Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, new President in Iran.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Russia scores a major hit against Ukraine’s air force.
Using cluster munitions delivered by the Iskander M missiles, Russian forces were able to destroy 2 Su-27s and damage additional 4 SU27s in possession of the Ukrainian air force.
These fighter jets were parked out in the open at the Mirhorod Airbase in Central Ukraine.
That Ukrainian forces demonstrate such recklessness and lapse in basic operational security to park high-value fighter aircraft unprotected three years into the war is very worrying.
Obviously, whoever is in charge of the airbase needs to be fired.
But more importantly, significant opsec reforms must be implemented to reassure western allies that the F-16s donated to Ukraine are not going to be wasted by facing the same fate of being destroyed when parked in the open.
2) NATO maintains an annual $43bn Ukraine commitment - further Trump-proofing Ukraine.
NATO members agreed to the Secretary-General Stoltenberg’s request that they keep military funding for the country at $43 billion in 2025 - at the same level that the NATO members have backed the country since the beginning of the invasion.
3) China reportedly escalates its involvement in the Ukraine war.
According to European officials, Chinese and Russian companies are developing an attack drone similar to an Iranian model used in Ukraine.
The companies discussed replicating Iran’s Shahed drone in 2023 and began developing and testing a version this year for shipment to Russia, according to the officials.
If true, this would be Beijing crossing the threshold into outright supply of lethal military aid.
New president in Iran - early inferences and observations.
After two rounds of voting, Iran has a new President: Masoud Pezeshkian.
That Pezeshkian was able to beat the hardliner conservative rival Saeed Jalili and pro-IRGC (Revolutionary Guard) candidate Mohammad Baghe Qalibaf (who came in at third place with a poor showing) is of course notable.
Dr. Pezeshkian, a 71-year-old heart surgeon and parliament member, opposes Iran’s morality police and advocates for renewing the 2015 nuclear deal to end Iran's isolation.
Saeed Jalili, his rival in the latest round, supported the status quo, opposed the nuclear deal, and had strong backing from religious communities.
Voting turnout was 50% for the second rout of the vote - higher than last week's (first round’s) record low of 40% since the 1979 revolution but still low overall.
It is far too early to pass on sweeping judgements like ‘‘pro-West reformists are back in power” or that rapprochement with the west is now imminent.
Some pundits have also claimed that the Iranian regime has demonstrated its weakness in inability to get a hardliner ‘‘elected’’ into the position of power.
But there is little evidence for the regime’s weakness.
Let’s not forget that this is not the first time Iran is ostensibly getting a ‘‘reformist’’ President, and that if Pezeshkian was truly a threat to the regime, the Guardian council would have removed him from the outset - not allowing him to partake in elections at all.
And if the threat was only apparent after Pezeshkian’s candidacy was approved, well that too wouldn’t have precluded effective interference: regime could have forced second-tier candidates to drop earlier in the race (in favor of Jalili) and as a last-ditch effort, blatant ballot stuffing and electoral fraud was also not beneath them either.
But this did not happen - simply because, for all his reformist stance, Pezeshkian didn’t cause an existential threat to the regime.
And on the contrary, there are in fact reasons to believe that Pezeshkian’s win can help this regime on both tactical and strategic level.
To see why that may be the case, let us unpack the potential gains for the regime from Pezeshkian’s win:
1) Avoidance of political crises.
This is no small feat - recall the 2009 protests that were the result of the brazen electoral fraud to keep Ahmedinejad in power and deny victory to his reformist political adversary - Mir Hossein Mousavi.
Back then, this “green movement” protest wave led to weeks of unrest and more than 250 deaths - caused by the regime’s lethal crackdown on peaceful protestors.
(side note: the movement took its name from a green sash given to Mir Hossein Mousavi by Mohammad Khatami - who himself was widely considered as the first true reformist President.)
At their height, the protests drew crowds of 2-3 million in Tehran: this was a serious threat to the regime, and but for decisive and ruthless action from the very outset, it is unclear how things would have turned out - mere two years later, a number of serious Arab dictatorships fell as a result of similar protest movements.
And only two years ago, Iran experienced months of protests that were caused by the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of the morality police (she was initially detained for wearing her headscarf ‘‘improperly’’).
The last thing that Khomeini and IRGC need is yet another protest movement after some brazen electoral fraud: especially now, when the Israel-Hezbollah crisis may spill over into a full-on war and there is a serious premium on internal political stability.
2) Boost the regime’s legitimacy.
Essentially, Khomeini and IRGC will ride on the wave of legitimacy granted to Pezeshkian.
In under 50 days, Iran held two rounds of elections free from blatant electoral fraud and significant unrest.
They have re-stabilized the regime, and in fact, refreshed it too: Pezeshkian is considered to be a reformist by most of the Western observers/punditry and there will likely be some hope of some sort of rapprochement and stabilization in relationship in both Washington and Brussels.
As a corollary to the added legitimacy, those advocating for regime change will have their arguments weakened.
(side note: and even though there is not much media attention given to those arguing for this, there are a number of serious people doing just that. From a number of establishment nat-sec types, to notable policymakers, and even a former Prime Minister of Israel.)
It is one thing when the President is someone like Raisi and/or IRGC man.
But when someone like Pezeshkian comes to power, the value of brazen and vigorous action to topple the regime goes down: for if there is even some remote chance of gradual reform, those arguing against an outright intervention will have their position strengthened.
If intervention and regime change was already risky and probably a net-negative, well it is much more so now: the cost of intervention was always high in any case, and now there would be an added opportunity cost of not giving it a chance (to come to some sort of co-existence arrangement/modus vivendi) with Iran under Pezeshkian.
What was always too risky and reckless will now be considered that and outright foolish too.
3) Signaling to allies.
Both China and Russia witnessed quick turnaround and a regime ‘‘update’’.
This is an important strategic signaling to both Moscow and Beijing: that the regime is strong, resilient and consequently, reliable.
Putin sees a strong signal that he can deepen his reliance on/increase cooperation with the Iranian military-industrial complex, and Xi sees that the country is worth investing into.
(side note: it is likely not a coincidence that there has been a significant delay in the implementation of the Chinese investments that were promised under a 25 year-long $400bn investment plan in Iran. Beijing was likely delaying significant action until Iran would start to recover from Trump’s ‘‘maximum pressure’’ sanctions, and the Iranian regime would prove itself durable enough to create a stable political order that could adequately absorb these funds.)
4) Reset or delay.
Precisely because Pezeshkian is seen as a possible reformer, there are benefits of optionality for the Iranian regime: either, 1) there is a possibility of a genuine reset and some interim agreement with the US/EU on how to co-exist and manage Iran’s nuclear options, or at the very minimum, 2) there is an opportunity to delay confrontation and win some time to maximize their hand.
And more time is very valuable to the regime: Iran has stopped complying with a number of IAEA regulations, has removed monitoring equipment (including live-stream IAEA cameras from enrichment sites), and is in the process of producing more of the new IR-6 Uranium enrichment centrifuges.
(side note: and just last month, Iran has already installed half of the planned additional IR-6 centrifuges in Fordow enrichment site.)
This requires a deeper dive once more intel is available, but the current expert consensus is that at a 60% enrichment Iran is only several months (if not weeks) away from reaching a 90% (weapons-grade) enrichment level.
And from there on, it would take mere 18 months to develop 4-5 nuclear warheads.
Iran is already in possession of medium-range ballistic missiles, and within 2-3 years, it will field a fleet of Su-34s and (likely) S-400 air defense SAM batteries to defend its skies.
This will not deny air supremacy for US or Israel - the disparity in technological prowess and might is too big for Iran to ever reach that anytime soon.
But it will raise the cost of action for the US/Israeli military.
All of this is to say that no matter how you look at it, time is on Iran’s side - it is in their interest to delay confrontation for as long as possible.
And if not an outright reset, the new ‘‘reformist’’ President is more likely to grant the sought-after delay than any other hardliner/IRGC candidate ever could.
Overall then, this was a good night for the Iranian regime - not the ideal outcome for Khomeini or the IRGC, but definitely an outcome that will boost the regime’s resilience in the short to medium term at the very least.
Questions remain on how the new President will handle pressing issues of foreign and domestic policy - we shall address these in future posts.
I am fascinated by the Orban-Zelensky meeting. I know Orban is the EU president in the rotation now, but what could these two have possibly said to each other.