Weekly Overview Cables - Ukraine War, Putin's comments on nuclear war, and al-Zawahiri killing.
*note: China’s response to Pelosi’s visit, PLA’s military drills, intel opportunities, and how the US should respond, all require a deeper dive and will be unpacked in Thursday’s cables.
Ukraine War Updates:
Donbas battlefield & outlook.
As Ukraine continues its shaping operations in preparation for a counterattack in the south (with Kherson city being the main target), Russia’s advances have continued to stall - still struggling with lack of manpower (and logistical challenges due to successful HIMARS strikes against railroads and ammo depots), they have not conducted any major assaults, trying to probe for weaknesses in the direction of Slovyansk and Bakhmut
Ukraine needs more HIMARS, more GMLRS missiles, and it needs Washington to finally pull the trigger on longer-range (with a 190 mile range, nearly 2x of the usual GMLRS missiles) ATACMS missiles.
And if the US will still refuse to provide ATACMS, the least that American diplomats can do is to use the possibility of their supply as leverage against Russia’s annexation plans.
If Russia successfully annexes the occupied territories, it will probably declare them as Russia proper, could potentially draw a new-red line, and if so, Moscow will most likely blackmail NATO against supplying weapons with a range enough to strike (the new) Russia.
Russia rallies old sellouts to make its case.
There is a group of spineless, money & status oriented members of Europe’s political establishment (surprise surprise).
These individuals will betray the national interests of the countries and people they were elected (or appointed) to represent.
Back in the day, Moscow was quick to identify and recruit these individuals as part-time Kremlin agents.
One of these is the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.
He is now going around power centers in Europe making a case for Putin - that apparently, Russia is interested in negotiating a peace settlement.
This is of course pure nonsense (what actual peace settlement could there be, if Russia is regrouping to resume attacks, and is clearly planning to annex all of the occupied territories), but the point of it all, is not to actually achieve a peace treaty: but to divide Europe (between supporters and opponents of this suggestion) and reduce support for Ukraine - increasing pressure/calls on Kyiv to negotiate “with a willing party”.
Putin is stalling for time and wants to achieve a reduced military support for/increased diplomatic pressure on Kyiv.
He is betting that if Ukraine’s ability to counter attack and retake territories is stalled for even several months, the reality of cold winter, and stubbornly persistent high energy prices, will deflate most of the remaining public support for Ukraine: both in the EU (especially) and in the US.
And this past week, Putin did in fact achieve a major policy success that will help to materialize his strategic objectives: OPEC+ meeting resulted in a decision to increase the oil output by a meagre 100k barrels per day.
That’s right, the amount is 10x smaller than initially expected by American leaders.
This new meaningless increase is a mere 0.1% of the global oil demand.
This is a clear snub to the Biden admin: who (as predicted and reiterated by these cables) gave up enormous leverage by visiting Saudi Arabia - and got nothing in return for it.
And not only that - the very day prior to the OPEC+ announcement, the US approved further interceptor sales to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE: way to give up all practical leverage over the short to medium term.
(side note: under this new deal, 96 Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD) missile interceptors worth $2.25 billion will be sold to Abu Dhabi, and additional 300 Patriot missile interceptors worth $3.05 billion will be sold to Riyadh).
All this means that the energy prices will remain high for the foreseeable future - the very condition that Putin was seeking to maintain for his other ploys to produce (at least some) effect.
As such, facing enormous pressure from all fronts (appeasement favoring European statesmen, increasingly tired and apathetic western public, and NATO leaders in need of results to justify (domestically) further military support), the government in Kyiv not only had to dismiss premature talks of peace (meaning submission and Russia solidifying its territorial gains), but had to do so in a way that shuts down even the possibility of a legitimate debate around this malicious proposition.
Kyiv played its hand well - the Ukrainian government: a) reiterated the need for Russian troops to withdraw from occupied troops as a precondition for negotiations (who could argue with that?), and b) Zelensky resorted to very strong rhetoric and labeled Schroeder’s proposal (and his involvement as an envoy for Russia) as “disgusting”.
(side note: and the fact that these proposals were made by Schroeder, played right into Ukraine’s hand. It would be much harder to pull off this label against a former statesman of stature and clean reputation).
This was a correct strategic stance to take - Ukraine cannot afford the slow & passive normalization of Russia’s present conduct.
It is clear that Moscow is planning to annex the territories under control, and peace talks are a mere ploy to win time for requisite logistical prep (and delay Ukraine’s counterattacks).
(side note: we are yet to see American diplomats warning loudly & publicly their European counterparts that any talks of peace right now, is essentially accepting Russia’s new borders and crystallization of their territorial gains. And this sadly may be an indicator that Washington is still not fully committed to a very long campaign, and thus doesn’t want to fully burn any bridges around the possibility of ‘‘talks’’)
And it was thus proper for Kyiv to prevent expansion of the diplomatic Overton Window, and legitimize even the possibility of negotiations at such a precarious period.
Putin’s remarks on nuclear war.
By pronouncing that “there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it should never be unleashed, and we stand for equal and indivisible security for all members of the world community [emphasis added]” Putin surprised many last week.
After all, this is a marked departure from his earlier nuclear saber-rattling.
These cables have always argued that Putin is bluffing with his exaggerated nuclear threats, and that Western statesmen must not balk and act intimidated (unfortunately however, Putin’s intimidation tactics did on a number of occasions, work in pushing NATO leaders to make unacceptably weak statements).
Nuclear war has never been seriously on the table for Putin - after all, this is a man who first and foremost wants to achieve glory and leave an epic legacy (that would compete with that of Peter the Great).
Nuclear annihilation of Russia (as a consequence of a general nuclear war) is clearly not much of a legacy to leave.
But what motivates Putin to make such a statement at this specific point in time?
There are a number of possible gains from such a pronouncement:
1) Putin gets to whitewash his reputation - even if a little.
He gets to position himself as a responsible and rational actor - one that the West can negotiate with (and push Ukraine to do the same).
First, there is the grain deal (that was largely motivated by other factors), and now this highly tempered and responsible statement.
Unfortunately, very soon Boris Johnson will be gone, Biden will be distracted with midterms, and Europeans will be thinking of the upcoming cold winter.
In this context, there might not be a Western leader who warns the pro-Ukraine coalition against normalizing Putin on the global stage.
And Putin’s responsible statements are preparatory measures for that period - when (as it is hoped by the Kremlin) someone like Macron will most likely suggest another round of negotiations with Putin (especially if Ukraine fails to successfully retake Kherson/other counterattacks fail).
When the right time arrives, Putin wants to be seen as a rational actor - not as someone who constantly threatens the world with nuclear annihilation.
2) Putin recovers threat credibility.
Putin himself, and his closest allies like Medvedev, have resorted to doomsday scenario threats to such an extent, that there is little credibility left of it all.
First, there was a threat of nuclear confrontation caused by NATO’s supply of weapons to Ukraine, then in relation to Sweden and Finland joining NATO (to be sure there were also a few more threats here and there).
What happened? NATO keeps supplying weapons to Ukraine and both Sweden and Finland are in the process of joining NATO.
Nothing happened.
Yet the Kremlin kept on making these threats.
As a result Putin developed a significant credibility gap.
Pulling back now, and lowering the intensity of rhetoric allows Putin to recover some credibility - creating some space for escalation.
And this space for credible escalation is especially important now - when Ukraine could: a) retake Kherson and b) Riding on the momentum, launch a campaign to retake Crimea.
The Kremlin would then most likely (and once again) resort to nuclear threats - highlighting that the threat to Crimea could create an existential threat to Russia, and as such, everything, including nuclear weapons, would be once more on the table.
And if they are likely to repeat such warnings, it is only reasonable for Russia to try to recover its threat credibility.
(side note: and Russia will most likely justify the gravity of the threat by reiterating America’s direct involvement in the war: something that they have now declared)
3) Providing an excuse to lower the intensity and scale of NATO’s support to Ukraine.
As discussed, there are certain Western statesmen already showing signs of wavering when it comes to enduring military support for Ukraine.
Putin’s responsible statement on nuclear war provides these politicians with an excuse to reciprocate with a gesture of goodwill - and they might do so by reducing their own involvement in the Ukraine war.
4) Deterring NATO’s involvement in Russia’s actual nuclear war against Ukraine.
At some point, Putin may in fact decide to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine: the most likely scenario being the potential fall of Crimea.
Russia could either strike Ukraine outright, or for threat display/demonstrative purposes, detonate a lower yield warhead in a relatively empty swathe of land.
Regardless of the exact sequence of events, Putin’s recent statement will serve as an excuse for the West to not get involved: he is not interested in a nuclear standoff with NATO as long as we don’t get involved over Ukraine.
Unfortunately, if Putin decides to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, a NATO-wide unity will most likely crumble.
There are already deviations and disagreements about the scale and intensity of support at lower levels of non-existential escalation.
It is almost inconceivable that most (not even all) NATO states would favor a specific response.
Under such a scenario, it would fall on the US to act decisively.
But this is still a remote possibility event that is contingent on multitude of factors to warrant a lengthier discussion.
Further military aid, and the state of NATO.
As the US is readying another package of $1bn in military aid for Ukraine, questions arise in relation to the contribution of other NATO members.
In particular, where is the contribution of Spain and Italy? These are major EU economies, and in terms of military prowess, come immediately after the UK, Turkey and France (amongst the European NATO members).
The news coming from Spain this past week was particularly eye-opening to say the least.
Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles announced that Spain simply could not send its German-made 40 Leopard 2A4 tanks to Ukraine (as originally intended).
The reason being that these poorly maintained tanks were in fact “in an absolutely deplorable state”.
Why exactly is a major NATO power doing such a poor job at maintaining its core firepower kit?
The war in Ukraine provided a real test of readiness for many NATO states.
Some, like those in the Baltics, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey and the UK, have demonstrated decent logistical readiness, and a world-class maintenance/logistical capability.
But many major powers not situated close enough to the Russian danger, have let themselves go.
And this needs to change - the US must simply demand it.
To end on a positive note, the US Senate did vote in favor of ratifying both Finland and Sweden’s membership of NATO
This is a remarkable show of bipartisan agreement.
The only Senator to vote against was Josh Hawley.
His argument? That somehow, in some parallel universe devoid of basic principles of logic, the membership of Sweden and Finland would distract from America’s focus on China.
How exactly the membership of these countries (resulting in a stronger European NATO in need of lesser US involvement) would detract from efforts to contain China was left unexplained.
Perhaps because it is simply unexplainable.
Especially given how both Sweden and Finland will empower NATO with a stronger access to the Arctic sea lanes - an area of increasing strategic location with an added opportunity to add pressure on China (via blockade of maritime trade routes).
al-Zawahiri killing: an important show of prowess & further implications.
al-Zawahari’s successful assassination was a major accomplishment for both the US and the Biden admin.
Not because al-Zawahari was a crucial organizational mastermind overseeing day-to-day operations of Al-Qaeda.
Even though at some point he was all that, today, the organization is largely decentralized and relies on sprawling and loosely connected networks that (given America’s advanced surveillance capabilities) struggle to coordinate & communicate their actions.
But neither was his assassination purely symbolic (that America does not forget to take out its major transgressors).
Instead, the overall context is crucial here: America took out al-Zawahiri whilst embroiled in three major foreign policy crises: 1) Ukraine war, 2) Taiwan Strait, 3) Iran nuclear deal on the cusp of failure.
Demonstrating capacity to multitask and reach everyone and everywhere is important.
That major distractions (that would likely overwhelm any other power) do not prevent America from carrying out all of the necessary national security missions.
This intimidates the adversaries and reassures allies.
And the specifics of the attack point to further exceptionalism:
1. Attack took place in a country that America does not have any formal military presence in.
2. The CIA’s ground team confirmed the death of al-Zawahiri.
The fact that the CIA maintains human agents in Afghanistan is significant.
Taliban leaders did probably suspect such presence - they would be foolish not to (and they are not fools).
But they clearly did not assess the potential presence and penetration to be at such a significant level - since if they did, they would not have accommodated al-Zawahiri in the outskirts of Kabul, and would have tried harder to conceal him successfully - probably somewhere in the mountains.
The extent of CIA’s presence will now intimidate Taliban leaders (especially given how the agency found al-Zawahiri by tailing the acting interior minister and one of the Haqqani network leaders, Sirajuddin Haqqani).
3. The assassination utilized extremely high-tech capabilities.
The CIA drones fired a hellfire R9X missile, which deploys six blades as it approaches the target but does not detonate a warhead.
In order to ensure accuracy (and prevent collateral damage) of the hit, America utilized state of the art technology to utilize a kinetic strike on al-Zawahiri.
Now, contrast this with Russia’s lack of precision-guided missile capabilities.
Russians are running out of these munitions, and are now largely dependent on unguided MLRS rockets and 152mm artillery shells.
But even when they do use Kalibr or (hypersonic) Khinjal precision cruise missiles, it is not uncommon for Russians to miss by several kms (that is, when on the rare occasions they actually chose to target military facilities vs residential buildings and other civilian infrastructure).
Further implications.
1) Taliban violated the 2020 Doha agreement.
As part of that agreement, Taliban agreed to prevent the presence and activities of the terrorist organization targeting America.
Not only did they fail to deliver, the fact that al-Zawahiri was under the patronage of Afghanistan’s acting interior minister suggests high likelihood of active aid.
That al-Zawahiri would feel comfortable enough to live in the outskirts of a capital city, suggests that this active help did not come from just the Haqqanis - the rest of the Taliban leadership agreed to this accommodation either by act or omission.
There a number of counter-terrorism implications for this: CIA will have to increase its presence in Afghanistan.
But if there was any debate about unfreezing Taliban's $3.5bn funds - currently under the US control - well this incident settles the question.
All future humanitarian aid must only be conducted via official UN bodies.
Taliban must not receive a single cent.
2) The relationship with Pakistan will either significantly improve or worsen.
Given that Haqqanis were providing cover and patronage to the leader of Al-Qaeda, it is highly likely that Pakistan’s intel service, the ISI, was also aware of at least some useful intel that led/could have led to al-Zawahiri’s assassination.
So then, either the ISI helped the CIA, or (whilst still in possession of at least valuable info) it did not offer any assistance.
It is more likely that (if they were indeed aware of crucial intel) the Pakistanis did indeed help the CIA.
Since:
a) Their relationship with the Taliban is tense, and the Pakistani air force had recently conducted air strikes against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TPP) in Afghanistan.
Helping America to further crush al-Qaeda, is an excellent way to add pressure on and further isolate and weaken the Taliban.
b) With the ouster of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, and with America’s increasingly cozy relationship with India (including its closer military partnership), the Pakistani military is keenly interested in restoring the relationship with the US.
As such, it is highly likely that the Pakistanis did in fact help the CIA.
But the truth will come out in the near future: public diplomatic statements and relations between the US and Pakistan will act as a strong indicator of what really happened.
We will all witness either improving or worsening relationship with Pakistan - and therein will lie the clues.
3) Who will take over al-Qaeda?
Intel suggests that the most likely candidate to take the reins of the organization and become the new Emir of al-Qaeda, is Saif al-`Adl.
Here is a key data point: Saif al-`Adl currently resides in Iran, and is apparently restricted from leaving.
Now, even though Saif al-`Adl has been under Iranian control for some time now, the new spotlight on the (potentially) next leader of Al-Qaeda changes the game: facing enough public/media pressure, Biden admin could be forced to demand his handover from Iran.
But this is unlikely to happen, since the current admin is still trying to resuscitate a nuclear deal/JCPOA (or remnants of it), and will probably resist introducing last-minute demands.
Especially given that these demands are likely to be dismissed outright.
A Shia regime in control of a Sunni terrorist - that is some power.
This is doubly so with the recent tensions between Iran and Taliban (that resulted in violent border clashes).
Tehran will want to keep Saif al-`Adl - he now has even higher value and can be used as leverage over the Taliban.
Iran could amp up pressure on Taliban to get in line through al-Qaeda - since they will need to ensure the safety of their likely new leader and will thus have an incentive to put pressure on Taliban to remain civil with Iran (and even if that does not materialize, Saif al-`Adl is still likely to remain in the higher echelons of Al-Qaeda leadership).
But things could also go in a very different direction: especially if the nuclear deal negotiations break down irreversibly - the US would then have little reason to not press for `Adl’s extradition.
Or even conduct another drone strike: this time in Iran.