps the Kremlin on its toes).
Macron’s gift to the “Global South”: early proofs.
In the previous post analyzing the potential implications of the French President’s Beijing trip, we highlighted one major geopolitical risk in particular: the normalization effect.
We discussed how if even a NATO leader, and a leader of the EU’s second largest economy can be so cozy with Xi Jinping, so dismissive of America’s foreign policy and so indifferent to the fate of Taiwan, then it is only a matter of time that the up and coming countries of the global south (with their own big aspirations) would seize this opportunity for their own ends.
In other words, Macron’s statements and conduct were a gift to these swing states: it normalized their pre-existing behaviors like hedging geopolitical bets whilst closing eyes on clear right and wrong.
Countries from Latin America, Africa, Middle East, all the way Southeast Asia can now pursue national interest with lesser concern for their reputation: a hitherto significant disincentive that precluded brazen state-level self-serving policy.
And unfortunately, this risk is now being materialized.
There is for example India - which as recently as last Monday, welcomed the Russian trade minister to discuss a free trade agreement to deepen the bilateral commercial ties (which were already on steroids during this war).
Nonetheless Delhi is at least self-aware in its rhetoric: it avoids silly diplomatic errors whilst playing all parties against each other (for example: as it is deepening its commercial ties with Russia, it is also pursuing a closer military relationship with the US).
But there are of course other countries that are (and will be) far less tactless in pursuing their self-interest.
Looking at the past week, Brazil is a great example of this.
In his comments (ostensibly expressing the wish that the war be over soon), Brazil’s President Lula accused the US of “encouraging” the war by arming Ukraine.
This is of course plainly dumb - by asserting that helping those in need of self-defense and self-preservation (from a superpower led by an egomaniac with imperial ambitions), US is “encouraging” the war, Lula is joining the ranks of the intellectual heavyweights (like the Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene) found on the clownish far right.
So then, Lula is either 1) demonstrating exceptionally bad judgment for a President of a major country, or 2) he is essentially dishonest: No good options here…
But is it really a coincidence that Lula was willing to say this so soon after Macron implied that the US was fanning the flames of potential war in Taiwan (to which, allegedly, China was simply ‘‘overreacting”).
Is it also a coincidence that so soon after Macron’s trip to Beijing (where he called for a foreign policy distinct from the one pursued by the US - urging Europe not to be a ‘‘follower”) Lula went on his own Beijing trip, where during a summit with Xi Jinping, he expressed the wish to work with China to ‘‘balance world politics” and backed the longstanding Chinese goal of undermining the US dollar?
Brazil is a major non-NATO ally of the US, and yet, its President talks about dismantling the US dollar on a trip to Beijing:
“Every night I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar.”
First off, your priorities are off here - there are plenty of domestic issues for you to think about every night - trust me, USD dominance in global trade is the least of your worries.
Secondly, the answer is very much in the question: countries chose to base their trade on the dollar, simply because, it is literally the best option out there.
The USD is backed by the financial might of the world’s richest and largest economy that is based on a durable political model and backed by the strongest military ever known to mankind.
What are your alternatives? The Russian ruble?
Or perhaps countries should base it on Chinese Yuan/the Renminbi?
That is not going to happen anytime soon: China is a deeply authoritarian system, where the political system is linked to one man (who can shut down or open an entire country on a whim).
There are too many political risks (let alone financial - China is not as rich, and it has too many chinks in the financial plumbing - with the recent real estate debt crisis being a prime example of this).
Most importantly, Beijing engages in capital controls - no free trade of desired predictability and durability can be based on a currency that can be directly interfered with due to capital controls (which remember, can be implemented based on a desire of one person).
And this basic truth is acknowledged by countries all over: one of the major reasons why Chinese Yuan is not a reserve currency of choice for most of the world.
In fact, as a share of global central bank reserves, Yuan is doing no better than the Canadian Dollar (both come at under 3% vs the USD at a dominant 58%): not a great testament of trust is it?
What about a common BRICS currency backed by gold (apparently on a roadmap to be discussed at the next BRICS summit this August).
Theoretic possibility yes, but hard to see how this would succeed anytime soon.
For a common currency to have a chance at success, the economies in question should be largely aligned on macroeconomic policy, their public finances/growth rates and trajectories not too divergent, and inflation somewhere in a similar ballpark.
But this is not the case for the BRICS countries: a lot of them have widely different inflation rates, and the central bank interest rates differ significantly too (from 4% to 14%).
Some BRICS countries may favor a stronger currency to prioritize cheaper imports, whilst others may want to drive an export-led growth and would therefore want to keep the price of the currency in check.
There are moreover, a number of strategic sticking points: would India want to tie itself so closely to China?
What if China gets shut out of global markets due to its decision to invade Taiwan?
Would other BRICS members want to stay involved and suffer a joint hit to their currency that would surely take place if the biggest member economy is being chocked?
The Eurozone crisis demonstrates how the misaligned public finances and macro policies, and obstacles to a joint decision-making (bailout decisions taking weeks in America, took years to implement in the Eurozone) could prove so damaging: the Euro project almost fell apart, and these were advanced economies of Europe that had significantly more similar economic fundamentals than say, South Africa and China..
So then, the reality is that the US Dollar is too far embedded in global finance (enjoying powerful network effects) to be challenged anytime soon - especially if the challenger option comes with even bigger problems.
(side note: and perhaps the type of leaders that would consider their own country (Brazil) joining a monetary union with Argentina, should spend their time learning the basic macro principles of how currencies operate, before throwing around accusations against the dollar’s dominance)
Now, Lula did later pull back a little - condemning the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity by Russia.
But this was only after a major backlash from western allies, and DC in particular.
The White House (rightly) accused the Brazilian President of “parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda without looking at the facts” emphasizing the crucial point that his ‘‘tone was not one of neutrality."
So the damage was already done.
And when it comes to France itself, despite efforts by Washington to reverse Paris' course, the results have been less fruitful than anticipated.
President Biden spoke with his French counterpart on Thursday.
But Macron did not use this opportunity to fix major mistakes.
The readouts from the White House and The Élysée diverged on a crucial point.
Whereas the WH statement said that the leaders "had reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait", the corresponding readout from the French presidency was conspicuously quiet on the issue of Taiwan specifically - in fact, it skipped it entirely when promoting general “support international law, including freedom of navigation, throughout the Indo-Pacific region."
So then, why was it so hard for the French to align on a basic principle that there should in fact be peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait?
From Washington’s perspective, surely this was the most minimal and basic point of alignment.
Why would the French not even mention Taiwan by its name?
It is unlikely that the French found it too difficult to upset the Chinese by even including the word “Taiwan” in a statement full of platitudes.
In fact, this is something that even Beijing would agree to: yes, let’s keep peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
(side note: naturally, for China that means Taipei’s willing submission to reunification. But that is besides the point.. the main point that the uttered sentiments were far from disagreeable (even to China) still stands)
A more likely explanation is that unfortunately, the French are still deliberately signaling to the US (and to the rest of the world) that they will push back against the hitherto consensus alignment on Taiwan.
A counter from Germany.
Macron’s sentiments are in stark contrast to those uttered by the German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock - who (when reporting her recent China trip to Germany’s Bundestag) commented that some of the impressions that she returned with were “shocking”.
Baerbock did not elaborate what specifically was shocking to her - but one could speculate this had to do with senior Chinese leadership’s stern rhetoric and warning on Taiwan.
Unlike the very much China enchanted Macron (who is doubling down on commerce and refuses to even voice any possible risks/downsides of cozier relations with Beijing), Baerbock offered a sobering assessment of China: emphasizing the increasing prominence of the “systemic rivals aspect” of the relationship.
The timing of these public comments on China is probably not coincidental.
At the time when France has made it clear that it is rather content to deviate significantly from Washington and pursue a primarily commercial interest in China (and care little about Taiwan), Germany’s contrasting stance comes with at least three major realpolitik benefits:
1. A reminder to the US that Germany is America’s biggest and most important ally on the European continent.
Sure, there are arguably even more devoted allies like Poland or Estonia.
And then there is France: with its nuclear weapons, largest navy in the EU, and an army well ahead of that of Germany’s.
But only Germany - the richest economy in Europe - is thus far aligning with Washington on China and Taiwan.
(side note: most of the other EU states do also align to a large extent. There are even those demonstrating far more courage than their bigger EU partners. Lithuania is a great example of this. But only Germany’s economy is big and important enough that its closer alignment with Washington must be very concerning to Beijing)
Consequently, Germany is reminding Washington of its value as a very close ally.
And beyond the benefits of a stronger long-term relationship, this should come with near term concrete gains as well: Berlin can accrue enough political capital to ask Washington to go easy on them in relation to all things Ukraine.
2. Counter and check France.
Strategic Autonomy may also be desirable to Germany, but a supranational union where France gets to set agendas/direction of the bloc, is not in Germany’s interests (beyond the basic point of pride).
3. Play the role of a kingmaker.
Assuming the role of the balancing power suits Germany well.
And there is a clear market for this.
Poland had made it clear that it is not (to put it mildly) happy with France pushing away the US.
And Poland is a rising power (that might even overtake the UK in terms of GDP per capita by 2030s) that will get to dominate the entire Eastern bloc that is turning out stronger due to the war in Ukraine (Warsaw will get even further leverage once Ukraine joins the EU. If demography is destiny, then the Eastern bloc can soon become a major power within the entire EU).
Ideally then, Berlin would side generally with the US, and use its intra-union swing vote and align with Poland whenever France needs to be checked/countered.
It could do the very opposite if/when the eastern bloc gets too ambitious and assertive for Berlin’s taste.
Having said all this, one should not be excessively cynical and doubt the sincerity of Baerbock’s sentiments.
After all, Germany was proven exceptionally wrong on its foreign policy towards Russia: dependence on Russian gas for 1/3rd of its natural gas needs (which was set to only increase with Nord Stream 2 - had the project gone ahead: Something that these cables spent better half of 2021 advocating against).
It is not too surprising therefore, that the German leaders want to avoid another international faux pas of epic proportions.
Two things could both be true: Germany is truly worried about cozying up to China and it gains from the contrast it creates with France.
But in geopolitics, nothing ever happens in the absence of a larger context.
And here, Germany is line to secure pragmatic gains from opposing the French stance.
But regardless of exact motivations at play, the US and the entire Western alliance is to gain from Germany trying to put a brake on the French eagerness to speed ahead towards the dragon’s den.