Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, Renewed Grain Deal and Putin's multi-pronged approach to pressure the West.
*note: cables will be off on Thursday and will resume as usual next Monday.
Ukraine war updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
Battle for Kherson continues, with Ukrainian forces’ consistent targeting of key Russian logistics hubs: 80% of residents have now been evacuated too.
Military operations continue whilst evidence of Russia’s military incompetence keeps piling up.
And on this occasion, the DNR’s (Donetsk People’s Republic) military commander Aleksandr Khodakovsky alleged that Russian friendly fire may have caused up to 60% of total Russian losses since last May.
It is unclear how he came up with this precise figure, but even an exaggeration of 4x would imply that approximately 1 in 6 Russian losses were caused by a friendly fire: an astonishing figure revealing either extreme incompetence, or total disregard to the value of Russian soldiers’ lives.
In the meantime, the US is expected to send their first VAMPIRE counter-drone systems to Ukraine in 2023.
Once again, something that could and should have been supplied way earlier.
But against the continuous military support, there were worrying reports that the White House is privately pushing Ukraine to show willingness to negotiate with Russians.
This is an extremely worrying development.
We have previously discussed (on a number of occasions) why negotiations are premature.
Indeed, the very report of Biden admin’s willingness to entertain negotiations will incentivize Putin to double down and escalate: he will smell blood and his assumptions that the West’s staying power is beginning to crumble will receive much-needed and well overdue confirmation (more on that later below).
Grain deal revival adds to Turkey’s prestige and influence.
Turkey is walking on a tightrope, and playing a very shrewd game in advancing its (and to a large extent, NATO’s) interests.
Following the reports that Russian money could escape sanctions and be rerouted to final destinations via Turkish banks, Ankara was quick to align with the US directives, and forced its banks to comply with Western sanctions (leaving only few countries - like the UAE - still useful for Russia’s financial ops to save its capital).
And after Moscow’s brief refusal to comply with the Black Sea grain export deal (by using absurd reasoning: that allegedly, drone strikes against its warships were leading to violations of the grain deal), Turkey scrambled to preserve the deal, carried on with Ukrainians a la “business as usual”, and essentially forced Putin to agree to the reality that he might not have enough leverage to resist the new status quo on the ground).
(side note: naturally, the Kremlin attempted to save face by claiming that it was the existence of specific “assurances” from the Turkish side that brought them back to the table.)
And this was not Putin’s only “prestige grant” this week to flatter Ankara - he also reiterated his suggestions that Turkey should/could become a gas hub in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey’s increasing prestige and leverage is yet another dynamic (alongside Russia’s weakening grip on its periphery/territories hitherto claimed as “spheres of influence”) of this war that is here to stay (at least, for the foreseeable future).
And with this, comes the opportunity to persuade Ankara to play a more active role in building partnerships in Central Asia - denying this strategic space to China.
Cultural and ethnic affinity is already a strong factor that makes such a Turkish leadership a high possibility.
And it is in fact in the US interests that it is a NATO ally - and not China - that gets to form deeper partnerships in the region.
Luckily, persuading Erdogan will not be too difficult, for geopolitical success breeds further appetites.
But both the US and the EU must get more involved in the region to act as the ultimate backstop to these efforts.
America’s increasing regional role in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia will pay long-term strategic dividends for years to come.
Washington must not miss this historic opening stemming from new configuration and balance of forces on the ground.
Putin escalates on all fronts.
Winter is coming; Ukraine’s energy and basic public goods infrastructure is under constant attack (raising the cost of EU support in energy and potential refugee inflow), EU leaders are increasingly divided (more on that in the upcoming cables), the UK is expected to enter the deepest recession since the financial crash of 2008, and the GOP will most likely flip the lower chamber (at the very least) - and may (in spite of their assurances to the contrary) prove to be far less generous and enthusiastic in their support to Ukraine (unable to free themselves from the shackles of the House freedom caucus).
All of these changing dynamics incentivize Putin to double down and amp up the pressure on the Western alliance: exacerbating cracks where possible.
For a long time, this came in the form of nuclear threats - yet facing the reality of ever evaporating weight and credibility of these threats, Putin himself ruled out their use in Ukraine.
Of course, the threat will not go away entirely, and the Kremlin is now using more subtle indirect methods: general threats of chaos in the form of ‘‘dirty radioactive bombs’’.
In addition, the discussion of nuclear use is now largely outsourced to Russia’s most senior generals.
And this achieves two goals simultaneously:
1) Adds credibility to potential future threats by demonstrating the acceptability of such discussions to Russia’s top military brass, and;
2) Sends a message to the West that regime change hopes are useless, and that whoever comes after Putin, is not going to be any better on the issue of nukes - just look at how his generals are discussing these options as very reasonable methods.
Having said all that, nuclear threats are taking the back seat in the new pressure campaign.
In addition to mobilization and targeting Ukraine’s key infrastructure (signaling willingness to prosecute a long and costly war of attrition, and thus raise the cost of supporting Ukraine) Putin is now escalating in matters of sabotage, creative recruitment of all available manpower, and securing far more significant supply of heavy weaponry (with a significant potential to alter the facts on the ground).
a) Undersea Sabotage
Something unusual has happened this past week: Norway announced that its military was placed on high alert from Tuesday - enhancing the available personnel for operational duties and boosting the role of a rapid mobilization force in response to the war in Ukraine.
Why?
Because Russian drones are making their presence known near the Norwegian air space, there is now worry that Moscow might be planning some sort of undersea sabotage to the gas pipelines that supply 25% of EU’s gas from Norway.
Back in October, these cables argued that the most likely explanation of a Nord Stream 1 leak/sabotage was Moscow’s signaling that a similar fate could fall onto the newly established Baltic Pipe (carrying the North Sea gas to Poland).
But similar “incidents” could furthermore take place in relation to the main Norwegian gas pipelines to Europe (Europe 1&2, Norpipe, Franpipe, Zeepipe I), or even to Langeled pipeline that supplies 20% of UK’s natural gas .
And this worry is as it happens very well-founded.
In fact, there have been a number of recent ‘‘incidents’’ to the undersea gas cables around the UK.
(side note: there was more in relation to the UK - with PM Truss’s phone hacked by Russian intel services. What a waste of effort that was)
Russia could not only mess with Europe’s gas, but it could furthermore tamper with its connectivity – voice, data and Internet.
All of these are legitimate worries that need to be countered with: a) more vigilance, and actively deployed military resources, and b) backchannel warning to the Kremlin that similar ‘‘incidents’’ could also take place in relation to Russia’s own cables, pipelines (even if their most important ones are land-based: signaling deep-strike capability and reach) and other energy/internet infrastructure.
Moscow must be convinced that their new strategy will backfire, and that the costs generated will be significantly higher (in multiples), than any potential perceived benefits.
b) Afghan commandos.
The Kremlin continues to demonstrate characteristic ruthlessness and creativity when it comes to recruiting manpower for Ukraine.
This time, they decided to kill two birds with one stone: 1) Stick it to America and damage its prestige, and 2) Recruit well-trained commandos.
They did this by embarking upon a campaign to recruit Afghan special forces soldiers who fought alongside American troops.
Many of them have fled to Iran after the fall of Kabul.
According to three former Afghan generals, Russia is now trying to recruit them into their ‘‘foreign legion’’ with $1,500 a month contracts and guarantee of safety for them and their families (from the Taliban).
This is a big deal: these commandos have been trained by Navy SEALS and Army Green Berets, and they could therefore pose danger to America’s national security by giving up the US tactical manuals/practices to Russians.
Many of these individuals will refuse to serve in Ukraine.
Some (especially those who feel betrayed by the US after the fall of Kabul) will jump at this opportunity.
Regardless of how many actually join Russian forces however (meaning Wagner mercenaries - the formal offeror of contracts) , why is it that America is not trying to outbid Russia?
Why not offer them a higher pay so that they join Ukraine’s foreign legion instead?
(side note: there is also a bigger issue of former US/NATO/Allied officers signing on as ‘‘trainers’’ for various countries after their formal service ends. The most egregious examples are the UK and New Zealand officers training PLA (Chinese) pilots. This practice must stop. Adequate legislation must be introduced to ban this practice.)
c) Iran ballistic missiles.
Iran has now escalated its support to Russia.
The supply of weaponry now goes beyond $20,000 loitering Shahed-136 drones.
There are now reports that Tehran was willing to supply Russia with 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles.
This is a significant escalation, and one that could lead to a markedly different outcome on the battlefield.
Ukraine must now be urgently supplied with adequate anti-ballistic missile systems in possession of NATO - starting with Patriot batteries: a move which will further benefit America’s military in helping its practice against Iranian ballistic missiles.
With that said, the very fact that Iran is willing to supply Russia with 1,000 ballistic missiles is a powerful indicator of the regime’s state of mind: they clearly don’t worry about the possibility of a military confrontation with the US.
If they did, they would not have parted ways with such a significant arsenal of highly valuable missiles.
If Tehran truly believed that President Biden was willing to exercise his Plan B if the JCPOA/nuclear deal was to fall through, would they really agree to give up so many ballistic missiles?
Producing these missiles is much more time-consuming and costly than building cheap $20,000 drones.
In addition, Iran must know that in the event of a military confrontation with America, its military-industrial production facilities would be one of the prime targets for America’s air strikes.
In other words, Tehran simply does not see a credible threat of a military escalation from the US.
And this is precisely why it can afford to delay, waste time, and advance maximalist aims in the negotiations over a nuclear deal: their ‘‘no deal’’ outcome is not sufficiently catastrophic to incentivize earnest and realistic negotiations.
Things might slowly change however with Netanyahu’s return as a PM of Israel: he will look at every opportunity to escalate and engage in preemptive strikes against Iran.
(side note: and precisely for this reason the Saudi reports of imminent Iranian attacks on the Kingdom did not seem too credible. Attacking SA does not benefit Iran right now. In fact, and if anything, it would benefit Riyadh: for it would force America to step up and protect its ‘‘partner’’ and reduce the tensions with Washington. )
In the meantime however, Iran must be faced with ever-increasing costs of propping up Russia.
These cables have previously outlined all the ways that America can and should amp up the pressure on Tehran - and it is about time that the Biden administration escalates on this.