Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, Wagner vs Putin's generals, and the Kremlin drone attack.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Refinery attacks.
In the past week, Ukraine had reportedly attacked four refineries and two fuel trains.
2) The EU’s Defense industrial complex wakes up.
A new EU-wide plan has been unveiled to boost weapons manufacturing across the union.
The European Commission's endorsement of the “Act in Support of Ammunition Production” signifies a pivotal development.
This strategic move secures an extensive injection of over $550 million from the EU budget, augmented by an equivalent sum of $550 million contributed by member nations.
(side note: the framework would also (and rather controversially) allow for dipping into pots of EU cash (from the cohesion fund) hitherto set aside to promote the union-wide economic development. The creative workaround: many factories were built in isolated areas - technically, a leveling up scheme..)
3) US military aid for Ukraine includes air-launched rockets.
The new $300mln package includes (for the first time) the Hydra-70, short-range air-launched rocket.
Short range and air-launched: clearly to prop up the upcoming counteroffensive.
4) Dutch PM: talks on F-16 supply to Ukraine ongoing.
Prime Minister Mark Rutte said that such discussions were “progressing’’.
The statement was made during Zelensky’s trip to the Hague (where reiterated calls for Putin to be prosecuted for war crimes)
5) Patriots successfully intercept and destroy Russia’s Kinzhal missiles.
US-supplied Patriot missiles had successfully taken down Russia’s Kh-47 Kinzhal missile.
This is significant, and according to the US officials, “both systems were performing at their best” - in other words, the Kinzhal did not malfunction (and so it was not easier to down it).
Kinzhals are considered hypersonic - but it is important to note that they reach hypersonic speeds mostly at the time of re-entry and midcourse maneuvering (unlike say, Zircon missiles - which operate at hypersonic speeds for most of their journey after the initial launch).
Nonetheless, this is a significant reputational boost to Patriot missiles - much needed after the embarrassment in the failure to intercept must slower Iranian drones targeting Saudi oil fields in 2019 (one hopes that was due to Saudi operator incompetence and not due to Patriots’ performance - but Pentagon leaks don’t go that far in history..).
Prigozhin’s antics reach new levels: unpalatable dilemmas for Putin.
Wagner leader Evgeny Prigozhin published a new self-made video full (standing by the side of dead bodies) of extreme rhetoric and personal insults directed at the Russian military’s top brass - Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and Chief of the General Staff (and head of the overall Ukraine command) General Valery Gerasimov.
For Putin, the worst part of this incident isn’t perhaps the fact that Prigozhin threatened to withdraw from Bakhmut and abandon the defense of the city in the next few days.
(side note: and there is now a report that Wagner is to be replaced by “Akhmat” in Bakhmut - Chechen forces/Kadyrov’s personal guard - although Russia’s defense ministry is yet to respond to this claim)
Neither is the implication that countless lives have been lost just to take the city by May 9th - Russia’s Victory Day (WWII) parade - an arbitrary date, where symbolism (of dubious impact - Bakhmut isn’t a major city after all) was weighed higher than doing things the proper way - avoiding unnecessary loss of lives.
No, for a psychopathic authoritarian highly sensitive to perceptions of power, none of these are as bad as Prigozhin’s direct expletive-laden insults aimed at the military leaders appointed by Putin - this is in effect an indirect insult against Putin himself.
For if the military chiefs are ‘‘fat cats” sitting comfortably by as Wagner soldiers get killed (due to allegedly, ammo shortage caused by the deliberate refusal of the Russia’s Ministry of Defense to provide adequate supply), then what does that make of Putin - a person who appointed them?
This is clearly an astonishing level of insult directed at Putin’s judgment, leadership, and ultimately, his reputation for prowess and competent administration of the state in times of war.
We also know that this is not the first time that Prigozhin directed his ire at the top brass.
Far from it: Prigozhin had made similar comments in the past - but those have secured him an audience with Putin.
In other words, Putin incentivized these hyperbolic outbursts.
This is operant conditioning 101: Putin had essentially trained Prigozhin to keep pressing the button.
But thanks to the Pentagon leaks, we also know that Putin didn’t really administer and direct - he outsourced.
According to leaked US intel, Putin (back in February) told Prigozhin to ‘‘address these issues with the Defense Ministry”.
In other words, even though Putin did after all, essentially side with his generals, he did not do much to resolve the tensions: he outsourced a key problem and left it unresolved.
Consequently, we have a situation where: 1) Putin rewarded bad behavior by granting Prigozhin attention and audience, and 2) Did not solve the underlying issue.
Rewarding and emboldening a drama queen demagogue without solving the root cause of the problem (really, a power dynamic, and intra-regime competition for resources and status) is a toxic mix: and this came back to bite Putin really bad.
One cannot emphasize enough how bad this insult is: consider a thought experiment - can you imagine a private military contractor in Iran, insulting the head of the IRGC?
Or let’s say there was a Wagner-like PMC fighting in Yemen - can you imagine its CEO calling the Saudi General (appointed by the crown prince/MBS) a ‘‘fat cat’’?
Both would be really difficult to contemplate even on a conceptual level - but then again, a year ago, no Russia observer or senior analyst could have predicted a similar situation happening in Russia.
More than a year into the war, we are now seeing real cracks in Putin’s prestige and charisma within Russia’s domestic politics.
Putin’s unpalatable dilemma.
He now faces two really bad options:
1) Punish Prigozhin and risk losing Wagner as a tool in Ukraine - not only in Bakhmut.
And there need not even be an outright insubordination, out of revenge, Prigozhin could simply order his troops to fight a little less hard - sabotaging further progress on the battlefield.
2) Appease Prigozhin and risk losing the support and loyalty of his “siloviki”/security apparatus.
Appeasing Prigozhin, and not addressing the personal insults directed at his top generals could cause both Shoygu and Gerasimov lose their respect and loyalty towards Putin.
And not only, if Putin signals his inability to discipline one drama queen, then what does it say about his own power and charisma?
What does it say about his ability to administer conflicts and resolve power dynamics within the regime?
If Putin shows weakness in this massively important area, then major players like Shoygu, Gerasimov, and others will be incentivized to hedge their bets and prep for a post - Putin era (that is, if they haven’t done so already).
Putin’s failure to be tough against Prigozhin will come at a high price: it will incentivize coalition building behavior within the very core of his regime.
The players with most to lose, will have to consider alternatives, and perhaps even consider backing someone who would pull the trigger (and this might be the literal one in Russia) on Prigozhin.
And there really is not a third option for Putin - opting for a combo of the first two (where Prigozhin gets a “stern talk” and yet, still secures more ammo -and there are already reports that he got what he wanted and was indeed promised this aid) will not alter the fundamental outcome that Prigozhin still got what he wanted - he was still rewarded for this unacceptable insult.
Putin is now facing a very tough situation: this very threat of losing his grip over his security apparatus, and not sanctions, (or disgruntled financial elites unable to dock their yachts in the south of France), is now the biggest threat to his personal power.
Putin’s continuous weakness and equivocation would offer an opening to a new player who would want to organize a shake-up (or even a coup) within the regime.
(side note: or maybe, the ticking time bomb has already started, and Prigozhin’s willingness to throw around such insults is a lagging indicator of things being already in motion)
The next few days/weeks will provide us with a preliminary answer on Putin’s chosen path - and some indication on the probable downstream implications following from this.
Striking the Kremlin: the responsible party and risks & rewards.
Perhaps the most pressing question of the past week was: who dunnit?
Who attacked the Kremlin with drones - was it Ukraine? Or was it a Russian false flag operation?
First off, it is essential to frame the question correctly: drone strikes against the Kremlin and an assassination attempt are two different things.
The Kremlin claims that it was an assassination attempt.
Now, this is almost certainly untrue - no matter what one may believe about Ukraine’s motivations for this attack (if it is indeed Kyiv), one thing is pretty clear: the resources deployed were wholly inadequate for a grand project like an assassination of a well-protected leader of a major (alleged) superpower at war.
The captured footage of one of the drone strikes (there were two in total) clearly shows that the drone was: a) flying at a very low speed, and b) carrying a very small payload (clear from the explosion).
It is also pretty obvious that the drone was not one of the bunker-busting types (not that they really exist - at least to public knowledge. And even if they do, Ukraine certainly doesn’t have these).
Finally, Putin wasn’t at the Kremlin at the time of this alleged plot to kill him - something that any assassin planning this, would have surely known.
So in order to believe the Kremlin’s claim that this was an assassination attempt, we must also believe that Ukraine: 1) launched a low-speed, low payload drone, (with no bunker-busting capacity), 2) Unaware that Putin wasn’t around, and 3) That, even if Putin had been around, the paranoid leader of major superpower at war, sleeps in a bedroom with windows opening up to the Kremlin’s gorgeous views (instead of a secured location/bunker).
In other words, we would need to believe that Ukrainians are extremely incompetent in their planning for an assassination, and that Putin is exceptionally reckless to sleep in a room vulnerable to such strikes.
Ukraine clearly did not have a realistic chance of assassinating Putin with this drone attack, but neither would they even be interested in a genuine assassination attempt.
The risks and unforeseen (escalatory) implications would be immense.
Indeed, senior officials in Kyiv were quick to dismiss these claims.
President Zelensky categorically denied any assassination attempt, and his senior adviser Mykhailo Podolyak emphasized the likely undesirable and escalatory outcomes from such an attack: “It would only encourage Russia to escalate the war it started and put millions of civilians in even greater danger..Why would we need this? Where is the logic in that?”
So then, the assassination attempt can be ruled out pretty confidently.
But in itself, this does not necessarily mean that Ukraine did not in fact launch this drone aimed at the Kremlin - it only means that this was extremely unlikely to have been a serious assassination attempt.
Kyiv could have ordered this attack for a number of strategic/symbolic reasons that do not involve any attempts to assassinate Putin.
And what would these other non-assassination motivations be?
Well for a start, the perception of the Kremlin’s impenetrability would have been (and is) gone: thus far (and but for few sabotage campaigns/strategic drone strikes organized by Kyiv), Russia has been conducting the war on its terms and largely, on Ukrainian territory.
Attacking the heart of Moscow, the nerve center of the Russian state, would signal Ukrainian willingness to dispute such a one-sided state of affairs.
By attacking the Kremlin, Ukraine would also demonstrate escalation dominance - that they are not afraid of triggering Russia
(side note: although if this was one of the aims of attack, statements made by Ukrainian officials certainly blunt the effect of this very signal)
Kyiv would also display: a) its own capabilities/long reach, and b) the Kremlin’s incompetence in defending the very heart of its regime.
Indeed, there is plenty of evidence of existence of motivation, will, and capability (necessary preconditions) that points in the direction of Ukraine being the author of this drone strike:
1) For a start, (and thanks to the Pentagon leaks) we know that back in February of this year, Ukrainians (defense intel/GUR in particular) wanted to target Moscow - and that this was only cancelled following the US appeals at restraint.
2) Ukrainian generals have long signaled general interest in turning the tables on Russia, and pushing for the war to be fought on their own terms.
Here is an excerpt from an article published by the two senior Ukrainian generals (Commander In Chief Valery Zaluzhnyi, and Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodskyi) back in the Summer of 2022:
"Russian citizens do not perceive the losses, failures, & most imp., the cost of this war...task of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2023 is to make these feelings sharper, more natural & quite tangible for the Russians...despite the considerable distance"
(side note: whether it is truly in Ukrainian interests to make the war more ‘‘real’’ for ordinary Russians is highly debatable - more on that later below).
And it is important to note that this strategy of making it real for Russians has many backers and proponents in the West.
Here are for example the thoughts of a former NATO supreme allied commander, highly regarded retired general Philip Breedlove.
Expressing the hope that the news are indeed true, Breedlove made the following remarks:
"Russia enjoys sanctuary, we essentially enforce it by forbidding Ukraine from using our weapons in striking Russia…I want the Russian Federation to have to expend energy and forces in their defense of their capital."
3) Finally, we also know that Ukrainians were quite capable of targeting Moscow via drones, have conducted similar drone attacks in the past (against legitimate military targets) and that previously, Ukrainian drones managed to travel even farther than Moscow.
(side note: and Kyiv may possible be behind yet another brazen assassination attempt taking place within Russia)
All of this is to say that Kyiv did have a bunch of good reasons to target the Kremlin - beyond the very uncredible allegation that this was an assassination attempt.
What adds further to the presumption that Kyiv was indeed behind this attack, is lack of credible alternatives - which mainly comes down to the theory that this was a Russian false flag operation.
The Russian false flag theory - did the Kremlin concoct the whole incident?
What about the hypothesis that the Kremlin did this deliberately? That it was a false flag operation?
Well, for a start, the strongest argument in favor of this theory is that we are indeed talking about the Russian state - with a strong track record of attempting outrageous false flags before: from nuclear “dirty bombs”, fake chemical attacks, to more conventional campaigns blaming civilian losses on Ukraine.
So yes, we know that Russians are quite capable of doing this, and that they have few ethical qualms in relation to such campaigns, but capability is not enough: ultimately, what would be the point?
Why would Russia be interested in doing this?
Well, there could be three main arguments in favor of this theory:
1) Scare off Ukraine’s Western backers by creating a false picture that Kyiv is escalating beyond the informal limits that the US/NATO is comfortable with.
2) Garner domestic support, create outrage and create a rally ‘round the flag effect around Putin (especially ahead of Ukraine’s counteroffensive - which is probably going to produce at least some results/further embarrassments for Russia).
3) Justify a retaliatory attack/assassination attempt against Zelensky.
Indeed, the clownishly uncredible and consistently hyperbolic former President (and the current Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council) Dmitry Medvedev was quick to jump the gun and argue that Russia could no longer afford to not take the option of a ‘‘physical elimination” of Zelensky in response to the Kremlin attack.
This very fact led many analysts and media pundits to arrive at a quick conclusion that the attack was a pretext for a retaliatory assassination attempt.
Nevertheless, each of these explanations is largely inadequate and unsatisfactory.
This is because:
1) The West is not going to pressure Ukraine just before a counteroffensive - and that is assuming they would believe the Kremlin’s claims (which they of course, would not).
Moreover, the time to warn of an unpalatable escalation would have been when the Ukraine fatigue was already at (or about to reach) its peak - for example: after a stalled or modestly successful counteroffensive and a prolonged stalemate.
(side note: the idea that Kyiv would resort to desperate and performative measures would also appear as more plausible at precisely that point in time)
There is also the issue of laying blame - Russians were quick to accuse Washington of being the mastermind behind this attack.
This naturally absolves Ukraine from at least some culpability - and thus, the angle of a Kyiv regime gone rogue and dragging everyone towards an unacceptable escalation with Moscow becomes significantly less convincing.
Consequently, Russia’s own rhetorical conduct would be utterly inconsistent with this possible goal.
And it is not just messaging either, in the wake of the assault, Moscow experienced a conspicuous surge in GPS spoofing on Thursday (the very next day).
Citizens in the heart of the city witnessed an overwhelming disruption of signals, rendering them incapable of summoning taxis or pinpointing the whereabouts of e-scooters.
So then, why cause all this trouble to ordinary citizens (and add to the perception of a crisis) when you are behind the attack in the first place?
It is pretty clear that Russia was using GPS spoofing as an electronic warfare (EW) tactic against additional drone attacks (similar EW and jamming tactics are used against Ukrainian short-range missiles - and unfortunately, to some notable effect).
Overall, Moscow’s post-incident behavior is largely inconsistent with the false-flag theory.
(side note: and the very fact that the Kremlin decided to lay the ultimate blame on Washington signals sheer embarrassment: after all, it is far more acceptable for the Kremlin’s security to be breached if another sophisticated superpower is behind it vs just Ukraine)
2) The Kremlin is thus far not in much need of an emergency rally ‘round the flag effect - domestic political conditions are not that dire to justify such a drastic ploy: with embarrassment and damage to the Kremlin’s reputation for competence and being in control, far outweighed by any temporary boost in public support.
3) Putin does not need any new or additional reasons to assassinate Zelensky - he tried that at the very outset of the invasion: before all this recent damage and humiliation caused by the Ukrainian military.
Why would he need to come up with an additional reason to ‘‘eliminate’’ Zelensky?
Since when is Putin seeking objective justifications for an assassination campaign?
Let’s not forget that we are dealing with a psycho that routinely murders his domestic political opponents and journalists covering his crimes and corruption.
The idea that Putin would need a new reason to assassinate a leader of a country that Russia is at war with, is frankly silly - especially given the costs of concocting such a justification.
On the balance of probabilities.
It is therefore more likely than not that Ukraine was indeed behind this attack.
Once again, this was clearly not an assassination attempt (unless one is willing to believe that Kyiv has the most clueless and incompetent assassins in history), but Kyiv did still have a lot to gain from this attack.
Beyond the aforementioned arguments (of “making it real to Russians” - which is probably the weakest argument to do this. You want to keep Russians annoyed at Putin and apathetic in general, not outraged that their cultural symbols and historic architecture is under attack) outlined by the Ukrainian generals, there are at least three powerful reasons to conduct this attack:
a) Escalation dominance and demonstration of resolve: that Ukraine is far from the point of agreeing to any humiliating concessions at the negotiation table - and that instead, they are willing to escalate and take the war straight to the Kremlin.
This is essentially a counter signal to Putin’s “I can outlast you and the West, and can/will do anything to win”.
b) Violating the Kremlin’s “red lines” (this time, quite literally) and showing to NATO allies that Putin is a paper tiger, and that his threats of ‘‘escalation’’ should be dismissed.
In other words, the message to NATO is this: don’t you worry about his red lines - send us the fighter jets/long-range missiles - comfortable in the knowledge that he is very unlikely to retaliate against you all - look, he cannot even properly respond to this insult against us, let alone NATO.
c) Demonstrating the Kremlin’s incompetence in keeping even its own nerve center secure.
This perception of incompetence is not only damaging to Putin’s domestic standing (attacking the core pillars of the regime’s reputation for prowess) - but it also signals weakness and decay to Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies and to China.
It serves to embarrass Beijing by association.
Indeed, the reputational costs to Russia are very high (hence why it is extremely unlikely that this was a false flag operation).
Overall then, we can on the balance, arrive at the following probable conclusions:
1) This was not a false flag attack; 2) This was not an assassination attempt, 3) The speed, size and payload carried by the drone indicates that this was launched somewhere from within Russia (maybe even in Moscow itself), and not in Ukraine - long-range drones capable of such a journey are both faster and bigger in size (they have to be, in order to carry sufficient amount of fuel) 4) This was likely a Ukraine-backed attack (and not necessarily formally sanctioned, and/or organized by the state/ by the Zelensky government itself, the small payloads/speed indicates low cost - could have been pro-Ukraine patriot groups/militias crowdsourcing several $million in funding to deliver this blow. Having said that, it could have also been purposefully outsourced to informal militias - to deliberately maintain plausible deniability for the official government.) conducted in order to achieve the strategic/political aims outlined above.