Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, destruction of Armavir Radar and Iran's succession issues.
Ukraine War Updates.
1) Ukraine regains some of the captured land in the Kharkiv axis.
On May 24, the Ukrainian General Staff announced that Ukrainian forces are driving Russian troops back from their defenses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukrainian forces have secured "combat control" over a section of the border where Russian troops initially crossed at the beginning of the offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast
2) Russia targets civilians in Kharkiv - with a likely goal of forcing a wave of depopulation.
Russian forces are using their “safe space” in the Russian airspace (comfortably out of range of the limited number of US-supplied Patriots: Washington still insists against their use in hitting fighter planes within Russian airspace) to launch devastating strikes on Kharkiv City, likely aiming to depopulate the city by demoralizing the local population and forcing them to leave.
On May 25, Russian forces executed four distinct missile and glide bomb attacks on Kharkiv City:
Just after midnight, an Iskander-M missile and S-300/S-400 air defense missiles struck an educational facility.
Around 1 pm, two KAB precision-guided glide bombs hit the Epicenter construction supermarket, igniting a fire that spread over 15,000 square meters.
Just after 5 pm, unspecified munitions targeted Central Park.
Shortly after at 7pm, a residential area in central Kharkiv was struck.
3) Ukraine successfully destroyed another S-400 air defense SAM.
Ukrainian forces successfully hit and destroyed a Russian S-400 battery with at least one (US-supplied) MGM-140 ATACMS tactical ballistic missile in Donetsk Oblast.
This is significant: S-400s are the most potent air defense SAMs currently in use by Russia.
These are also likely to be supplied to Iran very soon.
Moreover, China purchased S-400s from Russia in 2014, began testing it in 2018 and apparently used it to improve the designs of its own version of the missiles - HQ-15s.
Every time they destroy the radar of an S-300 or S-400 system, it helps make the skies less unfriendly for the cheaper Ukrainian OWA drones and the F-16s coming soon.
In other words, the successful destruction of these systems by ATACMS offers plenty of tactical knowhow for the US and other NATO allies: these insights will be extremely valuable for when the US would need to target the S-400s in possession of Iran and/or China.
In addition, every successful destruction of the S-300 or S-400 means that the skies are now safer for the F-16s that Ukraine is about to receive very soon (and additional long-range missile attacks on critical Russian assets will also be easier to pull off - evading interceptions).
3) The EU agrees to use the windfall profits from frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.
Another first in this war: the European Council adopted legal measures to use net profits from unexpected revenues of EU central securities depositories (CSDs) for military support to Ukraine and for its defense industry and reconstruction.
CSDs holding Russian sovereign assets over €1 million will contribute profits accumulated since February 15, 2024.
These funds will be paid bi-annually to the EU and allocated through the European Peace Facility for Ukraine's military support and reconstruction programs.
4) Ukraine strikes Russia’s strategic early warning radar system at Armavir.
The Armavir radar is a key part of Russia's strategic early warning system against the incoming ICBMs and IRBMs.
Needless to say, detecting such a strike is crucial for a swift interception response (it would also allow Russia to launch its own retaliatory strikes before their nuclear capabilities were destroyed on the ground).
Now, it can also be used to detect nonnuclear ballistic missiles - such as the ATACMS.
So arguably, there is a direct military use in Ukraine destroying these early-warning radars.
However, Armavir specifically, was a southern-facing system and unless Ukraine was launching ATACMS from Crimea (which it is not/it cannot), it is hard to see a strong military value in destroying them for Ukraine (which is obviously incapable of nuclear strikes).
More broadly, that Russia should maintain a functional strategic early warning system is in everyone’s interest: the last thing we need is that an already over the top and paranoid Russian state should feel even more insecure when its early-warning systems are disabled.
For further context, the destruction of these early warning radars is such a big deal that the Trump administration had considered using nuclear weapons in response to nonnuclear attacks on such capabilities - a stance recently mirrored in Russia’s doctrine.
These targets are highly sensitive and critical to national defense strategies - destroying them is arguably not worth the risk - especially given their limited military use of for Ukraine specifically.
At the very least, this is a propaganda win for the Kremlin - Moscow already claims that the entire NATO is united in an effort to destroy Russia, and when Ukraine hits their early warning radars (something of existential value) Kyiv only ends up bolstering the Russian narrative.
And this would then heighten the rally ‘round the flag effect and unite Russians further in their resolve to continue prosecuting this war.
(side note: it would not be too surprising to now see Russian propagandist claims that Ukraine did this on America’s behalf - that Washington wanted this radar gone and Kyiv did its dirty work.)
Finally, it also doesn’t help Kyiv’s case when it pleads for the US to remove targeting/reach restrictions and allow Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia.
The counter argument to this: that Ukraine wants to normalize hitting targets within Russia with its own/British/French missiles to then demonstrate the futility of the US targeting restrictions: to demonstrate that these targets are being hit regardless (without triggering a Russian backlash) and that the US should just help Ukraine achieve these operational goals better - instead of dragging its feet in hesitation.
But once again, there are already plenty of legitimate military targets (whereby their destruction will indeed help Ukraine’s conventional warfare capabilities) to choose from - and arguably, destroying Armavir radars did not pass the cost/benefit analysis on a strategic level.
Iran’s succession planning got a little more complicated.
Up until his death in the helicopter crash, Iran’s former President Ebrahim Raisi was the presumed successor to take over as the next Supreme Leader from the aging and 85 year old Ali Khamenei.
The helicopter crash and propaganda car crash.
Before unpacking implications on Iran’s regime, few things to note about the crash itself.
One noteworthy development was that Iran’s former Foreign Minister (the one who negotiated JCPOA/Nuclear deal with John Kerry) blamed America for the crash - not directly, but simply because US sanctions precluded delivery of parts needed to properly maintain the US-made Bell 212 helicopter that transported Raisi.
Iranian regime-controlled media later parroted the ridiculous accusations.
They probably didn’t think this one through though.
Firstly, everyone knows that Iran has gained expertise in sourcing most in-demand parts - far more exclusive than spare parts for Bell helicopters.
Secondly, even if this is true, then flying the helicopter in a non-airworthy state is tantamount to gross negligence.
After all, no one was forcing them to use American helicopters -why not simply use Russian-made helis?
Why not ask their new allies for a few transport helicopters?
Finally, all of this merely shows how (in spite of their rhetoric) dependent this regime is on America and the West in general.
What message does this send to the Iranian public: that the safety of their President depends on America sending spare helicopter parts?
Speculations.
Naturally, conspiracy theories abound: range of claims - from accusations against Israel (and the US) - to suggestions that some domestic rivals wanted to clear the way for another insider to become the next Supreme leader.
(side note: this latter speculation implies that there was no alternative to do so in a civil way - which would imply waning power of Supreme Leader Khamenei - and there is no evidence to this effect. Furthermore, assassinating Raisi - one of the most important players in this regime no matter what (even if he wasn’t going to be the next leader) would cause devastating intra-regime civil war (if found) and at the very minimum, cause a major morale loss and incentivize machiavellian moves for survival - which is bad for the integrity of regime as unit/for all involved.)
We won’t spend too much time on these claims: there is not a shred of credible evidence to blame any particular party.
In addition, utility to the West is also unclear: there is no guarantee that the next person in line to take on the Presidency or the role of a Supreme leader would be any better.
At best, this is a medium-term inconvenience to the regime (more on that later below) and at what extraordinary cost?
Things would quickly get out of hand if any Western adversary was truly behind this and was caught in the act: Iran's response could be unpredictable and very dangerous - since from Tehran’s point of view, this would cross all lines and the regime itself would be presumed to be under an existential danger.
With all that said however, for the sake of nuance, it is worth mentioning that causing this crash and making it look like an accident would not have been a major feat of technical prowess.
Yes, there were no outright signs of foul play - no missile residue etc.
But a crash can also happen due to GPS jamming - and most Western states are capable of doing this.
The combination of GPS jamming and heavy fog can also be extremely dangerous.
(side note: just a few weeks ago, there were reports that the airplane carrying British Defense Minister Grant Shapps suffered from GPS jamming and that Russia was suspected of causing this incident over Poland. This is not all too difficult.)
All of this is to only say that technically, it is very doable - but once again, there is no indication that any party had strong enough motivation or will to undertake such an extreme operation.
Succession dynamics: interests at play and fundamentals.
Raisi was 63 years old, and had enough of a gravitas and intra-system credentials to take on the role of the Supreme leader for the next 10-15 years (or longer - or maybe not: one should not be too confident that Iran’s current regime is everlasting.)
As such, him perishing in a heli crash will most definitely affect that dynamic: the pool of potential Supreme leaders has now shrunk significantly..
Now the dynamics at play in selection of the Supreme Leader is different from that of a President.
This will require more unpacking at the right time, but for now, suffice it to say that the Supreme Leader is selected by the majority vote in the Assembly of Experts - a 88 member assembly that consists of Islamic jurists elected by the public for eight-year terms.
In practice however, Khamanei’s wishes will most likely carry weight in directing the assembly towards a specific candidate.
And with Raisi now gone, the most likely candidates to take on the role of the next Supreme Leader are the 55 year old Mojtaba Khamenei (the son of the current Supreme Leader), and the 67 year old current head of the judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei.
The interests of the IRGC (Revolutionary guards corps) dictate the next Supreme Leader should continue to play the role of being a lightning rod and taking responsibility for the harshest/most confrontational aspects of Iran’s foreign policy.
Someone who is aligned with the IRGC (and is unlikely to usher social-political opening/reform) and who is simultaneously strong-willed enough to take the responsibility for a combative foreign policy.
For now, it is unclear whether the individual most in line with this profile is Khamenei’s son or the Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei (or someone else).
The next President and regime interests at play.
Raisi’s rise to power began in the 1980s - when he became famous as a prosecutor and a judge and was responsible for the executions of thousands of left-wing activists.
In spite of that butchery, looking at it amorally, Raisi was a strong-willed leader - he took over amid severe economic sanctions, (the Trump admin really put in the maximum pressure campaign into full effect starting in 2019) and diverged from his predecessors by showing little interest in negotiating with the US.
Instead, Raisi aligned Iran's foreign policy with the Supreme Leader Khamenei's vision - focusing on Middle Eastern and Asian strategies to neutralize sanctions.
(side note: precisely because Raisi was on the same page with Khamanei, the latter put in a lot of effort to guarantee Raisi’s win. In the lead-up to the 2021 election, Khamenei maneuvered to ensure that Raisi would win. Seizing on the collapse of the nuclear agreement (following theTrump administration’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018), the supreme leader had Iran’s Guardian Council (that vets Presidential candidates) disqualify all other serious contenders. The result was less a contest than a carefully managed coronation. With Khamenei’s blessing, Raisi won office with 62 percent of the vote (at the time of the lowest turnout in Iran’s history.)
Under his watch, Iran (through closer cooperation with China) succeeded in increasing its oil exports from roughly 400k barrels per day to 1.5 million - all of this in spite of crushing US sanctions.
In addition, the trade and military cooperation with both China and Russia has also boomed - with frequent joint military drills now being the norm
Raisi’s presidential term was a boon for the IRGC.
Traditionally the Iranian Foreign Ministry was at odds with the IRGC - the ministry (unlike the IRGC) was always trying to move towards ‘‘westernization’’ - finding an accommodation with the US, and securing access to western markets.
Under Raisi, the Iranian Foreign Ministry saw a shift - the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, was a diplomat close to senior IRGC officials.
Amir-Abdollahian promptly integrated the ministry's actions with the IRGC, promoting diplomats with IRGC ties and bolstering support for Iran’s regional allies.
And this was a pretty consequential development for the IRGC.
Previously, the IRGC was frequently constrained by the Foreign Ministry - the latter imposed roadblocks and obstacles to conducting missile tests.
Under Raisi/Amir-Abdollahian, all of this changed and there was a clear shift to a more assertive foreign policy and IRGC freely (and frequently conducted missile tests.)
As such, the IRGC is very invested in the outcome of the Presidential elections in June of this year - they will want to push for a continuity candidate that will not attempt to reverse the current status quo.
Continuity is the most likely outcome.
With all this said however, that Raisi turned away from Westernization and moved closer to both Russia and China was largely to do with fundamentals.
It was a consensus view in Tehran that given;
1) Growing tensions with the US - post 2018 (which saw America’s withdrawal from the JCPOA/nuclear deal, and imposition of crippling sanctions which started under Trump’s ‘‘maximum pressure” campaign - and were never lifted by Biden);
2) Start of the Ukraine war, Russia’s isolation and an opportunity to secure a meaningful relationship with isolated Moscow (supplying the latter with munitions, drones, and in-demand parts in exchange for money and military-industrial cooperation and significant military deals like the purchase of Su-34 fighter jets and potentially, the S-400 air defense systems/SAMs);
3) Cooling US-China relations, and the latter’s increasingly assertive stance vis-à-vis Washington (which extended into Chinese interest to challenge the US dominance in the Middle East), making diversification of energy sources a vital strategic need for Beijing, it was always in Iran’s interests to make use of these converging factors to its own advantage.
In other words, no matter who the President was going to be, it is almost inconceivable that Iran wouldn’t for example try to maximize Russia’s dependence on Iranian support or wouldn’t embark upon a closer relationship with China.
The difference would have been observed in the matter of degree/intensity - not fundamental direction.
And here too, we have a situation where the next President is unlikely to deviate from the consensus establishment view.
Or as Khamenei promised “there will be no disturbances in the country’s affairs”.
In addition, (and because he died on official duty) Raisi was declared a martyr and his death has in fact brought Iranian people together - no matter how repressive and unjust this regime is, it is also the case that a lot of Iranians did mourn the passing of their President.
Overall then, anyone trying to change this current status quo, would (if he could even get on the ballot) - in addition to challenging consensus establishment views and interests - have to contend with a practical matter of rallying the Iranian public against the vision and established direction set by their martyred President.
And this individual would have less than two months to achieve such a feat: extremely improbable to say the least.
Why less than two months? ;;; also looking for your theories on the Slovakian shooting.