Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War Updates, Storm Shadows, and Blinken - Cleverly meeting.
Ukraine War Updates.
1)Bakhmut.
Ukraine made significant gains southwest of the city as of May 14 - facing strong opposition from Russian tanks (Ukrainians have appealed for more Javelins).
Is this a decoy for main attacks coming up down south, or a beginning of a counteroffensive proper? (in spite of Zelensky’s claims to the contrary - more on that later below).
2) A humiliating day for the Russian air force.
Russian media outlets have reported a series of aircraft crashes in Bryansk Oblast, raising concerns over the escalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine.
On May 13, two Mi-8 helicopters, a Su-34 bomber, and an Su-35 fighter were involved in the incidents, with some Russian sources attributing the crashes to Ukrainian air defenses.
Geo-tagged footage reveals the aftermath of the crashes near Surestskii Muravei and Klintsy, approximately 50km away from the Ukrainian border.
Speculation from Russian military bloggers suggests a coordinated Ukrainian strike utilizing air defense systems positioned near the border area of Chernihiv Oblast (district) as the potential cause of the crashes (brilliant move from Kyiv if true).
Russian media reports confirm that all four crews have lost their lives in the incidents.
Furthermore, Russian sources have disclosed that the two helicopters were not ordinary Mi-8 models - but rather the costly Mi-8 MTPR1 with long-range electronic warfare systems, designed to suppress enemy air defense radars.
It is worth noting that Russia's inventory only consisted of approximately 20 such sophisticated systems.
And in a sign of a further intra-regime decay and normalization of attacks on the core military establishment of Russia (thanks in large part to Wagner/Prigozhin rhetoric going unpunished, and in fact, rewarded - more on that later below), in response to the crashes, Daniil Bezsonov, the Deputy Information Minister of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR), condemned the Russian aerospace command, accusing them of "tyranny" and "fraud."
3) Allied staying power.
On his visit to Brazil, the Dutch Prime Minister discussed Ukraine with his Brazilian counterpart - promising that Netherlands would back Ukraine for “as long as needed” : a message crucial for America’s major non-Nato ally (that has been recently hedging towards China and Russia quite a bit) to hear.
What Holland did rhetorically, Germany backed with concrete action: announcing a $3bn military aid package (Germany’s largest military aid commitment to date: involving a lot of air defense systems to be supplied to Ukraine) ahead of Zelensky’s expected visit.
4) Ukraine’s creative adjustments to commercial drones.
This great report highlights the creativity of the Ukrainian military in turning commercial drones into remotely operated killing machines.
Although larger, military-use drones like Switchblades and Iran’s Shahed drones have longer ranges and can carry heavier payloads, they also come with one crucial disadvantage: preprogrammed navigation.
Ukraine’s hand-built alternatives on the other hand, can be steered remotely by operators close to the frontlines: a unique advantage in responsiveness and flexibility.
5) Russia’s embarrassing victory day parade.
In a speech delivered in Moscow's Red Square on Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Western nations of waging a "real war" against Moscow, using Ukraine as a bargaining chip.
However, the subdued nature of the celebrations on Victory Day revealed Russia's vulnerability and military weakness rather than projecting its might.
The parade itself, which lasted less than an hour and featured only a single Soviet-era tank and no aircraft, drew clear and undesirable attention to Russia's diminished military capabilities.
(side note: there were a few more pieces of hardware that were “tank-like” but not quite the real deal. Understandable - all rapidly diminishing resources are devoted to the frontlines)
And only a handful of regional leaders attended the parade, including the heads of states of Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
Note the attendees - at least two leaders had little if any choice: one is unofficially Putin’s hostage (Belarusian leader Lukashenko), the other is a leader of another vassal state dependent on Russia’s military rescuing it and underwriting its occupation of Azerbaijani territory in Karabakh (leader of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan).
(side note: and if the US/EU brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal succeeds, even that lever over Armenia would become severely limited in practice)
And even then, Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko had to be driven a short distance to the event (refusing to walk with other attendees) and declined an invitation to a lunch hosted by President Putin.
6) Putin’s appeasement of Prigozhin proves costly.
Last week, we discussed how Putin was facing a dilemma over Wagner/Prigozhin: punish and lose a key resource (or a significantly diminished one - if not totally foregone) or appease Prigozhin (agreeing to resupply his troops) and send a signal of weakness and inability to administer tough punishment on those attacking the core leadership of his regime.
Putin decided to take the hit and appease Prigozhin - who in turn, then announced delivery of additional ammo.
But this mini-victory (and a reward for his aggressive attacks on Putin’s key generals) had emboldened him even further.
Prigozhin accused the Russian defense ministry of further incompetence, alleging a massive ‘‘rout” within the ranks of the Russian army (Russian defense ministry later confirmed withdrawals from areas of Bakhmut).
But he did not stop there: he “invited” the leaders of the Russian Defense Ministry to visit Bakhmut: calling on them to visit the city and address the issue of fleeing troops in person.
He also said that Wagner PMC was "using their ammunition to stop the fleeing servicemen of the Russian army" (in his telegram response to Viktor Sobolev, member of defense committee of the Russian parliament).
It is pretty clear what Prigozhin meant by that..
To be clear, it is not credible that Wagner did in fact confront formal Russian soldiers with lethal force (and thus far, there is not a shred of evidence of this) - now that would definitely lead to chaos within the Putin regime.
But the very fact that he can make such ludicrous claims and go unpunished, is a strong signal of Putin losing his grip - he is being exceptionally complacent to such major slights.
He seems to be indifferent to the threats that such conduct poses to his regime.
In power vertical systems, all regime officials’ power and status rests on the regime leader being in charge and competently administering the power dynamics within this regime - allocating power/resources, and administering penalties against those that deviate against the rules swiftly.
In other words the power of those under Putin is directly derivative of Putin’s own prestige - maintenance of which requires a periodical display of calculated ruthlessness and cruelty against those that dare to cross the line.
And unless this happens, as a second/third in command, your own power and status comes under question..
Now then, put yourself in a position of a senior Russian general, Defense ministry official or any other member of the the siloviki/security apparatus establishment - if under Putin’s rule you are now exposed to (unpunished) attacks from those that you consider as lesser parasites, then what does that say about the state of your authority?
What does it say about your job security and prospects under Putin’s rule? Is Putin really delivering on the promises contingent within the system of power vertical?
After more than a year into this war, Putin is starting to face extreme pressure on his regime; regional leaders of fake/puppet states join into mocking the military’s top brass, an obvious psychopathic thug claims to have used force against fleeing Russian soldiers, and pro-war nationalists (led by Igor Girkin - an individual who first started operations in Donbas in 2014 - dragging Russia further into Ukraine. Back then, Putin would have been happy with Crimea, but was then lured and persuaded into backing separatists in the east of Ukraine) have now openly declared political ambitions to “save Russia” from “turmoil” and “collapse” that could take place due to military failures in Ukraine.
Britain supplies Storm Shadow missiles: a game changer for Ukraine and an embarrassment for the US.
These cables have long called for the US to supply Ukraine with long-range missiles, and with ATACMS in particular: with a range of 185 miles, these are essential to reach deep behind Russia’s frontlines: enabling Ukraine to target everything from command & control to fuel depots.
Most of Crimea (and the Kerch bridge connecting it to Russia) and the Russian Navy would also be vulnerable to these missiles.
But the Biden administration was excessively risk-averse: fearing deep strikes within Russia and an escalation with the Kremlin.
(side note: and in making such erroneous estimations, the Biden admin is somehow forgetting that these strikes are a) already taking place, b) russia is not escalating - mostly because there is no viable path to an escalation, and c) there is a full-on major war that has already escalated as much as it can when it comes to conventional weapons - virtually almost all conventional weapons have been used by each side).
Well, now the UK is stepping up and offering the weapons that Ukraine needs to fill the gap in its long-range capabilities.
Equipped with a TR60-30 turbojet engine (giving it a range of 155 miles), the air-launched Storm Shadow cruise missiles will prove exceptionally instrumental for Ukraine.
The missile's 400 kg BROACH warhead, composed of a two-stage mechanism, has the potential to surpass the capabilities of laser-guided gravity bombs.
The first stage of the warhead consists of a shaped charge that effectively clears a path through formidable obstacles such as concrete and earth - facilitating the subsequent penetration of the target by a follow-on warhead.
This innovative design empowers cruise missiles with a level of hard-target penetration previously limited to laser-guided gravity bombs.
Meaning that: provided it successfully reaches its intended destination the Storm Shadow will prove to be an exceptionally potent weapon against fortified objects (perhaps even more effective than ATACMS).
There are however two major risk factors that could limit the Storm Shadow’s effectiveness:
a) Reliance on satellite navigation: Russians are increasingly proficient in Electronic Warfare (EW), and the missiles can therefore be interfered with and end up missing their targets.
This is perhaps one major disadvantage in comparison to ATACMS - being air launched, Storm Shadows require more prep, and come with way more preparatory ‘‘checklist operations” : as a result, granting more time/opportunity for Russian intelligence operatives to identify and prepare for an upcoming missile launch.
b) Because they are air launched, at some point, they will either need to be stored at or transferred to an airfield facility/storage: Russia could then pick up crucial intel and target them on the ground - even before the carrier plane gets an opportunity to take off.
c) They will be susceptible to the Russian S-300 SAMs.
If the Ukrainian S-300s can successfully hit Russian Kalibr cruise missiles that fly at speed of mach 0.8-3, then there is no good reason to expect that Storm Shadows traveling at a slower 0.8-0.95 Machs will not be even more vulnerable to the S-300 missiles (even if decoys/saturation from Ukraine with cheaper missiles, blunt this to some extent).
With that said however, Storm Shadows are on the whole empowering Ukraine with major capabilities - and increasing pressure on the US to deliver ATACMS.
Washington appearing as more hesitant and risk averse than London, is not a great look for a global superpower that needs to appear as tough as it can to deter China.
The Biden admin must quickly fix this problem and join the UK in supplying Ukraine with its own long-range missiles.
Blinken - Cleverly meeting sends a crucial signal ahead of the upcoming counteroffensive.
These cables have repeatedly highlighted the inadequacy of the Western/NATO support in the face of a looming Ukrainian counteroffensive.
First and foremost, Ukraine is entering this new offensive without modern air power - with the US/NATO still noncommittal on the provision of fighter jets like the F-16s.
In addition, Ukraine has not received adequate amounts of breaching equipment, mine-clearing machines, and bridging gear to surmount the formidable and deep defensive lines that Russia has been establishing for the past several months.
But perhaps the most consequential deficiency, came in the form of weak diplomacy: mainly, the necessary yet missing display of an essential signal that the Western support will continue regardless of the outcome of the upcoming counteroffensive.
And this was arguably the biggest strategic danger facing Kyiv: Ukraine was saddled with high expectations, offered short-term, just in time ammo support, yet crucially, faced lack of clarity on what will follow next.
And this was very dangerous - this oversight in long term signaling came with a risk of affecting Putin’s calculus in a very unfavorable way: the Kremlin (already suffering from confirmation bias and wishful thinking) could very well believe that if only they prevent an outright Ukrainian success, the Western enthusiasm (and the corresponding will for continuous support) would finally crumble, and that Kyiv would be pushed towards negotiations on unfavorable terms.
And that Russia - still in possession of around 18% of Ukraine’s territory - would enter these negotiations with a stronger hand.
So then, the Western proclivity to provide just in time capabilities and ammo support is not fit for long-term strategic signaling.
In fact, the very surge of ammo just ahead of the counteroffensive (with little clarity on post-counteroffensive level of support), very much serves to confirm the Kremlin’s theory of this war.
In other words, this lack of clear commitment on the long-term western support, incentivizes the Kremlin to drag out this war, convincing them that the time is still on their side: if only they could hold on for just a little longer.
Indeed, this very concern was shared by the Ukrainian leadership (including the President Zelensky himself) as well: they are rightly worried about conditionality of support based on hyped expectations.
Clearly, the Kremlin’s calculus that they can outlast the conditional support offered to Ukraine is very much not in the Western interests.
But it is also not in the US/NATO interests that right at the outset of this counteroffensive, Ukraine should believe that future support is conditional and thus, under threat: this very belief could push Kyiv towards conduct that prioritizes accomplishment of short-term political objectives over sustainable military operations.
The last thing we need right now, is a combination of: a) Putin deciding to bide his time and wait out the Western support, and b) for Zelensky to push for short-term theatrical battlefield gains - at the expense of what is appropriate from purely military concerns: causing a risk of Ukrainian forces overextending and leaving themselves stretched thin and open to a dangerous counteroffensive (and that is, if they even prove successful in chasing that unrealistic goal in the first place).
There was therefore, a significant gap in strategic communication from the West: there simply had to be some credible signal of long-term support.
And encouragingly, the first step was taken this past week when the Secretary of State, Antony Blinken hosted his British counterpart James Cleverly in DC.
Both sides reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine, and the British Foreign Minister made the following key comment:
“We need to continue to support them irrespective of whether this forthcoming offensive generates huge gains on the battlefield because until this conflict is resolved and resolved properly, it is not over” [emphasis added].
This is precisely the messaging needed to dispel Putin’s notion that time is on his side, and reassure Ukraine that they need not be worried about short-term demonstrative progress - and that they should instead focus on accomplishing a solid and durable campaign/counteroffensive in the nearest future.
And the effectiveness of this signaling is already quite evident.
It is surely not a coincidence that after weeks of hyping up an upcoming counteroffensive, President Zelensky was confident enough to announce a delay the upcoming campaign (citing the need for a better prep and more weapons/resources to accumulate) just two days after Blinken-Cleverly’s public signaling.
(side note: of course, we cannot also rule out a disinformation campaign/psyop - but the manner and tone of Zelensky’s statement indicates the newfound relief and confidence about the post-counteroffensive state of affairs.)
Naturally, this messaging will now have to be backed by concrete actions: it is all well and good to promise long-term / post-counteroffensive support, but the West now needs to show that they in fact mean it too: projects that imply long-term military support (as opposed to just in time deliveries) must be announced in the upcoming weeks.
Putin must see that the West is readying itself for another round of long-term commitments - something that he would be able to infer once the US/NATO announces plans that require another batch of long-term training and logistics support.
It is great that several Ukrainian brigades were trained in combined arms maneuvers ahead of this counteroffensive.
But Putin must see that many more are on course to receive similar training - with training schedules targeting late this year / early 2024.
Same applies to the schedule of future arms deliveries.
Putin may very well bet that he can withstand the upcoming counteroffensive and outlast the Western support (which he estimates to expire by the end of this year).
It is time to dispel him of that notion: the first step (with correct strategic messaging) has now been accomplished - it is now time to follow through with actual conduct that boosts the credibility of these crucial signals.