Ukraine war updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
Ukrainian troops continue repelling Russians in Bakhmut.
Further forward progress has not been made.
The temporary slowdown in frontline operations tempo allows for Kyiv to devote further resources available for Western training.
Next batch will be trained on new hardware supplied by the West - the armored vehicles in particular will feature prominently.
Delivery of these armored vehicles and tanks will pose a direct challenge to the stockpiles of the European NATO states - for example, at the start of the war, the UK had less tanks than Ukraine.
(side note: this is a purely numerical analysis of course. Obviously, Challenger IIs are much more advanced than the T-72 or T80s. But the point still stands: there are not enough for both a major ground offensive and enough to supply to an ally in need - domestic production levels in UK, Germany and France will have to rise significantly. This should be less of a problem for Germany or France. But the UK is going through a major period of public sector cuts - massive increase in defense spending will be criticized widely by those lacking a longer term strategic sense. Unfortunately for No 10, a potent coalition).
On the other hand, a Ukrainian infantry charging forward with heavy armor means lesser reliance on artillery use to pave the way for its soldiers - securing some time for NATO states to amp up their artillery shell production before Ukraine’s use becomes unsustainably high/hard to replace.
In the meantime, there is an informational war going over whether the small mining town of Soledar was indeed captured by Russian troops.
Although the town itself is strategically insignificant, it is economically valuable (due to its salt mines).
And if Wagner captures it, it is a substantial return on investment for Prighozhin.
In addition, and after weeks of little progress, withdrawal from Kherson, and slaughter in Makiivka, this would be the first win for Russia (no matter how insignificant).
At this point, and before further major offensives become viable options, Putin will be happy to see small towns like Soledar fall to Russian forces - this is at the very least a change in the ongoing demoralizing narrative (advanced by the far-right nationalists, Wagner and Chechen leader Kadyrov) that the Russian troops are completely useless, and its leadership wholly incompetent.
This very political pressure to act ruthlessly explains recent wave of missile strikes - one of which brazenly targeted a civilian apartment complex in Dnipro - causing major devastation and most probably very high casualties too (the rubble has not been cleared away fully).
The latest missile strikes had a mixed source: some were cruise missiles like Kalibr, others were modified S-300 and S-400 missiles launched from Belarus.
According to the spokesperson of the Ukrainian Air Force Yuri Ignat, these missiles are especially hard to intercept and hit - they reach Kyiv (from Belarus) in approximately two minutes.
The most effective solution would be to target the launch sites/s-300 and S-400 systems behind the strikes: this would in turn require arming Ukraine with longer-range precision missiles (like ATACMS).
Another reminder to the West not to delay the provision of these important weapons for much longer.
Putin once again replaces his top commander in Ukraine.
Only three month into the tenure of General ‘‘Armageddon’’, Sergey Surovikin, Putin decided to demote him and appoint Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov as the overall Commander in Ukraine.
(side note: technically, the appointment was made by the Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu - but it is inconceivable for a move of such gravity to be made in the absence of Putin’s explicit desire and support.)
First of all, the most pressing question needs to be addressed: why is Surovikin to be demoted?
Things were turning out a lot better for Russia under his command.
Living up to his reputation for ruthlessness and clear lack of any ethical concern towards civilians, Surovikin started a major campaign to use missile strikes against Ukraine’s core infrastructure - targeting the country’s electricity, power, and utilities.
This has been an effective campaign - imposing an unpalatable dilemma on Ukraine - forcing Kyiv to choose between using air defenses to protect the frontline troops and military assets or backend civilian infrastructure.
Needless to say, Ukraine’s offensive capabilities have been hampered.
What about withdrawal from Kherson?
Although Surovikin was the one “recommending” withdrawal from this important southern city, he really did not have much choice.
The untenable positioning and entrapment of Russian soldiers in Kherson was the fault of his predecessor.
Surovikin’s real choice was between saving relatively more competent 30k troops or agreeing to their outright slaughter.
By all objective standards, he made the right call, and in fact, executed the withdrawal with a high degree of competence: Russian troops somehow managed to install pontoon bridges on short order and withdraw rapidly and by surprise - even Ukrainian leadership was hesitant to believe that there was a movement to withdraw from Kherson up until the very last moment.
(side note: although this very ignorance may have been deliberately exaggerated and could have also been an excuse by Kyiv to not pursue Russian occupiers and engage them in close combat - calculating that saving offensive capacity was preferable to an attempt to route the withdrawing troops).
But then there is the Makiivka slaughter - a successful Ukrainian missile strike that killed hundreds (according to Ukrainian sources) or at the very least 89 (the highest figure Russians were willing to admit) freshly mobilized troops.
This was not a great start for a year - especially after Putin’s grandiose speech promising victory.
Milbloggers, ultranationalists, Chechen leader Kadyrov and Wagner chief Prighozin were quick to point fingers at the military leadership for a total failure to prevent the extent of the slaughter - apparently, there was an easy fix: not accommodating troops right next to the fuel storage.
That such an incident has happened on a number of previous occasions does not help the reputation of an ultimate theater commander - surely three months in a job was enough to issue a simple safety directive.
That may be so, but whether this directive would then be followed through diligently, is quite another matter altogether.
It is revealing that the Russian Defense Ministry (growing more reflexively defensive with each day) was quick to blame recruits for their use of mobile phones - alleging that this helped the Ukrainian side to locate their whereabouts with precision.
This is a plausible proximate cause - but one that raises yet another question - how is it that the leadership is trying to avert blame for inability to instill discipline.
If (as the Ministry alleges) this has been an ongoing issue, then isn’t a 11 month period enough to execute proper disciplinary measures to ensure that such a basic fiasco does not take place?
Once again, this is more of a middle management type problem - Russia has been losing many competent generals on the frontlines since the start of the war.
There may simply be not enough competent and efficient managers to instill this much-needed discipline.
But in spite of his short tenure, one could see how Surovikin could be held accountable for this basic error - after all, the political costs to Putin (mainstream media joined ultra-right and milblogger groups in their criticism) were immense - a refresh may have been needed.
And what better way to signal seriousness of intent than to appoint the Chief of General staff as the overall theater commander?
Alternative explanations.
a) Pretext to fire Gerasimov?
As in: is Putin deliberately creating a context where a direct failure by Gerasimov can justify his sacking?
It is possible, but extremely unlikely - the war is too important for Putin to use it for political games with little payoff.
After all, what is it really that he is to gain from such games? He can sack anyone at any point with little excuse needed for it (at least for now. (There are almost no signs of his weakening grip on power).
This “deliberate scheme to sack Gerasimov” theory would necessitate a further assumption: that Putin has been so weakened, and his effective power so restricted, that he feels a need for an elaborate ploy to concoct an excuse to sack Gerasimov.
In other words, a highly implausible scenario.
b) Regime rehabilitation.
This is a relatively more likely possibility: that Putin wants to rehabilitate his regime leaders’ / siloviki (security apparatus) heads’ reputation for competence.
If Ukrainian intelligence services are indeed correct, and Russia is in fact on a course to recruit 500k more mobilized troops, then a late winter/early spring offensive is likely.
And if Putin is confident about at least some success, then he might be deliberately placing Gerasimov into a position where he gets to secure the “win’’ - thus rebutting months long criticisms (from milbloggers/far right/Wagner/Kadyrov) of the official army leadership for their incompetence.
This is more plausible because it serves Putin’s interests - although he likes to have his options open, and a powerful and more confident Wagner is a good tool to have in his backpocket, it is also important to remind the players/outsiders like Prigozhin and Kadyrov (that are outside the highest echelons of the Kremlin leadership) that Putin’s own Siloviki come first - Shoygu and Gerasimov’s reputation is important for the top boss - as he is affected by mere association.
It is important to note that under this analysis, Surovikin’s demotion is a formality only - he would likely retain most of the control and responsibility for the day-to-day operational command.
We have thus far considered multiple possible angles, but what if the truth is far more banal?
After all, there is clear evidence that Putin is becoming increasingly erratic and unwilling to analyze the situation facing him holistically and with patience.
For example, during a meeting with government officials broadcast on state television last Wednesday, Putin laid into the Minister of Trade and Industry Denis Manturov.
Putin was not mincing his words: he accused Manturov of “fooling around” due to a failure to secure contracts for civil and military aircraft for 2023, and demanded that the latter gets it done within a month “and no later”.
The Russian economy is under an extraordinary pressure and the sanctions have a particularly biting effect on the sanctions industry.
With a disregard to this context, Putin found it appropriate to publicly humiliate Manturov.
And any individual possessing a rudimentary knowledge of business processes realizes that Putin’s directives to secure a major contract ‘‘no later’’ than a month are not reflective of the reality of complex procurement systems.
What if the same impatience with rational analysis and lack of appreciation for nuance is in play in the context of the Ukraine war as well?
What if the similar style of (limited) thinking led to the replacement of Surovikin?
This may in fact turn out to be the least interesting but the most likely answer to the question.
One thing is clear however: Gerasimov himself could not possibly be happy to take on this project.
Even if Russia is about to mobilize, Ukraine will also get a boost from the increasing amount of hardware available to it: and if tanks follow the steps of armored vehicles, then Russia’s offensive operations may become frustrated.
His task is not going to be easy: Prighozhin (and the far-right) will be out there for blood - using their social media heft to emphasize every failure and claim every victory on the ground.
As such, Gerasimov will have an incentive to take extreme measures to ensure at least some level of success - anything less, and he will be completely discredited, and will struggle to survive politically.
This is a good reminder that Ukraine needs offensive weapons fast - any further success will not only lead to territorial gains, but would also crush the reputation of one of the main regime leaders - scathing Putin by association too.
The US must go ahead with the F-16 sales to Turkey
There are reports that senior US lawmakers are raising concerns about the Biden admin’s proposed $20bn sale of 40 F-16 fighter jets and (80 modernization kits) to Turkey.
Some of this is unquestionably a genuine opposition that stems from geopolitical analysis arriving at wrong conclusions: that it is better to keep this particular leverage in place before Erdogan further aligns himself with Washington.
But this is a misreading of the status quo: the US is also going to sell F-35s to Greece.
And together with the recent military bases established in Greece, this is a worrying signal to Erdogan and an act of redistributing (intentionally or not) the regional balance of power from Washington.
In other words, Erdogan will need advanced fighter jets to counter these moves - and he will need them soon.
So either he gets them from Washington (maintaining interoperability with the US military) or he purchases the Su-35s or even more advanced J-20s from Russia and China respectively (which will lead to major long-term geopolitical implications).
So then, some of the analysis is merely a genuine misreading of the facts on the ground.
On the other hand, there is also a powerful Greek lobby in Congress blocking this transfer: players who do want to alter the balance of powers.
Regardless of the source of opposition, the Biden admin is on the right track on this one.
Going ahead with the sale will also have a further tension-reducing effect on the Turkey - Sweden relations.
It is important that both Sweden and Finland be admitted into NATO as soon as feasible.
To their credit, Swedish authorities have complied with most of the anti-terrorism and extradition demands advanced by Erdogan.
The extradition of a journalist (follower of Fetullah Gulen - leader of the FETO organization, currently residing in exile in the US) accused of a role in the 2016 coup attempt has been blocked by the Swedish Supreme Court.
This is understandable, Sweden is a country with a strong rule of law, and the Western diplomats must convey this message to Erdogan - convincing him to drop this particular demand.
There are however active players on the scene trying to sour the relationship between Ankara and Stockholm.
Burning President Erdogan’s effigy in Sweden was done precisely to increase tensions and increase the tensions in the Turkey vs West relations.
(side note: who gains from this? Russia, Kurds, Iran, China. Who loses? Western alliance)
Indeed, even the Swedish PM himself could no longer contain his frustration with the saboteurs:
“I would say this is sabotage against the Swedish NATO application..it is dangerous for Swedish security to act in this way [emphasis added]”.
Erdogan has an election coming up this June - he is thus particularly sensitive to the appearances of weakness and disrespect.
With the economy still struggling from high inflation, foreign policy accomplishments are going to be his go to trick in the next six months.
He will already be tempted by Putin’s (undoubtedly upcoming) offers of lucrative financing and trade deals to add a quick further boost to his stalling economy.
Refusing to sell F-16s and pushing him closer towards Russia will be an avoidable mistake.
Washington must not complicate the already difficult regional situation with further missteps.
Preserving distance between Turkey and Russia is going to be an important strategic and diplomatic goal for the Biden admin.
One that will be much tougher to achieve if the sale of F-16s is blocked (which if it goes through, will empower Washington with further leverage to demand additional concessions on the S400 issue - paving a path for Turkey’s eventual return to the F-35 program).
Yes, you're surely right. There is always room for chaos and lack of rational analysis in the Russian command pyramid(s). Improvise is a major tool in their dark shed. Thanks for the thorough look at all of this.
Let Turkey send someone to Sweden to interview the guy. NATO memberhip is very important, but they can’t hand him over. We are not hanging over Gullen.