Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, Putin's regime dynamics.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Russia continues to make battlefield advances in Donetsk.
Following Ukraine’s tactical withdrawal, Russian forces have achieved a notable tactical advance northwest of Avdiivka.
In the meantime, Russia is pushing hard to take Chasiv Yar - the strategically located hilltop city is now facing an assault of 25k Russian troops - including some of the elite paratrooper units.
It is likely that the goal was to capture the city ahead of the 9th of May victory parade in Moscow - this would not be the first time that political objectives would dictate Russia’s military operations on the ground.
But more generally, there is also likely a heightened level of urgency to capture as much territory as possible - before the new US-supplied hardware arrives on the battlefield.
This makes sense from the Russian perspective, but unfortunately for Ukraine, not enough hardware will arrive fast enough to reverse the current course in short order.
(side note: it is important to remember that it took 22 months for the US to deliver the first $24bn of military aid. Even if that rate is improved by 3x that would still be around 6-8months before Ukraine gets its hands on all of the approximate maximum of $30-35bn worth actual hardware that it could receive. Let’s not forget that around half of the $61bn aid is set aside to pay back Pentagon to replenish US munitions and/or support US intel & logistics operations in Ukraine)
For now, the most that can be hoped for is that further Russian advances are blocked.
2)Trump on Ukraine aid and NATO spending.
Another week and yet another indication of Trump reversal on Ukraine and NATO.
In his recent statement on the issue of Ukraine funding, Trump indicated willingness to provide aid to Ukraine, stressing the need for European contribution: “I’m going to try and help Ukraine but Europe has to get there also and do their job.”
He underscored that if European countries fail to provide adequate funding, questioning, “If Europe isn't going to pay, who are gravely more affected than we are. If Europe is not going to pay, why should we pay?”
This stance contradicts previous assertions made by Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán, who, following a March meeting with Trump at Mar-a-Lago, stated that Trump wouldn’t allocate further funding to Ukraine.
(side note: Trump is also creating a set-up/excuse to then continue spending on Ukraine: to his confused base, Trump can then claim that his reversal is due to change in course from Europe: he pressured them into contributing more, and that since they have stepped up, it is now fine for the US to continue doing the same - since there is no longer any freeloading going on. Of course this presumes that supporting Ukraine is also in the US interests - and this much was already admitted by Trump several weeks ago in his previous statement on the issue)
There were similar course reversals on NATO.
Trump previously indicated willingness to withdraw or restructure NATO into a ‘‘tiered’’ club.
We have previously criticized this policy proposal as pure nonsense: NATO is an all-or-nothing alliance: it either works as a whole unit or it doesn’t.
It is one thing to kick out a certain member state - but to form a tiered club would amount to undermining the entire alliance built upon interoperability and pooled resources.
(side note: we are talking hypotheticals here - there is no need to kick out anyone as of today - even Hungary, since with a different leadership in place the country will most likely revert back to conducting its foreign policy in line with its core fundamental interests).
But this is not the worst of it all: Trump famously said that he would sit back and let Russia do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO member country that failed to spend at the minimum NATO standard standard on their defense budgets.
It is hard to imagine a worse statement to undermine the alliance-wide deterrence.
With all that said however, implicit within these remarks was always a desire to bolster NATO’ effectiveness vs end the alliance.
No matter how sloppy and strategically damaging Trump’s remarks could be, he never expressed a desire to weaken NATO: only to either reform/strengthen or if all else fails, withdraw (and in his mind, stop wasting resources on a one-sided arrangement.)
And his recent remarks are some of the most pro-NATO comments that Trump had ever made.
Addressing his previous proposal of altering the NATO membership tiers, Trump dismissed the notion of restructuring the alliance - highlighting his ongoing criticism of European NATO members for failing to meet defense spending targets: “I don't need to renegotiate the terms of the treaty. All I need to do is have them pay their bills. They don't pay their bills.”
Adding to this, Trump is apparently also considering a 3% (of GDP) spending floor on defense.
Reports from the Telegraph indicate that Trump is considering raising the defense spending requirement for NATO, with discussions with Polish President Andrzej Duda in April said to have influenced this decision.
Trump's plan involves revising the NATO budgeting rules to exclude aid to Ukraine from being considered toward defense targets - aligning with his persistent criticism of European nations for their perceived lack of financial commitment to the alliance.
Currently, more than a dozen NATO members fall short of the existing two percent spending target, with only Poland, Greece, and the US forecasted to meet the proposed three percent threshold set by Trump.
All of this is welcome news - since no one who wants to end the alliance would urge more contributions to it.
And this certainly will be a novel and contradictory data point for Putin’s calculus: he is betting on diminished staying power from the West, and specifically, that Trump winning this year’s elections would: 1) put an end to US support for Ukraine (or at least to a meaningful extent), 2) put pressure on Ukraine to give into Russia’s maximalist demands, and either lose more territory on the battlefield or concede these willingly to prevent a further collapse.
And when Trump calls for a 3% defense floor and urges more European funding for Ukraine, then that should be a worrying signal for Putin: is Trump bluffing and by resetting expectations, is trying to strengthen his hand and negotiate from a position of power (once president)?
Or is he genuinely changing his stance and will in fact back Ukraine?
Either option is not ideal for Putin and is a far-cry from the ‘‘walk in the park’’ in Ukraine, hoped for/expected once Trump was to re-enter the White House
3) European leaders continue the tough talk on Ukraine - placing the Kremlin in a bind.
The UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron was in the spotlight for declaring that Ukraine had the authorization to utilize British weaponry to target locations within Russia.
Concurrently, French President Emmanuel Macron reiterated his willingness to consider deploying troops to Ukraine.
Now, Cameron’s statement is not really something new: of course Ukraine has a right (under the international law) to strike targets within Russia.
But this explicit endorsement was always missing from the western rhetoric and lack of openly articulated support for Ukraine’s deep strikes within Russia betrayed low confidence and perpetual fear of escalation: something that allowed leaders like the Germany’s Olaf Scholz to appear as less of an outlier for constant concern about long-range strikes and fear of escalation with Russia (the main reason Germany’s Taurus missiles are yet to be delivered to Ukraine).
In other words, Cameron’s remarks serve to further solidify the norm around Ukraine’s deep strikes within Russia - making it harder for people like Scholz to evade from doing what is necessary and supplying Ukraine with all available long-range missiles.
In response to both Cameron and Macron’s comments, The Kremlin criticized the UK and France - condemning what it deemed as "dangerous" statements that could escalate the conflict in Ukraine and involve Europe further.
The Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov labeled these developments as a direct escalation of tensions surrounding the Ukrainian conflict, potentially endangering European security and the broader European security framework.
Moscow faces a trilemma here: either they: 1) say nothing and erode deterrence, 2) say something back and warn of consequences but also do nothing and erode deterrence, or 3) warn of consequences and actually deliver and risk an escalation with NATO that they really cannot afford.
So far, the first option has not really been exercised: Moscow refused to simply ignore/shrug off these comments - calculating that the loss of deterrence would be greater from acting aloof than from saying something.
But in choosing between options 2 and 3, thus far the Kremlin has gone with loud barks and little action.
Recall how the Kremlin warned of significant escalations if Western Abrams/Challenger/Leopard tanks were supplied to Ukraine and then.. nothing happened?
This has been the pattern with all new platforms and capabilities delivered from the West.
And this is because Russia really cannot afford any conventional escalation with NATO.
This is crucial - too many discussions veer off towards the possibility of a nuclear escalation.
But if Russia uses its conventional capabilities (like Iskander-M missiles or other hypersonic/cruise/ballistic missiles) to strike ammo depots (say, in Poland) that form a distribution center for Ukraine’s military aid, then the main risk is not that there would be a nuclear war with NATO, but that either NATO would respond directly with their own missile strikes on Russian bases, or supply Ukraine with further long-range strike capabilities or (most likely) do both: and at that point, the potential gain from responding would arguably be more then cancelled by the actual damage from these retaliatory strikes from NATO.
Consequently, Russia continues to do largely nothing, but it is now also resorting to covert sabotage of these ammo depots (and more is being planned across entire Europe) - something that gives them plausible deniability - and thus, an excuse for NATO not to strike back directly.
And as long as this is the status quo, NATO has the luxury of not responding with a direct kinetic strike - but the alliance as a whole and its main members must supply Ukraine with all conventional firepower capabilities that would enable Ukraine to engage in effective deep strikes.
France and UK are already supplying SCALP-EG and Storm Shadows, the US is finally supplying ATACMS and Germany must stop wavering and finally send its Taurus missiles.
Putin’s internal regime challenges back on agenda
It has now been almost a year after Putin successfully fended off Prigozhin’s attempted coup in June 2023.
And now, two separate developments will once again put the pressure on (if not outright test) Putin’s regime: firing and arrest of the Deputy Minister Of Defense Timur Ivanov, 2) Probable death of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov - and the ensuing power struggle to find an adequate replacement.
To be clear, none of these challenges have the imminence and intensity of the Prigozhin incident of last year - but they will both come with a) direct challenges and b) potential list of unintended consequences.
In this post, we shall look at the first incident.
Ivanov firing & arrest.
Last week, a court in Moscow froze the former Deputy Defense Minister (and a close Shoygu confidant) Ivanov’s assets amid bribery allegations
Ivanov was arrested for allegedly accepting bribes and he now faces up to 15 years in prison.
Back in 2022, the anti-corruption investigation team of late Alexei Navalny exposed Ivanov’s astonishingly decadent and luxurious lifestyle and shady dealings: from Rolls-Royce to villas and extravagant vacations - all backed by receipts.
That very same investigation also linked Ivanov to a construction company that was awarded lucrative development deals by the military: most recently, including the reconstruction of Mariupol.
What can we make of it all?
Why is someone so close to the Defense Minister himself (who himself by all accounts, still remains as one of the closest confidantes to Putin) fired and jailed?
The answer probably lies in the combination of the following three factors:
1) Desire to preempt calcification of the new power structures within the system.
For all his theatrics and dangerous rhetoric, Prigozhin did play an important political role: he held fire to the feet of the Defence Minister Shoygu and Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov - and helped to keep them in check.
Now, he later on crossed the lines, directed his venom at Putin himself (calling him an a**hole) and tried to topple him outright… But, up until that point, he was useful politically (as well as militarily).
With Prigozhin gone however, no such challenge to the defense establishments exists.
In other words, an important check is gone, and there is now a risk of a concentration of power: especially now that a) there is more progress on the battlefield and the top brass recoups some of the reputational losses sustained earlier in the war, and b) there is more money going into all sorts of military (fully 3.5million Russians are now employed in the military-industrial sector working three different shifts daily and the number of military production enterprises have tripled since the outset of the war).
Put another way: there is more status gain and more potential for people like Shoygu to grift at a higher rate and amass even larger fortunes.
Which in turn means more funds that can be invested into Shoygu’s private military corporations like the Patriot PMC - and more hard power can be further consolidated by the military.
As such, the dismissal and arrest of Ivanov can be viewed as a reminder to the system of who is really in charge.
2) Appeal to the public.
Russians know that their leaders are corrupt - thanks to the combo of Navalny investigations and Prigozhin attacks, they are especially aware of the enormous levels of corruption in the military.
Ivanov’s arrest for corruption/bribery is clearly going to have an additional value as Putin’s signaling to the public: that there are no sacred cows, and those caught in corruption will be dealt with harshly.
Now, naturally, almost everyone in Russia is also fully aware that Putin himself is the biggest thief.
But what is acceptable in peacetime is not necessarily so in wartime.
Especially now that casualties mount, and further progress in Ukraine may come with higher costs - the demands imposed on the Russian people keep getting more intense (with another wave of mobilization most likely by the end of 2024) and will only keep escalating further still.
In this context, signaling to the public that the Regime will also share the burden and cut off the most obnoxious level of corruption is not the worst idea for Putin to implement.
And the distinction between Ivanov’s dismissal and arrest is crucial here: if the intent was to merely send a message to the security apparatus (siloviki) establishment, only dismissing Ivanov would have sufficed - but going beyond this, and actually jailing him serves an additional purpose: his arrest comes with a public element/theatrics of displaying the apparent cleanup operations.
3) Genuine desire to clean-up, and improve efficiency.
War has a way of bringing spotlight on certain often-overlooked realities of the status quo: it sharpens the focus.
And after two years of this war, Putin is increasingly aware of the shortcomings within the military-industrial complex.
He can surely see how corruption had affected operational efficiency at all levels of his system.
And it would not be all too surprising if he was genuinely interested in cutting off the most ostentatious levels of corruption and grift: after all, this is a legacy-defining war for Putin, and he placed all his bets on outlasting the west.
In this context, genuine attempts to reform the military should not come at all surprising.
Overall then, the reality can probably be found somewhere within the factors mentioned above.
It is possible that one of these reasons was the main driving force for Putin’s decision to arrest such a high-profile cadre within the military.
It is more likely however, that a combination of factors and objectives played a role in the overall decision to pull the trigger on Ivanov.
What this probably does not mean: that Shoygu is next in line on the chopping block.
Simply because Shoygu has been loyal and has been seen as loyal - Putin getting rid of Shoygu would send a dangerous message that absolutely no one is ever safe in his regime.
This would lead to perverse incentives of short-termism and power maximization: players within the regime may feel like they don’t have ‘‘equity’’ or skin in the game for the long-term viability of the system, and that they should instead plunder as much and as fast as possible while they can.
It could also lead to another attempt at removing Putin: if even Shoygu is unsafe, then no one is, and the next most powerful person in line may wish to preempt risks to his own future within the regime.
Putin surely understands these dynamics.
And besides, if Shoygu really was next in line, then signposting this move and allowing Shoygu enough time to potentially preempt this move on him is probably not the smartest way to go about removing him.
Finally, the signaling effect to the public may also end up being the opposite of what Putin would have hoped for: sure, Shoygu is very unpopular, but if Putin admits that he too is corrupt, then why did he keep him there for so many years?
That would imply that either: a) Putin is clueless and unaware of the criminality of his closest circle or b) he knew and still closed his eyes on all of this.
(side note: this analysis assumes that Shoygu would also be arrested for bribery/corruption. He could also be quietly dismissed instead. But this too is unlikely due to other reasons discussed.)