Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war, Xi's Moscow trip, and Japan's retort.
Ukraine war updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
Ukraine top ground forces commander Col. Gen Oleksandr Syrskyi commented that Kyiv was preparing for a counterassault that would take place ‘‘very soon”.
Syrskyi commented that Russia’s Wagner PMC was losing ‘‘considerable strength” and that Ukraine would take advantage of this.
This statement, in addition to an apparent declaration of intent to attack Bakhmut so soon after the delivery of Slovakian MIG-29s, should be viewed as part of the information war, and quite possibly, as part of a deception campaign.
Given that it is not at all rational to warn about precise location, timing, and conditionality of a counteroffensive, it is almost certain that Ukraine is engaging in bluffs and maybe even double/triple bluffs.
The aim is to sow confusion and create uncertainty.
And this uncertainty over Ukraine’s next moves will most likely affect the tempo and volume of Russia’s current attacks - at least some troops/resources will have to be pulled back from major ongoing assaults - providing a much-needed breather for Ukraine.
In the meantime, there have been reported drone strikes in Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol.
Beyond accomplishing the primary and secondary (stretching Russian forces thin over a larger contact line) military objectives, such attacks have two additional effects:
1) Symbolic value - that Ukraine has not, and is not going to give up on Crimea.
This is doubly important so soon after Putin’s recent visit (to demonstrate control) on the nine year anniversary of Crimea’s annexation.
2) Diminishing the value of the ‘‘land corridor’’ to Crimea by reducing the utility of Sevastopol as a viable Naval base for Russia.
The lower the utility and use of the Naval base in Sevastopol, the weaker is the argument to maintain a ground corridor to Crimea - making future territorial concessions (on Russia’s behalf) along this ‘‘corridor’’ more palatable.
In other words, these attacks are not only tactical and symbolic, but also highly useful in shaping the political context for the future negotiations.
Bad week for Russia.
But for Xi’s Moscow trip (more on that later below), this was an otherwise pretty bad week for Russia.
They have failed to attain any significant progress on the Bakhmut axis (or any other axes for that matter).
In addition, the west is rightly squeezing the juice out of the ICC warrant for Putin: justice ministers from around the world have met in London to discuss scaling up their support for the ICC and its operational capacity.
This is great - and it is important to maintain the global narrative of Putin as a man wanted for war crimes - for as long as possible.
This will diminish the Kremlin’s diplomatic clout - making it harder for even the traditional Russia orbiters to openly back Moscow in this war.
Speaking of: Russia is about to receive yet another diplomatic blow - this time from Serbia.
If the EU succeeds in implementing the agreement reached between Serbia and Kosovo to normalize their relations, Russia will suffer yet another blow to its soft power in Serbia and leverage over the EU (which was based on the ability to concoct tensions and revive conflict in the Balkans).
Russia was careless in offending Serbia’s interests - Wagner’s unhinged efforts to recruit soldiers from Serbia did not help to maintain Russia’s standing in the country.
But recent tensions notwithstanding, Serbia was/is always going to break from Russia - its future, security, and prosperity lay in the membership of the EU.
Moscow simply cannot compete with Brussels on what it can bring to the table.
Whether this deal takes hold or not, Serbia will (sooner or later) slip away completely from Russia’s grip: fundamental geopolitical incentives are simply too hard for Russia to resist.
(side note: also last week, Putin revealed an agreement with Belarus on potentially hosting Russian tactical nukes in the country. It is too soon to arrive at definitive/firm conclusions, but one can tentatively claim that potential outcomes are more likely to be around Belarus’s further subservience and vassalage with Russia vs any actual military impact on Ukraine/the rest of Europe. If needed, and through the use of submarines/air force, Russia can launch these tactical nukes from almost any location it wants regardless where exactly they are stored.)
Western military & financial aid.
This was a pretty good week for Ukraine on both fronts.
The EU sealed a $2.20 bln deal to secure 1 million artillery shells for Ukraine.
At Ukraine’s current consumption levels (of approximately 3k shells per day), this should be enough time for the Pentagon and the EU to ramp up their military-industrial capacity to catch up with the reality of an attrition war.
(side note: however, this still does not change the fundamental reality of EU powers lagging significantly behind the US, UK, Poland, and the Baltic States in terms of NATO spend. According to a new 2022 NATO report, none of the major continental powers like France or Germany devoted 2% of their GDP on defense. And this is in spite of a major invasion taking place on their doorstep. The US makes up 54% of the 30 member alliance’s GDP, yet provides 70% of its total spending. Majority of the 30 member alliance do not meet the bare minimum of a 2% of GDP spend. This needs to change - and Washington must lead in pressuring other member states to commit and deliver on this).
In addition, Ukraine had successfully secured $15.6 billion from the IMF.
This was a crucial lifeline: with an economic contraction of over 30% in 2022 and major stress on domestic public services (not to mention the constant fight to keep the power grid running in spite of Russia’s missile attacks), this financial aid was an essential lifeline for Ukraine’s overstretched government.
There was however some disappointing news that America’s 31 M-1 Abrams tanks would arrive only by this fall.
Although it is understandable that training and logistics will take much time, this was an avoidable problem if Washington was to pull the trigger on the decision to supply them much sooner in this war.
Had this decision been made earlier, in say September/October of 2022 (when success at the Kherson and Kharkiv axes made it clear that Ukraine can deliver major battlefield successes, and was indeed capable of executing complex combined arms meneuvers) instead of in the early weeks of 2023, Ukraine could have potentially received these tanks by late Spring - in time for its major counteroffensive.
This is yet another reminder that the US and NATO must not delay decisions that they will inevitably make (always due to the clear fundamental logic of this war - and what is needed to win it for Ukraine).
Miley’s faux pas
Further disappointment came from General Mark Milley, who took on the mantle of a media pundit, and commented that it would be ‘‘extremely difficult’’ for Ukraine to force out all of the invading Russian troops this year.
Milley then curiously added the following observation:
“You've got a state of nature where neither side, probably, can achieve their political objectives through military means, and that state of nature will exist for some period of time [emphasis added].”
These comments are problematic for two reasons:
1) This is yet another reminder to Putin that his Western adversaries are not convinced of the viability of Ukraine’s military success.
Given that a) Putin knows that Biden is receiving advice from Milley (who is bound to be less tactful in private than on a podcast), and b) Milley then reveals his assessment of the probability of Ukraine’s success as unlikely, what incentive does Putin now have to settle?
Why not delay, and extend the war to the point where Milley’s pessimistic outlook combines with increasing 1) public fatigue in the US and Western Europe, and 2) political pressure on Biden from the GOP (at around the 2024 election) - a point where the US would be most vulnerable to the option of ending the war by pressuring Ukraine to settle on unfavorable terms?
2) By using the term ‘‘political objectives’’ in relation to the goals of both sides, Milley’s comments create a distorted and false picture: by inadvertently asserting a false equivalence between Ukraine and Russia.
As if both sides were fighting for similar political reasons.
Let us be clear here: although both sides have a desirable political and strategic outcome from this war, only one side is fighting to accomplish it through use of force.
It was Russia -not Ukraine- that started this war to accomplish its political objectives.
Ukraine is fighting to reclaim its territory - there is no political goal beyond that for the use of force.
And fighting to re-establish sovereignty over a territory that is rightfully yours, is not the same as fighting a war of conquest - seeking to accomplish further strategic and political objectives in the process.
To the extent that Ukraine has any political objectives beyond return of its territories - seeking NATO/EU membership and security guarantees - it was always trying to attai these via peaceful means since at least 2013.
It is Russia and not Ukraine that is using force to advance its political objectives.
Milley should not forget this - ideally, he should not even comment on the politics of the war at all.
That is not his job.
Some pleasantly surprising displays of statesmanship.
Whereas a senior American General disappointed with his comments, there were few politicians that demonstrated a much-needed clear & unwavering strategic judgement: a welcome break from last week’s series of populist statements from the GOP frontrunners.
First there was Nikki Haley - a GOP presidential contender - chiming in on the Xi and Putin meeting, and highlighting how this amounted to a clear danger to the US national security interests:
“Why don’t they want Ukraine to beat China’s ally? Victory for Kyiv would make the U.S. safer without putting a single American soldier in harm’s way”.
And after the mandatory and expected attack on Biden - accusing him of “ hemming and hawing” on national security, and criticizing him for the slow delivery of military aid to Ukraine (on which we generally agree - with the caveat that thus far he is in fact the best we’ve got from the current unimpressive field..), Haley then (crucially) took a shot at DeSantis:
“More surprising is the weakness from some on the right.. They say the U.S. shouldn’t care about Ukraine because this war isn’t our fight. Some call it a mere ‘territorial dispute.’ They say we should ignore Ukraine so we can focus on China. This has it backward.”
This is great, and although Haley is unlikely to secure the nomination, she is weighty enough to be picked as a VP.
And having her in the White House is a great outcome if either Trump or DeSantis was to actually win the Presidency and needed to receive a much-needed periodic wake up call, and a pushback on the core national security issues facing America.
Then there was Italy’s Giorgia Meloni - who declared willingness to support Ukraine even if it was unpopular with voters and risked denting her government’s approval rating.
Crucially she then added the following gem: “The Ukrainian people are defending the values of freedom and democracy on which our civilization is based, and the very foundations of international law” .
Not only is Meloni displaying some admirable firm leadership - declaring her willingness to do what is right and not merely popular - but she is also laying down a precedent and a blueprint for all other “traditional conservative” center-right/right wing electorates in the West.
For there is nothing more traditional or conservative than defending values of freedom and conserving civilization.
Meloni’s stand is important to remind those in the US, that supporting Ukraine is not a partisan issue pushed by a ‘‘woke’’ liberal DC elite - but given the values at stake, it should be the one fight for which those on the traditional conservative right should display even more vigor than the rest of the population.
Xi confirms support for Putin and tests waters in Moscow.
A lot has been written about Xi Jinping’s imperial treatment in Moscow.
And Putin was understandably anxious to prove the continuous strength of the relationship and secure a grandiose display of China’s commitment to Russia.
And this did in fact happen - at least in rhetoric (if not in actions yet).
There are a plethora of quotes from both leaders, but one in particular stands out over the others: Xi Jinping praised Putin for his ‘‘strong leadership”.
That’s right, a war criminal wanted by the ICC was described as a strong leader.
In doing so, Xi not only helped Putin immensely - by providing a much needed support for the rehabilitations of his global reputation (and signaling to the “Global South” that given Xi’s unwavering support, they can and should in fact ignore the ICC label, and (as they have been doing to date) continue in their equivocation, hedging, and refusal to align with Western sanctions - and this final point is indeed crucial: more than 100 countries representing 40% of the global GDP are refusing to implement sanctions on Russia - either partially or in full).
Naturally, describing an internationally wanted war criminal as a ‘‘strong leader’’ does not do much to bolster Xi’s credentials as an impartial diplomatic broker - both Xi and Putin reiterated their calls for the Beijing proposed peace plan, but with Xi’s latest moves, this whole facade suffered a further blow to its already thin credibility.
In choosing between signaling China’s backing for Russia & staying power, and its aspirations as a fair diplomatic broker and a responsible great power, Xi opted for the former.
And this is of course unsurprising: Ukraine is nowhere near facing the conditions that would force Kyiv to submit to extraordinary political and territorial concessions - outcomes that would be realized if Kyiv was to agree to China’s suggestion of an immediate ceasefire: something that would automatically freeze Russian gains on the ground.
(side note: but offering this ‘‘peace proposal’’ - regardless of the probability of success -empowers Beijing with further optionality. China can now claim that it is trying to prevent a clear imbalance and acts as a counter to NATO (and not to Ukraine) if/when it decides to supply Russia with weapons. In other words: we want to get to a ceasefire, and if necessary to bring parties to the table, by arming Russia, we are willing to convince NATO that Putin cannot be defeated through fighting on the battlefield)
And Putin (in spite of terrible battlefield progress) is not slowing down either - he too is not going to adjust his maximalist war aims anytime soon.
So the war is going to continue for some foreseeable time.
And Xi thus judged that it is far more preferable to demoralize the west with its strong backing for Putin vs maintain a veneer of fairness and disinterest in this war.
The very fact that praising Putin for a strong leadership was so over the top, is in itself the whole point: by engaging in such a costly diplomatic gesture, China is signaling its resolve to prevent Russia’s defeat (all the while maintaining plausible deniability given that no major action has been taken to back this up).
Overall then, this was a successful trip for Xi - where he managed to (in addition to the aforementioned analysis) secure further additional wins:
1) Signal to the powers in Central Asia and Caucasus that Russia is not done - that Beijing will not allow for Russia to be defeated in a humiliating way.
Countries traditionally and firmly in Russian orbit - even those like Kazakhstan and Tajikistan - have openly challenged Russia and even launched scathing attacks against the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
(side note: and as advocated by these cables, both the EU and the US scrambled to engage these states.)
China’s message to these states was as follows: careful there - don’t jump to conclusions that Russia is spent. Don’t hedge too far towards the West. Putin isn’t done yet. Here is me proving that..
2) Strengthening the anti-west wing of the Kremlin elite.
Russia deciding to bind itself so closely to China was not always a given.
Even as recently as shortly before the 2022 invasion, opinion within the Kremlin elite was divided on whether it is indeed so prudent to fall fully into China’s orbit - as opposed to maintaining soft unalignment and getting to play the role of a kingmaker in the competition between the US and China.
Obviously, the invasion of Ukraine turned that question moot.
There may however have been some remaining players within the Kremlin elite that hoped for a ceasefire and gradual rapprochement in return for sanctions relief (however improbable any of this is in the near-term).
Xi’s visit, and declaration of support for Putin weakens that pro-west wing much further.
Those who opt to align ever closer with China now have a powerful argument that this is quite literally the only option Russia has to avoid a humiliating defeat against the full might of NATO.
There is now very little that those wishing for return to normalcy with the West can provide as a counterargument - any potential rapprochement is contingent on Putin’s revision of his maximalist war aims.
And since that is not happening anytime soon, Xi’s visit has reaffirmed and crystallized the only plausible strategic option facing the Kremlin in the short to medium term: becoming China’s vassal and calling it an ever closer partnership.
Putin’s gains.
1) Boost to Putin’s domestic prestige and popularity amidst battlefield setbacks, stagnant economy, and falling living standards.
This was a much-needed bump to Putin’s domestic standing.
After all, for all the hedging done by the “Global South” no major foreign leader of weight was willing to publicly align with Putin.
Biden gets to host a world leader almost on a monthly/bi-weekly basis.
Who (of note/worth) is visiting Putin?
(side note: leaders of pariah states like Belorussia or Iran don’t count).
Xi’s visit (especially so soon after the ICC move) lifts this taboo and boosts Putin’s prestige.
2) Signal to those hoping for a coup that Putin’s power is firm and well-supported by his “dear friend” Xi Jinping.
Rats abandon the sinking ship.
One way to prevent this flight and a potential regime change, is to keep a firm grip on all the potential troublemakers - and there is little suggestion that Putin’s grip is fading.
Another, more sustainable solution: convince everyone that not only is the ship not sinking, but the captain is the only hope for all hoping to survive the storm.
If there were any players willing to make a move against Putin, they will now have a hard time recruiting support:
1) NATO is (rightly) intent on ensuring that Russia gets to feel the full pain of its invasion folly, and;
2) The leader of the only country that can save Russia just declared Putin to be his ‘‘dear friend’’, praised his ‘‘strong leadership’’ and outright backed him in the 2024 Presidential elections in Russia.
Putin already had a strong grip on power - and now it is even more solid.
All of this is real bad news for the West.
Russia is falling further into the grips of China.
Beijing is now the source of economic, diplomatic and potentially, military aid.
Russia has little options going forward: in 2022, China accounted for nearly 30% of Russia’s exports and 40% of its imports.
And given the sanctions on USD and Euro trades, a growing share of this trade with China is being conducted in Yuan.
Moreover, the very fact of China’s refusal to come to a concrete agreement on a gas pipeline from Siberia (Power of Siberia 2), indicates Beijing’s desire to continue with the current arrangement - gas deliveries via the PoS 1 pipeline (already underutilized) and LNG shipments - both require little additional long-term commitment from China.
This then allows Beijing to fully exercise its leverage and squeeze Russia further into supplying China with cheap gas to boost its massive economy.
In other words, the US and the West in general is facing a China dominating the Eurasian mass.
At this point, Russia is on track to become a full-on vassal for China (and some may argue- convincingly - that this has already happened).
This is yet another reason why all those neophytes arguing that defending Ukraine is not in the core US interests are so deadly wrong.
Maybe certain towns in Donbas may not be on the radar of an average American, but all senior politicians in the US (like DeSantis) must surely realize that it clearly not in the US interests that the world’s largest country, with nukes (and hypersonic missiles to carry them), in possession of crucial minerals and resources, is now a vassal to China: and so defeating that country (and thus weakening China) at a cost of less than half a percentage point of America’s GDP and no direct involvement of the US troops, is clearly in America’s interests.
In fact, such bargains don’t come often: it is Ukraine that has offered the West a great deal, and frankly, a blank check.
The very least that the united West can do is to send Ukraine enough weapons and money and do it fast and without further unjustified delays: so that those brave Ukrainian soldiers can finish the job.
Kishida’s subtle warning to Beijing.
Last week, the Japanese PM Fumio Kishida became yet another G7 leader to have visited Kyiv.
But what was more noteworthy however, was the timing of the visit - Kishida’s visit to Kyiv coincided with Xi’s trip to Moscow.
And this was deliberate - Kishida is sending a subtle warning signal to Beijing that he would be willing to back Ukraine in a possible proxy war - if/when Beijing went ahead and decided to supply Russia with weapons.
And this makes sense - Russia/China duo is a threat to Japan, and Tokyo and Moscow have a long-standing territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (and Russia is periodically reviving this dispute - through brazen militarization maneuvers - whenever it needs to remind Beijing of its utility in confronting Japan).
A stronger Russia accomplishing its war aims in Ukraine would only further boost Putin’s confidence and appetite for risk-taking.
In addition, such a victory would only be possible if China was to really throw its weight behind Russia - and no doubt there would come a time when Beijing insists that Russia pays back for all this effort - whenever a serious confrontation with Japan eventually takes place.
This is an unacceptable scenario for Tokyo - so ideally, they get to deter China from this endeavor from the very outset - hence the not so coincidental trip to Kyiv.
For his part, President Zelensky played his hand (and this newfound leverage) well by calling on China to join Ukraine’s own peace formula - given that this would entail Russia withdrawing all of its troops, Beijing is not going to even entertain this.
But putting the ball in their court and forcing China to explain exactly which part of the reasonable Ukrainian demands for peace it finds unacceptable, is a very smart strategic play indeed.