Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, G20, and Polish missile non-crisis.
*note: cables will be off on Thursday, and will resume as usual next Monday. Happy Thanksgiving!
Ukraine war updates.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive & outlook.
With the burden of defending the right bank of the Dnieper river in Kherson gone, Russians are redeploying their forces to fortify and defend a narrower frontline.
This much was of course expected: and according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, positions in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts have been reinforced with forces saved due to Kherson withdrawal (around 30k).
Recently mobilized troops are also re-deployed across the eastern frontline - with the city of Mariupol reinforced with around 10-15k troops.
In the meantime, and according to Vadym Skibitskiy, the deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Russians are quickly running out of crucial ammo, and have only around 120 Iskander short-range ballistic missiles left (which is why it is so important that the new alternative - the Iranian ballistic missile pipeline is shut down quickly).
And against the context of Russia’s ammo struggle, The Biden admin has asked the Congress for an additional $37.7 billion more in Ukraine assistance - including $21.7 billion earmarked for weapons.
And another $7 billion to be given to the White House to draw down from the existing US weapons and ammunition stocks to send to Ukraine quickly.
Ukraine holds its tough line on negotiations.
Speaking (virtually) at the New Economy Forum in Singapore, President Zelensky reiterated that no peace would be possible without Ukraine liberating its ‘‘whole territory’’ - including Crimea.
On a more amusing note, the Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov commented that Zelensky’s desire to avoid another fruitless ‘‘peace treaty’’ and getting a ‘‘Minsk 3” type of deal was indicative of their disinterest in serious negotiations.
Now then, given that Minsk 1 and 2 were wholly flawed deals (that benefited only Russia - and even then, were fully implemented by Ukraine) and failed to prevent the eventual war in 2022, the Kremlin is admitting that it wants another Minsk type of deal.
Essentially, this is the message: What’s there not to like about Minsk 3? Why do you not want to negotiate with us? Let’s freeze this current conflict and secure Russia more time to recoup and reinvade later on. We can then agree to form a Minsk 4 - and so on, until we reach Poland.
But back to Zelensky’s more serious remarks: some analysts focus too much on the effect of such a tough (and still, adequate) stance on Russia.
There are however, other stakeholders involved, and Zelensky’s emphasis on total liberation is also designed to impose a dilemma on the US/NATO: any western suggestions that Ukraine should consider negotiations in the absence of these legitimate objectives would weaken Zelensky’s hand and his credibility: for either 1) He submits to the Western pressure and loses all his credibility (and incentivizes blood-smelling Putin to push for more), or 2) He rejects Western pressure and tensions between the US/NATO and Ukraine ensue - incentivizing Putin to pursue even more divide & conquer strategies, and attempt to weaken the thus-far enduring camaraderie and cooperation of the West.
In other words, Zelensky is forcing the West to either: 1) help Ukraine finish-off Russia and win the war, and get out the way with untimely suggestions of negotiations, or 2) Harm Ukraine’s - and as a result - their own position, global standing & prestige, and leverage over Russia.
The G20 Summit ends with a blow to Russia.
Getting the G20 members to agree on a unanimous condemnation was always going to be virtually impossible.
For a start, there is China (that did agree to hit and warn Russia - more on that later below) that was going to block the strongest rhetoric.
But even countries like Saudi Arabia, India, South Africa and Indonesia itself (the host country) were not going to sign up to anything radical.
The “Global South” is still hedging its bets.
But given these caveats, the final communique was a success for team Biden.
And on Ukraine specifically, the following paragraph was added and agreed to by all members:
“Most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine and stressed it is causing immense human suffering and exacerbating existing fragilities in the global economy – constraining growth, increasing inflation, disrupting supply chains, heightening energy and food insecurity, and elevating financial stability risks. [emphasis added]”
Now, the fact that G20 members agreed to this statement was already a major success.
But China signing up to this statement was even a bigger accomplishment: yet another major blow to Putin.
Beijing played its hand well by endorsing the statement that contained a caveat of ‘‘most members’’.
In other words, they both: 1) Hit Russia and warn about waning patience around the war in Ukraine, but 2) Do so whilst retaining a plausible deniability - after all, the statement expresses the sentiment of most members - not all of them.
But this was still a subtle warning and a dig against Russia for two major reasons:
1) China did not block the use of the term ‘‘war’’ in Ukraine - a label that Putin is still resisting - the Kremlin still maintains that this is a ‘‘special military operation’’.
As discussed in the previous cables, this designation is deliberate and very important for the Kremlin: in their fantasy world, this absolves them of a loss in a war.
The political repercussions of a loss in a war against Ukraine vs failure to achieve certain objectives of a ‘‘special military operation’’ are massively different (at least in the Kremlin’s perception).
Putin clearly believes that the propaganda burden of rationalizing away a loss in a war against a weaker party is markedly higher than admitting, regrettably, that certain objectives were not ‘‘fully achieved’’ due to ‘‘massive NATO-wide involvement”.
In other words, this is a matter of regime survival and security for Putin - and Beijing signaled a major lack of care and concern for the Kremlin’s ultimate political worries.
This is a powerful signal.
2) Beijing could have insisted on a term alternative to ‘‘most members’’.
Most indicates the weight of a majority opinion, and Chinese diplomats could have certainly pushed for a weaker term like ‘‘many’’ or even better ‘‘a number of countries’’.
But they didn’t - allowing Washington to present the weight and social proof of overwhelming condemnation of the war in Ukraine.
For the US, getting a coalition of countries representing 80% of the global GDP to agree to this statement was a major diplomatic accomplishment.
And for China to go along, was a major signal of impatience with Russia - and this is certainly going to increase as long as Russia prolongs the war, and especially if Ukraine keeps on winning on the battlefield.
Washington’s task then, is to help Ukraine to maintain momentum and make this victory even more likely going forward.
Escalating Iran - Russia cooperation strengthens Ukraine’s pitch to Israel.
With PM Netanyahu retaking power in Israel, many analysts suspect a higher likelihood of Israel’s direct military support & supply of Ukraine in the ongoing war with Russia (as opposed to post-war military partnership and rearmament - an almost certainty).
But even though (with Netanyahu back) a military confrontation with Iran is indeed now more likely, the fundamentals on Ukraine vs Russia have not changed too much.
Israel must balance the desire to weaken Russia in the war, and therefore reduce their appetite and capacity for further involvement in the Middle East (opening up space for Israel to take more action in Syria and against Iran) against the risks that: 1) Moscow may lash out by reneging on their deal with Israel on Syria air strikes (Tel-Aviv currently enjoys a wide latitude in military action against Iran-backed militias), and 2) That they may supply Iran with advanced air defense systems like the S-400s - this would complicate and raise costs of potential air strikes against Iran’s nuclear development & enrichment facilities.
As a result of this careful balancing act, the likelihood of Israel’s direct support for Ukraine will increase if Kyiv maintains its current tempo and demonstrates a capacity to actually win the war not too far into the future.
The more progress Ukraine demonstrates, the more likely is it that Israel supplies Kyiv with sought-after weapons.
And this is due to primarily two reasons:
1) The more losses Russia absorbs on the battlefield, the less resources/capacity it will have to redirect towards Iran;
2) And with the decrease in resources, Moscow’s leverage over Israel on Syria will dwindle: they will simply lack sufficient capacity to enforce a change of heart/reneging on a deal with Tel-Aviv.
So then, the best way for Ukraine to secure Israel’s support, is to continue demonstrating wins on a battlefield.
In the meantime however, there is another avenue: utilizing the new reality of escalating and intensifying Russia - Iran alliance.
Both the EU and the US are taking steps to sanction Iranian companies and entities involved in the supply of Russia with drones & missiles.
(side note: just this past week, the US imposed yet another list of sanctions against 14 individuals and 28 entities that were supposedly major players of a transnational network that procures technology for Moscow. But it is unclear how effective this will be, given that Iranians have now apparently agreed to move production to Russia - see below).
But this is yet to produce any effect.
And in fact, there are three new developments that strengthen Kyiv’s pitch by adding urgency to appeals made to Tel-Aviv:
1) Iran is claiming to have developed a hypersonic ballistic missile, and;
2) Russia has secretly transported captured US and UK weapons (Javelins, Stingers and NLAWs) to Iran - in return for their help with drones.
3) According to the Washington Post (citing senior US intelligence officials) Russian and Iranian officials have apparently finalized a deal in early November to manufacture Iranian drones on Russian territory.
In other words, not only is Iran continuously developing a powerful capacity to hit Israel directly, but Russia is also helping Iran to study major western anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles: both countries will therefore benefit from mutual expertise gain due to joint-production of drones.
These developments arm Zelensky with exceptional leverage: he can now offer a similar deal to Israel.
In return for Israeli help with air defense systems and attack drones, Ukraine can provide shot-down Iranian drones and missiles for Israel to study and prepare for.
And the very fact that Putin pioneered this deal of know-how in exchange for weapons, Netanyahu will have a powerful argument to do exactly the same, and potentially add as another leverage point in negotiations with the Kremlin.
Of course, Israel must also support Ukraine in advance of higher ideals and long-term interests, but sometimes, short-term and urgent needs trump all other incentives and concerns.
Kyiv must use this opportunity wisely, and continue pressing for Israel’s speedy and direct military aid - offering concrete and near-term intel benefits in return.
The Polish Missile non-crisis.
The missile that landed on a Polish village killing two civilians, had initially raised a world-wide alarm of NATO potentially triggering an Article V - the collective defense provision in response to what was then presumed to be a stray Russian missile, fired by Russia that landed within the Polish borders.
(side note: and even if Russia was to be found behind this strike, it is extremely unlikely that an Article V would have been triggered over such an incident. Now, if Russia had deliberately targeted a major NATO asset on a NATO territory, well then that would be a wholly different matter)
But what was initially presumed to be Russian recklessness (at the very least), turned out to be something totally different: a stray S-300 air defense missile fired by Ukraine landing in Poland.
So a major geopolitical/military crisis was averted.
This is not to say that a political crisis did not take place.
It did - and on this occasion, it was unfortunately between Ukraine and its Western allies.
And not because it was a Ukraine fired air-defense missile - after all, who can blame Ukraine for defending itself and trying to shoot down Russian missiles?
If anything, the ultimate responsibility for this incident lies with Russia - but for their missile barrage, no S300 would have been fired - no Polish civilians would therefore be killed.
So then, it was not the actual conduct of Ukrainians that created unnecessary tension and friction - it was rather, their rushed statements that demonstrated impossible levels of certainty.
“I have no doubt...that it was not our missile or our missile strike,” said President Zelensky before a full investigation could have produced sufficient evidence for such a definitive judgment.
This unreasonable level of certainty so soon after the incident, was further accompanied with some half-baked rhetoric coming from Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs - who labeled suggestions that it might after all be a stray Ukraine-fired missile that led to the death of Polish civilians as a ‘‘conspiracy theory”.
Well, it does not help that this ‘‘conspiracy theory’’ became a widely accepted conclusion (by both NATO states’ leaders, and most reputable investigative journalists alike) following investigations of the missile debris that clearly pointed to a determination that these were indeed the S300 missiles with a range of 100km - way out of reach for Russia.
Ukrainian President clearly forgot that credibility matters, and by jumping so quickly into conclusion and suggesting that Russia was attacking NATO, he provided rhetorical ammo to all extreme isolationists, right-winger media talking heads, and appeasers - groups that share one opinion in common: that Ukraine is trying to drag the rest of the NATO into war on its behalf.
Why would Zelensky do this?
Does he not realize that with the cost of living crisis, and the upcoming recession, the Western public is already demonstrating some wane in support (although still strong in absolute terms) for continuous support of Ukraine?
Does he not realize that he is fueling the rhetoric of whataboutism - the extremely intellectually bankrupt suggestion that both Ukraine and Russia are to blame for this war in equal measures?
Does he not realize that credibility matters for a country with aspirations to join the EU, and one day, NATO?
Indeed, in his comments to FT, a NATO member country diplomat made the following comment: “This is getting ridiculous. The Ukrainians are destroying [our] confidence in them. Nobody is blaming Ukraine and they are openly lying. This is more destructive than the missile.”
Now, it is of course possible (and indeed likely) that Zelensky, and others in the leadership of Ukraine, were not in the business of spreading deliberate deceit.
It is possible that someone at lower levels of the chain of military command simply did not want to own up to a mess up with the S300s, and had deliberately opted to omit providing this crucial briefing to the top brass.
Whatever the underlying reason however, the recklessness was extreme and unwarranted.
Adding to this embarrassment were Zelensky’s further comments - where he did indeed backtrack, albeit in a half-hearted and insincere way:
“I don’t know 100 percent — I think the world also doesn’t 100 percent know what happened”.
Well no one expects you to know 100% - merely delaying your (public) judgement would have sufficed.
And besides, this lack of 100% certainly was somehow conspicuously absent when Zelensky was advancing a positive theory that Russia was directly behind this strike.
Well, the damage is done, in addition to a number of muted private chatter in-between NATO member leaders, there were some open rebuttals too: President Biden directly contradicted Zelensky’s original narrative by a terse reminder that this was not what ‘‘the evidence’’ pointed towards, and the national security adviser Jake Sullivan had even reached out directly to the Zelensky admin - urging them to be more cautious in their rhetoric.
All this damage to credibility, and for what?
What is it exactly that Zelensky was seeking to accomplish by rushing to advance clearly self-interested narratives?
Did he really think that he could overrule all investigation that was about to happen, and successfully pin the direct blame on Russia?
Did he think that NATO states would forgo further analysis and intel gathering in favor of taking Zelensky’s statements at face value?
Or did he genuinely believe that Russia was behind this, and that him jumping on quickly to form a narrative would ensure that NATO escalated against Moscow?
None of these assumptions are valid, and holding any one of these points to lack of foresight and grand statesmanship.
If the US/NATO was so easy to influence and persuade, Ukraine would have received ATACMS, fighter jets and main battlefield tanks by early spring - let alone by now.
(side note: and they should certainly receive all of these)
If Zelensky is still struggling to convince the White House to provide longer range missiles for HIMARS, does he really believe that he has enough weight and influence to pull the US (and the rest of NATO) into conflict with Russia?
Of course one could argue that Zelensky’s goals were more minimalistic: that he merely wanted to add to the political momentum and demand further air defense systems/achieve some sort of no-fly zone over Ukraine.
But even here, it would have paid much more to await investigations instead of jumping to conclusions and advancing unverified assertions.
(side note: and as these cables have previously discussed, there are a number of powerful and persuasive arguments in favor of establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine - regardless if these air strikes encroach on NATO or not)
Now consider the alternative.
If Zelensky was to choose a path of reserve and caution instead, he would have secured a win-win situation: either 1) Russia was found responsible, and Ukraine would gain a further credibility boost for treating the incident with professionalism and objectivity, or 2) Ukrainian S-300 missile was discovered as the direct cause of the civilian deaths (as it ended up happening) and no one would waste time blaming Ukraine for wild claims, and the only focus would be exclusively on Russia: how it is Moscow’s activity that endangers all of Europe - how his war aggression spills over and endangers the lives of NATO citizens.
Instead, there is now a risk that General Mark Milley’s comments urging negotiations will gain some momentum.
This would indeed be very unfortunate - the US/NATO leadership must quickly forget and move on from this distasteful episode with Zelensky - after all, this is a government fighting a behemoth, and was at risk of losing its capital city mere eight months ago - if anyone deserves some slack and wider margin for error, it is the Zelensky government.
The West must not waste time on fanciful notions of negotiating with Russia - they are hunkering down and playing the long-game: “negotiations” is exactly what Putin needs to recoup and win more time.
The winter slowdown in fighting must therefore not be squandered on fruitless talks with the Kremlin, and this period must instead be used to train more of the Ukrainian soldiers and officers, and equip them with all of the air -defense and offensive weapons that they need to press on with the attack.