Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, and how can Iran and Houthis hit back.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Russia’s 3-months long assault degrades into meat-grinder tactics.
An assault on a small Ukrainian city of Avdiivka that started last fall, is yet to produce results.
And Russians are getting increasingly desperate: after months of extreme casualties (tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles) and failed attempts to capture the city, Russia is now sending assault units on foot and without cover of heavy armor.
This naturally makes them an easy target for the drone strikes.
What explains such a desperation to achieve results at all costs?
After all, this is not a major city like Kharkiv, why waste so many resources and lives on a town of 20k?
Yes, it is a logistical hub and has some strategic importance - but casualties north of 20k in exchange for a few miles?
At this point, Russia lost more troops on one small town that it thus far failed to capture, than America lost in total (around 12.5k dead) during the US-Mexico war of 1846-68 (and the latter had naturally resulted in enormous territorial gains in the West - let alone the brief capture of Mexico city).
If the time is truly on Russia’s side (as Putin loves to frequently claim), why not wait until sufficient forces have accumulated for an overwhelming advantage?
It is possible that Putin wants another ‘‘victory’’ prior to the Presidential elections (more like coronation) in March…
It is also a signal of Russia’s willingness to absorb enormous costs.
And such signaling (just when the US/EU is about to make decisions on further funding) is aimed at strengthening the hands of Putin appeasers in the West - arming them with arguments like: ‘‘fighting this war against Russia is futile. Just look at them.. look how willing they are to throw the kitchen sink.. we will never outlast them, so let’s save time and money and negotiate now”.
Unfortunately, Putin’s tactic seems to (gradually) take hold - imagine the contempt that he feels towards his western counterparts when such manipulation ends up working just fine..
Of course, it is still very likely that the funding in Congress and in the EU will soon go through - but the delay is already damaging: Ukraine will soon face shortages of ammo.
Additionally, and even if this round of funding goes through (which it almost certainly will), Putin is laying the ground for future crises in Western unity.
This is because of a simple reality that Ukraine will most likely not accomplish a major battlefield breakthrough anytime soon.
(side note: and Putin appeasers in the west seem to forgive Russia for the failure of their months long assaults (with full access to air power) on just one town, when they are very quick to point out Ukraine’s failure (without access to air power/ modern fighter jets to match Russia’s) across an entire 600 mile front-line in the east)
Naturally, when the time arrives for yet another round of funding, the voices of these appeasers will grow even louder: ‘‘again?! don’t we have homeless (or insert any other domestic issue) to take care of back home? Why are we wasting so much money on Ukraine?”.
And the answer is always the same: 1) It is Ukraine that wants to fight for their land, we are not fighting for them or pressuring them to do so. 2) And at 0.18% of our GDP, we have caused enormous damage (315k dead and wounded or 90% of pre-war personnel + thousands of destroyed tanks/armored vehicles, aircraft, warships etc) to the most significant military partner of our primary adversary, China. 3) And if we don’t do this now, if we allow Putin to get an away with an invasion, the world will revert back to the multipolarity (accompanied with the ‘‘might makes right’’ brute power jungle rules) of the 19th century - and the ultimate cost to Americans in both blood and treasure will be much higher under that system of international governance accompanied by perpetual insecurity, conflict and humanitarian/refugee crises.
2) Ukraine continues targeting strategic sites deep inside Russia.
Ukraine conducted a drone strike on a gas terminal in St Petersburg.
This was the very first time that St Petersburg became a target of a Ukrainian attack - further demonstrating the reach of Ukrainian special ops.
In addition, there was a massive explosion and fire as a result of a strike on a Rosneft oil storage facility in a Russian town of Klintsy - about 30 miles from the Ukrainian border.
It is only natural and strategically prudent for Ukraine to target Russia’s main money-making energy export industry: oil & gas.
3) Europe continues to step up.
First there was the British PM Rishi Sunak’s surprise trip to Kyiv - during which he announced a new $3.2 billion package to support Ukraine.
A significant portion of this fund, (at least $255 million) will be allocated for the rapid procurement and production of the various drones for Ukraine.
These include surveillance, long-range strike, and sea drones, making it the largest drone delivery to Ukraine from any nation.
Most drones are expected to be manufactured in the UK, marking a substantial contribution to Ukraine's defense capabilities.
In addition, Sunak was careful to rebut the previous switch in tone (from Biden switching to “as long as we can”) : promising to stand by Ukraine “for as long as it takes”.
Secondly, there is now a formal UK - Ukraine defense agreement in place.
This is a powerful step in deterring Russia: a treaty between Ukraine and a major NATO power, and therefore, a direct rebuttal to Putin’s imperialist ‘‘Russia’s sphere of influence” fantasy.
Some key paragraphs:
Through this agreement:
the Participants will work together on ensuring a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future, through the continued provision of security assistance and modern military equipment, across the land, air and sea, space and cyber domains – prioritising air defence, artillery and long-range firepower, armoured vehicles, and other key capabilities as required, such as combat air, and by promoting increased interoperability with Euro-Atlantic partners;
the UK will provide long-term advice and support for defence governance and policies in order to strengthen Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence;
the UK will, alongside other international partners, help Ukraine to enhance its deterrence to external aggressors by developing modern Armed Forces that are increasingly interoperable with NATO and contribute to the NATO force pool. This includes development of a modern defence sector in Ukraine, and a pathway to a future in NATO through…[emphasis added].There could have been no better rebuttal of Putin’s delusions that time is on his side and that Ukraine will be abandoned by the west.
Far too many countries need Ukraine to win for their own national security - not a reality that is likely to be changed by a few pro-Putin midwits in Congress or far-right media circles in the west.
And UK’s decisive action is now being followed by another major NATO power: France is now committing to produce 78 Caesar self-propelled howitzers specifically for Ukraine.
France will finance 12, and 60 more will need to be financed by a pool of allies.
And Ukraine bought 6 already for $3.3m -$4.4m.
With 78 more coming their way, Ukraine’s stock of self-propelled howitzers will more than double (Ukraine currently has 49).
5) Ukraine accomplishes a remarkable success in the Black Sea.
Over the past year, we have all witnessed how Ukraine has pursued a deliberate strategy of striking crucial military targets in Crimea and sinking Russian ships both at sea and when docked at ports.
The latest high profile attack was when Ukraine hit a major Russian landing ship with a cruise missile strike.
Russians are forced to adapt to this unwelcome reality, more of the ships are now loitering further away from the coast, and many warships now avoid the port of Simferopol and opt to dock at a naval base in Novorossiysk - a southern Russian city on the Black Sea coast.
But we now have another major accomplishment: Ukraine’s grain exports have now reached their pre-war levels.
Prior to the Ukraine war, on average, Ukraine exported between 7.5-8 million tonnes of grain a month.
This tanked after the initial Russian blockade and eased a little after the Black Sea grain deal.
Putin then reneged on this deal last summer (drawing the ire of his Global South partners - many African states most affected by the move had then boycotted July’s Russia-Africa economic forum at St Petersburg - Kenya going as far as to accuse Russia of backstabbing) and this then raised alarms that Ukraine would suffer further economic damage just when it was in the middle of a counteroffensive.
But in spite of the cancelled grain deal, Ukraine still managed to succeed in breaking this chokehold.
Grain exports have now reached their pre-war levels, and more companies are now willing to provide insurance for the cargo vessels carrying Ukrainian grain.
And in fact, insurance rates have dropped from 7% to 1.25% of the overall cargo value.
All of this is a remarkable accomplishment, and is in fact a reminder that war is being fought on multiple fronts: and that even if the borders in Donbas remain static (for now), Ukraine is successful in shaping favorable outcomes in other theaters of this war.
Direct military costs of escalation with Iran and its proxies: how can they hit back?
We have previously discussed how escalating towards a general air/missile strike campaign against Iran and its proxies could be advantageous to the US and other NATO allies.
But how can they respond?
What are their most dangerous capabilities?
(side note: this is an analytical observation - not a prediction. The best predictive indicator of this actually happening would be a significant re-deployment of Patriot and THAAD air defense SAM batteries into the region in preparation of a major confrontation)
In a post two weeks ago, we have already taken a closer and much more detailed look at the capabilities of Iran’s most important proxy - Hizbullah.
We shall now turn to Houthis and Iran itself.
There is of course an important caveat that the proceeding analysis will be rather high level - we do not have access to the most up to date intel on the IRGC/Houthi capabilities: this would mostly not be in the public domain
It is even likely that most governments also do not have such intel - only select few states like the US, Israel, UK, Turkey and possibly a few more countries will have access to the most up to date intel on the capabilities of these adversaries.
With that said, there is plenty of intel available to the public.
Some of it can be captured from satellite intel, and sometimes, regimes reveal (with exaggerated capabilities) their most important weapons for the propaganda and threat display capabilities.
But mostly, the following analysis will be based on IISS’ military balance report - perhaps the most reputable source of military intel available outside of formal state institutions.
Houthi threat.
The Houthis’ entire arsenal is based on Iranian, Chinese and older Soviet tech.
Most of their missiles are variants of the older Soviet Skud missiles - with some modern Iranian tech.
Just like Iran, Houthis possess a significant arsenal of Shahed drones: yet given that these carry around 60-100 pound payloads, they are comparable to 155mm artillery shells.
They are also pretty slow, and therefore, easy to shoot down.
Indeed, Ukraine usually destroys the entire swarm of Shahed drones - frequently scoring above a 90% hit rate.
Nothing special is needed to destroy these -Ukraine relies mainly on German Gepards.
But US warships are well-equipped with Phalanx CIWS - good fit for low-speed and low payload drones (saving more expensive missiles to tackle larger ballistic/cruise missiles).
So these are unlikely to cause much damage to the US/Allied ships - they are more likely to serve as a distraction and to harass commercial ships.
But Houthis also have a number of ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles (like the Soviet era P-15s, frequently shown at parades).
But they fly at subsonic speeds - so easier to shoot down.
More dangerous are Iranian Falaq-1 and Tankil ballistic missiles.
These have optical seekers and can reach speeds of Mach 4-6.
But being the crown jewel of the Houthi arsenal, they are likely to be well-guarded and thus not ready to be deployed at a very short notice.
A capable satellite intel can alert to visual indicators that would suggest their immediate deployment - shooting these launchers preemptively should not be too hard for the US navy.
Having said this, there are also a number of smaller/slower ballistic missiles that could cause not so insignificant damage.
Although US ESSM and SM-2 missiles are highly capable of taking these out, a few of them may get through and cause some damage to US ships.
With all that said however, Houthis are simply not in a position to cause significant direct threat to the US navy - especially after last week’s first major wave of airstrikes.
Iran threat.
Iran has no air power to speak of - its fleet consists of old F-4s and Russian Su-24s.
(side note: Iran’s limited Navy with few creaking warships and subs will likely avoid a direct confrontation where they would be immediately outmatched. A more likely threat is a number of speedboats and underwater drones - though it is unclear to what extent they have advanced. Overall however, the Iranian Navy will not pose a significant threat to the US or its allies. Iran surely remembers how in just one day back in 1988, they lost 50% of their Naval power after a direct clash with the US Navy. Since then, there has not been a radical improvement. They will most likely try to preserve their ships for an actual peer match like Saudi Arabia etc. ).
That may change soon with the arrival of Su-35s (and why therefore, it may be better to have an air strike campaign now rather than in future - more on that later below) but for now, its main threat comes in the form of ballistic missiles.
Naturally, all of the aforementioned ballistic missiles in Houthi hands are also in Iranian possession (since Iran is their country of origin..)
But how many are there?
There is no precise number, but back in March of 2022, the former CENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie said that Iran had 3,000 ballistic missiles - and that ‘‘some” of them could even reach Israel.
Now, the word “some” can mean a lot of things, but we are probably not talking about thousands or a few dozen.
But it is realistic that Iran may have hundreds of ballistic missiles that could reach Israel - this would mean a range of at least 900-1,000 miles.
There are a number of Iranian missiles capable of this range - with the most advanced likely being Khorramshahr-1,2 and (the most advanced) 4 types.
These can reach Mach-8 speeds upon re-entry, and can cause significant damage to both Israel and to US army bases in the region.
But it is important to remember that these are the crown jewels of Iranian arsenal, and less than a thousand of these are likely available - so then:
1) Iran will likely not use all/most of it unless it considers the upcoming war to be of true existential scale (which, it may not be too quick to conclude, given that the probability of a US ground invasion is unlikely - and in fact, firing them on US bases could perversely turn the war into one that carries existential stakes)
2) Both the US Israel are well capable of shooting down the majority of these ballistic missiles.
And when it comes to Israel, Iranian missiles would have to be fired from a narrow set of locations in the western Iran (given the distance needed to reach Israel).
In addition, they would need to fly through Iraq and Syria - meaning that there is a very specific limited approach vector for the Iranian missiles.
Combined with Israel’s compactness, saturation of systems like Arrow-3s (main shield targeting in mid-course phase of the missile’s journey) and David’s sling (additional shield upon re-entry phase) will keep Israel safe.
Even if Iran was to use all of its ballistic missile arsenal against US and Israeli targets, most of them will probably not go through the layered air defenses that will meet them.
(side note: unless Iran decided to use all of them at once in order to overwhelm the air defenses - an insane proposition even for Iran)
Finally, both Israel and the US would use F-35s to take out launch and storage facilities after the very first barrage..
Iran and its proxies may end up causing some serious damage - but in the grand scheme of things, the US and its allies will likely accomplish all of their narrow military objectives at an acceptable cost.
In return for defanging Iran, and dismantling its proxy network (which terrorizes and destabilizes the entire region and maintains a de facto veto on global commerce) this may yet prove to be a highly net positive campaign.
I see the Slovak leader says he will Never approve Ukraine membership in NATO. Mere talk, of course, and extremely speculative and premature. With the long delay of Swedish accession, I fear a new government there, in future, just loses interest and withdraws their application.