Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, Washington's nonsensical excuses on ATACMS, the impact of F-16s and race to counter ballistic missiles.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Russian forces continue to advance slowly in Donbas near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
2) Iran delivers ballistic missiles to Russia.
It is widely reported that Iran has now delivered more than 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, with the shipment arriving at a Caspian Sea port on September 4th, according to a Ukrainian military intelligence source.
The US and European officials confirmed that Iran has begun supplying Russia with these missiles, marking a significant escalation in their military support.
Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure during the upcoming fall and winter months.
In addition they will likely be used to distract and overstretch Ukraine’s air defenses and enable deep strikes without ballistic and hypersonic missiles that carry even more payload.
The war in Ukraine is evolving into a major confrontation between the West and enemies of the West: something that those shamefully arguing against helping Ukraine would do well to remember.
3) Pokrovsk is inflicting a serious toll on Russia.
According to the British Ministry of Defence reports, the Russian casualties have spiked to nearly 1,200 per day, making their current rate of loss on the Pokrovsk axis and in Kursk unsustainable.
Consequently, Russia’s operational capacity for this year may not extend beyond the Pokrovsk campaign, regardless of whether they capture the city.
With that said, Pokrovsk is now in danger of falling into Russian hands.
It is also important to remember that whether or not Pokrovsk itself is actually captured by Russia, merely approaching ever closer to the city will enable the Russian artillery to strike important rail routes branching out of Pokrovsk.
In other words, even without taking over the actual city of Pokrovsk, the Russian military can still succeed in attaining the most of the strategic value in disrupting the important role played by this city as a logistics hub.
Washington’s continuous nonsensical refusal to lift deep strike restrictions on Ukraine.
While announcing a new $250 million military aid package for Ukraine, the US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin dismissed the notion that the US should lift current restrictions on Ukraine from using US missiles in long-range strikes deep in Russia.
This is unfortunate enough, but what is even more disheartening is to see the Defense Secretary twist himself into inconsistent and illogical knots while trying to avoid spelling out the (most probable) real reason for this refusal: excessive risk-aversion and an embarrassing fear of escalation.
Austin doesn’t want to admit the worry around triggering Putin or crossing his ever-elusive ‘‘red lines’’.
So instead, he chose to provide an even more inadequate explanation: that apparently, there was simply no need for Ukraine to use US missiles and strike deep into Russia.
Austin justified his ‘‘no need’’ argument with three observations:
1) That Russia has relocated many aircraft and munitions depots out of range of US missiles;
2) That in any case, no ‘‘one specific capability will be decisive" and;
3) That Ukraine was already using their own long-range strikes - so they had long-range strike capabilities with or without the US in any case.
None of these are even remotely persuasive.
First off, the mere fact that Russia was forced to relocate its depots and air bases out of range is in itself the most persuasive argument in favor of continuing these strikes.
Clearly, this strategy worked, and so why not continue it?
And it is clearly not the case that all high-value Russian assets are now out of ATACMS’s range - this is clearly not plausible at all.
(side note: and there are credible reports that at least 250 military targets (like airfields, depots etc) close to Ukrainian border will be reachable with ATACMS. Surely not all of these 250 have been abandoned, or even can be - given their utility in supporting close combat efforts..)
Or is Austin really going to argue that if they were to deliver ATACMS without restrictions on their long-range use that Ukraine would simply fail to find viable targets?
And if hypothetically that was indeed the case, then what is the worry here?
If Ukraine is not going to find targets to use, then at the very least they can keep them as a deterrence against Russians moving back their high-value logistical nodes back to the border with Ukraine.
Secondly, the argument that no one specific capability is decisive has zero dispositive value since Ukraine is not arguing its opposite.
No one is saying that unrestricted long-range deep strikes alone will suffice to turn the tables on Putin.
But then again, this same logic can be applied to anything thus far given to Ukraine.
Austin could have used this argument to refuse the delivery of M1 Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Patriot air defense batteries, NASAMS, etc etc.
Similar arguments can be made in relation to helmets..
No one is arguing that with this one change Ukraine will be on top - Ukraine needs everything to go its way to have a fighting chance against a superpower.
But when all of these capabilities are provided for in sufficient quality, then they have a cumulative effect on the overall picture on the battlefield.
Ukraine needs all the edge that it can get - and that includes its ability to fight back without artificial restrictions.
Finally, the assertion that Ukraine is already engaging in long-range strikes is indeed very disingenuous.
Although it is true that Ukraine is busy with deep strike capabilities like the recently revealed long-range jet-engined ‘‘rocket’’ drone Palianytsia, their numbers are still not enough to make a meaningful dent on the overall picture.
In addition, at least one reason why Ukraine decided to engage in these long-range strikes to begin with, was a desire to offer a proof of concept for Washington: that hitting military targets hundreds of miles deep inside Russia is fine and that it won’t lead to an uncontrollable escalation.
Indeed, the very fact that these strikes are already taking place (as per Austin’s own words), is an additional argument to supply Ukraine with further ATACMS with no targeting restrictions.
They will continue to take place with or without Washington’s help in any case - so why not stop over-worrying about ‘‘escalation’’ and offer the help that Ukraine needs?
Austin himself did highlight that since the outset of this war in 2022, and with the help from the US, Ukraine has successfully inflicted major damage on Russia - including 350k Russian casualties and sinking or damaging 32 Russian Navy vessels in the Black Sea.
So how about Washington continues this much-needed help at the required level and intensity to ensure that one of the primary US adversaries, major enabler of Iran and North Korea, and the closest military ally of China continues to suffer enormous costs in this war?
(side note: the Biden admin’s foot dragging here is unjustifiable that even House Speaker Mike Johnson (who was initially skeptical on Ukraine aid) is now arguing that the US should not ‘‘micro-manage’’ war efforts in Ukraine by restricting Kyiv’s ability to engage in deep strikes.)
Ukraine loses the first F-16 in a friendly fire - how much of an impact can we expect from the rest?
Ukraine has now received six F-16s out of the 85 promised by the NATO countries.
These jets were first deployed in combat on August 27th, successfully intercepting Russian cruise missiles and drones aimed at power facilities.
And unfortunately, during a large-scale Russian missile attack on August 29th (74 drones, 5 missiles), a Ukrainian pilot (callsign "MoonFish") tragically crashed and killed.
He destroyed three cruise missiles and one drone before his F-16 went down, with no confirmation yet on whether it was shot down or suffered a mechanical failure.
Evaluating the impact of F-16s.
1) Early warning aircraft and advanced aircraft radars will sharpen F-16s edge in the battlefield.
Ukrainian pilots are currently facing tough odds, with Russia having 802 fighter aircraft versus Ukraine’s 72 as of August 2024 (a 13x advantage) and Ukrainian pilots are flying 20 times fewer sorties than their Russian counterparts due to limited resources.
Given this, it is imperative that Ukraine gets 1) more aircraft but also, 2) is able to maximize the utility of its sorties.
And one way to increase the productivity of these sorties, is to have advanced warning on appropriate targets.
And here, we have some good news: Sweden has sent two Saab 340 Airborne Early Warning radar aircraft - a significant upgrade for Ukraine’s air surveillance capabilities.
Ukraine previously had no radar aircraft, and this new capability could shift F-16s to more offensive roles.
In addition, the F-16s itself comes with advancements in radar capabilities.
Ukraine’s new F-16s are equipped with the APG-66 2A radar, capable of detecting targets over 52 miles away, a significant upgrade compared to Ukraine’s Soviet-era jets.
The system can track up to 10 targets and engage 6 simultaneously, providing superior situational awareness in challenging environments.
In addition, the F-16s feature modern radar warning receivers (RWRs) that offer detailed threat detection and identification, significantly improving Ukrainian pilots’ ability to navigate high-threat airspace compared to their older MiG-29s.
2) Advanced weaponry and offensive capability.
The Danish F-16s, while older models, have gone through midlife updates, giving Ukraine access to advanced NATO weaponry, including the AIM-120 AMRAAM long-range missiles that will be supplied by the US (promised for delivery by the end of the summer 2024).
The AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles will provide Ukraine with "fire and forget" capability, putting Ukrainian pilots on more equal footing with their Russian adversaries in air combat.
(side note: previously, Ukraine resorted to R-60 infrared and R-27 semi-active missiles on their Russian Su-27s and Mig-29s. The R-27 especially left Ukrainian pilots lacking long- range capabilities since the semi-active seeker head meant that they had to keep the fighter's nose pointed at the target to keep it locked for the entirety of the missile’s flight time.. In contrast to this deficiency, Russian pilots were equipped with the R-77 Active Radar missiles that had the desirable fire and forget capability. This was a massive advantage that Ukraine will now get to reduce.)
3) Improved survivability and ability to conduct SEAD missions.
The F-16's modular systems will also allow full integration of NATO air-to-ground ordnance like the AGM-88 HARM for SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) missions.
Ukraine will now find it easier to destroy S-300 and S-400 air defense batteries (as well as many other shorter-range systems) using its F-16s.
(side note: Initially, there was a concern that Ukraine may not get the most advanced munitions: Ukraine’s F-16s were shown with older A9 Sidewinder missiles in August 2023, rather than the more advanced A9X. There was a legitimate concern about advanced Western weapons falling into Russian or Chinese hands if an F-16 is shot down. However, the US has stated that advanced weapons like the A9X will eventually be sent to Ukraine. And there is some evidence that this may have already taken place.)
Full evaluation of F-16’s impact will have to wait and will ultimately depend on a number of factors: whether Ukraine will receive them in sufficient numbers and with sufficient numbers of advanced missiles, how many pilots will be trained and ready to operate them sometime soon, how well will they be maintained etc..
But even at this early stage we can assert with some confidence that this will be a significant capability for Ukraine.
Ukraine needs intel and ammo to hit ballistic missile launchers.
Late this August, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, publicized the number of Russia-launched and Ukraine-intercepted missiles since the onset of the invasion on February 24, 2022.
Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion, Russian missiles and drones have hit 11,879 sites in Ukraine, of which 6,203 were civilian targets, and 5,676 were military targets.
According to Syrskyi, the Russians used 9,590 missiles and 13,997 drones to attack Ukraine, of which 2,429 missiles and 5,972 drones were intercepted.
So the total intercept rate for missiles was around 25% and the rate for drones was around 43%.
In addition: “The effectiveness of interception of Kalibr, Kh-555/101 and R-500 cruise missiles against the Iskander air defense missile defense system was 67%. Kh-59, Kh-35, Kh-31 and other similar guided missiles - 22%. The difference in the interception of these two similar types of targets is explained by the fact that guided missiles are usually launched by the enemy at front-line or border facilities, where it is not possible to echelon air defense equipment.”
At least two things to note here:
1) We didn’t get a full breakdown of timelines - when exactly these missiles were launched and how did they coincide with the availability of modern air defense systems like Patriots, NASAMS and IRIS-T etc?
We know that Patriots and NASAMS in particular had very high intercept rates (but we also don’t have the full breakdown of exactly which missile was intercepted with which interceptor).
But overall, it is fair to say that availability of Patriots and other western-supplied interceptor systems produced a major dent in Russia’s hit rate.
We can observe this phenomenon most recently this year - late winter and early spring when Ukraine was struggling to shoot down Russian missiles due to a delayed Ukraine aid bill and the consequent lack of interceptor missiles.
2) Short-range ballistic missiles are a different breed altogether.
But this is where things get more interesting and significantly more troubling:
“The enemy used a total of 1,388 ballistic missiles against the Iskander, Tochka-U, and KN-23 anti-missile missiles produced by the DPRK, of which only 4.5% were intercepted”
This is a very low intercept rate - so low in fact, that attempting the intercept is probably much more costly and ineffective in comparison.
These aforementioned short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) have a range of around 70-300 miles and can carry payload of up to 1-1.5k lbs.
Due to their speed, flight path, flight duration (thanks to short ranges) and mobility of the launch platforms, it is much more challenging to intercept a short-range ballistic missile in comparison to long-range cruise or even ballistic missiles with a longer flight duration.
Iskander-M or Tochka-U can be driven closer to frontlines and placed tactically to exploit opportunities in Ukraine’s defensive gaps (whether that is lack of radars, interceptors, or sensors in the relevant area).
There is no easy solution to this problem: just saying that Ukraine needs more interceptors is not good enough (although they need that too).
The reality is that Ukraine would always need to prioritize munitions (interceptor missiles) for Patriots or NASAMS or Arrows to prioritize high-value targets like the long-range cruise/ballistic missiles (with even higher payloads) or the Russian air force aircraft.
As such, there will never be enough interceptor missiles to devote to the mission of intercepting missiles that have 1) lower payload, and 2) have a dismal 4.5% interception rate.
A better way to solve this problem may be to improve the ability to find and destroy the launchers: in other words, preventing the missiles from taking off altogether.
This is a far more effective strategy - and one which the UK and US utilized against the Houthis in Yemen.
The primary limiting factor here is availability of better intel: it is unclear how much real-time intel help Ukraine receives.
But probably nowhere near enough to deal with this threat more effectively - and this needs to change.