Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, Putin's escalation, and proper western response.
Ukraine war updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
Kyiv continues to liberate its territories (albeit at a slower - yet expected- tempo), and has now freed more than 3,700 square miles from Russian occupation.
This is still a low-probability event, but Ukraine is now closer to push through the Luhansk-Severodonetsk line, and effectively force the collapse of Russian forces’ willingness and ability to fight.
In addition, Ukraine is making progress in recapturing the territories that Putin is currently planning to annex (following the sham referendums).
Ukrainian forces have steadily expanded their foothold there - if they manage to secure the remaining Russian-held urban areas east of the city of Kupyansk, they could then push into the neighboring Luhansk region - which is one of the four that Russia seeks to claim as its own.
Russia’s morale and leadership issues.
Intel reports (based on intercepted communication) suggest that there are a number of incidents of outright insubordination and complaints about senior leadership.
In the meantime, Putin has now taken over the reins of day-to-day command, and started to give directions to field generals.
A President with little (if not none) experience of direct military command, giving field operation directives - not a good idea for Russia but good news for Ukraine..
Meanwhile, the geopolitical costs for Moscow keep mounting:
1) Uzbekistan is now warning its citizens against joining the Russian military - Russia is now resorting to the humiliation of fast-track citizenship offers to recruit soldiers from the former USSR countries.
2) Israel is finally stepping up its help to Ukraine, and will now supply anti-drone, air defense hardware to Ukraine.
Russia getting too cozy with Iran is now backfiring..
(side note: Tel-Aviv is clearly not doing this solely out of goodwill and a goal of demonstrating its displeasure with Moscow’s increasing dependence on Iran. They will get to benefit more directly too: by collecting valuable and actionable insights on Iranian Mohajer-6 drones used in Ukraine).
3) The West rallies more strongly around Ukraine.
Even leaders like Macron, someone who wasted so much time shuttling back and forth from Moscow. and urging the West to not humiliate Putin, is now criticizing other “neutral” countries for sitting it out on the sidelines of this conflict.
Putin is now losing his remaining European pillars for effective advocacy in favor of a ‘‘negotiated agreement’’.
(side note: it also helps that EU’s underground gas storage has reached 85% of capacity - exceeding the EU-wide target of 80% by the end of October. With worst case scenarios no longer likely, and Ukraine demonstrating continuous battlefield progress, further rhetorical support will continue).
4) President Biden definitively confirmed America’s long-term commitment to Ukraine.
First, there was his CBS “60 Minutes” interview where he promised to back Ukraine ‘‘as long as it take’’.
(side note: he also commented on Taiwan - more on that in the upcoming cables).
But more importantly, there was a UN General Assembly speech where the US President delivered the following remarks:
"This war is about extinguishing Ukraine’s right to exist as a state — plain and simple — and Ukraine’s right to exist as a people… Whoever you are, wherever you live, whatever you believe … that should make your blood run cold. [emphasis added]"
Well that’s it right there - there are no ifs and buts anymore…
The US is now definitely committed to following through on the promise to back Ukraine “as long as it takes’’.
No amount of HIMARS could have done an equally adequate job (as these remarks have) at signaling to Moscow that there is no good outcome that it can achieve in Ukraine.
This speech marks a turning point: more than anything, more than all of the financial, diplomatic and military support to date.
Now that Biden framed the war in such existential (and accurate) terms, there is no way back without a devastating loss of credibility for the US.
Putin makes his move: nuclear threats, “partial mobilization’’ and the Donbas referendum.
As discussed in the previous cables, Putin had to escalate in some way.
The status quo was simply untenable: facing the pressure from far-right nationalists, his own siloviki/security faction (some of whom are now openly challenging the competence of the Kremlin and the military leadership in general), and his larger electoral base: who were induced into indifference and tacit support as long as Putin made them feel proud to be Russian (and as long as the War was a movie to watch on their TVs - without much participation needed) - recent battlefield humiliations challenged that ability.
And so Putin made his move and escalated with a combination of threats, political maneuvers, and military escalation.
Thank god we did not send Ukraine ATACMS or modern tanks… otherwise Putin might have escalated.. (sarcasm)
One hopes that these silly notions will now stop.
Once and for all: if the objective is to help Ukraine win this war (which it is), then one must expect resistance and escalation from Putin no matter what weapon the West supplies Ukraine with.
Even if (hypothetically speaking), Ukraine managed to take back these recently liberated territories without the US/NATO military gear/funding/intel support, Putin would still have had to respond and escalate.
For at the end of the day, it is the outcome that he is forced to respond to - not the particular technology or tactic that leads to that outcome.
Nuclear threats.
To set the tone and indicate seriousness - that he means business - Putin started off with his go-to nuclear threat.
Crucially, he accused the West engaging in “nuclear blackmail” and aiming to destroy Russia by considering the use of nuclear weapons against Russia.
Naturally, and only in response, he too was willing to threaten the use of nuclear weapons as well:
"If there is a threat to the territorial integrity of our country, and for protecting our people, we will certainly use all the means available to us - and I'm not bluffing".
This is important, Putin amps up the ante and accuses the West of having a desire to destroy Russia - he is laying the context for ‘‘existential threat’’ - an acceptable reason for the use of nuclear weapons under the Russian nuclear use doctrine.
In other words, to convince the West that he is not bluffing, he wants to create a perception that he believes that Russia is under existential threat - that his state of mind is amenable to the use of nuclear weapons.
But threat credibility is not the only reason for such rhetoric - Putin also aims to create a rhetorical plausible deniability for both China and India.
Both countries already have major concerns about the war, and Putin creating the perception that he genuinely believes that Russia is under a major existential threat, provides some excuse for India and China not to distance themselves too far too soon.
In other words, (at least from Putin’s perspective) both Delhi and Beijing can claim that ‘‘the situation is dangerous all around’’, and that instead of being a delusional imperialist, Putin is merely an aggrieved party trying to defend his besieged country - and that the West must therefore treat his concerns with adequate seriousness.
It is one thing to side with a madman, quite another to be associated with a party perceiving (no matter how erroneously) a genuine existential threat - the latter is far more politically acceptable (even if still exceptionally costly).
But even this is not going to do much to allay increasing concerns from India and China: both are now more vocal about Russia’s conduct in general, and about nuclear escalation in particular.
India’s foreign minister commented that the trajectory of the war in Ukraine was one of a “profound concern” and that the “nuclear issue is a particular anxiety”.
In the meantime, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (in a talk with EU’s Foreign Affairs Rep Borrell), reaffirmed his opposition to the use of weapons of mass destruction “under any circumstance”.
And this is just a day after China reiterated a call for a ceasefire in Ukraine.
This is a clear case of Beijing distancing itself from Putin and his brinkmanship.
Putin resorting to nuclear weapons is still unlikely (given the all around costs) but they also cannot be wholly dismissed.
These cables have advocated (since April) for an adequate cost imposition on Russia’s potential nuclear use.
The reports that the White House has been delivering private warnings to the Kremlin are not surprising.
No doubt, top level nuclear strategy/game theory scientists are advising the White House in this high-stakes game.
But the costs must go beyond those of a strategic nature.
As advocated in the previous cables, Putin must feel unsure that his army could even properly execute such a nuclear strike without generating immediate nuclear fallout risks to Russia itself (more on that later below).
“Partial mobilization”.
First of all, let us all appreciate how unprecedented this move truly is.
This is the first time that Russia declares a general mobilization after WWII.
Not even a high-casualty, high-cost and humiliating war in Afghanistan prompted this move from a hawkish Soviet cabinet.
First and foremost, this is an admission of weakness and failure - there is no way around this.
Putin is forced to ‘‘agree’’ with the recommendations of his military, and devote these unprecedented resources, because after seven months of war, his ‘‘special operation’’ is turning into an utter failure.
We have previously discussed the political risks and costs that a mobilization entails - no need to rehash them all here.
But it is important to unpack this decision further:
1) The mobilization is “partial” in name only.
The term ‘‘partial’’ is a political label used by both Putin (during his announcement speech) and the Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu.
And even though there have been multiple references to the 300k figure, there is nothing to stop the Kremlin from going above that number.
Indeed, the actual document outlining Putin’s executive order does not have a reference to the 300k limit.
In addition, the actual executive order has a somewhat hidden provision (article 7) that gives a wide administrative leeway/discretion to add many more troops as needed.
In other words, there are no legal restrictions to prevent Putin from executing a full-scale mobilization and recruiting millions.
(side note: of course, this is in theory only - in practice, it is doubtful that Russia’s corrupt “Voenkomats”/admin recruitment centers will be able to muster something even close to 300k anytime soon.)
Finally, even if there were legal limits to prevent the Kremlin from going over the 300k number - what is there to stop the Defense Ministry from outright falsifying the figures?
All indicators to date suggest that the Russian military will try to recruit more than the often-cited 300k number.
The following reports, that: a) Tiniest remote villages in Siberia have mass mobilization orders delivered to most of their male residents, b) That (contrary to the pronouncements made by both Putin and Shoygu) those without military experience are also being called, suggest that the true scale of this mobilization effort is indeed massive - they are trying to recruit anyone they can get their hands on.
2) Political opposition to the order creates further regime risks.
Putin is on a risky path here.
There is widespread opposition to his mobilization order.
Even though the penalty for desertions/refusals to enlist and for vocal opposition to the mobilization orders has been toughened-up, Russians by and large are not coy about their views.
On the first day of the mobilization order, more than 1,300 were arrested for their opposition to this decision.
This is a significant figure - after all, Russia is an authoritarian state with tight control over information and law-enforcement.
And the mere fact that there is no social stigma in vocally opposing this mobilization order (or fleeing Russia in droves - spiking airfare and causing bottlenecks of cars on Russia’s various borders), is powerful evidence of lack of true public support for this war.
Even though Russians were tacitly approving Putin’s decisions and telling pollsters that they support the war effort - this was more an evidence of indifference and apathy rather than a genuine fervent support for the war (an attitude held only by the extreme nationalist right: 10-15% of the total population).
If there was genuine support for this war, men (at least those fit for service) would have been embarrassed to voice their opposition - let alone flee the country.
Indeed the most common chant in these public street protests is “I am not going to die for Putin” - if more and more Russians start seeing this as Putin’s war vs Russia’s war, Putin’s days will be numbered…
3) Quantity vs Quality.
Even if Russia manages to mobilize sufficient manpower and reverse the correlation of forces on the battlefield, there are some legitimate questions about the quality of this newly recruited force.
According to most reports, these troops will receive a meagre two weeks of training.
Many NCOs - officers who would normally administer this training - are either killed/wounded or occupied on the frontlines.
Furthermore, two weeks is barely enough as a refresher course on using and maintaining an AK-47 (and that is for those that have indeed served before).
What about armored vehicle training? How will the new recruits know how to march in lockstep with tanks and BTRs?
There is simply not enough time to train them on proper battlefield formations and complex (even basic) combined arms maneuvers.
The duration of the intended training, indicates therefore, that any attempts to incorporate any combined arms offensive exercises are likely going out of the window.
These troops are literally going to be used as cannon fodder - thrown into battle without proper armored infantry training..
Add to this: low morale and the basic reality that most recruited soldiers do not want to be there..
(side note: if they truly wanted to fight, they would have accepted very lucrative contracts and would not have burned many “Voenkomats”/admin recruitment centers”. Even most of the convicts refused to enlist with Wagner - a private military company).
In other words, this is going to be a Potemkin army - a low-quality facade to defend Donbas with sheer numbers, and to demonstrate “power and mass”, and force Ukraine into negotiations - a prospect that is now all but gone (see below).
The Ukrainian Commander in Chief is right to say that they have defeated Russia’s professional army (remainder of most of these are pinned and trapped in Kherson), and now they need to do the same in relation to the new cannon fodder troops (unclear when they will show up with all these logistical challenges).
But rhetoric aside, this escalation cannot be dismissed as “bunch of unprofessional cannon fodder to deal with”.
As discussed above, there is no formal limit to how many men Russia could recruit under this executive order.
Putin may well throw in the kitchen sink to stop and potentially reverse Ukrainian progress on the battlefield.
As such, the US and NATO must also escalate in the comprehensive aid that they are to provide (later below).
Referendums in Donbas.
Russia began holding sham referendums in four areas of Ukraine (parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions of eastern and southeastern Ukraine) controlled by the Russian forces.
A precursor to illegal and brazen annexation, the territories amount to 15% of Ukraine.
No matter what their results are, referendums are only the first step - Putin would have to approve the annexation process.
He is expected to do so in his speech to Russia’s Security Council on September 30.
(side note: meaning that there is still time to persuade Putin to at least delay a final decision on this move).
First of all, this is an announcement of a lengthy war - if he was to proceed with annexation, he would effectively shut down the doors to any possible negotiation with Ukraine.
The West would also be trapped in helping Ukraine (truly) as long as it was necessary - for the alternatives would be unacceptable even to the most pro-negotiation/pro-appeasement factions in the West.
Handing over Ukrainian territory and effectively agreeing to the annexation is a non-starter.
Secondly, this is an exceptionally risky move for Putin - for if he was to annex these territories and then lose them to Ukraine, that would be a humiliation like no other.
He would formally lose Russian territory, and would effectively cancel out a number of his “red lines’’ - revealing them as utterly meaningless.
Given the risks, the potential gains of this move would have to also be substantial.
And there are indeed major compelling reasons for Putin to pull-off this annexation:
1) Securing minimal war aims.
We have previously discussed how Putin could always withdraw from post-Feb-24 territories and declare successful ‘‘demilitarization’’ and ‘‘denazification’’ (defeat of the Azov battalion/Mariupol) of Ukraine.
But context matters - that could only be believable (sold successfully to the domestic audience) if and only if Russia withdrew in an orderly and coordinated fashion, and on a high note.
Doing so after a rout and globally witnessed defeat in the Kharkiv axis is out of question.
As such, Putin now needs to show something more for his efforts.
He could (as a minimum) consolidate and annex the aforementioned four regions in the east and southeast Ukraine.
And to solidify his grip over these territories, Putin could then threaten to defend them with nuclear weapons (a suggestion already made by the former puppet President Dmitriy Medvedev).
Russia would gain little in the long-term, and would be stuck with crippling sanctions and a weak economy for years.
But in the short-term, this would reverse the narrative of Russia losing the war, and provide a lifeline to Putin’s regime.
2) Justification for military escalation.
Mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Russian men to boost the ‘‘special operation’’ is not a plausible tactic.
The Kremlin needed a stronger justification for this politically costly mobilization - an appeal to Russian pride.
A moral justification to defend the new territories and to protect the Slav brothers who chose Russia over Ukraine (in itself a last-ditch attempt to create some facade of prestige: that at least someone is choosing Russia over Ukraine..).
3) An excuse to use conscripts.
The Russian law prohibits deployment of fresh conscripts in the foreign theaters of war.
But what if these territories are annexed?
They would then become Russia’s own territories - hundreds of thousands of green conscripts could then be deployed to these regions to boost the manpower available for the defense.
And once they are there, it is easier to deploy them for further offensive operations meant to ‘‘protect’’ the Russian territories.
Time to escalate.
The US, EU, NATO, and the collective West in general (including AUKUS, South Korea etc) must par Russian escalation with one of their own.
The scale, speed, and frequency of Western military and financial assistance must increase drastically.
Ukraine must be equipped with all that it needs to deploy an overwhelming force on the battlefield, break Russian lines, and retake more crucial strategic locations before Moscow gets to see the impact of its mobilization efforts.
Specifically:
1) The West must up the ante on incentivizing and encouraging defections.
We have previously touched upon the policy of incentivizing defections - and that was before we got to see the overwhelming evidence of Russians already taking matters into their own hands and fleeing/escaping the draft.
So then, and as an example, Czechs are wrong to refuse humanitarian visas to fleeing Russians.
(side note: naturally, there are legitimate national security concerns around opening the gates to fleeing Russians. Many of these are likely to be ‘‘illegal’’ agents/spies/saboteurs without diplomatic cover. But this is a pragmatic challenge to deal with. There are ways around it, and both the US and the EU can concoct a sustainable policy to minimize the risks. But on the point of principle, outright refusal to grant asylum to fleeing Russians is a bad policy. We would be leaving them no options but to stay and fight - don’t expect heroism and outright refusals to engage in warfare..)
2) Price caps on Russian energy - make them global and universal.
With significant distancing and coldness shown by both India and China towards Putin and his escalation plans, now is the ideal moment to get those two on board in implementing global price caps initiated by G7 and the EU.
This is not an appeal to idealism - we are not going to frame this as Delhi and Beijing’s opportunity to disincentivize further warfare (by biting into Putin’s energy sales revenue - and thus ability to spend on and sustain a large mobilized military).
That is instead, a favorable outcome/by-product that Washington would seek.
The pitch to Delhi and Beijing is rather simple: you get to benefit from lower energy costs, (Russia has nowhere else to go in any case - especially not after escalating with further manpower deployment), and secure a further opportunity to express your displeasure and ‘‘concerns’’ with Putin’s escalations.
And this need not result in a damaged relationship with Moscow.
There is a precedent for this: India (in particular - Beijing has lesser concerns around assertive stance vis-à-vis Moscow) can take heart from the Turkish case study.
Erdogan whispered sweet nothings into Putin’s ears, secured great energy and grain import deals, and then: a) Let his son-in-law build a Bayraktar drone manufacturing plant in Ukraine, and b) Agreed to (under Washington and Brussels’ pressure) rein in major Turkish banks, and prohibit them from using Mir (alternative to SWIFT) payment systems with Russian banks.
3) Scale up training Ukrainian army.
Under the leadership of former British PM Boris Johnson, the UK started to train Ukrainian soldiers in the fields of England - with an output goal of 10,000 well-trained professional Ukrainian soldiers produced every three months.
This program started in spring and has undoubtedly produced some early results on the battlefield.
Back then, these cables had advocated for the US and the rest of the NATO countries to do the same and at a higher scale.
Even if most NATO countries were to opt-out, between themselves, the US, France, Germany and Poland could have produced at least 3-4x more well-trained troops in the same time period.
That did not happen..
(side note: the US is indeed training Ukrainian soldiers for specific roles, but not at the scale that we are advocating).
Well then, better late than never - there is little good reason for not starting now, and scaling up the British program and ending up producing 40-50k well-trained professional soldiers every three months - as opposed to only 10k.
The West needs to counter Russia not just in technology but also in available and employable manpower.
4) Supply Ukraine with more advanced tech.
This means modern tanks like German Leopards (and potentially, M1 Abrams), more armored vehicles, further long-range drones (like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle), ATACMS/ other long-range missiles, and advanced fighter jets like the F-16s.
Advanced surface-to-air air-dense tools (Arrow 3, Israel’s Davids’s Sling, Patriots, NASAMS) are especially important here - crucial to convince the Russians that their tactical nuclear strikes may not only fail to strike the target, but could also potentially be intercepted and destroyed on Russia’s own territory - in addition to the sheer humiliation (and reduced future deterrence/threat display capacity), that would also constitute an acceptable risk for Moscow.
True, all of these will require more training and will come with logistical impediments (for example, these modern tanks need careful maintenance and a steady pipeline of fuel to power them - a logistical nightmare).
But an army that is capable and ingenious enough to attach (supposedly, only NATO hardware compatible) HARM anti-radiation missiles (against air-defense/surface to air radars) on MIG fighter jets, can surely overcome many more challenges in a fight for freedom against a bloodthirsty imperialist who is intent upon teaching them a lesson.