Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war, Israel vs Iran: future balance of escalation dominance.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Funding for Ukraine starts to ramp up: impact will be far from imminent.
The Pentagon announced a substantial $6 billion aid package aimed at boosting Ukraine's defense capabilities.
The package includes contracting with industry for critical systems such as Patriot and NASAMs air defense interceptors to defend Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and deny the free reign to Russian fighter jets (that have been flying increasingly low/too close to the frontlines - a crucial clue that Ukraine simply had no way to deter their presence).
Additionally, the aid will provide "significant amounts" of artillery ammunition, air-to-ground munitions, counter-drone systems, and other essential military equipment.
All of this is great, but it will not have an immediate impact on the battlefield.
Russia still maintains a 10 to 1 advantage in artillery firepower across the frontline.
Russians are also intensifying their advances in the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar directions.
And in addition to the conventional firepower advantage, the manpower gap keeps getting bigger too.
Here is a devastating example of this: since February, Ukraine’s manpower posture in the Donetsk Oblast had remained largely unchanged.
In the meantime, and over the same time period, Russia added around 20 new units to the oblast.
This disparity is likely to grow for the rest of the Spring and Summer.
And unlike the firepower disparity, the manpower disparity involves some bad judgment from the leadership in Kyiv.
Last year’s mobilization legislation (lowering the conscription age to 25) was delayed for an entire year and signed only this month.
And even then, only 50k additional troops are likely to be recruited through this measure - when the army leadership highlighted the need for an additional 500k back in December.
The reality is that at this point, Ukraine will likely need to reduce the conscription age to 18.
Even back in January of this year, Russia was recruiting additional 30k troops every month.
Similar figures are not publicly available for Ukraine - but the 10x disparity is likely present in this matter too (+ or - few thousand men).
The reality is that the Ukraine aid is 6 months too late - had it been delivered at the requested time, (and had Ukraine also took the crucial recruitment efforts much sooner), Kyiv would have been in position to not only defend its frontlines, but potentially, even attempt a fresh new counteroffensive this year.
And that is no longer the real option anymore - at this point, Ukraine will most likely spend the rest of 2024 trying to stop any further significant Russian advances (or at the very least, the rate of advance).
2) Washington finally changes its policy on ATACMS delivery.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced a reversal in the Pentagon's stance on supplying Ukraine with longer-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS).
(side note: a few of these were already quietly delivered last month, and have already been used by Ukraine to strike key targets. And ATACMS can strike targets up to 200 miles away)
What explains this change?
Well, Austin states the US is in a "good place" regarding its missile stockpiles - alleviating previous concerns that had hindered the provision of these weapons.
But this was not the only change - there was also a major change in messaging around Ukraine’s target selections.
Here, Austin emphasized that the decision on how and when to use the missiles rests solely with Kyiv: “It’s up to them on how and when to use it, and our hopes are that they’ll create some pretty good effects with that and other things.”
This is a much-needed and once again, belated change in policy.
Yet another area where the right policy was not pursued from the very outset.
But even though the US has now finally agreed to supply Ukraine with ATACMS, other major allies are still dragging their feet: German chancellor has once again ruled out supply of long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine.
This is unfortunate, since unlike its French and British peer cruise missiles (storm shadow and SCALP-EG), the turbofan-powered Taurus has a longer range (of up to 310 miles) and its delayed-fuse technology (Multi-Application Fuze Initiation System (MAFIS) enables it to penetrate several layers before detonating the main charge.
This means that significant military targets like deep bunkers and even key bridges (like the Kerch strait bridge connecting Ukraine and Russia) could become viable targets for destruction.
And one cannot overstate the strategic, military, and political impact of severing the bridge link between Russia and Ukraine.
Given the stakes at hand, there is no room for further German hesitancy on this matter - Berlin must come to terms that Ukraine needs to win and not merely survive - since there is no such thing: there is no status quo or stalemate..
Unless Ukraine is winning, through sheer momentum, and manpower/material advantage, Russia’s onslaught will continue no matter how long it may take.
Ukraine cannot afford to fight a war of attrition - it must either win outright or recapture enough lands to impose a favorable peace deal on Putin.
German leadership must finally come to terms with this basic fact.
And all of this is happening against the background of increasingly militarizing Europe: Danes donate all of their artillery to Ukraine, the French refuse to rule out the possibility of NATO troops on the ground in Ukraine, and Britain just sent its single largest military aid package to Ukraine.
We are now in a situation where it is going to increasingly be Germany vs the rest of Europe coming to terms with what needs to be done.
3) Russia doubles down on Iranian weapons - building up local capabilities.
Russians are actively working to modernize Shahed-136 Kamikaze UAVs being produced locally (in Alabuga/Tatarstan Republic of Russia) - with plans of almost doubling the payload of the high-explosive warhead to 198 pounds (from a previous 110).
Russians are of course primarily focused on reducing their dependence on Iranian supply chains and improving the capabilities for the performance of their own army in Ukraine.
However, the benefits from the resulting improvements are bidirectional: the knowhow on the improvements/modernization will surely be shared with their Iranian counterparts: meaning that Quds-affiliated militias (including the primary proxy like the Hezbollah) will gets their hands on a weapon capable of inflicting more damage and devastation per each unit.
4) The US warns China it is crossing the line in its support for Russia.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken warns China of diminishing US patience over its support to Russia, particularly in supplying critical components for Moscow's defense industry.
During discussions with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Blinken emphasized that the Biden administration is prepared for further action if Beijing does not alter its course.
The US has already imposed sanctions on over 100 Chinese entities and applied stringent export controls to curb the flow of military-use components like microelectronics and machine tools to Russia.
Blinken hinted at the possibility of drafting severe sanctions against Chinese banks - potentially severing their access to the global financial system.
This would of course be a significant escalation - we shall discuss the implications of this if it ever materializes.
Balance of powers in escalation dominance: Iran is on its back foot going forward.
We have previously covered Israel’s counter-strike a week after Iranian ballistic missile barrage.
For a number of previously discussed reasons, Netanyahu had ultimately opted against a significant escalation.
But their surgical strikes and destruction of Iranian air defense radars at the Natanz facility demonstrated the level of precision and damage that Israel was capable of inflicting without resorting to the expensive pray and spay approach adopted by Iran.
Iran’s original retaliation and reaction to the latest Israeli counter-strikes have indeed revealed its cards definitively: it is fearful of an open confrontation with Israel and the US.
If previous precautions around use of Hizbollah could have been rationalized away as prudent desire to not needlessly waste its crown jewel of a proxy in a lopsided conflict with Israel - the most recent retaliation didn’t enjoy the same luxury in plausible deniability: either Iran was going to respond properly or not.
Iran simply could not stand by without a proper response - and so they did respond by launching more than 320 ballistic & cruise missiles and drones.
But: 1) There are suggestions that they offered an implicit warning through third parties prior to the attack (hoping to minimize the actual damage while keeping up the appearance of toughness) and 2) They were very quick to announce publicly that they deemed the matter to be ‘‘concluded’’.
Israel of course disagreed with matters being in fact concluded and hit Iranian air defense sites in a strategically important Isfahan (with proximity to Natanz nuclear facility - a signal from Israel on what could be next).
And Iran’s reaction to these strikes was also very revealing.
First, they blamed it all on “mini drones’’ - since this would ostensibly reduce the pressure on them to respond to such slights.
And now, there are credible reports that Iran resorted to outright fabrication in order to save face..
This is because following an Israeli missile strike, a critical radar component of Iran's air defense was destroyed.
The radar, identified as the 30N6E2 “Tombstone," is essential for tracking air and missile threats.
Analysis by imagery expert Chris Biggers reveals the direct hit and subsequent deceptive tactics by Iran.
By the next day, Iran replaced the destroyed Tombstone radar with a different model, the 96l6E "Cheese board," radar at the same location.
This move, however, is seen as an outright facade - since the replacement radar does not match the system's specifications, rendering the battery inoperative.
This act of "denial and deception" by Iran serves a dual purpose.
Domestically, it projects an image of resilience and operational capability, potentially averting a broader crisis.
Internationally, it is not deceiving adversarial observers like the US and Israel - who have advanced satellite capabilities and can easily discern the operational status of the battery.
Nonetheless: the false pretenses allow Iran to let it go without needing to respond with more force.
So the question is why?
Why is Iran so wary of an escalation that it rushes to fabricate conditions on the ground to mask a grave injury?
Iran’s future capabilities are under threat: future attritional engagements favor Israel
The answer lies in the probable outcomes that would follow if a further escalation between Israel and Iran would in fact take place.
A lot of media/analyst attention was devoted to the high cost of intercepting Iranian missiles - arriving at the erroneous conclusion that long-term conflict and successful defense of Israel was highly unsustainable.
On the surface, it is not all too difficult to fall into this trap: with a $3.5 million per Arrow missile, a million $ per David's Sling interceptor the costs add up quickly - and after adding to that all of the operational costs and costs of flying fighter jets/maintenance etc, the total cost of defending the attack amounted to around 4-5 billion shekels or around $1-1.3 billion.
To be clear, this is a significant cost - but is it really a scenario where continuous defenses against future Iranian attacks are financially unsustainable?
A lot of pundits have focused on this point but they fail to take into account the total available supply of Iranian long-range ballistic missiles that require an intervention from David’s sling/Arrow systems.
In reality, Iran most likely already used around 3-4% of its total available stock (more on that later below) of ballistic missiles that are capable of flying all the way to Israel.
(side note: here we are talking about MRBMs = Medium-range ballistic missiles, 1,000-3,000 km (620-1,860 miles) and IRBMs = Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, 3,000-5,500 km (1,860-3,410 miles))
And given that Iran would most likely not use it all against just Israel, the total cost of defending against future ballistic missiles would probably be around $15-$25bn: this is certainly a lot, but not astronomically high in the context of modern warfare.
But not enough attention is being paid to the other side of the coin: Iran’s capacity to sustain further attacks without emptying all of its chambers.
And a lot of this capacity depends on two factors: 1) Iran’s total stock of IRBMs and MRBMs and 2) How quickly can they replenish this stock.
(side note: Iran has effectively defunct Air force and a Navy that it really cannot afford to waste on forward missions (and then again, these would not fight Israeli navy in the Mediterranean and would mainly engage in ‘‘nuisance campaigns’’ in key areas like the Persian gulf)
Not enough data is available to properly evaluate the second factor.
In addition, what Iran is capable of doing in the war of attrition is less relevant for the purposes of evaluating its prospects in a conflict with Israel.
This is because any war with Israel is unlikely to be a long affair - Israel is not going to conduct a land invasion and its airstrikes will most likely aim to debilitate and demilitarize (and potentially, denuclearize) Iran.
As such, what Iran can do in a short-to-medium term is more relevant: how much damage can they inflict in a matter of months?
What they can replace/replenish/scale in the long-term is less relevant for now.
Moreover, once there is war, the blockade on Iran will tighten - it is doubtful that the US/EU would let Iran to acquire necessary parts/resources needed to replenish their stock of missiles in the short order.
As such, it is more relevant to focus on the current stockpile for now.
So how many relevant missiles are in Iran’s possession?
How much damage can they really inflict?
There is no precise number, but back in March of 2022, the former CENTCOM Commander General Kenneth McKenzie said that Iran had 3,000 ballistic missiles - and that ‘‘some” of them could even reach Israel.
Now, the word “some” can mean a lot of things, but we are probably not talking about thousands or a few dozen.
But it is realistic that Iran may have hundreds of ballistic missiles that could reach Israel - this would mean a range of at least 900-1,000 miles.
There are a number of Iranian missiles capable of this range - with the most advanced likely being Khorramshahr-1,2 and (the most advanced) 4 types.
These can reach Mach-8 speeds upon re-entry, and can cause significant damage to both Israel and to US army bases in the region.
When it comes to Israel, Iranian missiles would have to be fired from a narrow set of locations in the western Iran (given the distance needed to reach Israel).
In addition, they would need to fly through Iraq and Syria - meaning that there is a very specific limited approach vector for the Iranian missiles.
Combined with Israel’s compactness, saturation of systems like Arrow-3s (main shield targeting in mid-course phase of the missile’s journey) and David’s sling (additional shield upon re-entry phase) will keep Israel safe.
Even if Iran used all of its ballistic missile arsenal against US and Israeli targets, most of them will probably not go through the layered air defenses that will meet them.
Both Israel and the US would use F-35s to take out launch and storage facilities after the very first barrage..
With all that said, consider also that Iran has already used 120 missiles to strike Israel - which lands somewhere between 2-4% of the total stock.
And what did it get in return?
Ignoring political theater benefits (which arguably, did not amount to much either) 120 ballistic missiles resulted in no meaningful damage and some shrapnel injured one girl..
Now, let us assume that given 1) lack of forewarning 2) better adaptations 3) larger number of missiles used next time, Iran manages to somehow achieve a much higher success rate - let us be generous and assume a 20x improvement of performance.
That would still mean that only 20% of missiles go through and hit something (a lot of those not shot down may still be jammed/redirected to non-target locations).
Overall then, Iran would be capable of some not so insignificant damage - but in the grand scheme of things, it is not going to be as damaging as Israel taking out key Iranian facilities.
And this is why future decisive escalation does not favor Iran.
Up until this April, Iran could somehow bluff its way into appearing like a bigger threat than it truly was.
Now however, it has revealed its cards and demonstrated lack of desire for future escalation.
And as discussed, there are good reasons for this lack of enthusiasm in openly confronting Israel any further.
The balance of powers has therefore shifted: Israel has demonstrated what was true from the very outset: it has the upper hand.
The problem is that this upper hand can only be fully activated if Iran was to further cross lines and keep attacking Israel - since this would eventually trigger a US response.
Without this however, this overall hypothetical Israeli advantage remains just that: since without full US backing, sooner or later Israel would run out of crucial capabilities and munitions that allow it to have this upper hand in the first place.
And this is how we end up in an awkward new balance: where Israel can confidently escalate only if Iran keeps crossing more lines (that would then open up full US support).
Ultimately then, the US once again holds the ultimate leverage over the direction of this conflict.