Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, targeting restrictions on Russian military and Russia-North Korea security pact: risks and opportunities.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Washington’s partial lift on targeting restrictions is already yielding major results.
Back in May, and after Russia’s advance into Kharkiv region, Biden admin lifted restrictions on using US-supplied long-range missiles like ATACMS (and shorter-range GMLRS missiles) for HIMARS to enable Ukraine strike Russian military bases, logistics depots, and airfields close to Belgorod region and involved in attacks on Ukraine.
And more than a month in, results are clear: Russia’s offensive has stalled and intensity of missile strikes have gone down.
WAPO quoted a commander of a reconnaissance battalion of Ukraine’s 57th Brigade - noting that Russia has not conducted any S-300 missile strikes against Kharkiv.
And Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov told WAPO that the situation in Kharkiv City "massively changed" after the U.S. partially removed certain operational restrictions.
In addition, the Associated Press reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian troops and air defense systems within 20 kilometers inside Russian territory.
A Ukrainian artillery commander stated that Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to destroy Russian columns near the international border - these columns were apparently preparing to enter Ukraine.
2) And yet, dripititis continues still.
Back in May, we discussed how the Biden admin was doing most of the things right in relation to supporting Ukraine - but doing so too slowly, too hesitantly (worrying excessively about Putin’s “red lines’’) and in a drip drip fashion - an acute case of dripititis.
Well, it continues…
When the restrictions were first lifted, these only applied to regions in northwest Ukraine - bordering Kharkiv.
This is illogical - why not target any Russian military base?
There was no good answer then, and there isn’t one now - and so the Biden admin lifted this geographic limit: Kyiv was told that it can use American-supplied weapons to hit any Russian forces attacking from across the border, and that these were not limited to those in the region near Kharkiv.
The subtle shift in messaging first appeared in a PBS interview with national security adviser Jake Sullivan.
Sullivan stated that the agreement with Ukraine about firing American weapons into Russia extends to "anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory.”
So far so good, but then the Pentagon spokesman, Army Maj. Charlie Dietz added the following implicit caveats: “this is not about geography... If Russia is attacking or about to attack from its territory into Ukraine, it only makes sense to allow Ukraine to hit back against the forces that are hitting it from across the border….Additionally, they can use air defense systems supplied by the United States to take Russian planes out of the sky, even if those Russian planes are in Russian airspace, if they’re about to fire into Ukrainian airspace”.
Translation: if these military assets simply exist, you cannot target them using HIMARS/ATACMS, but if they are about to attack, or (in the case of a fighter bomber) about to fire into Ukraine, then you can attack.
This is once again a ridiculous proposition.
All of Russian military targets must be legitimate targets - why burden Ukrainian planners with a fact-finding mission to determine whether a particular base is about to be used in an imminent attack?
And if a fighter jet is in the air, then how do you determine whether they are about to fire into Ukraine?
Are we expecting operators of Patriot air defense systems in Ukraine to be mind-readers too?
Was ESP part of the training delivered to Ukrainian officers by the Pentagon?
An outrageous proposition altogether: all Russian military assets will be used against Ukraine in one way or another.
This is war - not a game of whack a mole.
The Pentagon is imposing standards on Ukraine that it would not impose on itself or on any other allied country resisting a war of aggression.
Once again, after some time, this restriction too will be lifted - but in the meantime, WAPO reports a serious operational burden already exists on Ukrainian officers and slows them down considerably.
In addition, key military bases remain out of reach due to the fact that unreasonably strict targeting restrictions are still in place.
The last thing that a country resisting an invasion from a military superpower like Russia needs to hear is that they must also be careful to exercise their mind-reading skills before targeting legitimate military assets.
And even though it is great that the Biden administration is moving Ukraine ahead of other countries that were slated to receive air defense missiles (Washington will "reprioritize" deliveries of Patriots and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems missiles planned for a select group of countries, and deliveries of interceptors to other countries will be delayed until after Ukraine’s inventory is restocked), without the ability to strike deep inside Russia, Ukraine will not be able to compete for air dominance.
For example, the ISW estimates that the S-400 air defense SAMs deployed within Russia and (out of HIMARS GMLRS missile range) can cover 64% of Ukraine’s air space.
And this in turn means that any future F-16s that Ukraine is about to receive will be less effective in combat with these S-400s still in place to take them out over eastern Ukraine.
3) Serbia is moving ever-closer towards NATO.
And gradually, ditching Russia.
The Financial Times (FT) reported that third-party countries have sent roughly 800 million euros worth of Serbian-produced ammunition to Ukraine since February 2022.
In an interview with FT, Serbia’s Prime Minister Vučić confirmed that this number is "in the right ballpark’’, then adding a careful clarification that Serbia does not export ammunition to Ukraine or Russia, and that Serbia's clients in the US, Spain, and Czechia can allocate the ammunition as they see fit.
Unnamed diplomats and analysts told the FT that official Serbian government data purposely veils the flow of ammunition to Ukraine via third-party countries.
This is a monumental geopolitical shift and a major success for both NATO and the EU.
Putin signs a military defense pact with North Korea - risks and opportunities.
The most notable news of the week was that the Russian President Vladimir Putin commits to supporting North Korea against the US by strengthening military and trade ties with Pyongyang.
Putin assured North Korean state media that Russia will continue to back the DPRK and its people in their resistance against what he calls an "insidious, dangerous, and aggressive enemy."
This new agreement is an upgrade to their previous relationship and pledges military assistance if either one of the countries is attacked.
The risks are significant.
For a start, this new status quo will incentivize more belligerence from North Korea - they will feel more secure in escalating both rhetorically and militarily (conducting more frequent military operations/missile tests etc).
In addition, North Korea would likely cause deliberate trouble to distract/occupy US resources if (in the very unlikely scenario) Russia itself was to come under attack.
(side note: and this would not be done only out of honor to the pledged mutual assistance. If the state of the world is such that Russia - a nuclear superpower- is actually under attack, then the fall of North Korea would be peanuts in comparison. Russia’s (and also, Iran’s) survival is therefore of crucial strategic value to North Korea itself - it cannot afford to be the only major Pariah state left on the scene.)
Finally, there is also the issue of actual Russian support for North Korea - if the latter was to come under attack.
Here, things are a bit more unclear - it is unlikely that Russia would supply North Korea with its most advanced platforms like the Su-35 fighter jets, Zircon hypersonic missiles (that can be launched from submarines) or even lesser Khinzhal or Kalibr missiles.
And that is for three reasons: 1) training on these platforms would take too long - and it is unclear if North Korea has resources to train on/maintain these advanced missiles.
A good indicator of what is possible in the future, is to observe what actions will be taken in the short-term: are Russians going to train North Korean fighter pilots/drone/missile operators?
If there is intel to that effect, then that is a very worrying development indeed.
2) They are available in limited numbers and Russia needs them all for Ukraine, and if things escalate further, to deter and/or counter NATO forces;
3) The costs of doing so would be immense - the US would likely target Russian deliveries.
There would also be huge economic repercussions in the form of even more crippling sanctions.
4) It would not please China: Russia’s assistance would create a cover for corresponding militarization from the US, and China doesn’t want more US presence in the peninsula.
So an outright (and significant) Russian supply of advanced munitions is less likely.
What is more likely is that Russia would either supply low-level ‘saturation’ weapons like the first-person view (FPV) drones (or even the more advanced ‘‘Orlan’’ drones - Russians are getting better at mass production of these platforms) and/or provide advanced intel in the form of real-time accurate satellite pictures of the battlefield conditions (which is already very valuable).
So Russia’s commitment to North Korea is overall worrying - but there is no need to catastrophize this beyond what it could actually be.
In the meantime, there are some tactical and strategic opportunities that the US can and must exploit.
Opportunities.
1) South Korea and Japan can be swayed into more active roles as allies.
The new status quo is intolerable to both - they cannot afford an emboldened Putin on their doorstep.
(side note: and Japan already has a separate border dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories/Kuril islands.)
Both nations will be interested in a situation where Russia is drained in Ukraine - and is therefore less able to help North Korea.
(side note: similar dynamics already existed before - precisely why Japan and South Korea have been active helpers of Ukraine: these incentives will now strengthen.)
And for Biden admin, South Korea in particular will be easier to influence.
Seoul is currently racing to renew a critical defense-cost sharing agreement with the US by the years-end.
(side note: and this is the Special Measures Agreement (SMA)) - which allocates liability for the cost of maintaining US presence: 28k troops and hardware)
This urgency is driven by the desire to avoid potentially more difficult bargaining with a possible Trump administration in 2025.
The existing SMA expires at the end of 2025, but South Korea aims for renewal by the end of this year.
Their worry is understandable of course - Trump has previously criticized South Korea for paying "almost nothing" for the American troops stationed there.
And in an April interview with Time Magazine, Trump claimed the U.S. has essentially funded much of South Korea's military at no cost.
Trump suggested that while South Korea agreed to pay billions, they might be paying very little now that he's no longer in office.
Seoul aims to prevent a repeat of the tough SMA renewal talks with the Trump administration in 2020, which demanded a significant hike in South Korea’s cost share.
(side note: there are of course risks to this approach however. Firstly because Trump can simply renege on the deal negotiated by Biden and perhaps more importantly, Trump may view this as a sneaky way to go behind his back: not a great start.)
And precisely this anxiety grants enormous leverage to Biden.
Now, both South Korea and Japan have helped Ukraine - but the extent of this help hasn’t been anywhere as significant as it can be.
And when it comes to specific lethal military aid, South Korea’s help has been indirect (supplying more than 100k 155m artillery shells to the US - which then transferred them on to Ukraine).
And Japan hasn’t provided any lethal military aid (citing their pacifist constitution).
Both countries can do much more - and Biden now has more leverage to demand such help.
If Japan’s constitution doesn’t prevent it purchasing tomahawks from the US and investing into their own long-range missile systems (and aiming to raise the spend to 2% of their GDP - all welcome news of course) then neither should it stop them from helping Ukraine.
And South Korea has an enormous potential as a military-industrial powerhouse.
It is already supplying a significant amount of weapons to NATO allies (single handedly rearming Poland with advanced tanks and FA-50 attack aircraft.)
And there is already some indication that following the Russia- North Korea deal, Seoul may be willing to demonstrate initiative here - supplying Ukraine with artillery shells and air defense missiles.
Overall however, after Russia’s mutual assistance security deal with North Korea Washington has a stronger hand to push for more direct Ukraine aid from both South Korea and Japan.
2) Possibility of friction in Beijing’s relations with Moscow.
Xi Jinping was most likely not very happy with Putin’s deal with Kim.
For a number of reasons:
1) North Korea diversifying its sources of patronage is not good for China - they would rather be the main potential protector and thus maintain their leverage over Pyongyang.
And with this leverage comes the power to reduce recklessness of the Kim regime.
If however, there is another country that Pyongyang can rely on, Beijing’s ability to minimize such excesses will be reduced;
2) Russia is now likely to face more sanctions - this means more Chinese businesses and financial institutions dealing with Russia may become collateral damages of US Secondary Sanctions;
3) Most importantly, Beijing doesn’t want to invite a bigger presence of the US military on the Korean peninsula.
And Russia’s alliance with North Korea makes precisely this scenario more likely.
The US will now see more need and excuse to increase its military presence on the Korean peninsula.
US submarines will have a legitimate excuse to prowl in the East China Sea.
4) Russia may become a bigger burden due to a harder campaign in Ukraine.
This is especially so if the US capitalizes on the opportunity to push Japan and South Korea to increase their aid to Ukraine.
If this happens, then Russia will face a bigger headache in Ukraine - turning into a major burden for Beijing.
3) Stronger domestic rhetoric in favor of a bolder foreign policy against Russia.
American right/GOP is divided into three parts: 1) Core establishment that understands the importance of containing both Russia and China, 2) A significant portion advocating for significant re-focus on (almost exclusively) on China - even if at the detriment of a weaker presence and and ability to shape outcomes in Europe and Middle East, 3) Irrational and reflexive extreme isolationists like Marjorie-Taylor Greene - this is the smallest crowd. But they can be pretty loud. They oppose aid to Ukraine, and are intuitively anti-China, but never initiated any major strategic/foreign policy initiative to Contain it. In short, these are clueless demagogues - the most dangerous crowd that poison the well.
That Russia is now formally allied to North Korea will help with messaging with all three groups.
It is clear that: 1) America’s enemies are joining forces, and 2) unlike some politicians in America, Russia is not at all isolationist in its foreign policy - willing to intervene in remote regions and happily engage in proxy wars if it means hurting America and its allies.
This is the point that some US politicians (and media personalities like Tucker Carlson etc) miss: engaging in world affairs is important.
Either the US shapes the world or it lives in a world shaped by its adversaries.
And in Ukraine, we have this opportunity where America’s strategic interests of weakening Russia align with its values of defending a democracy fighting for survival.
So all those calling for a softer approach towards Putin, and even an end to Ukraine aid must stop and ponder: is this who you want to appease? An imperialist invader who is willing to commit his country into defending a nuclear-armed pariah state like North Korea?
Is it not finally clear that stopping Putin’s march in Europe is a matter of core national security?