Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine war updates, and the Western establishment offers the worst strategic advice to the leadership of Ukraine.
Ukraine war updates.
1) Ukraine loses Vuhledar.
Not as strategically important as Pokrovsk, but still a high ground and a symbolic/narrative loss nonetheless.
2) Pokrovsk advance continues with enormous toll for Russia.
According to open-source intel tracking, in its attempt to capture Pokrovsk, to date, Russia lost 4x as much hardware as Ukraine.
3) Ukrainian strike kills North Koreans.
A recent missile strike by Ukrainian forces near the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk has reportedly resulted in the deaths of several North Korean military officials.
The presence of North Korean personnel highlights Pyongyang's deepening ties with Moscow: as of June of this year, there is a mutual defense pact between Russia and North Korea.
The main question is: what is the maximum that North Korea will receive in return for such intimate involvement in Ukraine?
Russia helping them (or rather, promising to) with their satellite program and submarine propulsion tech is well-reported.
If the situation escalates towards Moscow helping with nuclear tech and/or ICBMs, then that would be a monumental change.
It is time for Ukraine’s leaders to adopt ‘‘credible war aims’’ says the beacon of Western establishment thought - a terrible advice.
A week after Zelenskyy‘s visit to Washington, (where he didn’t get the long -expected help with long range airstrikes) Ukraine battlefield losses last week have began to compound.
Could the outcome have been different if months before this loss Ukraine was decisively enabled to attack ammo depot, and all other strategically valuable military-industrial facilities that are deep inside Russia (which played an outsized role in the invasion in Donbas)?
One doesn’t know for certain, but surely it would have helped.
And yet, instead of reflecting on this policy failure and doubling down on advocacy to secure Ukraine all that it needs to win, the Western establishment thought is slowly moving towards accommodation and ‘‘realism’’.
The pinnacle of this months-long change in the wind was that one of the most circulated articles last week was the editorial published by the Economist magazine - calling on the need to temper maximalist objectives and introduce ‘‘credible war aims’’.
The aforementioned editorial calls for a frank and open discussion about concessions that Ukraine (as they claim) may need to make in order to end the war, and how it is necessary to be realistic about Ukraine’s prospects.
The economist argues that Ukraine is nowhere near winning - which is not totally untrue - and certainly, the current unaltered trajectory (which implies more of the same impotent western support) would inevitably lead to that outcome.
But they then leap into a heroic claim that Ukraine needs to reassess their war aims openly and transparently:
The only hope of keeping American and European support and uniting Ukrainians is for a new approach that starts with leaders stating honestly what victory means [emphasis added].
Right, because in war, deception as to the tactical and strategic options, and revealing once hands has zero cost - great logic.
But leaving aside this strange logical blunder, what is essentially argued here, the crux of the argument is that instead of pursuing maximalist war aims against Russia, (which the Economist and other increasing establishment voices deem as unlikely) Ukraine needs to tone it down and lower the war aims (accepting that they cannot take back all of the lands stolen since 2014) in return for gains:
1) Western support in rebuilding Ukraine’s military base and giving the weapons that it needs, and;
2) A NATO membership.
Sounds nice, although it is unclear what but for lack of political will is stopping Ukraine’s allies from doing the first proposal.
And if they are not arming Ukraine when it urgently needs them, where is the guarantee that they will do so when the war is over, and there is a reduced urgency to do so?
In fact, the very same voices warning against escalation with Russia, will then argue that there is a delicate balance of powers and a tenuous peace and that we should not rock the boat and give Putin a reason to launch a preemptive attack.
(side note: and you can guarantee that the Kremlin would warn precisely against that scenario - threatening a new war if the West (as the Economist is appealing here) was to actually follow through with the first proposal.)
But the Economist had crystallized the long-brewing establishment voices that boil down to: territory in exchange for ‘‘peace’’ and increased security (The economist calls for NATO membership - but there are other variations of this too - like more ironclad bilateral security guarantees).
Naturally, a NATO membership is an ideal end-state for Ukraine, but arguing that Kyiv should be open about its willingness to forgo territory (or more realistically, gradually change its rhetoric and de-emphasize the recovery of all lost territory) runs into a number of issues.
Let’s unpack them.
1) Core strategic problems: preemptive concessions in the context of a coercive negotiation.
War is essentially a military continuation of a coercive negotiation: 1) at least one of the parties in war wants something from another, and 2) is willing to use force and 3) the other party is willing to resist this by using his own sources of military force (otherwise, it is a surrender and there is no war.)
So this is the essential context for negotiation - Ukraine’s advisers want the country to give up its leverage and concede preemptively: a terrible strategy.
The first issue is therefore one of core strategy: the whole point of this current, difficult period is to signal to Russia Ukraine’s willingness to take on the beating and still push for maximum recovery of their lost territories - to demonstrate the will to fight until the desired outcome has been attained.
The strategic intent here is pretty clear: to signal to Moscow that their war of attrition will not lead to good outcomes for the Kremlin, and that Ukraine’s resolve will not be weakened.
And so the future cost of a continued invasion will outweigh the meager gains.
Indeed, the main objective of the Kursk incursion (aside from establishing an extended buffer zone in Russia) - which we previously described in these cables as highly risky, and that an operation that could backfire massively - was to the strengthen Ukraine’s hand in the upcoming negotiations: to have a bargaining chip that they can trade in return for recovering their own territory.
It’s one of the core elements of the victory plan that Zelenskyy was touting in Washington DC.
Consequently, doing the very opposite and signaling willingness to give up territory, so soon after that plan would essentially waste all those resources and soldiers’ lives in vain.
It would be an admission that the strategy doesn’t work; it would be an admission that Ukraine’s short term tactic of extracting concessions from Russia is no longer plausible: and that Ukraine has given up on trying to pressure Russia into concessions.
So, faced with that reality, what possible incentive would the Kremlin have to not continue pressing even further?
The response to this obvious problem from The Economist is that Ukraine would instead get a NATO membership, and that this would somehow cover the part of Ukraine that’s not under Russian occupation (similar to the arrangement with the government of West Berlin during the cold war and prior to the German reunification.)
To be clear, this would be an ideal intermediate outcome and indeed, what we have also been advocating for ourselves here in these cables.
But at this point, this is simply not a realistic plan - not now, or even in the medium term.
And so, what would end up happening is that Ukraine would preemptively signal weakness, and willingness to concede without having a corresponding ironclad guarantee of a NATO membership.
Let’s not forget that this is a 32 country membership where just one country (like Hungary) can block Ukraine’s membership to NATO.
So then, under this plan, Ukraine would have the worst of both worlds: on the one hand, it would admit to lacking the necessary will to continue the fight and would instead signal eagerness to end the war.
On the other hand, Ukraine would receive nothing in return and would face a situation where it lacks deterrence and a convincing answer to the crucial question of why wouldn’t the Kremlin press its advantage?
Indeed, we don’t even need to look too far into NATO membership composition, and how they may vote - just merely observing how the biggest powers like the US act and seeing how Washington is reluctant to provide ATACMS for deep strikes within Russia, and how Germany is reluctant to provide their Taurus missiles is already indicative of the current (and near-term) political winds.
If the whole world (including Putin) can see that Biden and Schultz are hesitating on this, then how likely is it that Ukraine has a chance of becoming a NATO member anytime soon?
And if they won’t be members of NATO anytime soon, then where is the corresponding deterrence against even more loss of territory?
2) Asymmetric impact on morale on the population and troops.
Majority of Ukrainians (even though this majority has in fact reduced over the past year) are still against any territorial concessions.
On the other hand, more Russians are now in favor of holding peace talks.
But if Ukraine signals its lack of will to continue the war the results on morale would be quite catastrophic.
Putin’s image and reputation for martial prowess will improve.
The media will double-down on this new narrative, and the months-long criticisms of Russia’s military’s ineptitude and corruption will fall back into the backseat.
Even the embarrassment of Kursk incursion will be largely forgotten - it will be reinterpreted as a hail mary attempt of a party which is clearly losing and is clearly willing to admit that it’s losing.
And within this context, the morale of frontline troops will also change.
And if to date, Russia was struggling to recruit people because the casualties were so enormous, well things can change now.
If it’s about finishing the job and accomplishing the victory, the cost of joining the war effort is now much lower.
This could paradoxically make it much easier for Russians, to be able to recruit even more troops in the near term, which would then lead to much worse outcomes for Ukraine.
In the meantime, a significant proportion of Ukrainian soldiers will be bewildered by the need to defend every single small town in eastern Ukraine.
And sentiment will undoubtedly shared by larger population - for if we are going to concede the goal of restoring a 1991 border, if we are willing to give away Donbas in return for western security guarantees/NATO membership, then why should we waste the lives of all the soldiers over some 10,000 person town in Donbas?
The strategic importance of the town in question will no longer matter as much as the grander picture - the grand narrative of “we are giving up anyway so let’s cut our costs right now”.
3) Asymmetric costs of supporting belligerents.
Another, often under-appreciated fact is that the task of supporting the relative sides will also become asymmetric.
Ukraine will instantly turn into an obviously losing side - as such, the support for Ukraine within the western states will also dwindle.
The public support and pressure to supply the country with ammo and weapons will also reduce.
And this is quite logical: since what is the point of providing all that support if the end is near - if we are forcing Ukraine to conceive in any case?
Naturally, this is a totally misguided approach.
Since this is precisely the time to strengthen Ukraine’s hands in negotiations.
But many in the West will not see it this way, and certainly populist politicians, (who are already constantly fanning the the anti-Ukraine flames with statements like “we’re wasting our money on a lost cause - the money that can be used on our own people”.) will double down on their rhetoric.
And certain countries that were already hesitant in their support for Ukraine will now have even more legitimate reasons to be apprehensive - since why for example, should Germany supply Taurus missiles, and further worsen its relations with Russia just before the war is over?
The unwillingness to confront Russia will manifest itself in other (more indirect and less headline grabbing) ways too.
For example, any resolutions of votes in the UN that condemn Russia, that propose a pro Ukraine measure, will now garner even less support from the many countries of the Non-aligned movement (NAM), or the global south.
Once again, these countries are hedging their bets, and the winds are now moving in Russia’s favor.
The opposite will be true for Russia - many of its backers were undeterred by Western pressure or sanctions to begin with: countries like Iran and North Korea didn’t really care about the Western/U.S. counter-measures when providing missiles and artillery shells to Russia.
But countries like China, have slowly evolved their stance towards supporting Russia.
As the Secretary of State Antony Blinken said earlier last month China does provide majority of machine tools and microelectronics necessary for Russia to continue building sophisticated weapons:
(side note: Approximately 70% of Russia's machine tools and 90% of its microelectronics imports are sourced from China and Hong Kong. These imports are being used to manufacture critical military hardware, including missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions, underscoring the increasing role of China in sustaining Russia's war efforts.
It is also true that China was helping Russia with dual purpose technology for a long time: for example DJI drones: a major supplier of commercial drones that helped Russian frontline troops using them for military purposes and guiding their artillery even before the prolific use of FPV drones.
But recently (as this report by the Reuters highlighting Russian drone programme in China makes it clear) China has now started the supply of more serious weapons as the war has evolved over the last two years it has become clear for Beijing that the cost of supporting Russia is much lower.
The turning point was Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive last summer, and Putin‘s ability to consolidate power in the wake of the Prigozhin coup attempt.
This, combined with the slow drip-drip nature of the western support for Ukraine, the slow delivery of weapons needed to make a difference, and the changing narrative within the West, culminating in many months-long delay in Congress, with the Ukraine bill, Russia’s relentless (even if highly costly) forward momentum, have convince Beijing that amping up their support for Russia was a worthy bet.
And now that Russia will gain a stronger strategic hand (and with its stronger hand in the battlefield all but guaranteed) it will be even less costly for Beijing to prop up its support for Moscow in the hopes of weakening the West’s/Europe’s hand in the final negotiations with Russia.
And all this is not even counting countries, like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or Kazakhstan in central Asia.
All of these countries have enabled Russia in a number of ways.
Whether that is helping to hide sanctioned capital, escape trade sanctions, or simply re-establish businesses somewhere safe (e.g. Dubai) or importing washing machines en masse (e.g. Kazakhstan) in just to then re-export them to Russia and let the Russian army disassemble them for valuable chips, the point is for all of these states that have been hedging their bets for so many years, it is now going to be quite unproductive/irrational to comply with the Western pressure just when Russia is about to get back on the ascendance.
In other words, this preemptive, full transparency, and open discussion of minimizing Ukraine’s war aims, and discussing territorial concessions would only weaken Ukraine’s on international stage - where unfortunately, might still makes right.
4) Underappreciated impact on domestic policy of respective belligerents.
Those calling for this policy also underestimate the domestic political repercussions for both Russia (largely favorable) and Ukraine (mostly catastrophic).
As The Economist itself notes, at this very moment, the far right is on the rise in Ukraine.
The war may have softened the resolve of millions, but it has also increased pride in Ukraine’s martial ability, and has strengthened certain groups that favor strong nationalism at any cost.
And many of these groups have participated in the war - they are now experienced combatants, many of whom are also skilled in covert operations.
A not so insignificant number of these individuals will see such measures proposed by the West as pure treason.
Consequently, all bets are off, it is unclear the extent to which they will act civilly in their opposition to this deal.
It is therefore totally plausible that there might be a civil, armed conflict, or an attempt to overthrow the government that is about to concede Ukraine’ s territories.
And even if the worst case scenario doesn’t materialize, there could still be a political gridlock/paralysis within the parliament.
It is yet to be seen how many different factions in Ukraine’s Rada (legislature) would vote on this potential deal if there are tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands protesters in the Maidan square accusing these very lawmakers of treason.
Where is the confidence in expecting that such a concessionary deal would even go through?
This would be a nightmare scenario for Ukraine - the country fighting for its survival would fall into political paralysis.
And this would then present ideal conditions for Russia to maximize their battlefield gains.
Indeed, for Russia, the situation will be much more rosy.
Putin will be riding high on public support.
The contrast between political turbulence in Ukraine and Russia’s stronger hand in negotiations will be on a full display for all the Russians to see.
It will also be a time when a lot of factions in the west will blame each other for weakness and a lack of will.
Putin will use this as perfect propaganda to prove that he was in fact, victorious not only on the battlefield, but in the realm of grand strategy.
And this will help to secure his regime and embolden him even further.
And in the scenario where the deal doesn’t go through, well, now Putin will simply continue with the boost to his popularity acting as a tailwind.
Russia will simply continue where it left off - but restarting from a stronger position, convinced that the will behind support for Ukraine is going to eventually degrade.
This whole idea of Ukraine coming up with plausible, more limited war aims and an excessive eagerness to display willingness to negotiate (when the other side is clearly not willing to do so) is so counterproductive and misguided that it is astonishing that mainstream publications and opinion shapers are even proposing this.
Such a policy will fail to achieve any of the objectives that it is ostensibly aiming to accomplish - while emboldening the Russian regime, and strengthening its hand: both domestically and globally.
Ukraine only stands to lose from this display of transparent and allegedly “more realistic” war aims.