Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, Wagner to help Hizbullah, and Israel needs to adjust its tactics.

Ukraine war updates.

• 1) Avdiivka assaults intensify - when political imperatives overtake military strategy.

• Russia is poised to launch a major counteroffensive and attempt to capture Avdiivka with additional 40k troops.

• Russian forces have already lost hundreds of armored vehicles and tanks, and have sustained enormous casualties in their previous assaults.

• At this point, Russia’s desire to double down seems to be driven mainly by politics and not military strategy - although Avdiivka has a strategic value of being a minor logistical node, it is nowhere near enough to commit such a significant portion of Russia’s frontline troops to the attack.

• With Ukraine’s counteroffensive stalling, and ground about to freeze, a ‘‘win’’ in Avdiivka would be a good way for Russia to end the year with a much-needed ‘‘momentum’’ going into the 2024.

• The Kremlin will most likely fail to sell this assault (if even successful) as a major success to its domestic audience, but inflicting further morale losses to Ukraine’s western backers seems easier than ever - and that will most likely be the only minor political gain that Putin can obtain from this assault.

• Of course, there is also the intended signaling effect to the West: I am nowhere near being defeated, in fact, watch me waste tens of thousands of troops on this small town. I can outlast you all.

• 2) Russia strikes Kyiv and Ukraine conducts further effective sabotage.

• Over the weekend, Russia launched a large-scale missile and drone strike campaign targeting Kyiv - for the first time in 52 days.

• Majority of the strikes were conducted via 31 Iran-made Shahed 131/136 drones. There were also Russian long-range cruise, ballistic and surface to air missiles involved: two Kh-59 missiles, one Kh-31 missile, one P-800 Onyx anti-ship missile, an S-300 missile and either an S-400 missile or an Iskander-M missile.

• Ukrainian air defenses responded - albeit with a lower than usual interception rate (which, especially for drones, usually stands above 80%): downing 19 Shaheds, one Kh-59 missile, and one ballistic missile destroyed by a Patriot air defense system interceptor missile.

• In the meantime, Ukraine was not idle either, it has been reported that Ukraine’s military intelligence - GUR - had successfully orchestrated an explosion of railway tracks in Russia’s Ryazan oblast - derailing 19 railroad cars of a freight train carrying a mineral fertilizer to a weapons production facility.

• In addition, there were reports of a major fire (preceded by several loud blasts) in a gunpowder production facility - which apparently, had previously fallen victim to a suspicious fire as well.

• 3) Ukraine warns of retaliation using Moscow’s own playbook.

• Ukraine’s Energy Minister German Galushchenko warned of potential retaliation against Russia's oil and gas infrastructure if Moscow was to intensify attacks on Ukraine's electric system this winter.

• Russia is already conducting regular cyberattacks on Ukraine's electric grid, with expectations of increased physical attacks during colder months when energy usage peaks for heating - this would be the repeat of winter 2022.

• Not only is this dirty tactic aimed at crushing Ukraine’s economic activity, and causing enormous misery to civilians, but it is also designed to prevent the western-supplied crucial air defense SAMs like Patriots and NASAMS from defending skies above the frontline Ukrainian troops.

• The Ukrainian minister is therefore right to emphasize the possibility of a reciprocal approach, stating that Ukraine would consider targeting Russia's energy infrastructure in response, deeming it “only fair” - well, it is not only fair, but necessary too.

Wagner to help Hizbullah.

• There are numerous reports (based on US intel) of Wagner group plans to provide an air-defense system to Hizbollah.

• Naturally, with Prigozhin gone, Wagner cannot do anything in foreign affairs without Putin’s permission first (even with Prigozhin still alive, the Kremlin would not have allowed an independent foreign policy for Wagner).

• If later confirmed, this would be a rather surprising move from Putin - Russia would in effect be taking sides against Israel.

• This would go against the careful balancing act that Putin tries to maintain with Israel.

• To date, Putin’s Israel policy has been quite successful - where, in exchange for their refusal to arm Ukraine, Israel would get a free pass to strike Iran-backed militias in Syria (with Russian SAMs curiously turned off during these raids).

• In fact, one would face difficulty finding many better foreign policy successes for Russia, than that of its relationship with Israel (leaving aside obvious transactional relationships like those with North Korea and Iran).

• One could very well argue that when it comes to China and India, Russia is getting the shorter end of the stick - neither country has offered to arm Russia, and both have benefited from G7 price caps on Russian crude oil, to drive a harder bargain.

• Pundits frequently bring up Putin’s relationship with the Turkish President as an example of an incipient alliance - nothing could be further from the truth.

• Although the two countries do indeed maintain strong trade relations (especially in energy), Turkey (unlike Israel) has been a strong backer of Ukraine - Turkish Bayraktar drones and armored vehicles have caused massive damage to the Russian army (especially in many early-on key battles).

• Turkish companies and banks have also complied with western financial sanctions imposed on Russia (unlike say, many in the UAE - another US ally), and it has refused to let in any additional Russian submarines or warships into the Black Sea via the Bosphorus strait (faithfully implementing its obligations under the Montreux convention).

• All this is to say that it is very strange indeed that Russia would so openly side with Iran in this conflict (and arming Hizbullah with air defense SAMs is precisely that).

• Three possibilities arise;

• 1) The report is untrue - and perhaps deliberately so, as part of a disinformation to sow distrust between Russia and Israel.

• Although technically possible, this is still highly unlikely: not least because the US intel has a credibility to preserve (especially in front of an ally), and spreading obvious untruths is the fastest way to losing this credibility.

• 2) Putin is bluffing - he is threatening to do this in order to secure commitments from Israel that the status quo ante will prevail - that things will go back to normal after the war with Hamas, and that Israel will continue to sit out the war in Ukraine - and will continue to abstain from helping Kyiv with lethal weapons.

• This is highly plausible, and given that the senior Likud officials (annoyed with Russia’s hitherto moral ambivalence in the war with Hamas) have indeed threatened to help Ukraine defeat Russia, one could see how Putin is creating bargaining chips in the form of threats to secure Israel’s commitment that no such post Hamas war armament of Ukraine will indeed take place.

• 3) Putin has calculated that the status quo ante is not plausible, and that Israel will indeed help Ukraine once it is done with Hamas.

• He may be convinced that there is no going back: especially given that it is unlikely that Israeli PM Netanyahu, (with whom he has particularly good relations) is likely to remain in power for much longer.

• This would also be a plausible scenario, and in line with other diplomatic overtures (like inviting a Hamas leader to Moscow).

• But this is a terrible look for Russia - especially a mere week after anti-semitic riots in the Makhachkala airport in Dagestan (Northern Caucasus region) - when the local Muslim population stormed the airport to find Jewish passengers supposedly (based on anti-semitic fake news spewed on Russian telegram channels) being resettled/evacuated into Dagestan from Israel.

• (side note: to be fair, Russian authorities have then acted decisively - arresting more than 60 people involved in these riots. But: a) this is mainly because the Kremlin cannot allow for a lawlessness of this scale - it is a direct threat to the Putin regime, and b) there is a deeper issue that Russia faces in the Northern Caucasus region (home to Dagestan and Chechnya), and the longer that the Hamas vs Israel war drags, challenges to the Kremlin will only mount. This is a longer topic worthy of a deep dive at another time.)

America’s deterrence in the Middle East working thus far - calls for ceasefire are misguided, but Israel needs to tone down intensity of its campaign.

• In the meantime, the cover of deterrence offered by the US still holds.

• Two aircraft carriers, additional THAADs and Patriots, US air strikes on Iran-backed militias in Syria, deploying an Ohio-class nuclear submarine, shooting down Houthi missiles, and making direct threats to Iran to stay away, have all thus far worked to preclude further Iranian involvement via Hizbullah.

• The long-awaited speech (advertised and announced via several over-the-top theatrical trailers) by Hassan Nasrallah - the leader of Hizbullah, had essentially amounted to nothing.

• Nasrallah promised to keep all options on the table, but overall, he created pretexts to stay out of the war for the time being - he highlighted how Hizbollah has already killed 57 IDF soldiers (unverified) and committed a third of IDF forces to northern Lebanon (also likely an exaggeration).

• The Hizbullah claim of fixing a third of IDF forces in the north, is not merely a throwaway performance indicator - it is also an excuse for not doing much more.

• Translation: we have already pulled a third of the IDF away from Gaza - what else do you want?

• Hizbullah is clearly deterred and is not thus far interested in a further conflict.

• It has already lost around 70 fighters just from low-intensity clashes.

• But perhaps the most important signal came from Hizbullah leader’s implicit distancing from October 7th massacre against Israeli civilians:

  “The international community keeps bringing up Iran and its military plans, but the October 7 attack was a 100% Palestinian operation, planned and executed by Palestinians for the Palestinian cause, it has no relation at all to any international or regional issues.”

• As in: our hands are clean in this specific massacre.

• Separately, Iranian media is describing Israel’s ground offensive as a failure - frequently highlighting Hamas’s ability to continue to fight successfully on its own.

• The logic is clear: if Hamas can fight on its own, then there is no need for Iran (and Hizbullah) to get involved.

• This is of course untrue - Hamas is no match for Israel, but this totally baseless exaggeration of Hamas’s capacity is a convenient way out for Iran.

• None of this is to say that the calculus would not change - it is still possible (if not likely) that Hizbullah may be forced to act if Hamas was on the brink of a total collapse.

• Against this background are frequent calls for ceasefire - this is wrong: Israel should aim to finish off Hamas once and for all.

• A ceasefire would only help Hamas to regroup and recover, and entrench even further.

• It is in no one’s interest that Hamas’s reign should be prolonged any further.

• There is no peace between Palestinians and Israelis with Hamas still in power.

• The longer that Hamas stays in power, the worse it is for Palestinians living in a prolonged conflict, with no proper governance in place.

• With that said, frequent humanitarian pauses are clearly in order - and the US Secretary of State was right to travel to Israel for another pitch.

• Netanyahu argues against this - demanding that hostages be released first.

• But it is hard to see why Hamas would do that - giving away all of its leverage.

• This therefore seems like a disingenuous demand from Netanyahu - deliberately implausible in its fulfillment - an excuse to go on without any pauses.

• But this is wrong: minimal humanitarian pauses should be offered without preconditions and without constant direct pressure from President Biden.

• (side note: the argument of Hamas ‘‘regrouping’’ is inapplicable in this particular context. This would not be an extended ceasefire. A brief (few days) humanitarian pause here and there will not materially harm IDF’s prospects in destroying Hamas - Gaza is fully surrounded and under control of the IDF.)

• Israel is: 1) fighting a defensive war against barbaric forces, and 2) is right to destroy Hamas, but its operations have not been proportional or ‘‘surgical’’ - the civilian death toll is very high.

• Even if one allows for an exaggeration of casualties by Hamas-controlled Palestinian health ministry, the fact of the matter is that if more than 72 UN staffers have been killed in Gaza, and ambulances containing mostly women and children get hit by targeted strikes, then the military operation has thus far been highly indiscriminate and disproportionate - this needs to stop.

• In addition to the obvious violations of the international law and basic ethics, Israel will furthermore end up hurting its own just and rightful cause by showing a total lack of care towards civilian losses.

• As a liberal-democratic state with a rule of law, it needs to demonstrate a stark operational contrast with the barbarian terrorists that it is currently fighting.

• Israel needs to hold itself to the highest standards of international law on the armed conflicts - and Washington must warn its ally to ensure that this happens.

• For his part, Secretary of State Antony Blinken finally delivered a much needed veiled warning from an ally:

  
  "Much more needs to be done to protect civilians and to make sure that humanitarian assistance reaches them. Far too many Palestinians have been killed; far too many have suffered these past weeks. And we want to do everything possible to prevent harm to them and to maximize the assistance that gets to them (emphasis added).”

• Finally, a blank check is being gradually replaced with an accountability check.

• Indeed, when more children die in 1 month of IDF bombardment than in the entire 20 months of war in Ukraine, something really unacceptable is going on.

• The excessive manner in which Netanyahu is prosecuting this war, will in the long term damage the interests of Israel as a state.

• He is quite literally walking into the trap set up by Hamas - excessive Palestinian civilian casualties in Gaza is precisely what Hamas leadership needs to turn the table on Israel on the global arena, and to ensure itself a solid social base and a pipeline for future terrorist converts.

• And all of this goes beyond the actual conduct of the IDF - senior Israeli politicians must watch what they say.

• When a senior Israeli cabinet minister warns of a nuclear strike against Gaza (a notion that is equally as preposterous and ridiculous as it is cruel and morally unacceptable: the radioactive waste would spread across the Middle East - let alone Israel itself) he should be quickly (and definitively) removed.

• But instead, the Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu got away with a mere suspension.

• And Netanyahu himself damages the Israeli cause by talking about the IDF’s security role in Gaza for an ‘‘indefinite period”.

• This raises global alarms and plays right into the Hamas/Iran propaganda machine.

• Finally, (and perhaps most shockingly - since there is not even a shred of military justification for this) some 150 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank since October 7th attacks - this amounts to almost the total number of Palestinians killed in the West Bank last year.

• There is absolutely no legal or moral justification for this - the West Bank settlements were illegal from the get-go.

• But these additional murders committed by settlers go beyond the pale.

• The Israeli government must put pressure on settlers to end this unlawful and immoral campaign - this is one of the areas where Washington’s tough love is also most needed.

• The US-Israel alliance is strong, and delivers results in the form of strong deterrence against regional escalation of this war.

• But Israel needs to prepare for the post-conflict world - it cannot deplete all of its global goodwill and prestige and find itself in the new, much more hostile Middle East that ends up favoring the grand strategic objectives of Iran more than anything else.

• Israel will surely win the battle, eradicate the pressing security threat from Hamas, and will eventually take its rightful revenge.

• But it must be careful not to lose the geopolitical war in the meantime.