Ukraine war updates.
1) Ukrainian armed forces pressed forward with counteroffensive maneuvers.
Across no fewer than three distinct theaters of engagement.
Swift strides were made along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis, whilst progress was also registered within the western expanse of Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukraine has also allegedly executed a drone attack upon the Soltsy airbase nestled within the precincts of Novgorod Oblast - apparently, causing damage to at least two Tu-22M3 long-range supersonic strategic bombers.
2) Russia is building a major drone factory to mass produce Iranian drones.
Russia is actively engaged in a collaboration with Iran for the development of a substantial fleet of 6,000 drones by the summer of 2025, an initiative that ultimately seeks to eclipse Tehran's own prowess in drone production.
Confidential documents pertaining to this ambitious initiative that were discreetly disclosed to WaPo, have unveiled the Kremlin's aspirations.
Armed with Russian industrial capacity, experience, and finesse, the supposed plan is laser-focused on revamping Iran's somewhat antiquated manufacturing methods.
The objective is twofold:
1) To harness the might of Russian manufacturing acumen to deliver drones at an unprecedented scale, surpassing Iran's accomplishments in terms of production volume and quality assurance;
2) Add further improvements to Iran’s Shahed-136 drones - adding the ability to execute swarm attacks (wherein a cluster of unmanned aerial vehicles would collaborate autonomously to strike a designated target with precision).
This is not good at all - Russia is clearly amping up its military capacity for a lengthy war of attrition.
And the 6,000 additional drones (especially if equipped with swarm attack capabilities) would cause havoc for Ukraine - at the very least, they would drain Ukraine of the expensive (and harder to produce) air defense missiles.
Defending cities and the key infrastructure would become much more difficult too.
Granted, the 6,000 is a goal and one which is yet to materialize only by 2025, we could still expect major numbers in 2024.
If Russia was to independently produce even 20% of that figure in 2024, that would already cause major headaches for Ukraine.
As such, the production facilities are legitimate military targets that Ukraine needs to destroy.
It will not be easy, the factories are to be located at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone - some 670 miles further than Moscow.
Ukraine does not have any missiles capable of reaching that far.
Consequently, special ops and sabotage groups operating local drones would need to do the job - this would be a high-effort but high-reward mission.
Given that shorter-range drones will need to be used, smaller payloads are necessarily implied - as a result, a definitive production-shutting damage would be almost inconceivable to accomplish.
But even delays and disruptions could win Ukraine a lot of time - and so, it is very likely that at some point, we are to hear about Ukraine’s sabotage of these facilities (or of the intermediary facilities that produce the necessary parts - or both).
3) The GOP’s Ukraine games reached a new low.
House Majority leader Kevin McCarthy had his work cut out for him already - working to get the Biden admin’s $24 billion request for Ukraine military aid was going to be tough no matter what - so the last thing he needed on his plate, was someone from his own party to complicate things even further: a hitherto pro-Ukraine Congressmen threw in some new (ostensibly, well-intentional, but exceptionally counterproductive) out of order objections.
Rep. Don Bacon - to date, a staunch Ukraine supporter said that he would sign off on the new military aid only if advanced weapons like the ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) were to be included in the package: “Why keep giving Ukraine weapons that don’t help them win the war? don’t want to give more for a gridlock.”
Now, these cables have always called out the Biden admin for its hesitancy to send ATACMS out of fear of escalation - even when the UK and France have already sent their own long-range missiles (Storm Shadows and SCALP-EG respectively).
But Rep. Bacon’s rationale for a potential refusal is absurd.
First off, yes, ATACMS will make a major difference, they will help Ukraine to attack command & control posts, airfields, and key logistical supply hubs deeper behind frontlines - reducing the combat load for the frontline assault units.
But they are not a game-changer that will magically alter the tide of the war.
Ukraine would still need to advance over heavily mined land - the ‘‘stalemate’’ (more accurately, very slow progress) will not come to an end because of the ATACMS.
Secondly, the $24 billion is crucial to help Ukraine with all other essential advanced weaponry to prevent further stalemate.
Thirdly, Rep. Bacon assumes that the only options are either a stalemate or a breakthrough - no at all, Ukraine can still lose…
It is not like without additional aid, Ukraine will simply be able to maintain its current positions indefinitely.
Absolutely not, Russia is ramping up its production, Iran is helping out, and without a resolute and consistent financial backing for Kyiv coming from the West, Russia will simply overwhelm Ukraine through its sheer heft.
Finally, if Rep. Bacon wants Ukraine to win, he needs to support the package and then Push the Biden admin to do much more.
But additional funds are crucial to pass - they are not only essential for the ongoing support, but are going to be indispensable for the reliable supply of future platforms that depend on the funding allocated by the Congress.
For example, the F-16s will have to come out of the limited Presidential Drawdown Authority budget (PDA).
People like Rep. Bacon (especially him, sitting on the House Armed Services Committee, he should know better) and others like him, must stop playing politics and must pass additional funding for Ukraine without resorting to trite gimmicks based on nonsensical rationale.
Some good news on F-16s and Gripen fighter jets.
Ukraine begins to train its pilots on the F-16s.
This was confirmed by the Defence Minister Oleksiy Reznikov.
The bad news is that the training will take at least 6 months..
And this is understandable - it will take a long time to train Ukrainian pilots to conduct frontline missions under the constant threat of layered Russian SAMs (like the Pantsirs, BUKs and the S-300s) whilst remaining aware of the combat air patrols (CAP) executed by the Russian fighter jets.
And given that the threat posed by the F-16s (and Gripens - more on that later below), it is very likely that these CAPs will be conducted by Russian Su-35s - and these come armed with the advanced, long-range (up to 247 miles - though this is an unlikely hit distance in real combat), and hypersonic R-37M missiles.
This announcement closely follows a recent confirmation from the US that the F-16s would be delivered (from Dutch and Danish stocks) to Ukraine upon the completion of this training.
This is great news - slow progress, but still something to celebrate..
Nevertheless, there are still many practical questions that are yet to be answered - there are questions around maintenance, supply resilience, and risk to storage and contractor/maintenance crews (which could draw NATO closer into a direct confrontation with Russia).
Specifically:
1) Maintenance of F-16s (once on Ukrainian soil) will remain an issue.
The anticipated airframes to be dispatched from Holland and Denmark are likely to be quite old - raising concerns about their longevity and functionality.
2) The fleet will need to be maintained by the civilian contractors - probably Americans and other NATO-state citizens.
Ukraine will need to train its own maintenance crew to reduce dependency on the West.
3) Until that happens, these Western contractors will face major risks - Russia is bound to target hangars, air fields, and maintenance depots essential in the maintenance and operations of F-16s.
There is a risk of Russia vs NATO escalation if say Americans or European contractors were to be killed by Russian missiles.
(side note: similar issues will apply in relation to Gripen jets - discussed below)
Ukraine to get Gripen fighter Jets.
President Zelenskyy provided an important update on achieved ‘‘outcomes’’ from his trip to Sweden:
1. We agreed to work on the joint production of CV-90s armoured vehicles in Ukraine.
2. Ukrainian warriors began training to operate Swedish “Archers”.
3. Ukrainian pilots are already taking part in testing “Gripen” fighter aircraft. We discussed further steps to transfer them to Ukraine.
4. We are preparing the transfer of Sweden’s new, 13th security assistance package.
5. Sweden joined the Peace Formula, more specifically its items on the restoration of nuclear safety, justice, environment protection, and humanitarian mine clearance.
6. Ukraine will be ready to open EU accession talks this year and we have Sweden’s support on our path to the EU.
7. Our teams will discuss the bilateral document on security guarantees following the G7 Declaration last month.
8. Sweden stands ready to provide advanced water pumping systems to restore water supply after Russian terror act at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Plant.
9. Sweden will take active part in Ukraine’s recovery, including with the engagement of private capital.
10. Ukraine counts on Sweden, Swedish regions and companies taking patronage over Ukrainian regions and spheres which require recovery after Russian strikes. I am grateful to Sweden for its firm and consistent support. Together, we protect life, freedom, and our common values.
All of these are important accomplishments, but the news on Gripen fighter jets stands out for its salience and immediate impact.
At least in the near to medium term, getting Ukraine equipped with the necessary offensive air power is crucial: they will be indispensable in destroying Russian close-support artillery and missile systems that bombard Ukraine’s slow-moving (due to heavy mines) advancing offensive armored units.
They can furthermore use their air-to-air missiles to destroy Russia’s close combat support Ka-52 ‘‘alligator’’ helicopters further ahead of the battlefield - providing additional shield for the offensive units.
And Gripens should not be seen as an inferior option in comparison to the F-16s.
Of course, in the long-term, the sustainability of supply favors the provision of F-16s: there are around 4,000 F-16s in total, and more than 100 are about to retire - giving them away is less of a concern.
Available Gripens are going to be in the dozens range (Sweden can argue that it still is not within NATO, and operates only 94 Gripen jets - even a dozen jets is a larger proportion of its overall stock than the F-16 is for their own donor countries), and so, training pilots on one platform with higher available numbers just makes better logistical sense - given that pilot training is costly and time consuming, and that the pool of eligible skilled pilots is small, it makes sense to train them on the platform that 1) will have highest amount of available units for the 2) longest amount of time.
But this assumes the possibility of the binary choice - which unfortunately, does not yet exist.
The Biden admin has been too slow, and too hesitant in taking a clear stance that 1) It will provide a sufficient amount of F-16s, and so 2) As quickly as possible - starting to train all available pilots right now.
But alas, that is not happening, and at least in the near to medium term, the Gripen jets do have certain advantages over F-16s - to compensate for their limited numbers:
a) Ukraine’s air fields favor Gripens over the F-16s: most of the Ukrainian airfields are too short for a comfortable F-16 landing - its lighter undercarriage is not well-suited to the stresses of a limited runway.
Ukrainian airfields have not been updated to full NATO standards - they are largely remnants of a Soviet era.
And the soviet-era airfields were built like floor tiling: there are a number of disparate concrete blocks with sealant filling up in between.
For Ukraine specifically (and for most of the post-Soviet states) that is of a great advantage: since this allows for the expansion and contraction of concrete from extreme heat and cold.
But this also allows for the accumulation of a toxic mix of debris in-between these tiles: stones, moss etc.
The F-16 take-off requires a higher amount of air intake than Gripens - their engines would therefore be at a higher risk of harmful debris.
This also means that the maintenance will be a bigger challenge for the F-16s.
b) Gripens come with Meteor missiles - these are currently considered to be the most advanced air-to-air missiles in the world, and were designed by the major EU powers to deal with Russian fighter jets specifically.
Of course, this is assuming that there is a unanimous agreement by the producer countries to supply these for Ukraine.
Meteors were jointly developed by the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden - As such, the export decision will require a consensus.
At least some of the countries may object to the provision of these missiles - what if the unexploded missiles land in the Russian territory and are then reverse engineered/studied by Russians to remove the European edge?
(side note: similar questions will arise in relation to AIM-120D variant of AMRAAM and JASSM standoff missiles for the F-16s: both are yet to be approved)
A valid concern, but the missiles were designed to deal with Russia specifically, and this threat of a ‘‘Russian engineer capture’’ would remain as a valid risk no matter when it is used.
Europeans will merely choose when the ultimate showdown will take place - is it really better to avoid going full-in, and not doing everything to defeat Russia now, only to use these missiles in the actual NATO vs Russia war?